Authorization server for MCP clients (SDK provider with dynamic client
registration, PKCE, refresh rotation and revocation) that signs users in
through Gitea and runs tool calls with the user's own Gitea token.
- consent page with CSRF protection and a browser-binding cookie on the
Gitea callback (confused-deputy protection for the shared Gitea app)
- encrypted token store (Fernet, HKDF-derived key, 0600, atomic writes,
symlink and corrupt-file refusal); our tokens stored only as hashes
- tokens bound to the MCP endpoint resource and the gitea scope; the
static bearer keeps working next to OAuth
- code replay and refresh token reuse revoke the grant
- automatic upstream refresh with per-session locking; invalid_grant
ends the session and never falls back to the admin token
- OAuth-only deployments (no GITEA_TOKEN, no bearer) may start
- rate limit on the OAuth endpoints, query strings dropped from access logs
Inventory and gap analysis of the 0.2.0 codebase against the full Gitea API
and the official gitea-mcp toolset, the B1..B11 + security chunk plan, ADRs
0001-0006 for the full-access rebuild, SDK/OAuth research notes, and the
instance swagger pinned for tool generation. The audit-logging doc moves to
docs/audit-logging.md.
Latte