Resolves the long-standing problem that label tools passed names while Gitea's
API requires numeric label ids.
- gitea_client: add _resolve_label_ids() helper; create_issue and add_labels now
resolve label names to ids (case-insensitive) and raise a clear "Unknown
label(s)" error instead of a generic 500.
- New tools: remove_labels (by name) and update_label (located by current name).
- Register both write tools and document the name-based label contract.
- Tests: resolver mapping + unknown-label error, add_labels id translation,
update_label and remove_labels handlers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a create_label write-mode tool so labels can be created in a repository
through the MCP server (previously there was no way to define labels, which
blocked attaching labels to issues). Follows the full tool checklist:
- arguments.py: CreateLabelArgs (name, hex color, optional description/exclusive),
with extra=forbid and a hex-color pattern.
- gitea_client.py: create_label() POSTing to /repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels with
url-encoded path segments.
- write_tools.py: create_label_tool handler; normalizes the color to a leading
'#', bounds text output, and lets auth/authz errors surface.
- mcp_protocol.py: register create_label (write_operation=True).
- server.py: wire create_label into TOOL_HANDLERS.
- docs/api-reference.md: document create_label.
- tests: success path, color normalization, and invalid-color rejection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ref-like tool arguments (ref, sha, base, head) were only length-limited
and were interpolated unencoded into Gitea API URL paths (get_tree,
get_commit_diff, compare_refs). Because httpx collapses ".." path segments
(RFC 3986), a crafted value such as "../../../../owner/repo/contents/secret"
escaped the declared owner/repo prefix. In service-PAT mode this allowed a
user authorized on one repository to read arbitrary repositories the service
token could reach, and in OAuth mode it bypassed the policy engine's
per-repository rules (which never see ref values).
Two defense layers:
- arguments.py: add _validate_git_ref / GitRef that rejects ".." path
segments, leading "/", backslashes, null bytes, control chars, whitespace,
and "?"/"#", while preserving legitimate slash refs (feature/foo, v1.2.3).
This is what actually closes the traversal.
- gitea_client.py: defense-in-depth urllib.parse.quote() on owner/repo
(safe="") and ref/sha/base/head/filepath (safe="/") in every repo URL
builder, mirroring the existing pattern in server.py.
Tests: negative cases for traversal/unsafe chars across all four fields,
positive cases for slash-containing refs, length-bound regression, and a
URL-layer confinement check. Full suite green (176 passed), coverage 85.64%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>