Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Latte e873d0325b feat: scope list_repositories to the authenticated user in service-PAT mode
docker / test (push) Successful in 28s
docker / lint (push) Successful in 33s
lint / lint (push) Successful in 35s
test / test (push) Successful in 33s
docker / docker-test (push) Successful in 10s
docker / docker-publish (push) Successful in 6s
Previously list_repositories was blocked in service-PAT mode because it has no
repository target for the per-user permission check, so users could not list
their repositories at all (the connector surfaced a generic error).

list_repositories now returns only the repositories the signed-in user owns or
contributes to, instead of everything the bot token can see:
- gitea_client.py: add list_user_repositories(login) — resolves the user id and
  queries /api/v1/repos/search with the uid filter.
- repository.py: list_repositories_tool uses the user-scoped path when a service
  PAT is configured and a user login is present; pure-OAuth mode still uses the
  user's own /user/repos.
- server.py: allow list_repositories through the service-PAT guard (it is scoped
  to the user in the handler); all other tools still require a repository target.
- README.md: document the new user-scoped behavior and its visibility caveat.

Tests: user-scoped client method (uid resolution + unknown user), PAT-mode tool
scoping, and conftest now clears the request context between tests to prevent
contextvar login leakage across files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 17:07:19 +02:00
Latte 2d95e89035 fix: prevent path traversal via Gitea ref/sha/base/head parameters
test / test (push) Successful in 20s
lint / lint (push) Successful in 22s
docker / lint (pull_request) Successful in 33s
docker / test (pull_request) Successful in 25s
test / test (pull_request) Successful in 38s
lint / lint (pull_request) Successful in 40s
docker / docker-test (pull_request) Successful in 15s
docker / docker-publish (pull_request) Has been skipped
The ref-like tool arguments (ref, sha, base, head) were only length-limited
and were interpolated unencoded into Gitea API URL paths (get_tree,
get_commit_diff, compare_refs). Because httpx collapses ".." path segments
(RFC 3986), a crafted value such as "../../../../owner/repo/contents/secret"
escaped the declared owner/repo prefix. In service-PAT mode this allowed a
user authorized on one repository to read arbitrary repositories the service
token could reach, and in OAuth mode it bypassed the policy engine's
per-repository rules (which never see ref values).

Two defense layers:
- arguments.py: add _validate_git_ref / GitRef that rejects ".." path
  segments, leading "/", backslashes, null bytes, control chars, whitespace,
  and "?"/"#", while preserving legitimate slash refs (feature/foo, v1.2.3).
  This is what actually closes the traversal.
- gitea_client.py: defense-in-depth urllib.parse.quote() on owner/repo
  (safe="") and ref/sha/base/head/filepath (safe="/") in every repo URL
  builder, mirroring the existing pattern in server.py.

Tests: negative cases for traversal/unsafe chars across all four fields,
positive cases for slash-containing refs, length-bound regression, and a
URL-layer confinement check. Full suite green (176 passed), coverage 85.64%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 15:57:52 +02:00
Latte 59e1ea53a8 Add OAuth2/OIDC per-user Gitea authentication
docker / lint (push) Has been cancelled
docker / test (push) Has been cancelled
docker / docker-build (push) Has been cancelled
lint / lint (push) Has been cancelled
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Introduce a GiteaOAuthValidator for JWT and userinfo validation and
fallbacks, add /oauth/token proxy, and thread per-user tokens through
the
request context and automation paths. Update config and .env.example for
OAuth-first mode, add OpenAPI, extensive unit/integration tests,
GitHub/Gitea CI workflows, docs, and lint/test enforcement (>=80% cov).
2026-02-25 16:54:01 +01:00