feat: harden OAuth state secret validation, DCR file permissions, and policy defaults
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- Enforce 32-char minimum on OAUTH_STATE_SECRET at startup (config.py) - Write DCR client registry with owner-only (0o600) permissions before atomic replace - Flip policy.yaml default write action from allow → deny - Add CLAUDE.md with architecture, commands, and AGENTS.md contract summary - Add .pre-commit-config.yaml mirroring `make lint` checks - Update .gitignore: add .venv, .claude, .mypy_cache, .ruff_cache, .coverage.* - Extend docs: audit log rotation guidance, OAUTH_STATE_SECRET and DCR_STORAGE_PATH notes - Tests: short-secret rejection, 32-char acceptance, POSIX permission check for DCR store Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -31,3 +31,23 @@ Exit code `0` indicates valid chain, non-zero indicates tamper/corruption.
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- Persist audit logs to durable storage.
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- Protect write permissions (service account only).
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- Validate integrity during incident response and release checks.
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## Rotation
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The server appends to a single audit file and does not rotate it in process — rotating
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mid-stream would break the `prev_hash`/`entry_hash` chain. Manage growth externally with
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`logrotate` using `copytruncate` so the open file handle keeps appending:
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```
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/var/log/aegis-mcp/audit.log {
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weekly
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rotate 12
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compress
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missingok
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notifempty
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copytruncate
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}
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```
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Run `scripts/validate_audit_log.py` against each rotated segment to confirm the chain
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remains intact across rotations before archiving.
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ cp .env.example .env
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| `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` | Yes when `OAUTH_MODE=true` | - | OAuth client secret |
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| `OAUTH_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE` | No | empty | Additional accepted JWT audience beyond the MCP resource and Gitea client id |
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| `OAUTH_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS` | No | `300` | OIDC discovery/JWKS cache TTL |
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| `OAUTH_STATE_SECRET` | Yes when `OAUTH_MODE=true` | - | HMAC secret for signed OAuth state wrappers |
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| `OAUTH_STATE_SECRET` | Yes when `OAUTH_MODE=true` | - | HMAC secret for signed OAuth state wrappers; must be at least 32 characters (e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`) |
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| `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` | No | empty | Additional allowed redirect URIs for OAuth clients |
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## MCP Server Settings
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@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ cp .env.example .env
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| `LOG_LEVEL` | No | `INFO` | `DEBUG`, `INFO`, `WARNING`, `ERROR`, `CRITICAL` |
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| `STARTUP_VALIDATE_GITEA` | No | `true` | Validate OIDC discovery endpoint at startup |
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| `DCR_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Enable dynamic client registration at `/register` |
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| `DCR_STORAGE_PATH` | No | `/var/lib/aegis-mcp/dcr_clients.json` | Persisted OAuth client registry path |
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| `DCR_STORAGE_PATH` | No | `/var/lib/aegis-mcp/dcr_clients.json` | Persisted OAuth client registry path. Written with owner-only (`0o600`) permissions on POSIX hosts |
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## Security and Limits
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