diff --git a/docs/adr/0005-result-envelope-and-errors.md b/docs/adr/0005-result-envelope-and-errors.md
index 086dbbc..e6b2894 100644
--- a/docs/adr/0005-result-envelope-and-errors.md
+++ b/docs/adr/0005-result-envelope-and-errors.md
@@ -27,3 +27,72 @@ Every successful tool call returns one text content item with JSON:
   Messages are truncated and stripped of tokens and the Authorization header.
 - Argument validation failures become `is_error=True` with the jsonschema path.
 - Unknown tool names raise `MCPError(INVALID_PARAMS)`.
+
+## Amendments
+
+### Secret handling in results (implemented in `gitea/executor.py`, `gitea/encoding.py`)
+
+Two layers run on every result, success and error, before the size limit:
+
+1. Exact redaction (always on, independent of `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`). The
+   following values are replaced with `[REDACTED]` wherever they occur in a
+   string or dict key of the payload: the token of the calling identity,
+   `GITEA_TOKEN`, `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`, the
+   `extra_secrets` given to the executor, and secret values submitted in the
+   request body of the same call.
+2. Pattern masking (`SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`). `off` skips it. `mask` replaces
+   each match of the secret patterns (provider keys, JWTs, private key headers,
+   generic `api_key`/`token` assignments) with a shortened form. `block`
+   withholds the whole result and returns an `is_error` result of kind
+   `secret_blocked`.
+
+Request-body secret fields. Values of these fields, when at least 4 characters
+long, are collected from the submitted body (nested objects and lists up to a
+depth of 8) and redacted from the result of that call, because Gitea echoes
+some of them back (a created webhook returns its `authorization_header`):
+`password`, `secret`, `client_secret`, `token`, `access_token`, `auth_password`,
+`auth_token`, `private_key`, `authorization_header`, `remote_password`,
+`mirror_password`, `mirror_token`, `aws_secret_access_key`, `aws_access_key_id`.
+For Action secret writes the `data` value is redacted at any length. Only the
+value sent in the same call is known to the executor, so a later read of an
+object that stores such a value is not covered by this rule (pattern masking
+still applies).
+
+Credential-issuing operations. The successful results of
+`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS` skip pattern masking and block mode, because
+their whole purpose is to hand the caller a freshly minted credential that
+masking would make unusable (and block mode would refuse to deliver):
+
+- `userCreateToken` (access token)
+- `adminCreateRunnerRegistrationToken`, `orgCreateRunnerRegistrationToken`,
+  `repoCreateRunnerRegistrationToken`, `userCreateRunnerRegistrationToken`
+  (Actions runner registration tokens, delivered in a response header)
+- `userCreateOAuth2Application`, `userUpdateOAuth2Application` (OAuth2
+  `client_secret`)
+- `repoCreateDeployToken` (deploy token)
+
+Exact redaction still applies to these results, so the caller's own tokens are
+never echoed, and their errors are masked like every other error. Operators who
+do not want any credential to pass through the model context should disable
+these tools with `DISABLED_TOOLS`.
+
+Hardening of the result path: JSON from Gitea nested deeper than 100 levels is
+returned as text instead of being parsed (the recursive redaction and masking
+passes must not hit the interpreter recursion limit), and a base64 file upload
+whose decoded size would exceed `MAX_BINARY_BYTES` is rejected before it is
+decoded with kind `payload_too_large`.
+
+### Path encoding and the raw tool
+
+Path values are percent-encoded with `/` escaped as `%2F`, except for the
+parameters that Gitea 28.1.0 serves through wildcard routes (branch, tag, file
+path, ref and compare names on `branches`, `tags`, `contents`, `contents-ext`,
+`raw`, `media`, `compare`, `git/refs`, `commits/{ref}/status(es)` and
+`pulls/{base}/{head}`). The decision is keyed on the route and the parameter,
+not the parameter name: `releases/tags/{tag}` and `editorconfig/{filepath}` are
+single-segment routes that only resolve with `%2F`.
+
+The raw tool `gitea_api_request` rejects `%` in paths, so it cannot send
+`%2F`. A route with a single-segment parameter whose value contains a slash
+(a release tag such as `rel/1.0`) must be called through the generated tool for
+that operation.