fix: redact a data field in Action secret responses; test: secret echo suite

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Latte committed 2026-10-14 17:46:11 +02:00
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@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ Security properties (all covered by tests):
OAuth client secret, ``extra_secrets`` and secret values submitted in a
request body are replaced with ``[REDACTED]`` in every result, always;
* secret-bearing response fields (:data:`~.encoding.SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`, for example a
webhook's stored ``authorization_header``) are redacted by key name in every result except
webhook's stored ``authorization_header``, and ``data`` on Action secret operations) are
redacted by key name in every result except
those of :data:`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS`, whatever ``SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`` says;
* secret-pattern masking/blocking follows ``SECRET_DETECTION_MODE``, except for
:data:`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS` whose purpose is to return a freshly
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ Security properties (all covered by tests):
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import itertools
import json
from collections.abc import Iterable, Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ class _Call:
sudo: str | None = None
paginated: bool = False
credential_issuing: bool = False
#: Action secret operations: a ``data`` field in the response is a secret value.
action_secret: bool = False
header_data: str | None = None
call_secrets: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@@ -183,6 +187,13 @@ class _Call:
return next((value for key, value in self.query if key == name), None)
def _is_action_secret_path(segments: list[str]) -> bool:
"""True for ``.../actions/secrets[/...]`` raw paths (an Action secrets endpoint)."""
return any(
first == "actions" and second == "secrets" for first, second in itertools.pairwise(segments)
)
def _classify(media_type: str) -> str:
"""Return ``json``, ``text`` or ``binary`` for a response media type."""
if not media_type or media_type == "application/json" or media_type.endswith("+json"):
@@ -358,6 +369,7 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
sudo=sudo,
paginated=operation.paginated,
credential_issuing=credential_issuing,
action_secret="Secret" in operation.operation_id,
header_data=HEADER_DATA_OPERATIONS.get(operation.operation_id),
call_secrets=tuple(
sensitive_body_values(submitted, secret_data="Secret" in operation.operation_id)
@@ -415,6 +427,7 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
call.body = RequestBody(json=body, has_json=True)
segments = call.display_path.split("/")
call.call_secrets = tuple(sensitive_body_values(body, secret_data="secrets" in segments))
call.action_secret = _is_action_secret_path(segments)
call.paginated = any(key in {"page", "limit"} for key, _ in call.query)
return await self._send(call, identity)
@@ -624,8 +637,15 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
payload = redact_exact(payload, secrets)
if not exempt and "data" in payload:
# Stored secrets (webhook authorization headers, ...) by field name: pattern
# masking cannot recognise them and SECRET_DETECTION_MODE may be off.
payload = {**payload, "data": redact_fields(payload["data"], SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS)}
# masking cannot recognise them and SECRET_DETECTION_MODE may be off. Gitea
# never returns an Action secret's value; should a response carry a ``data``
# field on a secret operation, it is the value and is redacted too.
keys = (
SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS | {"data"}
if call.action_secret
else SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS
)
payload = {**payload, "data": redact_fields(payload["data"], keys)}
mode = self._settings.secret_detection_mode
if mode != "off" and not exempt:
if mode == "block":
+265
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@@ -143,3 +143,268 @@ async def test_credential_issuing_operations_still_return_their_credential(
assert minted in text
# ... but the audit file never contains it.
assert minted not in json.dumps(audit_entries())
# Action secrets: names and metadata only, never values
VALUE = "Sup3r-Secret-Action-Value!"
SHORT_VALUE = "pw"
def listing_with_values() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""What Gitea sends (names and creation times), plus a hostile ``data`` field."""
return [
{"name": "DEPLOY_KEY", "created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "data": VALUE},
{"name": "NPM_TOKEN", "created": "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z", "description": "ci"},
]
SECRET_LISTINGS = [
("gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"}, "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets"),
("gitea_actions_org_list_secrets", {"org": "acme"}, "/orgs/acme/actions/secrets"),
(
"gitea_api_request",
{"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets"},
"/repos/o/r/actions/secrets",
),
(
"gitea_api_request",
{"method": "GET", "path": "/user/actions/secrets"},
"/user/actions/secrets",
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "path"), SECRET_LISTINGS)
async def test_listing_secrets_returns_names_and_metadata_never_values(
httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, mode: str, tool: str, arguments: dict[str, Any], path: str
) -> None:
mock_user(httpx_mock)
httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}{path}", json=listing_with_values())
async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
text, structured = await call(client, tool, arguments)
assert VALUE not in text and VALUE not in json.dumps(structured)
names = [item["name"] for item in structured["data"]]
assert names == ["DEPLOY_KEY", "NPM_TOKEN"]
assert structured["data"][0]["created"] == "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
assert structured["data"][1]["description"] == "ci"
async def test_a_secret_path_in_a_repository_is_not_mistaken_for_action_secrets(
httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
) -> None:
mock_user(httpx_mock)
httpx_mock.add_response(
url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/contents/secrets", json=[{"name": "a", "data": "kept"}]
)
async with connected() as client:
_, structured = await call(
client, "gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/o/r/contents/secrets"}
)
assert structured["data"][0]["data"] == "kept"
SECRET_WRITES = [
(
"gitea_actions_update_repo_secret",
{"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
"/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
),
(
"gitea_actions_update_org_secret",
{"org": "acme", "secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
"/orgs/acme/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
),
(
"gitea_actions_update_user_secret",
{"secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
"/user/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [VALUE, SHORT_VALUE])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "path"), SECRET_WRITES)
async def test_updating_a_secret_never_echoes_the_submitted_value(
httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
mode: str,
value: str,
tool: str,
arguments: dict[str, Any],
path: str,
) -> None:
caplog.set_level("DEBUG")
mock_user(httpx_mock)
# Success echoing the value, then a validation error repeating it (as Gitea 422s do).
httpx_mock.add_response(
method="PUT",
url=f"{API}{path}",
status_code=201,
json={"echo": value, "name": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
)
httpx_mock.add_response(
method="PUT",
url=f"{API}{path}",
status_code=422,
json={"message": f"invalid secret data: {value}", "errors": [f"data {value} too long"]},
)
async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
ok = await call(client, tool, {**arguments, "body": {"data": value}})
failed = await call(client, tool, {**arguments, "body": {"data": value}})
for text, structured in (ok, failed):
assert value not in text
assert value not in json.dumps(structured)
assert "[REDACTED]" in ok[0] and "[REDACTED]" in failed[0]
assert value not in json.dumps(audit_entries()) and value not in caplog.text
async def test_the_raw_tool_also_hides_a_submitted_secret_value(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
mock_user(httpx_mock)
httpx_mock.add_response(
method="PUT",
url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/K",
status_code=422,
json={"message": f"bad {VALUE}"},
)
async with connected() as client:
text, _ = await call(
client,
"gitea_api_request",
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/K",
"body": {"data": VALUE},
},
)
assert VALUE not in text and "[REDACTED]" in text
# Other submitted credential fields
CREDENTIAL_BODIES = [
(
"gitea_admin_create_user",
{},
"POST",
"/admin/users",
{"username": "bob", "email": "bob@example.com", "password": "Pa55word-Of-Bob"},
),
(
"gitea_hook_repo_create_hook",
{"owner": "o", "repo": "r"},
"POST",
"/repos/o/r/hooks",
{"type": "gitea", "authorization_header": "Bearer hook-target-token-123", "config": {}},
),
(
"gitea_repo_migrate",
{},
"POST",
"/repos/migrate",
{
"clone_addr": "https://example.org/x.git",
"repo_name": "x",
"auth_token": "migration-source-token-123",
"auth_password": "migration-source-pass-123",
"aws_secret_access_key": "aws-secret-access-key-value-123",
},
),
(
"gitea_api_request",
{},
"POST",
"/orgs/acme/hooks",
{"config": {"secret": "shared-hook-secret-123", "url": "https://x.example"}},
),
]
def secret_values(body: Any) -> list[str]:
found: list[str] = []
if isinstance(body, dict):
for key, item in body.items():
if isinstance(item, str) and key in {
"password",
"authorization_header",
"auth_token",
"auth_password",
"aws_secret_access_key",
"secret",
}:
found.append(item)
else:
found.extend(secret_values(item))
return found
@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "method", "path", "body"), CREDENTIAL_BODIES)
async def test_submitted_credentials_are_redacted_from_results(
httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
mode: str,
tool: str,
arguments: dict[str, Any],
method: str,
path: str,
body: dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
mock_user(httpx_mock)
secrets = secret_values(body)
assert secrets
httpx_mock.add_response(
method=method,
url=f"{API}{path}",
status_code=422,
json={"message": "rejected: " + " ".join(secrets), "errors": secrets},
)
request = (
{"method": method, "path": path, "body": body}
if tool == "gitea_api_request"
else {**arguments, "body": body}
)
async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
text, structured = await call(client, tool, request)
for secret in secrets:
assert secret not in text and secret not in json.dumps(structured)
assert secret not in json.dumps(audit_entries())
assert "[REDACTED]" in text
# Credential-issuing operations: the credential goes to the caller, nowhere else
async def test_issued_credentials_reach_the_caller_but_not_the_audit_file_or_the_logs(
httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
) -> None:
caplog.set_level("DEBUG")
mock_user(httpx_mock)
token = "9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a099887766"
registration = "runner-registration-token-0123456789ABCDEF"
httpx_mock.add_response(
method="POST", url=f"{API}/users/alice/tokens", json={"id": 1, "name": "ci", "sha1": token}
)
httpx_mock.add_response(
method="POST",
url=f"{API}/admin/actions/runners/registration-token",
headers={"token": registration},
status_code=200,
)
async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode="block")) as client:
created, _ = await call(
client, "gitea_user_create_token", {"username": "alice", "body": {"name": "ci"}}
)
runner, _ = await call(client, "gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token", {})
assert token in created and registration in runner # the documented exemption (W-07)
audit_text = json.dumps(audit_entries())
for secret in (token, registration):
assert secret not in audit_text
assert secret not in caplog.text