Adds a create_label write-mode tool so labels can be created in a repository
through the MCP server (previously there was no way to define labels, which
blocked attaching labels to issues). Follows the full tool checklist:
- arguments.py: CreateLabelArgs (name, hex color, optional description/exclusive),
with extra=forbid and a hex-color pattern.
- gitea_client.py: create_label() POSTing to /repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels with
url-encoded path segments.
- write_tools.py: create_label_tool handler; normalizes the color to a leading
'#', bounds text output, and lets auth/authz errors surface.
- mcp_protocol.py: register create_label (write_operation=True).
- server.py: wire create_label into TOOL_HANDLERS.
- docs/api-reference.md: document create_label.
- tests: success path, color normalization, and invalid-color rejection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously list_repositories was blocked in service-PAT mode because it has no
repository target for the per-user permission check, so users could not list
their repositories at all (the connector surfaced a generic error).
list_repositories now returns only the repositories the signed-in user owns or
contributes to, instead of everything the bot token can see:
- gitea_client.py: add list_user_repositories(login) — resolves the user id and
queries /api/v1/repos/search with the uid filter.
- repository.py: list_repositories_tool uses the user-scoped path when a service
PAT is configured and a user login is present; pure-OAuth mode still uses the
user's own /user/repos.
- server.py: allow list_repositories through the service-PAT guard (it is scoped
to the user in the handler); all other tools still require a repository target.
- README.md: document the new user-scoped behavior and its visibility caveat.
Tests: user-scoped client method (uid resolution + unknown user), PAT-mode tool
scoping, and conftest now clears the request context between tests to prevent
contextvar login leakage across files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related issues made the connected MCP server return a bare "Internal
server error" for tools that need real Gitea API access (e.g.
list_repositories), while public-repo-by-path reads worked:
1. Gitea OIDC access tokens only carry openid/profile/email and cannot call
the repository REST API, so pure-OAuth mode fails for most tools. A service
PAT (GITEA_TOKEN) is required in practice; per-user permission is still
enforced before each call, so this does not weaken authorization.
2. The tool handlers caught GiteaError broadly and re-raised it as RuntimeError.
Because GiteaAuthenticationError/GiteaAuthorizationError subclass GiteaError,
a clean 401/403 was masked as a generic internal error and the server's
re-authorization guidance never fired.
Changes:
- read_tools.py / repository.py / write_tools.py: re-raise the auth/authz
subclasses before the broad GiteaError catch so server.py returns actionable
guidance instead of a generic 500.
- .env.example + README.md: document GITEA_TOKEN as a least-privilege bot PAT,
explain why it's needed and that OAuth remains authoritative, and note that
list_repositories is intentionally unavailable in service-PAT mode.
- tests: assert tool handlers propagate auth errors unwrapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ref-like tool arguments (ref, sha, base, head) were only length-limited
and were interpolated unencoded into Gitea API URL paths (get_tree,
get_commit_diff, compare_refs). Because httpx collapses ".." path segments
(RFC 3986), a crafted value such as "../../../../owner/repo/contents/secret"
escaped the declared owner/repo prefix. In service-PAT mode this allowed a
user authorized on one repository to read arbitrary repositories the service
token could reach, and in OAuth mode it bypassed the policy engine's
per-repository rules (which never see ref values).
Two defense layers:
- arguments.py: add _validate_git_ref / GitRef that rejects ".." path
segments, leading "/", backslashes, null bytes, control chars, whitespace,
and "?"/"#", while preserving legitimate slash refs (feature/foo, v1.2.3).
This is what actually closes the traversal.
- gitea_client.py: defense-in-depth urllib.parse.quote() on owner/repo
(safe="") and ref/sha/base/head/filepath (safe="/") in every repo URL
builder, mirroring the existing pattern in server.py.
Tests: negative cases for traversal/unsafe chars across all four fields,
positive cases for slash-containing refs, length-bound regression, and a
URL-layer confinement check. Full suite green (176 passed), coverage 85.64%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace deprecated @app.on_event startup/shutdown handlers with a FastAPI
lifespan context manager, move the inline hashlib/time imports in the auth
middleware to module top, and back the unbounded _api_scope_cache with a new
size- and TTL-bounded BoundedTTLCache utility.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a GiteaOAuthValidator for JWT and userinfo validation and
fallbacks, add /oauth/token proxy, and thread per-user tokens through
the
request context and automation paths. Update config and .env.example for
OAuth-first mode, add OpenAPI, extensive unit/integration tests,
GitHub/Gitea CI workflows, docs, and lint/test enforcement (>=80% cov).
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