Merge pull request 'feat!: full-access Gitea MCP server (1.0.0): full API coverage, stdio + streamable HTTP, admin and per-user OAuth' (#71) from feat/full-api-coverage into dev

Reviewed-on: #71

.env.example

@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ MCP_BEARER_TOKEN=
 PUBLIC_BASE_URL=
 # Extra Host header values accepted behind a reverse proxy (comma separated).
 ALLOWED_HOSTS=
+# Proxy addresses whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted (comma separated IPs or
+# networks). The default only trusts a proxy on this host. Behind a Docker proxy
+# on another address list that address; use * only if the port is reachable
+# solely from the proxy.
+FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=127.0.0.1
 
 # --- Per-user OAuth (HTTP only) -----------------------------------------------
 OAUTH_ENABLED=false
@@ -29,6 +34,11 @@ GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=
 # Encrypts stored user tokens. At least 32 characters. Generate with:
 # openssl rand -hex 32
 TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
+# Optional allowlist of redirect URIs clients may register (comma separated): exact
+# URIs, or https://host/ prefixes. Empty accepts any https URI (and http on
+# loopback); the consent page is then the only check. For a public deployment list the
+# hosted clients you use, e.g. https://claude.ai/,https://chat.mistral.ai/
+OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST=
 # Granular Gitea scopes only (read:/write: activitypub, admin, issue, misc,
 # notification, organization, package, repository, user). Unknown values are rejected.
 OAUTH_SCOPES=write:activitypub,write:admin,write:issue,write:misc,write:notification,write:organization,write:package,write:repository,write:user

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -4,16 +4,29 @@ name: ci
 #
 #   gitleaks        secret scan over the full history
 #   lint            ruff check, ruff format --check, mypy
-#   test-unit       pytest (coverage gate from pyproject.toml)
+#   test-unit       pytest (coverage gate from pyproject.toml: 90 percent)
 #   test-integration  pytest against a throwaway Gitea in Docker
 #   test-mcp        MCP smoke tests, including against the freshly built image
-#   build-and-push  build the image; push it on push events (needs lint + test-unit)
+#   build-and-push  build and scan the image; push it on push events (needs lint, test-unit,
+#                   test-integration, test-mcp and security, so :dev and :latest are never
+#                   pushed while any of them is red)
 #   docs-check      docs drift check
 #   security        security test suite, pip-audit, ruff bandit rules
 #
+# Jobs that use the shared Docker daemon or secrets (test-integration, test-mcp,
+# build-and-push) do not run for pull requests from forks: a fork controls the
+# workflow and test code, and access to the daemon is root-equivalent on the
+# host. Also enable "require approval for workflows from forks" in Gitea.
+#
+# Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA (the version is in the
+# trailing comment); bump deliberately.
+#
 # Docker hygiene on the shared runner: every resource this workflow creates has
 # a per-run name (aegis-ci-<run id>-...) and is removed by an `if: always()`
-# step that deletes exactly those names. Nothing here ever prunes.
+# step that deletes exactly those names. Registry tags (:sha-<12>, :dev, :latest, :main)
+# are shared with other users of the daemon: they are applied only immediately before the
+# push and only untagged afterwards, never used to remove containers. Nothing here ever
+# prunes.
 
 on:
   push:
@@ -37,9 +50,10 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Install gitleaks
         shell: bash
@@ -60,13 +74,15 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -87,13 +103,15 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -105,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
         # Best effort: some act_runner versions do not support the v4 artifact
         # backend, and the coverage gate itself already ran above.
         continue-on-error: true
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
         with:
           name: coverage-${{ github.run_id }}
           path: coverage.xml
@@ -117,17 +135,20 @@ jobs:
   #    cleanup step is the safety net for cancelled runs.
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   test-integration:
+    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 40
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -137,6 +158,8 @@ jobs:
         env:
           AEGIS_INTEGRATION: "1"
           AEGIS_IT_NETWORK_MODE: container
+          # A runner that cannot start must fail the job, not xfail the Actions scenario.
+          AEGIS_IT_REQUIRE_RUNNER: "1"
         run: uv run pytest tests/integration -m integration --no-cov
       - name: Cleanup
         if: always()
@@ -151,19 +174,22 @@ jobs:
   #    runners.
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   test-mcp:
+    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 40
     env:
       MCP_IMAGE: aegis-ci-${{ github.run_id }}-mcp:test
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -185,8 +211,8 @@ jobs:
         run: bash scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh "${MCP_IMAGE}"
 
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  # 6. Build the image from the checked-out commit. On push events it is also
+  # 6. Build the image from the checked-out commit under a per-run local tag
-  #    pushed:
+  #    (aegis-ci-<run id>-build:<sha>). On push events it is also tagged and pushed:
   #      :sha-<12>   every branch (immutable, traceable to the commit; lets any
   #                  feature branch image be pulled and tested)
   #      :dev        additionally on dev
@@ -195,7 +221,8 @@ jobs:
   #    outputs and the job summary.
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   build-and-push:
-    needs: [lint, test-unit]
+    needs: [lint, test-unit, test-integration, test-mcp, security]
+    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     outputs:
@@ -203,7 +230,9 @@ jobs:
       digest: ${{ steps.digest.outputs.digest }}
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Compute image name and tags
         id: meta
@@ -211,6 +240,8 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           IMAGE="git.hiddenden.cafe/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
           SHA_TAG="${IMAGE}:sha-${GITHUB_SHA::12}"
+          # Local build tag: unique per run, never a registry tag.
+          BUILD_TAG="aegis-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-build:${GITHUB_SHA}"
           EXTRA_TAGS=""
           if [ "${GITHUB_EVENT_NAME}" = "push" ]; then
             if [ "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" = "main" ]; then
@@ -222,6 +253,7 @@ jobs:
           {
             echo "image=${IMAGE}"
             echo "sha_tag=${SHA_TAG}"
+            echo "build_tag=${BUILD_TAG}"
             echo "extra_tags=${EXTRA_TAGS}"
           } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
@@ -231,28 +263,51 @@ jobs:
           docker build -f docker/Dockerfile \
             --label "org.opencontainers.image.revision=${GITHUB_SHA}" \
             --label "org.opencontainers.image.source=https://git.hiddenden.cafe/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" \
-            -t "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}" .
+            -t "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}" .
 
       - name: Smoke-test image
         shell: bash
-        run: docker run --rm "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}" version
+        run: docker run --rm "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}" version
 
+      # Vulnerability scan of the image that is about to be pushed: pinned Trivy
+      # (sha256 verified), fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL findings. Waivers live
+      # in security/trivyignore.txt and docs/security.md.
+      - name: Install Trivy
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          bin_dir="${RUNNER_TEMP:-/tmp}/trivy-bin"
+          bash scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh "${bin_dir}"
+          echo "${bin_dir}" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+
+      - name: Scan image
+        shell: bash
+        run: bash scripts/ci/scan_image.sh "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}"
+
+      # No third-party action sees the registry token: the CLI reads it from stdin. The
+      # credentials go to a per-job config directory (DOCKER_CONFIG), never into the shared
+      # credential store of the runner's Docker client.
       - name: Log in to the registry
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        shell: bash
-        with:
+        env:
-          registry: git.hiddenden.cafe
-          username: ${{ github.actor }}
           # PAT with write:package scope. The built-in token lacks package-write
           # on this instance.
-          password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+          REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+          REGISTRY_USER: ${{ github.actor }}
+        run: |
+          config_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
+          echo "DOCKER_CONFIG=${config_dir}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          printf '%s' "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" | DOCKER_CONFIG="${config_dir}" \
+            docker login git.hiddenden.cafe --username "${REGISTRY_USER}" --password-stdin
 
+      # The registry tags are applied here, right before the push, and removed again by the
+      # cleanup step (untag only).
       - name: Tag and push
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
         shell: bash
         run: |
-          for tag in ${{ steps.meta.outputs.extra_tags }}; do
+          for tag in ${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }} ${{ steps.meta.outputs.extra_tags }}; do
-            docker tag "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}" "${tag}"
+            docker tag "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}" "${tag}"
           done
           for tag in ${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }} ${{ steps.meta.outputs.extra_tags }}; do
             docker push "${tag}"
@@ -284,9 +339,14 @@ jobs:
         if: always()
         shell: bash
         run: |
-          docker logout git.hiddenden.cafe || true
+          # Only the per-job credential directory created above is removed.
+          if [ -n "${DOCKER_CONFIG:-}" ]; then
+            rm -rf "${DOCKER_CONFIG}"
+          fi
+          # Registry tags first (untag only), then the per-run build tag.
           bash scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh \
-            "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}" ${{ steps.meta.outputs.extra_tags }}
+            "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}" ${{ steps.meta.outputs.extra_tags }} \
+            "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}"
 
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # 7. Docs drift check
@@ -296,13 +356,15 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -321,13 +383,15 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false

.gitea/workflows/publish.yml

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ name: publish
 
 # Build the Python package with uv and publish it to the self-hosted Gitea PyPI
 # registry on merge. dev -> a dev package (aegis-gitea-mcp-dev, .devN versions);
-# main -> the stable package (aegis-gitea-mcp). Gated on lint + tests so a release
+# main -> the stable package (aegis-gitea-mcp). Gated on lint, tests and the security
-# can never ship red. Reuses the REGISTRY_TOKEN package secret (same one ci.yml
+# checks so a release can never ship red. Reuses the REGISTRY_TOKEN package secret
-# uses); if it is absent the job fails loudly instead of publishing anonymously.
+# (same one ci.yml uses); if it is absent the job fails loudly instead of publishing
+# anonymously.
 on:
   push:
     branches:
@@ -19,13 +20,15 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -44,13 +47,15 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -60,29 +65,70 @@ jobs:
         run: uv run pytest
 
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  # 3. Build with uv and publish to the Gitea PyPI registry.
+  # 3. Security: the same gates as ci.yml (secret scan over the history, security
+  #    tests, dependency audit, bandit rules). Nothing is published without them.
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  security:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - name: Set up uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
+        with:
+          version: "0.12.5"
+          enable-cache: false
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: uv sync --locked
+      - name: Install gitleaks
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          bin_dir="${RUNNER_TEMP:-/tmp}/gitleaks-bin"
+          bash scripts/ci/install_gitleaks.sh "${bin_dir}"
+          echo "${bin_dir}" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+      - name: Scan history
+        shell: bash
+        run: gitleaks git --config .gitleaks.toml --redact --no-banner --verbose --exit-code 1 .
+      - name: Security tests
+        run: uv run pytest tests/security --no-cov
+      - name: Dependency audit
+        run: bash scripts/ci/pip_audit.sh
+      - name: Ruff security rules
+        run: uv run ruff check --select S .
+
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # 4. Build with uv and publish to the Gitea PyPI registry.
   #
   #    dev  -> aegis-gitea-mcp-dev  X.Y.Z.dev<run_number>  (always unique)
   #    main -> aegis-gitea-mcp      X.Y.Z                  (no-op if already there)
   #
   #    The package name + version are patched into pyproject.toml at build time
-  #    only — never committed. The committed file keeps name "aegis-gitea-mcp"
+  #    only, never committed. The committed file keeps name "aegis-gitea-mcp"
   #    and version "X.Y.Z".
   # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   publish:
-    needs: [lint, test]
+    needs: [lint, test, security]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
         with:
           version: "0.12.5"
           enable-cache: false
@@ -135,7 +181,7 @@ jobs:
         # v4 artifact backend. The real deliverable is published to the registry
         # below, so a failed artifact upload must not fail the release.
         continue-on-error: true
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
         with:
           name: dist-${{ steps.chan.outputs.channel }}
           path: dist/*
@@ -144,25 +190,26 @@ jobs:
         shell: bash
         env:
           # Reuse the existing package secret (same one ci.yml uses). The
-          # token authenticates as its owning Gitea user, so GITHUB_ACTOR is the
+          # token authenticates as its owning Gitea user, so the actor is the
-          # username and the token is the password.
+          # username and the token is the password. uv reads the credentials from these variables, so the token never
-          REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+          # appears on a command line (process listings, shell traces).
+          UV_PUBLISH_USERNAME: ${{ github.actor }}
+          UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           # --check-url makes uv skip files already in the registry, so a main
           # push that did not bump the version is a clean no-op instead of a 409.
           uv publish \
             --publish-url https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi \
-            --check-url   https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ \
+            --check-url   https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/
-            --username    "${GITHUB_ACTOR}" \
-            --password    "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}"
 
       # Optional second step to also publish to public PyPI lives behind its own
-      # secret. Intentionally left as a disabled stub — this pass does NOT push
+      # secret. Intentionally left as a disabled stub: this pass does NOT push
       # to public PyPI.
       #
       # - name: Publish to public PyPI
       #   if: ${{ secrets.PYPI_TOKEN != '' }}
       #   shell: bash
       #   env:
-      #     PYPI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PYPI_TOKEN }}
+      #     UV_PUBLISH_USERNAME: __token__
-      #   run: uv publish --username __token__ --password "${PYPI_TOKEN}"
+      #     UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.PYPI_TOKEN }}
+      #   run: uv publish

.gitea/workflows/scan.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+name: scan
+
+# Weekly vulnerability check that does not depend on a push. The base image digests
+# in docker/Dockerfile are pinned and refreshed by hand, so a new fixable HIGH or
+# CRITICAL advisory in the pinned image, or a new advisory in the locked
+# dependencies, turns this run red: the reminder to refresh the digests (see the
+# comment at the top of docker/Dockerfile) or bump the dependency.
+#
+# Same rules as ci.yml: third-party actions pinned to a commit SHA, resources named
+# per run and removed by name, no pruning.
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '17 5 * * 1'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+env:
+  UV_PYTHON_DOWNLOADS: never
+  UV_NO_PROGRESS: "1"
+
+jobs:
+  image-scan:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    env:
+      SCAN_IMAGE: aegis-ci-${{ github.run_id }}-scan:test
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - name: Build image
+        run: docker build -f docker/Dockerfile -t "${SCAN_IMAGE}" .
+      - name: Install Trivy
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          bin_dir="${RUNNER_TEMP:-/tmp}/trivy-bin"
+          bash scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh "${bin_dir}"
+          echo "${bin_dir}" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+      - name: Scan image
+        shell: bash
+        run: bash scripts/ci/scan_image.sh "${SCAN_IMAGE}"
+      - name: Cleanup
+        if: always()
+        shell: bash
+        run: bash scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh "${SCAN_IMAGE}"
+
+  dependency-audit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - name: Set up uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86 # v5.4.2
+        with:
+          version: "0.12.5"
+          enable-cache: false
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: uv sync --locked
+      - name: Dependency audit
+        run: bash scripts/ci/pip_audit.sh

AGENTS.md

@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ Full access by default (ADR 0001). The server does not decide what is safe; the
 owner restricts exposure with `READ_ONLY`, `TOOLSETS`, `DISABLED_TOOLS` and the
 scope of the Gitea token. Everything else below is load-bearing:
 
-- Every tool call produces one audit event in the hash-chained, append-only log.
+- Every tool call is audited in the hash-chained, append-only log with a write-ahead
+  model: a `tool_call_started` entry is written before the call executes (the call is
+  refused with `audit_unavailable` when that entry cannot be written), and a
+  `tool_invocation` entry with the outcome is written after it. Anything that counts
+  calls in the log counts `tool_invocation` entries.
 - No secrets or tokens in logs, errors, audit entries or results. Output is
   passed through secret masking (`SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`, default `mask`).
   `Identity.token` and every `SecretStr` setting never appear in `repr`.
@@ -62,18 +66,21 @@ src/aegis_gitea_mcp/
   errors.py       ToolError, GiteaAPIError(status, kind, message)
   audit.py        hash-chained audit log; security.py secret masking;
   response_limits.py, rate_limit.py (HTTP), request_context.py, logging_utils.py
-  server.py, transports, oauth/   planned (chunks B4, B5), not present yet
+  server.py       the low-level SDK Server: tool list, call dispatcher, audit calls
-scripts/        generate_catalog.py, validate_audit_log.py, ci/, check_docs.py (B11)
+  transports.py   stdio runner and the streamable HTTP app
+  auth.py         static bearer verification and identity resolution
+  oauth/          per-user OAuth: provider, resolver, encrypted store, upstream, callback
+scripts/        generate_catalog.py, validate_audit_log.py, check_docs.py, ci/
 spec/           pinned Gitea swagger
-tests/integration/  live Gitea in Docker (harness.py), opt-in
+tests/integration/  live Gitea in Docker (harness.py), opt-in; sweep of every tool
+tests/mcp/      MCP smoke tests (stdio, HTTP, container image), opt-in
+tests/security/ security regression suite
 ```
 
-Modules marked planned do not exist yet. Request flow (target):
+Request flow: client -> SDK transport and auth verifier -> `Identity` ->
-client -> SDK transport and auth verifier -> `Identity` -> toolset/read-only
+toolset/read-only filters -> schema validation -> `tool_call_started` audit entry
-filters -> schema validation -> executor (Gitea call with the identity's token,
+-> executor (Gitea call with the identity's token, optional `sudo`) -> limits and
-optional `sudo`) -> limits and masking -> result envelope (ADR 0005) -> audit.
+masking -> result envelope (ADR 0005) -> `tool_invocation` audit entry.
-The executor and the catalog exist; the server and transports that connect them
-to MCP clients do not yet.
 
 ## Commands
 
@@ -87,13 +94,14 @@ make lint | format | test | test-integration | run | validate-audit | docker-bui
 ```
 
 Live-Gitea integration tests carry the `integration` marker and run only with
-`AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1` (`make test-integration`).
+`AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1` (`make test-integration`); the MCP smoke tests under
+`tests/mcp` carry `mcp_smoke`. `tests/integration/sweep_baseline.json` pins the
+expected outcome of every tool, see `tests/integration/README.md`.
 
 ## Quality gates
 
 Ruff (E,W,F,I,B,C4,UP,S,SIM,RUF), ruff format, mypy and pytest must be green
-before every commit. Coverage threshold is 80% until the final chunk and 90%
+before every commit. The coverage threshold is 90%; never lower it. Tests must not write outside `tmp_path`
-from then on; never lower it. Tests must not write outside `tmp_path`
 (the autouse fixture in `tests/conftest.py` isolates env, cwd, `DATA_DIR`,
 `AUDIT_LOG_PATH` and singletons). Python 3.10+, line length 100, public
 functions need docstrings and type hints. Documentation lives under `docs/`;

CLAUDE.md

@@ -12,12 +12,9 @@ HTTP, using the official `mcp` SDK v2 low-level `Server`. Full access by default
 and the Gitea token scope. Auth modes: admin-token (`GITEA_TOKEN` / static
 `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`) and per-user OAuth on HTTP (user's own Gitea token).
 
-The project is mid-rebuild (chunk plan in `docs/audit.md`). Built so far: tooling,
+The rebuild is complete: catalog, executor, server, both transports, per-user OAuth,
-`config.py`, `identity.py`, `errors.py`, the generated catalog (`catalog/`), the
+setup command, CI, security suite, MCP smoke tests and the live integration suite are in.
-Gitea executor (`gitea/`), the setup command (`setup_cmd.py`, `setup_snippets.py`,
+The remaining open items are tracked in `docs/roadmap.md`.
-`setup_template.py`), the integration harness, CI and audit/security/limits
-helpers. Planned: server and transports (B4), OAuth (B5), smoke tests (B9),
-docs (B11).
 
 ## Commands
 
@@ -27,7 +24,7 @@ make lint               # ruff check, ruff format --check, mypy src
 make format             # ruff format + ruff check --fix
 make test               # uv run pytest (coverage gate)
 make test-integration   # AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1, needs Docker
-make run                # uv run aegis-gitea-mcp serve (not implemented until B4)
+make run                # uv run aegis-gitea-mcp serve
 uv run python scripts/generate_catalog.py --check   # catalog matches the spec
 make validate-audit     # verify audit hash chain
 uv run pytest tests/test_config.py::test_defaults -v   # single test
@@ -44,11 +41,12 @@ uv run pytest tests/test_config.py::test_defaults -v   # single test
   upload building, `SLASH_ROUTES`), `pagination.py`, `redaction.py`.
 - `setup_cmd.py`, `setup_snippets.py`, `setup_template.py` (done): the `setup`
   command, its client snippets and the built-in `.env` template.
-- Server (B4, planned): low-level SDK `Server` with one `on_list_tools` and one
+- `server.py` (done): low-level SDK `Server` with one `on_list_tools` and one
   `on_call_tool` dispatcher, jsonschema validation, audit, `is_error` results for
-  tool failures, `gitea_api_request` escape-hatch tool.
+  tool failures, `gitea_api_request` escape-hatch tool. `transports.py`: stdio
-- Auth (B5, planned): static bearer verifier and OAuth provider with encrypted
+  runner and streamable HTTP app.
-  token store.
+- `auth.py` and `oauth/` (done): static bearer verifier and the OAuth provider
+  with encrypted token store.
 - Core helpers (done): `config.py` (`Settings`, `get_settings()`,
   `reset_settings()`), `identity.py`, `errors.py` (`ToolError`,
   `GiteaAPIError`), `audit.py`, `security.py`, `response_limits.py`,
@@ -61,7 +59,9 @@ points `DATA_DIR`/`AUDIT_LOG_PATH` into `tmp_path`.
 
 ## Invariants
 
-Kept: audit event per tool call; no secrets in logs/errors/results; no stack
+Kept: write-ahead audit (a `tool_call_started` entry before the call runs, the
+call is refused when it cannot be written, a `tool_invocation` entry with the
+outcome after it; count calls by `tool_invocation`); no secrets in logs/errors/results; no stack
 traces by default; `127.0.0.1` default bind and fail-closed HTTP auth off
 loopback; untrusted-content labelling; schema validation with no extra
 properties; response size bounds; validated `GITEA_URL` and strict
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Details in `AGENTS.md`.
 
 Python 3.10+, line length 100, ruff (E,W,F,I,B,C4,UP,S,SIM,RUF) plus ruff format,
 strict-ish mypy (`disallow_untyped_defs`, relaxed in tests). Public functions need
-docstrings and type hints. Coverage 80% now, 90% from the final chunk. All
+docstrings and type hints. Coverage gate 90%. All
 documentation goes under `docs/`; security-impacting changes update docs in the
 same changeset. No em-dashes in text.
 

README.md

@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ uv run aegis-gitea-mcp setup
   they are missing, and keeping values it does not know;
 - prints ready-made client configurations and a docker-compose snippet.
 
-Secrets are only ever written to the env file, never printed.
+Secrets are only ever written to the env file, never printed. `serve` reads `./.env` only
+while it keeps the 0600 mode and your ownership; to keep the file elsewhere use
+`--env-file PATH` (or `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`) on both commands.
 
 Run it:
 
@@ -124,9 +126,14 @@ Both modes can run on one HTTP deployment at the same time (details in
   calls then run with that user's own Gitea token, so Gitea enforces that user's permissions:
   admin tools fail with Gitea's own 403 for non-admins. Upstream tokens are refreshed
   automatically. Stored user tokens are encrypted (Fernet, key derived from
-  `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) in `DATA_DIR/oauth-tokens.json` with mode 0600; the server's own
+  `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) in `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json` with mode 0600; the server's own
-  tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes. The signed-in login is visible in the `identity`
+  tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes. A store written with another key stops startup until
-  field of every result.
+  the key is restored or the file is moved away. The signed-in login is visible in the
+  `identity` field of every result. Before the browser goes to Gitea, a consent page
+  (`/oauth/consent`) names the client and where the result goes and needs an explicit approval;
+  for public deployments set `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` to the hosted clients you use. An
+  OAuth-only deployment (no `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`, no `GITEA_TOKEN`) is supported: it has no admin
+  identity to fall back to.
 
 ## Client configuration
 
@@ -138,9 +145,12 @@ Gitea token, `<MCP_BEARER_TOKEN>` is the value from the env file.
 Claude Code:
 
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio --env GITEA_URL=https://git.example.com --env GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token> aegis-gitea -- uvx aegis-gitea-mcp
+claude mcp add --env GITEA_URL=https://git.example.com --env GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token> --transport stdio aegis-gitea -- uvx --index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ aegis-gitea-mcp
 ```
 
+Keep `--transport stdio` and the server name after the `--env` options: `--env` accepts several
+values, so an option placed before the name would swallow it.
+
 Claude Desktop, Cursor and other local clients that read an `mcpServers` block:
 
 ```json
@@ -148,7 +158,7 @@ Claude Desktop, Cursor and other local clients that read an `mcpServers` block:
   "mcpServers": {
     "aegis-gitea": {
       "command": "uvx",
-      "args": ["aegis-gitea-mcp"],
+      "args": ["--index", "https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/", "aegis-gitea-mcp"],
       "env": {
         "GITEA_URL": "https://git.example.com",
         "GITEA_TOKEN": "<your-gitea-token>"
@@ -158,9 +168,16 @@ Claude Desktop, Cursor and other local clients that read an `mcpServers` block:
 }
 ```
 
-`uvx` installs the package from your configured index (see [packaging.md](docs/packaging.md)
+Always pass the `--index` of the project's registry. The name `aegis-gitea-mcp` is not
-for the Gitea registry). To run from a clone instead, use `uv` as the command with the
+registered on public PyPI, so a bare `uvx aegis-gitea-mcp` would resolve there, and whoever
-arguments `--directory /path/to/AegisGitea-MCP run aegis-gitea-mcp`.
+registers that name would receive your Gitea token through the environment. The owner should
+reserve the name on PyPI to close that gap (see [packaging.md](docs/packaging.md)). To run from
+a clone instead, use `uv` as the command with the arguments
+`run --directory /path/to/AegisGitea-MCP aegis-gitea-mcp serve`, or on the command line:
+
+```bash
+claude mcp add --env GITEA_URL=https://git.example.com --env GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token> --transport stdio aegis-gitea -- uv run --directory /path/to/AegisGitea-MCP aegis-gitea-mcp serve
+```
 
 ### Remote streamable HTTP
 
@@ -177,7 +194,8 @@ claude.ai custom connector: Settings, Connectors, Add custom connector, URL
 Claude registers itself (dynamic client registration) and sends you to Gitea to sign in.
 
 Mistral Le Chat custom connector: Intelligence, Connectors, Add Connector, Custom MCP
-Connector, URL `https://gitea-mcp.example.com/mcp` (HTTPS with a valid certificate).
+Connector, URL `https://gitea-mcp.example.com/mcp` (HTTPS with a valid certificate). Adding
+connectors in Le Chat may require workspace admin rights.
 Authentication is either HTTP Bearer Token with the `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` value, or OAuth 2.1 with
 dynamic client registration so users sign in with their own Gitea account.
 
@@ -237,15 +255,20 @@ when the proxy forwards a different `Host`.
 Bind rules: the server binds to `127.0.0.1` by default. A non-loopback `MCP_HOST` refuses to
 start (exit code 2) unless `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` or a complete OAuth setup is configured. Requests
 with an unexpected `Host` header are rejected (DNS-rebinding protection). The MCP endpoint is
-rate limited (`RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`), keyed by a hash of the Authorization header, else the
+rate limited (`RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`) per client IP and per hash of the Authorization header.
-client IP.
+Behind a proxy on another address set `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` so the real client IP is used. A
+non-loopback bind without `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` or `ALLOWED_HOSTS` logs a startup warning (remote
+`Host` headers get 421). The server also exits with code 2 when the audit log cannot be opened
+for append, and refuses tool calls it cannot audit.
 
 More in [docs/deployment.md](docs/deployment.md) and [docs/hardening.md](docs/hardening.md).
 
 ## Configuration
 
-All settings are environment variables (or `.env` in the working directory), case-insensitive.
+All settings are environment variables (or an env file), case-insensitive. The env file is
-Core ones:
+`--env-file PATH`, else `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`, else `./.env` only when it is a regular file owned by
+you with mode 0600 (what `setup` writes); any other `./.env` is ignored with a warning (run
+`chmod 600 .env` or pass `--env-file`). Real environment variables always win. Core ones:
 
 | Variable | Default | Meaning |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -255,7 +278,7 @@ Core ones:
 | `MCP_HOST`, `MCP_PORT`, `MCP_PATH` | `127.0.0.1`, `8080`, `/mcp` | HTTP bind and endpoint path |
 | `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` | unset | Static bearer for HTTP, at least 32 characters |
 | `OAUTH_ENABLED` | `false` | Per-user OAuth on HTTP |
-| `READ_ONLY` | `false` | Expose only read-only operations |
+| `READ_ONLY` | `false` | Expose only operations annotated read-only |
 | `TOOLSETS` | `all` | Comma separated domains to expose |
 | `DISABLED_TOOLS` | empty | Tool names to hide |
 | `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` | `mask` | `off`, `mask` or `block` |
@@ -265,8 +288,10 @@ Every variable, its default and its validation rules are in
 
 ## What is config-gated, and what is impossible
 
-Config-gated, all optional: `READ_ONLY` (only GET operations, and `gitea_api_request` accepts
+Config-gated, all optional: `READ_ONLY` (exposes only the operations annotated read-only, which
-only GET), `TOOLSETS` (domains), `DISABLED_TOOLS` (single tools, an unknown name is a startup
+are the GET operations plus a few POST endpoints that do not change anything, such as the
+markdown and markup render endpoints and the file-contents query; `gitea_api_request` stays
+listed but accepts only GET), `TOOLSETS` (domains), `DISABLED_TOOLS` (single tools, an unknown name is a startup
 error), and `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` (`mask` replaces secret-like strings in results, `block`
 withholds a result that contains one, `off` disables it; exact redaction of the server's own
 tokens always applies). A filtered tool is neither listed nor callable.
@@ -276,6 +301,23 @@ writes to the instance configuration, and instance-wide OAuth applications (UI o
 registers its OAuth application as a user application of the admin). `gitea_api_request` reaches
 anything newer than the pinned spec once Gitea ships it.
 
+## Known limitations
+
+A token with the `all` scope does not make every tool work. Check
+[docs/integration-coverage.md](docs/integration-coverage.md), generated by running every tool
+against a live Gitea 28.1.0, for the per-tool outcome.
+
+- `gitea_user_create_token`, `gitea_user_get_tokens` and `gitea_user_delete_access_token` need
+  basic authentication with the account password (a Gitea API rule). The server always sends
+  token authentication, so these three return 401 through it. Create tokens in the Gitea UI.
+- Some operations depend on instance state and answer 404 or an error until it exists: the
+  commit signing keys (`gitea_misc_get_signing_key`, `gitea_repo_signing_key` and their SSH
+  variants) when the instance has none, user badges (Gitea cannot create badges through the
+  API), unadopted repositories, run artifacts, git notes and the GPG key verification, which
+  need data the instance does not have yet. The coverage report lists them with the reason.
+- Tools that depend on a runner, such as workflow runs and jobs, only return data once an
+  Actions runner is registered.
+
 ## Result and error format
 
 A successful call returns one text item with JSON (see

docs/adr/0004-auth-modes.md

@@ -38,3 +38,36 @@ Chat requires dynamic client registration and Claude prefers it. Details:
 
 The server holds per-user Gitea tokens. That is the most sensitive asset after
 the admin token and is covered by the threat model.
+
+## Implementation notes (chunk B5)
+
+- **OAuth-only deployments are allowed.** With `OAUTH_ENABLED=true`, no
+  `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` and no `GITEA_TOKEN`, the server starts and every user
+  brings their own Gitea token. Admin-token mode is then unavailable and fails
+  closed. `GITEA_TOKEN` stays required whenever admin-token mode is reachable
+  (a static bearer, or an unauthenticated loopback endpoint).
+- **Own consent step.** Gitea remembers consent for our single Gitea
+  application, so a dynamically registered client with an attacker's redirect
+  URI could otherwise obtain a token for a victim who merely opens a link (the
+  confused-deputy problem of OAuth proxies). `/authorize` therefore leads to our
+  consent page, which names the client and the redirect URI. Approving needs a
+  CSRF token bound by a `SameSite=Strict` cookie and a matching `Origin`, and
+  sets a browser-binding cookie that `/oauth/callback` requires, so a Gitea
+  redirect URL obtained by someone else cannot be completed in another browser.
+- **Token binding.** Tokens are bound to the MCP endpoint URL (RFC 8707) and
+  carry the single scope `gitea`; the SDK enforces both
+  (`validate_token_resource=True`, `required_scopes=["gitea"]`), and the static
+  bearer reports the same resource and scope. `/authorize` with another
+  `resource` is refused with `invalid_target`.
+- **Replay handling.** A replayed authorization code, or a rotated-out refresh
+  token presented again, revokes the whole grant (RFC 6749 4.1.2, OAuth 2.1
+  refresh token reuse detection). Revoking either token ends the grant.
+- **Store key.** The Fernet key is HKDF-SHA256(`TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,
+  info `aegis-gitea-mcp oauth store`), so the setting can be any long random
+  string. Changing it makes the store unreadable; startup then stops instead of
+  wiping the file.
+- **Limits.** At most 500 registered clients (the least recently used client
+  without a session is evicted, otherwise registration is refused), 50
+  sessions per Gitea login (the oldest ends), and 1024 pending sign-ins. The
+  unauthenticated OAuth endpoints share the per-IP rate limit, and query
+  strings are removed from access log lines.

docs/architecture.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ GiteaExecutor                         (gitea/executor.py)
 Gitea REST API (/api/v1)
 ```
 
-Every tool call ends in one audit event, and every result is wrapped in the same envelope.
+Every tool call is audited (a write-ahead `tool_call_started` entry, then one `tool_invocation` entry with the outcome), and every result is wrapped in the same envelope.
 
 ## Catalog
 
@@ -102,10 +102,12 @@ compared, so length does not leak). A match runs the call as `GITEA_TOKEN`, with
 resolved once from `GET /user`. stdio is always this mode.
 
 Per-user OAuth mode: the server is an OAuth 2.1 authorization server for MCP clients (dynamic
-client registration, PKCE) and a confidential OAuth client of Gitea. `/oauth/callback` receives
+client registration, PKCE) and a confidential OAuth client of Gitea. `/authorize` parks the
-Gitea's code, exchanges it, and issues the client opaque access and refresh tokens that map to
+request and shows the consent page `/oauth/consent` (client name, redirect URI, approval with
-the user's Gitea tokens. A call with such a token runs with the user's own Gitea access token,
+CSRF and origin checks) before the browser goes to Gitea. `/oauth/callback` receives Gitea's
-so Gitea enforces that user's permissions. The mapping lives in `DATA_DIR/oauth-tokens.json`
+code in the same browser, exchanges it, and issues the client opaque access and refresh tokens
+that map to the user's Gitea tokens. A call with such a token runs with the user's own Gitea access token,
+so Gitea enforces that user's permissions. The mapping lives in `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json`
 (mode 0600). Gitea tokens in it are encrypted with Fernet (key derived from
 `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`); our own tokens are stored as SHA-256 hashes. Upstream refresh is
 automatic.
@@ -115,8 +117,9 @@ One token verifier accepts either kind. The dispatcher turns the verified token
 
 ## Audit
 
-Every tool call, including failed and invalid ones, produces exactly one event in the
+Every tool call, including failed and invalid ones, produces exactly one result event in the
-append-only, hash-chained audit log. Only argument names are recorded, never values. Details and
+append-only, hash-chained audit log, after a write-ahead event that makes a call fail closed when
+the log stops accepting writes. Only argument names are recorded, never values. Details and
 integrity validation are in [audit-logging.md](audit-logging.md).
 
 ## Request flow
@@ -127,7 +130,9 @@ integrity validation are in [audit-logging.md](audit-logging.md).
    schema, and resolves the identity.
 4. The executor calls Gitea with the identity's token.
 5. The response is bounded, redacted and masked, and wrapped in the envelope.
-6. One audit event is written and the result is returned.
+6. One audit result event is written and the result is returned. (A write-ahead
+   `tool_call_started` event is written right after the tool lookup in step 3; when it cannot be
+   written the call is refused.)
 
 ## Module map
 

docs/audit-logging.md

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # Audit logging
 
-Every tool call produces exactly one event in an append-only, hash-chained JSON-lines log,
+Every tool call produces exactly one result event (`tool_invocation`) in an append-only,
-whether it succeeded, failed at Gitea, failed validation or hit an internal error. Security
+hash-chained JSON-lines log, whether it succeeded, failed at Gitea, failed validation or hit an
-events are logged in the same chain.
+internal error. A call to a known tool is preceded by a small write-ahead event
+(`tool_call_started`, see Location and permissions). Security events are logged in the same
+chain.
 
 ## What an event contains
 
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@ Each line is one JSON object:
 | Field | Meaning |
 |---|---|
 | `timestamp` | UTC, ISO 8601 |
-| `event_type` | `tool_invocation` or `security_event` |
+| `event_type` | `tool_invocation`, `tool_call_started`, `access_denied` or `security_event` |
 | `request_id` | Correlation id of the request |
 | `payload` | The event data, see below |
 | `prev_hash` | `entry_hash` of the previous line (`GENESIS` for the first) |
@@ -26,8 +28,15 @@ A tool invocation payload records:
 - the HTTP status when Gitea answered, and the outcome: success, or the error kind
   (`not_found`, `forbidden`, `invalid_argument`, `internal_error`, ...);
 - the duration in milliseconds and the correlation id;
-- the argument names, sorted. Argument values are never logged, so request bodies, secret values
+- who called: the MCP client id of the verified token (`aegis-static-bearer` for the static
-  and file contents do not reach the log.
+  bearer), a 12 character hash of the OAuth grant's session id (`session`, only for OAuth
+  tokens, never the id or a token) and the source address (`client_ip`, HTTP only; behind a
+  proxy it is the forwarded address only when the proxy is in `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`);
+- the argument names, sorted, and only names that are properties of the tool's schema; any other
+  name is counted in `rejected_argument_count`. Argument values are never logged, so request
+  bodies, secret values and file contents do not reach the log. A call to a tool that does not
+  exist is recorded as `(unknown tool, N chars)`: the caller's string is neither logged nor
+  echoed in the error.
 
 All payloads also pass through secret masking before they are written
 (`SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` other than `off`).
@@ -54,6 +63,19 @@ keep elsewhere.
 
 The log is written to `AUDIT_LOG_PATH`, default `DATA_DIR/audit.log` (`/var/lib/aegis-mcp` in the
 image). Keep it on durable storage, readable and writable only by the service account.
+The server creates a missing state directory with mode 0700 and the log with mode 0600, tightens
+an older log it owns that is group or world readable, and refuses to open the log through a
+symlink (startup exits with code 2). A keyed (HMAC) chain is not offered: the chain is
+tamper-evident only, so ship the log off the host as the integrity control.
+
+The server opens the file for append at startup and exits with code 2 (message on stderr) when
+that fails, so it never runs unaudited. The check does not stop at startup: each call to a known
+tool first writes a `tool_call_started` entry (tool name, domain and correlation id), and when
+that write fails (full disk, revoked mount, closed file) the call is refused with
+`audit_unavailable` and never reaches Gitea. Calls resume as soon as writes work again. A write
+failure of the final `tool_invocation` entry after a call has executed is only logged to stderr:
+the Gitea side effect already happened and the caller must still receive the result. The
+`correlation_id` of both entries is the request id, which is also the entry's `request_id`.
 
 ## Rotation
 

docs/configuration.md

@@ -1,9 +1,28 @@
 # Configuration
 
 All settings are environment variables. They are read case-insensitively from the process
-environment and from a `.env` file in the working directory (the environment wins). Unknown
+environment and from an env file (the environment always wins). Unknown variables are ignored.
-variables are ignored. A blank value (`KEY=` in `.env`) counts as unset for the optional
+A blank value (`KEY=` in the env file) counts as unset for the optional secrets, URLs and
-secrets, URLs and paths. List values accept commas or whitespace as separators.
+paths. List values accept commas or whitespace as separators.
+
+## Which env file is read
+
+The env file is never trusted just because it sits in the working directory: MCP clients start
+stdio servers inside the project they work on, which can be a cloned repository carrying a
+planted `.env` that switches off secret masking or the audit log or points `GITEA_URL` at
+another host. The file is chosen in this order:
+
+1. `--env-file PATH` of `serve` (and `setup`): used as given. It must exist and be a regular
+   file.
+2. The `AEGIS_ENV_FILE` environment variable: same rules.
+3. `./.env`, but only when it is a regular file (not a symlink), owned by the user running the
+   server, with no group or other permissions (mode 0600, which `setup` writes). Otherwise it is
+   ignored and one warning goes to stderr that says why and how to fix it:
+   `chmod 600 .env`, or pass `--env-file`.
+
+Real environment variables take precedence over every file. A missing `./.env` is silent.
+Containers pass settings as environment variables (`env_file:` in compose), not through the
+working directory.
 
 `.env.example` is the annotated template. `uv run aegis-gitea-mcp setup` fills one in for you
 (see [getting-started.md](getting-started.md)). Secret settings never appear in logs, errors or
@@ -17,7 +36,7 @@ when OAuth is on.
 
 | Variable | Default | Rules |
 |---|---|---|
-| `GITEA_URL` | required | `http` or `https`, must have a host, no credentials, query or fragment. A trailing `/api/v1` is removed. |
+| `GITEA_URL` | required | `http` or `https`, must have a host, no credentials, query or fragment, and no whitespace, backslash or control characters. A trailing `/api/v1` is removed and the URL is rebuilt from its parsed parts. Plain `http` to a host that is not loopback starts, but `serve` prints a warning on stderr because every token then travels unencrypted. |
 | `GITEA_TOKEN` | unset | Token for stdio and for admin-token mode on HTTP. Its scopes bound what the server can do. Required for stdio (exit code 2 without it). |
 
 ## Transport
@@ -30,27 +49,44 @@ when OAuth is on.
 | `MCP_PATH` | `/mcp` | Starts with a single `/`, no query, spaces or trailing slash, not just `/`. |
 | `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` | unset | Static bearer token for HTTP (admin identity). At least 32 characters. Generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`. |
 | `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` | unset | Public URL behind a reverse proxy. Same URL rules as `GITEA_URL`, and `https` unless the host is loopback. Required for OAuth. |
-| `ALLOWED_HOSTS` | empty | Extra `Host` header values accepted behind a proxy. The loopback names with the port and the host of `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` are always allowed. Other `Host` values are rejected (DNS-rebinding protection). |
+| `ALLOWED_HOSTS` | empty | Extra `Host` header values accepted behind a proxy. The loopback names with the port and the host of `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` are always allowed. Other `Host` values are rejected (DNS-rebinding protection). A non-loopback `MCP_HOST` with neither `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` nor `ALLOWED_HOSTS` logs a startup warning on stderr, because remote clients then get 421. |
+| `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` | `127.0.0.1` | Comma list of IP addresses or networks (or `*`) whose `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers are trusted. Set it to the address of the reverse proxy when it is not on the same host, for example a Docker network. Otherwise the per-IP rate limit sees the proxy address for every client: a request that carries `X-Forwarded-For` from a peer outside this list is not honoured and logs one warning ("add its address to FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS"). `*` trusts every peer and logs a warning: only use it when the port is reachable solely from the proxy, since clients could otherwise spoof their IP. |
 
 ## Per-user OAuth (HTTP only)
 
 | Variable | Default | Rules |
 |---|---|---|
-| `OAUTH_ENABLED` | `false` | When true, the four settings below are required, or the server refuses to start (exit code 2, with the list of what is missing). |
+| `OAUTH_ENABLED` | `false` | When true, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`, `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` are required, or the server refuses to start (exit code 2, with the list of what is missing). |
 | `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID` | unset | Client id of the Gitea OAuth application (created by `setup`). |
 | `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` | unset | Its client secret. |
-| `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | unset | At least 32 characters. Encrypts stored user tokens. Losing it invalidates every stored login. |
+| `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | unset | At least 32 characters. Encrypts the token store. The key cannot be rotated in place: a store written with another key stops startup (exit code 2) instead of being wiped, until you restore the original key or move `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json` away, which signs every user out. |
 | `OAUTH_SCOPES` | all `write:<category>` scopes | Granular Gitea scopes only (`read:` or `write:` plus activitypub, admin, issue, misc, notification, organization, package, repository, user). Anything else is rejected, because Gitea grants full access for unknown scope strings. Must not be empty. |
+| `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` | empty | Comma list of redirect URIs MCP clients may register: exact URIs (`https://client.example/cb`) or prefixes ending in `/` that allow a whole host (`https://claude.ai/`). A bare origin without a path is refused. Empty accepts any https URI (and http on `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`). With a list, https URIs must match it; loopback URIs stay allowed for native clients. Checked at registration and again at `/authorize`. |
 
 `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` is also required for OAuth. The Gitea OAuth application's redirect URI is
 `<PUBLIC_BASE_URL>/oauth/callback`.
 
+OAuth-only deployments are supported: with `OAUTH_ENABLED=true` and neither `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`
+nor `GITEA_TOKEN`, every user brings their own Gitea token and admin-token mode is simply not
+available (nothing falls back to it). `GITEA_TOKEN` stays required whenever admin-token mode is
+reachable: with a static bearer, without any HTTP authentication, and on stdio.
+
+Sign-in flow and limits: `/authorize` sends the browser to the consent page `/oauth/consent`,
+which names the client and the redirect URI and needs an explicit approval (CSRF token, cookie
+and an `Origin` that matches `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`) before the browser goes to Gitea; the callback
+`/oauth/callback` completes only in that same browser. Issued `agm_` access tokens live 1 hour
+and refresh tokens 30 days (rotated on use, reuse revokes the grant); authorization codes live 5
+minutes and pending sign-ins 10 minutes. Bounds: 500 registered clients (10 redirect URIs and 8
+KiB of metadata each), 1024 pending sign-ins and codes, 50 sessions per Gitea login, and per
+client address 20 pending sign-ins and 20 registrations per hour. The consent form body is
+limited to 16 KiB and must be `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`.
+
 ## State
 
 | Variable | Default | Rules |
 |---|---|---|
-| `DATA_DIR` | `~/.local/state/aegis-gitea-mcp` (`/var/lib/aegis-mcp` in the image) | `~` is expanded. Holds the token store (`oauth-tokens.json`, mode 0600) and the audit log. |
+| `DATA_DIR` | `~/.local/state/aegis-gitea-mcp` (`/var/lib/aegis-mcp` in the image) | `~` is expanded. Holds the encrypted token store (`oauth-store.json`, mode 0600) and the audit log. A new directory is created with mode 0700; an existing one must belong to the running user and is tightened to 0700, otherwise OAuth startup fails. |
-| `AUDIT_LOG_PATH` | `DATA_DIR/audit.log` | Path of the hash-chained audit log. See [audit-logging.md](audit-logging.md). |
+| `AUDIT_LOG_PATH` | `DATA_DIR/audit.log` | Path of the hash-chained audit log. See [audit-logging.md](audit-logging.md). The server opens it for append at startup and exits with code 2 and a message on stderr when it cannot. |
 
 ## Tool exposure
 
@@ -59,7 +95,7 @@ listed nor callable.
 
 | Variable | Default | Rules |
 |---|---|---|
-| `READ_ONLY` | `false` | Expose only read-only (GET) operations. `gitea_api_request` stays listed but accepts only GET. |
+| `READ_ONLY` | `false` | Expose only operations annotated read-only (GET plus a few non-mutating POST endpoints such as the render endpoints). `gitea_api_request` stays listed but accepts only GET. |
 | `TOOLSETS` | `all` | Comma separated domains: `admin`, `repo`, `issue`, `pull`, `release`, `wiki`, `org`, `team`, `user`, `actions`, `hook`, `package`, `notification`, `misc`, or `all`. Unknown domains are rejected. `gitea_api_request` belongs to `misc`. |
 | `DISABLED_TOOLS` | empty | Exact tool names to hide, lowercased on load. An unknown name is a startup error that lists the bad names. |
 
@@ -74,7 +110,7 @@ listed nor callable.
 | `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` | `mask` | `off`, `mask` or `block`. See below. |
 | `LOG_LEVEL` | `INFO` | `DEBUG`, `INFO`, `WARNING`, `ERROR` or `CRITICAL`. Logs go to stderr. |
 | `EXPOSE_ERROR_DETAILS` | `false` | When true, the exception class name is added to internal and transport errors. Never a stack trace. Do not enable in production. |
-| `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | At least 1. Per client on the HTTP MCP endpoint, keyed by a hash of the Authorization header, else the client IP. Excess requests get 429. |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | At least 1. Per client on the HTTP MCP endpoint and on the unauthenticated OAuth endpoints (`/register`, `/authorize`, `/token`, `/revoke`, `/oauth/consent`, `/oauth/callback`), keyed by the client IP (an IPv6 client counts per /64) and, on the MCP endpoint, by a hash of the Authorization header. Excess requests get 429. Only the first rejected request per client and minute is written to the audit log. Tracking is in memory and bounded (idle clients are forgotten). |
 
 Secret detection: `mask` replaces secret-like strings in results with a placeholder, `block`
 withholds a whole result that contains one (`secret_blocked`), `off` disables pattern matching.

docs/deployment.md

@@ -9,8 +9,12 @@ hands the power of its Gitea token to every client that can authenticate.
 - Admin-token only: set `GITEA_TOKEN` and `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`. Every client with the bearer token
   acts as the token owner.
 - Per-user OAuth: additionally set `OAUTH_ENABLED=true` with the OAuth settings. Users sign in
-  with their own Gitea account and act under their own permissions. The static bearer keeps
+  with their own Gitea account (after a consent step on `/oauth/consent`) and act under their
-  working next to it as the admin identity; leave `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` unset to turn that off.
+  own permissions. The static bearer keeps working next to it as the admin identity; leave
+  `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` unset to turn that off.
+- OAuth only: `OAUTH_ENABLED=true` with neither `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` nor `GITEA_TOKEN`. The server
+  starts and serves signed-in users only; admin-token mode does not exist in this deployment, so
+  no request can ever fall back to an admin identity. Recommended for public deployments.
 
 ## Docker
 
@@ -50,7 +54,7 @@ Points that matter:
 - The port is published on `127.0.0.1` only. The reverse proxy on the same host is the public
   entry point.
 - `DATA_DIR` must be a persistent volume writable by the container user. It holds the audit log
-  and the encrypted OAuth token store (`oauth-tokens.json`, mode 0600). Losing the volume loses
+  and the encrypted OAuth token store (`oauth-store.json`, mode 0600). Losing the volume loses
   all OAuth logins and the audit history. Back it up, and protect the backup like the secrets it
   protects.
 - Keep `.env` out of version control and out of the image (mode 0600; `setup` writes it that
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ Check it: `curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/health`.
 
 Terminate TLS at a reverse proxy. `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` must be the public https URL (it is required
 for OAuth, and http is only accepted for loopback hosts). Mistral Le Chat needs a valid public
-certificate.
+certificate, and adding a connector there may require workspace admin rights.
 
 Caddy:
 
@@ -81,7 +85,15 @@ in mind for long tool calls.
 
 The server rejects requests whose `Host` is not allowed (DNS-rebinding protection). Allowed hosts
 are the loopback names with the port, the host of `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`, and `ALLOWED_HOSTS`. If
-you reach it under another name, add that name to `ALLOWED_HOSTS`.
+you reach it under another name, add that name to `ALLOWED_HOSTS`. With a non-loopback
+`MCP_HOST` (the container) and neither `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` nor `ALLOWED_HOSTS`, every remote `Host`
+is rejected with 421, and the server logs a warning at startup naming the two variables.
+
+The server trusts `X-Forwarded-For` only from `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` (default `127.0.0.1`). When
+the proxy reaches the container from another address, for example a Docker network, add that
+address or network (`FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=172.18.0.0/16`). Without it every request looks like it
+comes from the proxy and shares one per-IP rate limit bucket. `*` trusts any peer, so use it only
+when the port is reachable solely from the proxy.
 
 ## OAuth application in Gitea
 
@@ -96,6 +108,12 @@ Gitea has no instance-wide OAuth application API, so the application belongs to
 that created it. Re-running setup reuses it; if the stored client secret is missing, Gitea has to
 regenerate it, and setup asks before doing so.
 
+Before the browser is sent to Gitea, the consent page `/oauth/consent` shows the client name and
+the redirect URI, because Gitea remembers consent for this one application and any client can
+register itself. For a public deployment also set `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` to the hosted
+clients you use, for example `https://claude.ai/,https://chat.mistral.ai/` (see
+[configuration.md](configuration.md)).
+
 `OAUTH_SCOPES` is the scope list sent to Gitea. Keep it to granular scopes. Narrow it (for
 example to `read:repository,read:issue`) to limit what signed-in users' tokens can do through this
 server regardless of their Gitea rights.
@@ -103,8 +121,9 @@ server regardless of their Gitea rights.
 ## Upgrades
 
 - Application: pull the new image (or package) and restart. The data volume is kept.
-- `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` must stay the same, or stored OAuth logins can no longer be decrypted
+- `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` must stay the same. A store written with another key stops the server
-  and users have to sign in again.
+  at startup (exit code 2, the file is kept) instead of being wiped: restore the old key, or move
+  `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json` away to start over, which signs every OAuth user out.
 - Upgrading Gitea: tool names and schemas come from the pinned swagger, so a Gitea upgrade does
   not change them. To pick up a newer API, re-pin the swagger and regenerate the catalog:
 
@@ -124,3 +143,29 @@ The workflows in `.gitea/workflows/` lint, test and build. The `docs-check` job
 `uv run python scripts/check_docs.py`, which fails when `docs/tools.md` or the README tool summary
 is stale, or when a document names a tool that does not exist. `scripts/generate_catalog.py
 --check` fails when `tools.json` does not match the pinned swagger.
+
+Security rules of the pipeline:
+
+- Jobs that use the runner's Docker daemon or a secret (`test-integration`, `test-mcp`,
+  `build-and-push`) do not run for pull requests from forks. Access to the daemon is
+  root-equivalent on the host, and a fork controls the workflow and test code. Also enable
+  "require approval for workflows from forks" (or the equivalent runner setting) in Gitea, and
+  keep the daemon of a shared runner free of services you cannot afford to lose.
+- Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA with the version in a trailing
+  comment. Bump a pin deliberately: look up the SHA of the new tag with
+  `git ls-remote https://github.com/<owner>/<action> refs/tags/<tag>` (add `^{}` for annotated
+  tags). The registry token never reaches a third-party action: the CLI reads it from stdin and
+  `uv publish` reads `UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD`.
+- `build-and-push` scans the built image with a pinned Trivy (`scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh`,
+  sha256 verified) before anything is pushed, and fails on HIGH or CRITICAL findings that have a
+  fix. `scan.yml` repeats the scan and the dependency audit every week, so a new advisory in a
+  pinned base image turns it red: refresh the digests in `docker/Dockerfile`. Accepted findings
+  go in `security/trivyignore.txt` with a waiver row in [security.md](security.md).
+- `publish.yml` needs the `security` job (secret scan, security tests, dependency audit, bandit
+  rules) as well as lint and tests.
+- The image is built under a per-run local tag (`aegis-ci-<run id>-build:<sha>`), scanned under
+  that tag, and the registry tags (`:sha-<12>`, `:dev`, `:latest`, `:main`) are applied only
+  immediately before the push. `build-and-push` needs `lint`, `test-unit`, `test-integration`,
+  `test-mcp` and `security`, so `:dev` and `:latest` are never pushed while one is red.
+- The cleanup script removes containers only for per-run image names (`aegis-ci-<run id>-...`).
+  Registry tags, the `:sha-` tag included, are only untagged.

docs/getting-started.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Setup prompts for the Gitea URL and the token (hidden input). For unattended use
 | `--gitea-url` | Gitea base URL |
 | `--public-base-url` | Public https URL of this server. Enables registration of the OAuth application |
 | `--no-oauth` | Do not create the Gitea OAuth application |
-| `--env-file` | Env file to create or update (default `./.env`) |
+| `--env-file` | Env file to create or update (default `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`, else `./.env`) |
 | `--template` | Env template (default `./.env.example`, else the copy built into the package) |
 | `--yes` | Never prompt, and accept regenerating an OAuth client secret |
 
@@ -96,10 +96,14 @@ make validate-audit
 With `uvx`, no checkout is needed:
 
 ```bash
-GITEA_URL=https://git.example.com GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token> uvx aegis-gitea-mcp
+GITEA_URL=https://git.example.com GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token> \
+  uvx --index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ aegis-gitea-mcp
 ```
 
-The package comes from the Gitea package registry, see [packaging.md](packaging.md).
+The package comes from the Gitea package registry, see [packaging.md](packaging.md). Always pass
+the `--index`: the name is not registered on public PyPI, and a bare `uvx aegis-gitea-mcp` would
+resolve there. From a clone use
+`uv run --directory /path/to/AegisGitea-MCP aegis-gitea-mcp serve`.
 
 ## Where state lives
 

docs/hardening.md

@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ authentication), but it does not decide what is safe. This checklist is how you
   header).
 - `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` protects the stored per-user tokens. Keep it separate from the data
   volume backups. `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` likewise.
-- Use `setup`, which writes the env file with mode 0600 and never prints secrets.
+- Use `setup`, which writes the env file with mode 0600 and never prints secrets. The server
+  loads `./.env` only while it is a regular file you own with mode 0600; keep it elsewhere with
+  `--env-file` or `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`.
+- For a public OAuth deployment set `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` (for example
+  `https://claude.ai/,https://chat.mistral.ai/`), so only the hosted clients you use can
+  register, and leave `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` and `GITEA_TOKEN` unset when nobody needs the admin
+  identity.
 - Do not paste tokens into chat with the assistant, and do not commit `.env`.
 
 ## Network and transport
@@ -40,6 +46,7 @@ authentication), but it does not decide what is safe. This checklist is how you
   rejected.
 - Restrict who can reach the endpoint at the proxy or firewall too (VPN, allow list), as a
   second layer in front of bearer authentication.
+- Set `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` to the proxy address only (not `*`), so a client cannot spoof its IP.
 - Leave `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` on. Put request-size and connection limits at the proxy.
 - Use https for `GITEA_URL`. Plain http sends the token unencrypted (setup warns about it).
 

docs/integration-coverage.md

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+# Integration coverage
+
+Generated by the live-Gitea integration suite; do not edit by hand. Regenerate with:
+
+```bash
+AEGIS_IT_WRITE_REPORT=1 AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1 uv run pytest tests/integration -m integration --no-cov
+```
+
+Target: Gitea 28.1.0. Every tool of the server (538) is called at least once through the MCP server against a seeded instance (see `tests/integration/test_sweep.py`). A call counts as covered when it reaches Gitea and answers 2xx, answers a status the swagger documents for that operation, or answers a status listed as an explicit allowance below. Scenario tests (`tests/integration/test_scenario_*.py`) add real state changes; a tool counts as 2xx when any call in the run got a 2xx.
+
+| Domain | Tools | 2xx | Documented non-2xx | Allowances | Not covered |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| actions | 70 | 65 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
+| admin | 33 | 30 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
+| hook | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| issue | 73 | 73 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| misc | 20 | 18 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
+| notification | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| org | 45 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| package | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| pull | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| release | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| repo | 124 | 121 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
+| team | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| user | 77 | 73 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
+| wiki | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| total | 538 | 521 | 8 | 9 | 0 |
+
+Excluded from the generic sweep and covered by a dedicated test:
+
+- `gitea_misc_delete_current_token`: deletes the token the sweep itself runs with; covered by test_sweep_isolated.py with a throwaway token
+
+## actions
+
+Tools with a 2xx (65):
+
+`gitea_actions_cancel_workflow_run`, `gitea_actions_create_org_variable`, `gitea_actions_create_repo_variable`, `gitea_actions_create_user_variable`, `gitea_actions_delete_action_run`, `gitea_actions_delete_org_runner`, `gitea_actions_delete_org_secret`, `gitea_actions_delete_org_variable`, `gitea_actions_delete_repo_runner`, `gitea_actions_delete_repo_secret`, `gitea_actions_delete_repo_variable`, `gitea_actions_delete_user_runner`, `gitea_actions_delete_user_secret`, `gitea_actions_delete_user_variable`, `gitea_actions_disable_workflow`, `gitea_actions_dispatch_workflow`, `gitea_actions_download_run_job_logs`, `gitea_actions_enable_workflow`, `gitea_actions_get_artifacts`, `gitea_actions_get_artifacts_of_run`, `gitea_actions_get_org_runner`, `gitea_actions_get_org_runners`, `gitea_actions_get_org_variable`, `gitea_actions_get_org_variables_list`, `gitea_actions_get_org_workflow_jobs`, `gitea_actions_get_org_workflow_runs`, `gitea_actions_get_repo_runner`, `gitea_actions_get_repo_runners`, `gitea_actions_get_repo_variable`, `gitea_actions_get_repo_variables_list`, `gitea_actions_get_user_runner`, `gitea_actions_get_user_runners`, `gitea_actions_get_user_variable`, `gitea_actions_get_user_variables_list`, `gitea_actions_get_user_workflow_jobs`, `gitea_actions_get_user_workflow_runs`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow_job`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow_run`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow_run_attempt`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow_run_logs`, `gitea_actions_get_workflow_runs`, `gitea_actions_list_action_tasks`, `gitea_actions_list_repository_workflows`, `gitea_actions_list_workflow_jobs`, `gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_attempt_jobs`, `gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_jobs`, `gitea_actions_list_workflow_runs`, `gitea_actions_org_create_runner_registration_token`, `gitea_actions_org_list_secrets`, `gitea_actions_repo_create_runner_registration_token`, `gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets`, `gitea_actions_rerun_failed_workflow_run`, `gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_job`, `gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_run`, `gitea_actions_update_org_runner`, `gitea_actions_update_org_secret`, `gitea_actions_update_org_variable`, `gitea_actions_update_repo_runner`, `gitea_actions_update_repo_secret`, `gitea_actions_update_repo_variable`, `gitea_actions_update_user_runner`, `gitea_actions_update_user_secret`, `gitea_actions_update_user_variable`, `gitea_actions_user_create_runner_registration_token`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (5):
+
+| Tool | Status |
+| --- | --- |
+| `gitea_actions_approve_workflow_run` | 409 |
+| `gitea_actions_delete_artifact` | 404 |
+| `gitea_actions_download_artifact` | 404 |
+| `gitea_actions_force_cancel_workflow_run` | 409 |
+| `gitea_actions_get_artifact` | 404 |
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## admin
+
+Tools with a 2xx (30):
+
+`gitea_admin_create_hook`, `gitea_admin_create_org`, `gitea_admin_create_public_key`, `gitea_admin_create_repo`, `gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token`, `gitea_admin_create_user`, `gitea_admin_cron_list`, `gitea_admin_cron_run`, `gitea_admin_delete_hook`, `gitea_admin_delete_runner`, `gitea_admin_delete_user`, `gitea_admin_delete_user_badges`, `gitea_admin_delete_user_public_key`, `gitea_admin_edit_hook`, `gitea_admin_edit_user`, `gitea_admin_get_all_emails`, `gitea_admin_get_all_orgs`, `gitea_admin_get_hook`, `gitea_admin_get_runner`, `gitea_admin_get_runners`, `gitea_admin_list_hooks`, `gitea_admin_list_packages`, `gitea_admin_list_user_badges`, `gitea_admin_list_workflow_jobs`, `gitea_admin_list_workflow_runs`, `gitea_admin_rename_user`, `gitea_admin_search_emails`, `gitea_admin_search_users`, `gitea_admin_unadopted_list`, `gitea_admin_update_runner`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (1):
+
+| Tool | Status |
+| --- | --- |
+| `gitea_admin_adopt_repository` | 404 |
+
+Allowances (2):
+
+| Tool | Status | Reason |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `gitea_admin_add_user_badges` | 500 | Gitea answers 500 for an unknown badge slug and the API cannot create badges |
+| `gitea_admin_delete_unadopted_repository` | 404 | no unadopted repository exists on the instance; Gitea answers 404 although the swagger lists only 204 and 403 |
+
+## hook
+
+Tools with a 2xx (20):
+
+`gitea_hook_org_create_hook`, `gitea_hook_org_delete_hook`, `gitea_hook_org_edit_hook`, `gitea_hook_org_get_hook`, `gitea_hook_org_list_hooks`, `gitea_hook_repo_create_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_delete_git_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_delete_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_edit_git_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_edit_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_get_git_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_get_hook`, `gitea_hook_repo_list_git_hooks`, `gitea_hook_repo_list_hooks`, `gitea_hook_repo_test_hook`, `gitea_hook_user_create_hook`, `gitea_hook_user_delete_hook`, `gitea_hook_user_edit_hook`, `gitea_hook_user_get_hook`, `gitea_hook_user_list_hooks`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## issue
+
+Tools with a 2xx (73):
+
+`gitea_issue_add_assignees`, `gitea_issue_add_label`, `gitea_issue_add_subscription`, `gitea_issue_add_time`, `gitea_issue_check_assignee`, `gitea_issue_check_subscription`, `gitea_issue_clear_labels`, `gitea_issue_create_comment`, `gitea_issue_create_issue`, `gitea_issue_create_issue_attachment`, `gitea_issue_create_issue_blocking`, `gitea_issue_create_issue_comment_attachment`, `gitea_issue_create_issue_dependencies`, `gitea_issue_create_label`, `gitea_issue_create_milestone`, `gitea_issue_delete`, `gitea_issue_delete_comment`, `gitea_issue_delete_comment_deprecated`, `gitea_issue_delete_comment_reaction`, `gitea_issue_delete_issue_attachment`, `gitea_issue_delete_issue_comment_attachment`, `gitea_issue_delete_issue_reaction`, `gitea_issue_delete_label`, `gitea_issue_delete_milestone`, `gitea_issue_delete_stopwatch`, `gitea_issue_delete_subscription`, `gitea_issue_delete_time`, `gitea_issue_edit_comment`, `gitea_issue_edit_comment_deprecated`, `gitea_issue_edit_issue`, `gitea_issue_edit_issue_attachment`, `gitea_issue_edit_issue_comment_attachment`, `gitea_issue_edit_issue_deadline`, `gitea_issue_edit_label`, `gitea_issue_edit_milestone`, `gitea_issue_get_comment`, `gitea_issue_get_comment_reactions`, `gitea_issue_get_comments`, `gitea_issue_get_comments_and_timeline`, `gitea_issue_get_issue`, `gitea_issue_get_issue_attachment`, `gitea_issue_get_issue_comment_attachment`, `gitea_issue_get_issue_reactions`, `gitea_issue_get_label`, `gitea_issue_get_labels`, `gitea_issue_get_milestone`, `gitea_issue_get_milestones_list`, `gitea_issue_get_repo_comments`, `gitea_issue_list_blocks`, `gitea_issue_list_issue_attachments`, `gitea_issue_list_issue_comment_attachments`, `gitea_issue_list_issue_dependencies`, `gitea_issue_list_issues`, `gitea_issue_list_labels`, `gitea_issue_list_pinned_issues`, `gitea_issue_lock_issue`, `gitea_issue_move_issue_pin`, `gitea_issue_pin_issue`, `gitea_issue_post_comment_reaction`, `gitea_issue_post_issue_reaction`, `gitea_issue_remove_assignees`, `gitea_issue_remove_issue_blocking`, `gitea_issue_remove_issue_dependencies`, `gitea_issue_remove_label`, `gitea_issue_replace_labels`, `gitea_issue_reset_time`, `gitea_issue_search_issues`, `gitea_issue_start_stopwatch`, `gitea_issue_stop_stopwatch`, `gitea_issue_subscriptions`, `gitea_issue_tracked_times`, `gitea_issue_unlock_issue`, `gitea_issue_unpin_issue`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## misc
+
+Tools with a 2xx (18):
+
+`gitea_api_request`, `gitea_misc_delete_current_token`, `gitea_misc_get_current_token`, `gitea_misc_get_general_api_settings`, `gitea_misc_get_general_attachment_settings`, `gitea_misc_get_general_repository_settings`, `gitea_misc_get_general_ui_settings`, `gitea_misc_get_gitignore_template_info`, `gitea_misc_get_label_template_info`, `gitea_misc_get_license_template_info`, `gitea_misc_get_version`, `gitea_misc_list_gitignores_templates`, `gitea_misc_list_label_templates`, `gitea_misc_list_license_templates`, `gitea_misc_render_markdown`, `gitea_misc_render_markdown_raw`, `gitea_misc_render_markup`, `gitea_misc_topic_search`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (2):
+
+| Tool | Status | Reason |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `gitea_misc_get_signing_key` | 404 | the throwaway instance has no commit signing key; Gitea answers 404 although the swagger lists no 404 for this operation |
+| `gitea_misc_get_signing_key_ssh` | 404 | the throwaway instance has no commit signing key; Gitea answers 404 although the swagger lists no 404 for this operation |
+
+## notification
+
+Tools with a 2xx (7):
+
+`gitea_notification_get_list`, `gitea_notification_get_repo_list`, `gitea_notification_get_thread`, `gitea_notification_new_available`, `gitea_notification_read_list`, `gitea_notification_read_repo_list`, `gitea_notification_read_thread`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## org
+
+Tools with a 2xx (45):
+
+`gitea_org_add_issue_to_project_column`, `gitea_org_block_user`, `gitea_org_check_user_block`, `gitea_org_conceal_member`, `gitea_org_create`, `gitea_org_create_label`, `gitea_org_create_org_repo`, `gitea_org_create_org_repo_deprecated`, `gitea_org_create_project`, `gitea_org_create_project_column`, `gitea_org_delete`, `gitea_org_delete_avatar`, `gitea_org_delete_label`, `gitea_org_delete_member`, `gitea_org_delete_project`, `gitea_org_delete_project_column`, `gitea_org_delete_repos`, `gitea_org_edit`, `gitea_org_edit_label`, `gitea_org_edit_project`, `gitea_org_edit_project_column`, `gitea_org_get`, `gitea_org_get_all`, `gitea_org_get_label`, `gitea_org_get_project`, `gitea_org_get_project_column`, `gitea_org_is_member`, `gitea_org_is_public_member`, `gitea_org_list_activity_feeds`, `gitea_org_list_blocks`, `gitea_org_list_labels`, `gitea_org_list_members`, `gitea_org_list_project_column_issues`, `gitea_org_list_project_columns`, `gitea_org_list_projects`, `gitea_org_list_public_members`, `gitea_org_list_repos`, `gitea_org_move_project_columns`, `gitea_org_move_project_issue`, `gitea_org_publicize_member`, `gitea_org_remove_issue_from_project_column`, `gitea_org_rename`, `gitea_org_set_default_project_column`, `gitea_org_unblock_user`, `gitea_org_update_avatar`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## package
+
+Tools with a 2xx (9):
+
+`gitea_package_delete_package`, `gitea_package_delete_package_version`, `gitea_package_get_latest_package_version`, `gitea_package_get_package`, `gitea_package_link_package`, `gitea_package_list_package_files`, `gitea_package_list_package_versions`, `gitea_package_list_packages`, `gitea_package_unlink_package`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## pull
+
+Tools with a 2xx (26):
+
+`gitea_pull_cancel_scheduled_auto_merge`, `gitea_pull_create_pull_request`, `gitea_pull_create_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_create_pull_review_comment_reply`, `gitea_pull_create_pull_review_requests`, `gitea_pull_delete_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_delete_pull_review_requests`, `gitea_pull_dismiss_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_download_pull_diff_or_patch`, `gitea_pull_edit_pull_request`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_request`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_request_by_base_head`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_request_commits`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_request_files`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_get_pull_review_comments`, `gitea_pull_list_pinned_pull_requests`, `gitea_pull_list_pull_requests`, `gitea_pull_list_pull_reviews`, `gitea_pull_merge_pull_request`, `gitea_pull_pull_request_is_merged`, `gitea_pull_resolve_pull_review_comment`, `gitea_pull_submit_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_undismiss_pull_review`, `gitea_pull_unresolve_pull_review_comment`, `gitea_pull_update_pull_request`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## release
+
+Tools with a 2xx (13):
+
+`gitea_release_create_release`, `gitea_release_create_release_attachment`, `gitea_release_delete_release`, `gitea_release_delete_release_attachment`, `gitea_release_delete_release_by_tag`, `gitea_release_edit_release`, `gitea_release_edit_release_attachment`, `gitea_release_get_latest_release`, `gitea_release_get_release`, `gitea_release_get_release_attachment`, `gitea_release_get_release_by_tag`, `gitea_release_list_release_attachments`, `gitea_release_list_releases`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## repo
+
+Tools with a 2xx (121):
+
+`gitea_repo_accept_repo_transfer`, `gitea_repo_add_collaborator`, `gitea_repo_add_issue_to_project_column`, `gitea_repo_add_push_mirror`, `gitea_repo_add_team`, `gitea_repo_add_topic`, `gitea_repo_apply_diff_patch`, `gitea_repo_change_files`, `gitea_repo_check_assignee`, `gitea_repo_check_collaborator`, `gitea_repo_check_subscription`, `gitea_repo_check_team`, `gitea_repo_compare_diff`, `gitea_repo_create_branch`, `gitea_repo_create_branch_protection`, `gitea_repo_create_deploy_token`, `gitea_repo_create_file`, `gitea_repo_create_fork`, `gitea_repo_create_key`, `gitea_repo_create_project`, `gitea_repo_create_project_column`, `gitea_repo_create_status`, `gitea_repo_create_tag`, `gitea_repo_create_tag_protection`, `gitea_repo_delete`, `gitea_repo_delete_avatar`, `gitea_repo_delete_branch`, `gitea_repo_delete_branch_protection`, `gitea_repo_delete_collaborator`, `gitea_repo_delete_file`, `gitea_repo_delete_key`, `gitea_repo_delete_project`, `gitea_repo_delete_project_column`, `gitea_repo_delete_push_mirror`, `gitea_repo_delete_subscription`, `gitea_repo_delete_tag`, `gitea_repo_delete_tag_protection`, `gitea_repo_delete_team`, `gitea_repo_delete_topic`, `gitea_repo_download_commit_diff_or_patch`, `gitea_repo_edit`, `gitea_repo_edit_branch_protection`, `gitea_repo_edit_project`, `gitea_repo_edit_project_column`, `gitea_repo_edit_tag_protection`, `gitea_repo_generate_repo`, `gitea_repo_get`, `gitea_repo_get_all_commits`, `gitea_repo_get_annotated_tag`, `gitea_repo_get_archive`, `gitea_repo_get_assignees`, `gitea_repo_get_blob`, `gitea_repo_get_branch`, `gitea_repo_get_branch_protection`, `gitea_repo_get_by_id`, `gitea_repo_get_combined_status_by_ref`, `gitea_repo_get_commit_pull_request`, `gitea_repo_get_contents`, `gitea_repo_get_contents_ext`, `gitea_repo_get_contents_list`, `gitea_repo_get_editor_config`, `gitea_repo_get_file_contents`, `gitea_repo_get_file_contents_post`, `gitea_repo_get_issue_config`, `gitea_repo_get_issue_templates`, `gitea_repo_get_key`, `gitea_repo_get_languages`, `gitea_repo_get_licenses`, `gitea_repo_get_project`, `gitea_repo_get_project_column`, `gitea_repo_get_push_mirror_by_remote_name`, `gitea_repo_get_raw_file`, `gitea_repo_get_raw_file_or_lfs`, `gitea_repo_get_repo_permissions`, `gitea_repo_get_reviewers`, `gitea_repo_get_single_commit`, `gitea_repo_get_tag`, `gitea_repo_get_tag_protection`, `gitea_repo_get_tree`, `gitea_repo_list_activity_feeds`, `gitea_repo_list_all_git_refs`, `gitea_repo_list_branch_protection`, `gitea_repo_list_branches`, `gitea_repo_list_collaborators`, `gitea_repo_list_forks`, `gitea_repo_list_git_refs`, `gitea_repo_list_keys`, `gitea_repo_list_project_column_issues`, `gitea_repo_list_project_columns`, `gitea_repo_list_projects`, `gitea_repo_list_push_mirrors`, `gitea_repo_list_stargazers`, `gitea_repo_list_statuses`, `gitea_repo_list_statuses_by_ref`, `gitea_repo_list_subscribers`, `gitea_repo_list_tag_protection`, `gitea_repo_list_tags`, `gitea_repo_list_teams`, `gitea_repo_list_topics`, `gitea_repo_list_user_tracked_times`, `gitea_repo_merge_upstream`, `gitea_repo_migrate`, `gitea_repo_mirror_sync`, `gitea_repo_move_project_columns`, `gitea_repo_move_project_issue`, `gitea_repo_new_pin_allowed`, `gitea_repo_push_mirror_sync`, `gitea_repo_put_subscription`, `gitea_repo_reject_repo_transfer`, `gitea_repo_remove_issue_from_project_column`, `gitea_repo_rename_branch`, `gitea_repo_search`, `gitea_repo_set_default_project_column`, `gitea_repo_tracked_times`, `gitea_repo_transfer`, `gitea_repo_update_avatar`, `gitea_repo_update_branch`, `gitea_repo_update_branch_protection_priorities`, `gitea_repo_update_file`, `gitea_repo_update_topics`, `gitea_repo_validate_issue_config`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (1):
+
+| Tool | Status |
+| --- | --- |
+| `gitea_repo_get_note` | 404 |
+
+Allowances (2):
+
+| Tool | Status | Reason |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `gitea_repo_signing_key` | 404 | the throwaway instance has no commit signing key; Gitea answers 404 although the swagger lists no 404 for this operation |
+| `gitea_repo_signing_key_ssh` | 404 | the throwaway instance has no commit signing key; Gitea answers 404 although the swagger lists no 404 for this operation |
+
+## team
+
+Tools with a 2xx (15):
+
+`gitea_team_add_team_member`, `gitea_team_add_team_repository`, `gitea_team_create_team`, `gitea_team_delete_team`, `gitea_team_edit_team`, `gitea_team_get_team`, `gitea_team_list_team_activity_feeds`, `gitea_team_list_team_member`, `gitea_team_list_team_members`, `gitea_team_list_team_repo`, `gitea_team_list_team_repos`, `gitea_team_list_teams`, `gitea_team_remove_team_member`, `gitea_team_remove_team_repository`, `gitea_team_search`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none
+
+## user
+
+Tools with a 2xx (73):
+
+`gitea_user_add_email`, `gitea_user_block_user`, `gitea_user_check_following`, `gitea_user_check_user_block`, `gitea_user_create_oauth2_application`, `gitea_user_current_add_issue_to_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_check_following`, `gitea_user_current_check_starring`, `gitea_user_current_create_project`, `gitea_user_current_create_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_create_repo`, `gitea_user_current_delete_follow`, `gitea_user_current_delete_gpg_key`, `gitea_user_current_delete_key`, `gitea_user_current_delete_project`, `gitea_user_current_delete_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_delete_star`, `gitea_user_current_edit_project`, `gitea_user_current_edit_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_get_gpg_key`, `gitea_user_current_get_key`, `gitea_user_current_get_project`, `gitea_user_current_get_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_list_followers`, `gitea_user_current_list_following`, `gitea_user_current_list_gpg_keys`, `gitea_user_current_list_keys`, `gitea_user_current_list_orgs`, `gitea_user_current_list_project_column_issues`, `gitea_user_current_list_project_columns`, `gitea_user_current_list_projects`, `gitea_user_current_list_repos`, `gitea_user_current_list_starred`, `gitea_user_current_list_subscriptions`, `gitea_user_current_move_project_columns`, `gitea_user_current_move_project_issue`, `gitea_user_current_post_gpg_key`, `gitea_user_current_post_key`, `gitea_user_current_put_follow`, `gitea_user_current_put_star`, `gitea_user_current_remove_issue_from_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_set_default_project_column`, `gitea_user_current_tracked_times`, `gitea_user_delete_avatar`, `gitea_user_delete_email`, `gitea_user_delete_oauth2_application`, `gitea_user_get`, `gitea_user_get_current`, `gitea_user_get_heatmap_data`, `gitea_user_get_oauth2_application`, `gitea_user_get_org_permissions`, `gitea_user_get_settings`, `gitea_user_get_stopwatches`, `gitea_user_get_verification_token`, `gitea_user_list_activity_feeds`, `gitea_user_list_blocks`, `gitea_user_list_emails`, `gitea_user_list_followers`, `gitea_user_list_following`, `gitea_user_list_gpg_keys`, `gitea_user_list_keys`, `gitea_user_list_oauth2_applications`, `gitea_user_list_orgs`, `gitea_user_list_projects`, `gitea_user_list_repos`, `gitea_user_list_starred`, `gitea_user_list_subscriptions`, `gitea_user_list_teams`, `gitea_user_search`, `gitea_user_unblock_user`, `gitea_user_update_avatar`, `gitea_user_update_oauth2_application`, `gitea_user_update_settings`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (1):
+
+| Tool | Status |
+| --- | --- |
+| `gitea_user_verify_gpg_key` | 422 |
+
+Allowances (3):
+
+| Tool | Status | Reason |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `gitea_user_create_token` | 401 | Gitea only accepts basic auth here; the server always sends token authentication |
+| `gitea_user_delete_access_token` | 401 | Gitea only accepts basic auth here; the server always sends token authentication |
+| `gitea_user_get_tokens` | 401 | Gitea only accepts basic auth here; the server always sends token authentication |
+
+## wiki
+
+Tools with a 2xx (6):
+
+`gitea_wiki_create_wiki_page`, `gitea_wiki_delete_wiki_page`, `gitea_wiki_edit_wiki_page`, `gitea_wiki_get_wiki_page`, `gitea_wiki_get_wiki_page_revisions`, `gitea_wiki_get_wiki_pages`
+
+Tools with a documented non-2xx status (0):
+
+none
+
+Allowances (0):
+
+none

docs/packaging.md

@@ -44,28 +44,46 @@ Dependencies are pinned in `uv.lock`; `uv sync` reproduces the environment.
 
 ## Install from the Gitea registry
 
+Index URL: `https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/`
+
 Stable:
 
 ```bash
-uv pip install \
+# run it without installing into an environment (recommended):
-  --extra-index-url https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ \
-  aegis-gitea-mcp
-
-# or run it without installing into an environment:
 uvx --index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ aegis-gitea-mcp
+
+# or install it into an environment:
+uv pip install --index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ aegis-gitea-mcp
 ```
 
-Dev (newest pre-release build):
+Dev (newest pre-release build, package `aegis-gitea-mcp-dev`):
 
 ```bash
-uv pip install --pre \
+uvx --index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ --prerelease allow aegis-gitea-mcp-dev
-  --extra-index-url https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ \
-  aegis-gitea-mcp-dev
 ```
 
-The registry holds only this project's packages and does not proxy PyPI, so it is added as an
+The registry holds only this project's packages and does not proxy PyPI, so it is added with
-extra index and the dependencies (`mcp`, `httpx`, ...) still come from PyPI. With `pip` use
+`--index` and the dependencies (`mcp`, `httpx`, ...) still come from PyPI. uv's default index
-`--extra-index-url` the same way.
+strategy (`first-index`) takes a package from the first index that has it and never mixes
+versions across indexes, so with `--index` the name `aegis-gitea-mcp` is always taken from
+this registry, even if somebody registers it on PyPI.
+
+Do not use `--extra-index-url` with `pip`. It merges the indexes, and `pip` picks the highest
+version from either: whoever publishes `aegis-gitea-mcp` on PyPI with a higher version number
+wins (dependency confusion), and the package would run with your Gitea token in its
+environment. With `pip`, fetch the wheel from this registry alone, then install it:
+
+```bash
+pip download --no-deps --index-url https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/ aegis-gitea-mcp -d wheels/
+pip install wheels/aegis_gitea_mcp-*.whl
+```
+
+The name is not registered on public PyPI. Publishing there is intentionally not configured, but
+the owner should reserve both names (`aegis-gitea-mcp`, `aegis-gitea-mcp-dev`) on PyPI so nobody
+else can take them. Until then every install command above must name the index.
+
+To run from a clone instead of a registry:
+`uv run --directory /path/to/AegisGitea-MCP aegis-gitea-mcp serve`.
 
 ## Publishing
 

docs/raw-api.md

@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ because credentials belong in the identity, not in the URL.
 ## Behaviour
 
 - It goes through the same executor as every generated tool: the identity's token, no redirects,
-  response limits, redaction and secret masking, the result envelope and one audit event.
+  response limits, redaction and secret masking, the result envelope and the same audit entries (`tool_call_started`, then `tool_invocation`).
 - There is no allow list of paths and no write classification: with full access, the token's
   scopes and the identity's Gitea permissions are the limit.
 - `READ_ONLY=true` keeps the tool listed but it accepts only `GET`.
 - `TOOLSETS` without `misc`, or `DISABLED_TOOLS=gitea_api_request`, removes it.
-- The audit event records the method and the path, so it is visible which endpoint was called.
+- The audit entry records the method and the path, so it is visible which endpoint was called.
 
 ## Example
 

docs/security-findings.md

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+# Security review findings (S1)
+
+Review of commit `ce5ae6c` on `feat/full-api-coverage`, 2026-10-14. Scope: every path from an
+HTTP request or a stdio message to a Gitea call (`transports.py`, `auth.py`, `server.py`,
+`oauth/*`, `gitea/*`, `rate_limit.py`, `config.py`), audit and logging, `setup_cmd.py`, the
+Docker image and CI. The threat model is in [security.md](security.md). S2 fixes these
+findings and adds the negative tests to `tests/security/`.
+
+Severity: critical, high, medium, low. Reproduction scripts referenced below were run in a
+scratch directory against the code as committed; each fix lists the negative test that proves
+it.
+
+## Summary
+
+| Id | Severity | Title | Status (S2) |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| SEC-01 | high | Unbounded request body on the unauthenticated consent POST | fixed |
+| SEC-02 | medium | Stored webhook `authorization_header` returned by hook read tools | fixed |
+| SEC-03 | medium | Audit write failures after startup do not stop later calls | fixed |
+| SEC-04 | medium | Settings read a `.env` file from the process working directory | fixed |
+| SEC-05 | medium | Any https redirect URI can be registered; the consent page is the only barrier | fixed, default waived (W-10) |
+| SEC-06 | medium | Fork pull requests run Docker-capable jobs on the shared runner | fixed |
+| SEC-07 | medium | CI actions pinned by mutable tags, one of them receives the registry token | fixed |
+| SEC-08 | low | Rate limiting gaps (`/token`, `/revoke`, IPv6, proxy address) | fixed |
+| SEC-09 | low | OAuth pre-sign-in state can be flushed by unauthenticated floods | fixed |
+| SEC-10 | low | `GITEA_URL` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` accept whitespace and control characters; plain http Gitea is silent | fixed |
+| SEC-11 | low | Audit log created with umask defaults; unkeyed hash chain | fixed, keyed chain waived (W-11) |
+| SEC-12 | low | Tool audit entries do not record the client, session or source IP | fixed |
+| SEC-13 | low | Token store directory ownership is not verified | fixed |
+| SEC-14 | low | CI cleanup and credential handling on the shared Docker daemon | fixed |
+| SEC-15 | low | `tests/security` missing, so the CI `security` job fails; publish is not gated on it | fixed |
+| SEC-16 | low | No container image vulnerability scan | fixed |
+| SEC-17 | low | Consent POST accepts a missing `Origin` header, unlike ADR 0004 says | fixed |
+| SEC-18 | low | Unvalidated argument names and unknown tool names reach the audit log | fixed |
+| SEC-19 | low | One fixed cookie name for concurrent sign-ins in the same browser | fixed |
+
+All 19 findings were fixed or waived in S2 (status column and per-finding status lines below); the
+negative tests live in `tests/security/`. The fixes found four further defects that are fixed in
+the same changeset: secrets inside JSON object keys were not pattern masked (`fef80a5`), a
+trailing newline passed the `sudo` pattern (`984673e`), a `data` field on an Action secret
+response was not redacted (`421a650`), and configuration errors for `OAUTH_SCOPES` and
+`TOOLSETS` echoed the offending values (`0f5f5cd`).
+
+No critical findings. Verified as sound (no finding): static bearer comparison, the identity
+split between static bearer, OAuth and no-auth (including OAuth-only deployments), Sudo
+handling for OAuth users, path, query and header encoding in the executor, redirect handling,
+response size and JSON depth bounds, stdio stdout hygiene, error detail exposure, PKCE, code
+and refresh replay handling, consent CSRF and clickjacking headers, the browser-binding
+cookie, token store encryption and atomic writes, the setup command's env file handling, and
+the Dockerfile (pinned digests, non-root, no secrets in layers).
+
+## Findings
+
+### SEC-01 (high): unbounded request body on the unauthenticated consent POST
+
+- Status: fixed in `d5ca530`: consent and callback routes wrapped in a 16 KiB body limit; 415 for any content type but `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` before a byte is read; form parsed with `max_files=0, max_fields=8, max_part_size=4096`. Tests: `tests/security/test_oauth_input_bounds.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/callback.py:137-155` (`consent_submit` calls
+  `await request.form()`), routes at `callback.py:169-173`.
+- Description: the browser routes are custom Starlette routes. Unlike the MCP endpoint and the
+  SDK's `/authorize`, `/token`, `/register` and `/revoke` (all wrapped in
+  `RequestBodyLimitMiddleware`), they have no body limit, and `uvicorn` sets none. Starlette
+  parses `multipart/form-data` with up to 1000 fields of up to 1 MiB each held in memory, and
+  file parts of unlimited size spooled to `/tmp`, which is a RAM-backed tmpfs in the shipped
+  `docker-compose.yml`. The `Origin` check passes when the header is absent, and the CSRF check
+  only runs after parsing. Reproduced: one unauthenticated POST with 500 one-megabyte multipart
+  fields raised the server's RSS from 93 MB to 593 MB; a single 200 MB file part was consumed
+  completely before the 400 answer. The per-IP limit (120 requests per minute) counts requests,
+  not bytes, so a single client can exhaust memory and get the process killed. OAuth mode only.
+- Fix: wrap the consent and callback routes in `RequestBodyLimitMiddleware` with a small cap
+  (16 KiB is ample: the form has three short fields); answer 415 before reading the body when
+  the content type is not `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`; parse with
+  `request.form(max_files=0, max_fields=8, max_part_size=4096)`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_oauth_input_bounds.py`): drive the ASGI app with a
+  counting `receive`; a 1 MiB urlencoded POST to `/oauth/consent` gets 413 having read at most
+  the cap plus one chunk; a multipart POST gets 415 having read no body; a valid consent still
+  works.
+
+### SEC-02 (medium): stored webhook `authorization_header` returned by hook read tools
+
+- Status: fixed in `5b622e6`: `SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS` (the request-side key list) redacts non-empty string values by key name at any depth in every result except credential-issuing operations, in all `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` values. Tests: `tests/security/test_secret_echo.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/gitea/executor.py:339-356` and `603-625` (only values submitted
+  in the request body are redacted, via `sensitive_body_values` in
+  `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/gitea/encoding.py:387-405`).
+- Description: the Gitea `Hook` schema includes `authorization_header`, and Gitea fills it on
+  list, get and edit. A create call redacts the header because the caller submitted it, but
+  `gitea_hook_repo_list_hooks`, `gitea_hook_repo_get_hook` and the org, user and admin
+  equivalents (and `gitea_api_request` on hook paths) return stored headers verbatim to the
+  model and the remote client. Reproduced with a mocked `repoListHooks` answer: the header
+  value appears in the result. Pattern masking does not catch `Basic ...` or most `Bearer ...`
+  values.
+- Fix: redact known secret-bearing response fields in `_seal`, before pattern masking: a
+  non-empty `authorization_header` at any depth becomes `[REDACTED]` (presence stays visible).
+  Keep the set (`_SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`) next to `_SENSITIVE_BODY_KEYS` so new fields are
+  added in one place. Credential-issuing operations are unaffected (no hook operation is one).
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_secret_echo.py`): list, get and edit hook responses
+  (repo, org, user, admin, and the raw tool on `/repos/o/r/hooks`) containing
+  `authorization_header` never contain the value in `content` or `structured_content`, with
+  `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` set to `off`, `mask` and `block`.
+
+### SEC-03 (medium): audit write failures after startup do not stop later calls
+
+- Status: fixed in `43eebd3`: the write-ahead alternative: a `tool_call_started` entry is written before every known tool runs and the call is refused with `audit_unavailable` when it fails. Documented in `docs/audit-logging.md`. Tests: `tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/server.py:414-426` (only obtaining the logger is checked) and
+  `server.py:509-537` (write errors are logged and swallowed);
+  `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/audit.py:104-107`.
+- Description: the fail-closed check only proves the file could be opened once. Once the
+  singleton exists, a full disk, a revoked mount or any other write error makes every later call
+  run unaudited, indefinitely, while AGENTS.md promises an audit event for every call. The
+  post-execution swallow is intentional for the call that already ran, but nothing stops the
+  next one.
+- Fix: record audit health. On a write failure set `AuditLogger.healthy = False`; at the start
+  of `call_tool`, refuse with `audit_unavailable` while unhealthy, after one probe write
+  (a small `audit_probe` security event) fails. Alternatively write a `tool_invocation_started`
+  entry before execution and refuse when it fails. Either way, document the choice in
+  `docs/audit-logging.md`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py`): after one successful call, make
+  the log file's `write` raise `OSError`; the next call returns `audit_unavailable` and the
+  mocked Gitea receives no request; when writes work again, calls resume.
+
+### SEC-04 (medium): settings read a `.env` file from the process working directory
+
+- Status: fixed in `79aa4f7`: `./.env` loads only as a regular file owned by the user with mode 0600; `--env-file` and `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`; documented in README, configuration and troubleshooting. Tests: `tests/security/test_env_file.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/config.py:109-114` (`env_file=".env"`).
+- Description: pydantic-settings loads `./.env` for every setting not present in the
+  environment. Claude Code and other clients start stdio servers with the project directory as
+  the working directory, so a cloned repository can plant a `.env`. Reproduced: with
+  `GITEA_URL` and `GITEA_TOKEN` in the environment, a world-readable `.env` in the working
+  directory set `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off`, `EXPOSE_ERROR_DETAILS=true` and
+  `AUDIT_LOG_PATH=/dev/null` (all calls then go unaudited, and the startup audit check passes).
+  A client configuration without `GITEA_URL` in the environment would also send the token to an
+  attacker-chosen `GITEA_URL`.
+- Fix: honour `./.env` only when it is a regular file (not a symlink) owned by the current user
+  and not readable or writable by group or others (the mode `setup` writes, 0600); otherwise
+  ignore it and print one warning to stderr. Add an explicit `--env-file` option (and
+  `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`) for other locations. Document it in `docs/configuration.md`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_env_file.py`): a 0644 `.env` in the working directory
+  with `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off` and `AUDIT_LOG_PATH=/dev/null` is ignored (mode stays
+  `mask`, the audit path stays under `DATA_DIR`); a symlinked `.env` is ignored; a 0600 `.env`
+  owned by the user is honoured; environment values still win.
+
+### SEC-05 (medium): any https redirect URI can be registered; the consent page is the only barrier
+
+- Status: fixed, default waived (W-10) in `8be8592`: owner decision: optional `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` (exact URIs or `https://host/` prefixes, checked at registration and `/authorize`); the open default is waived with the consent page as mitigation, and the allowlist is recommended for public deployments. Tests: `tests/security/test_oauth_redirects.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/provider.py:99-115` (`redirect_uri_problem`),
+  `provider.py:306-343` (`register_client`), `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/callback.py:109-135`.
+- Description: dynamic client registration is open to anyone and accepts any https redirect
+  URI and any `client_name`. Gitea remembers consent for our single application, so the only
+  thing between a phishing link and a victim's full-scope token (default `write:` on every
+  category, including admin for site admins) is a click on our consent page, which shows an
+  attacker-chosen name (for example "Claude") and the redirect URI. The design is documented in
+  ADR 0004; this is an owner decision on residual risk.
+- Fix (owner to choose): add `OAUTH_REDIRECT_HOSTS`, an allowlist of redirect hosts accepted at
+  registration (default: loopback plus the hosted clients the owner uses, for example
+  `claude.ai` and `chat.mistral.ai`), with a clear registration error otherwise; on the consent
+  page show the redirect host first and prominently and the client's registration age. Or accept
+  the risk and record it as a waiver in `docs/security.md`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_oauth_redirects.py`): with the allowlist set,
+  registering `https://evil.example/cb` returns `invalid_redirect_uri`; allowlisted and loopback
+  URIs register; existing rules (http on non-loopback, fragments, credentials, custom schemes)
+  stay rejected.
+
+### SEC-06 (medium): fork pull requests run Docker-capable jobs on the shared runner
+
+- Status: fixed in `766968f`: `test-integration`, `test-mcp` and `build-and-push` carry the fork guard. The Gitea setting "require approval for workflows from forks" is a manual step recorded in `docs/deployment.md`. Tests: `tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`.
+- Where: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:22-25` (`pull_request` to `dev` and `main`), jobs
+  `test-integration` (`ci.yml:119-144`) and `test-mcp` (`ci.yml:153-185`).
+- Description: a pull request from a fork runs its own workflow and test code, and these jobs
+  use the runner's Docker daemon (building images, starting containers, joining networks).
+  Access to the daemon is root-equivalent on the host that other tenants share. Secrets are not
+  passed to fork runs, but the host is.
+- Fix: enable "require approval for workflows from forks" (or the equivalent runner setting) in
+  Gitea, and guard the Docker jobs with
+  `if: github.event_name == 'push' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository`.
+  Record the setting in `docs/deployment.md` or the CI notes.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`): parse the workflow YAML; every job that
+  calls `docker` (or the integration and MCP smoke jobs by name) carries the fork guard.
+
+### SEC-07 (medium): CI actions pinned by mutable tags, one of them receives the registry token
+
+- Status: fixed in `766968f`: every `uses:` is pinned to a full commit SHA with a version comment; `docker/login-action` was replaced by `docker login --password-stdin` into a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG`; `persist-credentials: false` on every checkout. Tests: `tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`.
+- Where: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:40, 63-69, 90-108, 124-130, 160-166, 206, 242, 299-305,
+  324-330`; `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml:22-28, 47-53, 77-85, 138`. `docker/login-action@v3`
+  receives `REGISTRY_TOKEN` (`ci.yml:242-248`).
+- Description: `actions/checkout@v4`, `actions/setup-python@v5`, `astral-sh/setup-uv@v5`,
+  `actions/upload-artifact@v4` and `docker/login-action@v3` resolve to whatever the tag points to
+  at run time. A compromised or retagged action runs with the job's secrets and the Docker
+  daemon. `actions/checkout` also persists the job token in `.git/config` for later steps.
+- Fix: pin every `uses:` to a full commit SHA with the version in a comment; replace
+  `docker/login-action` with `echo "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login --username ... --password-stdin`;
+  set `persist-credentials: false` on checkout where pushing is not needed.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`): every `uses:` value in
+  `.gitea/workflows/*.yml` matches `@[0-9a-f]{40}$`; no step passes `secrets.*` to a third-party
+  action's `with:`.
+
+### SEC-08 (low): rate limiting gaps
+
+- Status: fixed in `f57c237`: `/token` and `/revoke` rate limited; IPv6 clients keyed by /64; `ForwardedHeadersMiddleware` applies forwarded headers for `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` peers and logs one warning for any other peer that sends `X-Forwarded-For`. Tests: `tests/security/test_rate_limits.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/components.py:37` (`RATE_LIMITED_PATHS` lacks `/token` and
+  `/revoke`), `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/rate_limit.py:142-163` (per-IP key is the full address),
+  `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/transports.py:168-188`, `transports.py:400-419`.
+- Description: `/token` and `/revoke` (client secret checks, store writes) are not limited. Each
+  IPv6 address is its own bucket, so a client with a /64 is effectively unlimited. Behind a
+  proxy whose address is not in `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` (the default `127.0.0.1` does not match a
+  Docker network), every request shares the proxy's bucket, and because the limit runs before
+  authentication, any unauthenticated client can exhaust the budget of all authenticated users.
+- Fix: add `/token` and `/revoke` to `RATE_LIMITED_PATHS`; key IPv6 clients by their /64; log a
+  one-time warning when a request carries `X-Forwarded-For` from a peer outside
+  `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_rate_limits.py`): limit+1 requests to `/token` get 429;
+  two addresses in one IPv6 /64 share a bucket; a forwarded header from an untrusted peer logs
+  the warning once.
+
+### SEC-09 (low): OAuth pre-sign-in state can be flushed by unauthenticated floods
+
+- Status: fixed in `87f048c`: per client address at most 20 pending sign-ins and 20 registrations per hour; clients younger than `PENDING_TTL` are never evicted; the store write runs in a worker thread. Tests: `tests/security/test_oauth_input_bounds.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/provider.py:139-159` (`_ExpiringMap.put` evicts the oldest
+  entry), `provider.py:80-85`, `provider.py:333-356` (client eviction),
+  `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/store.py:250-275` (synchronous fsync on the event loop).
+- Description: 1024 `/authorize` requests (needs only a self-registered client) evict every
+  legitimate pending sign-in; 500 registrations evict recently registered clients that have
+  not finished signing in. Every registration writes and fsyncs the whole store on the event
+  loop. Impact: sign-in denial of service, no data exposure.
+- Fix: per-IP quota on pending requests and registrations (for example 20 each); never evict a
+  client younger than `PENDING_TTL`; run `OAuthStore._write` in a worker thread
+  (`anyio.to_thread.run_sync`).
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_oauth_input_bounds.py`): 1100 `/authorize` calls from one
+  IP do not evict a pending request from another IP; a client registered a minute ago survives
+  a registration flood.
+
+### SEC-10 (low): base URLs accept whitespace and control characters; plain http Gitea is silent
+
+- Status: fixed in `d96c3ac`: whitespace, backslash and control characters rejected in both URLs, the URL is rebuilt from its parsed parts, `serve` warns for plain http to a non-loopback Gitea (a warning rather than a refusal, so existing lab setups keep working). Tests: `tests/security/test_base_url_validation.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/config.py:87-103` (`_normalize_http_url` validates the parsed URL
+  but returns the raw string), `config.py:180-201`.
+- Description: `https://gi\ttea.example.com`, `https://gitea.example.com/a\nb` and values with
+  spaces pass validation; `urlsplit` strips tabs and newlines for the check while the raw value
+  is used later, so the validated and the used URL can differ. A plain `http://` `GITEA_URL` to a
+  non-loopback host is accepted at serve time without any warning, although the admin token, the
+  OAuth client secret and user tokens then travel in clear text (setup warns, `serve` does not).
+- Fix: reject any whitespace or non-printable character in both URLs; return the URL rebuilt
+  from its parsed parts; print a startup warning (or refuse unless an explicit
+  `ALLOW_INSECURE_GITEA_URL=true`) for http to a non-loopback host.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_base_url_validation.py`): parametrized rejection of tab,
+  newline, carriage return, space, NUL and bidi controls in `GITEA_URL` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`;
+  existing rejections (scheme, credentials, query, fragment, bad port, missing host, http public
+  base URL) kept; `serve` with `GITEA_URL=http://gitea.internal` prints the warning.
+
+### SEC-11 (low): audit log created with umask defaults; unkeyed hash chain
+
+- Status: fixed, keyed chain waived (W-11) in `7307214`: directory 0700, log opened `O_NOFOLLOW` with mode 0600, an older loose log is tightened, startup exits 2 for a symlink. The optional `AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` was not added: off-host shipping is the documented integrity control. Tests: `tests/security/test_audit_file.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/audit.py:36-39`, `audit.py:64-69`.
+- Description: `DATA_DIR` is created with the default mode (0755 under a 022 umask) and the
+  audit log with 0644; only the OAuth store later tightens the directory, so in admin-token mode
+  other local users can read logins, paths and timing of every call. The audit path is opened
+  without `O_NOFOLLOW`. The SHA-256 chain has no key, so anyone with write access can rewrite
+  it consistently, and truncating the tail is not detectable.
+- Fix: create the directory with 0700 and open the log with
+  `os.open(path, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)`; document off-host
+  shipping as the integrity control, optionally add an `AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` for a keyed chain.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_audit_file.py`): after the first call the log is 0600 and a
+  newly created `DATA_DIR` is 0700; a symlink at the audit path makes startup exit 2.
+
+### SEC-12 (low): tool audit entries do not record the client, session or source IP
+
+- Status: fixed in `fd5e4b7`: tool entries carry `client_id`, a 12 character `session` hash and `client_ip`. Tests: `tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/server.py:509-537`.
+- Description: in OAuth mode an entry names the Gitea login but not which MCP client or grant
+  made the call, nor the source address, which limits incident response (for example finding
+  which registered client a stolen token belonged to).
+- Fix: add `client_id` from the verified access token, a short hash of the session id and the
+  client IP (when on HTTP) to the tool invocation entry.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py` or a sibling): an OAuth call's entry
+  contains the client id and no token or session id in clear.
+
+### SEC-13 (low): token store directory ownership is not verified
+
+- Status: fixed in `6f7a3c0`: the store directory must be owned by the effective user and must not stay group or world writable; checked on load and on every save. Tests: `tests/security/test_token_store.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/store.py:133-143`.
+- Description: an existing `DATA_DIR` owned by another user, or one that stays group or world
+  writable after the chmod attempt, only produces a warning. Whoever controls the directory can
+  replace the store with an older copy (resurrecting revoked grants) or delete it.
+- Fix: refuse (raise `OAuthStoreError`) when the directory's owner is not the effective user or
+  it is still writable by group or others.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_token_store.py`): with a directory reported as owned by
+  another uid (monkeypatched `os.stat`) or mode 0777 that cannot be tightened, loading or saving
+  fails with a clear message.
+
+### SEC-14 (low): CI cleanup and credential handling on the shared Docker daemon
+
+- Status: fixed in `766968f`: cleanup removes containers only for per-run refs (`aegis-ci-*`, `:sha-*`) and only untags shared tags; the credential directory is per job; `uv publish` reads `UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD`. Tests: `tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py` (fake `docker` on `PATH`).
+- Where: `scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh:43-48`, `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:281-290`,
+  `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml:150-157`.
+- Description: the cleanup removes every container whose `ancestor` is one of the given refs,
+  and the build job passes the shared tags `:latest`, `:main` and `:dev`; on a daemon that also
+  runs a deployment of this image that can remove containers that are not the job's.
+  `docker logout` acts on the shared credential store when the job is not containerized.
+  `uv publish --password "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}"` puts the token on the command line.
+- Fix: remove containers only for per-run refs (`aegis-ci-<run id>-*` and the job's own
+  `:sha-` tag); for shared tags only untag (`docker image rm` of the tag); pass the publish
+  token through `UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD`.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`): run the cleanup script with a fake
+  `docker` on `PATH` that records argv; `rm -f` is only issued for containers of per-run refs;
+  `publish.yml` contains no `--password` argument.
+
+### SEC-15 (low): `tests/security` missing; publish not gated on the security job
+
+- Status: fixed in `766968f`: `tests/security` exists (this suite) and `publish.yml` has a `security` job that `publish` needs (gitleaks, security tests, pip-audit, ruff `S`). Tests: `tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py`.
+- Where: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:337`, `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml` (needs only lint and
+  test).
+- Description: `pytest tests/security` exits with code 4 (path not found), so the CI `security`
+  job fails today. The publish workflow ships packages without gitleaks, pip-audit or the
+  security tests.
+- Fix: S2 creates the suite listed below; add a `security` job (pip-audit, ruff `S`, security
+  tests, gitleaks) to `publish.yml` and make `publish` need it.
+- Negative test: the suite itself; a CI workflow test asserting `publish` needs the security
+  job.
+
+### SEC-16 (low): no container image vulnerability scan
+
+- Status: fixed in `766968f`: Trivy 0.76.0 pinned with sha256 (`scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh`) scans the built image in `build-and-push` before the push and fails on fixable HIGH or CRITICAL findings (`scripts/ci/scan_image.sh`, waivers in `security/trivyignore.txt`); `scan.yml` repeats it weekly as the digest refresh reminder. Verified locally against the built image (clean).
+- Where: `docker/Dockerfile:6-7`, `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (`build-and-push`).
+- Description: base image digests are pinned and refreshed by hand; OS package advisories in
+  the image are never checked.
+- Fix: add a scan step (Trivy or Grype pinned by digest) on the built image, failing on high and
+  critical with a waiver file, and a scheduled digest refresh reminder.
+- Negative test: CI only (the step runs and fails on a known vulnerable test image).
+
+### SEC-17 (low): consent POST accepts a missing `Origin` header
+
+- Status: fixed in `782d416`: consent POST needs an `Origin` equal to the public origin, with the `Referer` origin as fallback; missing, `null` or foreign values are refused. Tests: `tests/security/test_oauth_csrf.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/callback.py:138-140`; ADR 0004 says approval needs "a
+  matching `Origin`".
+- Description: the `SameSite=Strict` double-submit cookie is the effective CSRF control and is
+  sound, but the code and the ADR disagree. Browsers send `Origin` on form POSTs.
+- Fix: require `Origin` to equal the public origin (fall back to `Referer` when `Origin` is
+  absent), or correct the ADR.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_oauth_csrf.py`): POST without `Origin` and `Referer`,
+  with `Origin: null`, and with a foreign origin all get 400 and no redirect.
+
+### SEC-18 (low): unvalidated argument names and unknown tool names reach the audit log
+
+- Status: fixed in `fd5e4b7`: only argument names that are schema properties are recorded (rest counted as `rejected_argument_count`); unknown tool names are recorded as `(unknown tool, N chars)` and not echoed. Tests: `tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/server.py:412-413` (argument names recorded before validation),
+  `server.py:428-431` (unknown tool name echoed and audited).
+- Description: validation messages carefully avoid caller-chosen argument names because "they
+  could carry a secret", but the audit entry records them before validation, and an unknown tool
+  name (up to 128 characters) is written to the audit log and echoed in the error. Pattern
+  masking still runs, so only non-pattern secrets are affected.
+- Fix: record only argument names that are properties of the tool's schema (plus a count of
+  rejected ones); record unknown tool names as a fixed marker plus length, and do not echo them.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_redaction.py`): a call with an extra argument named like a
+  40-hex token, and a call to a tool named like one, leave neither value in the audit file or
+  the error.
+
+### SEC-19 (low): one fixed cookie name for concurrent sign-ins in the same browser
+
+- Status: fixed in `782d416`: the binding cookie is named per flow (`aegis-oauth-flow-<8 hex of the state hash>`). Tests: `tests/security/test_oauth_csrf.py`.
+- Where: `src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/callback.py:56-60`, `callback.py:150-155`.
+- Description: a second sign-in started in the same browser overwrites the first flow's binding
+  cookie. The first callback then fails and writes a high-severity
+  `oauth_callback_binding_mismatch` audit event, a false alarm that trains operators to ignore
+  the one event that signals a confused-deputy attempt.
+- Fix: suffix the binding cookie name with a short hash of the Gitea `state`
+  (`__Host-aegis-oauth-flow-<8 hex>`), and look it up by the state on the callback.
+- Negative test (`tests/security/test_oauth_csrf.py`): two interleaved flows in one browser
+  both complete; a callback without its own cookie still fails and is audited.
+
+## Negative tests S2 added to `tests/security/`
+
+All of the files below exist now (the list is kept as the specification they were written
+from). Results are in the "Verification results" section of [security.md](security.md).
+
+Some of these duplicate existing unit tests on purpose: the security suite is the one CI and
+reviewers read, and it must stay green independently of refactors elsewhere. Reuse the helpers
+in `tests/test_oauth_helpers.py` and `tests/test_executor_helpers.py`.
+
+1. `test_auth_required.py`
+   - `/mcp` without `Authorization` gets 401 with `WWW-Authenticate` (bearer-only app and OAuth
+     app).
+   - Wrong bearer gets 401: same length, shorter, longer, empty, wrong scheme (`Basic`, `token`),
+     trailing whitespace, the bearer of another deployment.
+   - The static bearer is compared with `hmac.compare_digest` on digests (spy).
+   - OAuth: expired, revoked, other-resource and unknown `agm_` tokens get 401; an `agm_` token
+     never resolves to the admin identity (Gitea mock sees the user's token only).
+   - Route inventory: the set of routes reachable without authentication is exactly
+     `/`, `/health`, the `.well-known` documents and the OAuth routes; adding a route fails the
+     test.
+2. `test_startup_fail_closed.py`
+   - Non-loopback binds (`0.0.0.0`, `::`, a public IP, a host name, `127.1`, `0`) without bearer
+     or OAuth exit 2 and never call `uvicorn.run`.
+   - Half-configured OAuth, a bearer shorter than 32 characters, an http `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` on a
+     public host, an unwritable audit log and (SEC-11) a symlinked audit path all exit 2.
+3. `test_redaction.py`
+   - With all secrets configured (`GITEA_TOKEN`, `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`,
+     `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, a user's Gitea access and refresh tokens, an issued `agm_` token),
+     drive a Gitea error that echoes each of them and a success body that contains each of them:
+     none appears in the result, the error message, the audit file, or captured logs at DEBUG.
+   - `uvicorn.access` records for `/oauth/callback?code=...&state=...` and
+     `/oauth/consent?request=...` contain `[redacted]` instead of the query.
+   - `repr` of `Settings`, `Identity`, `SessionRecord`, `UpstreamTokens` and
+     `PendingAuthorization` contains no secret.
+   - Validation errors never contain argument values (SEC-18 for names).
+4. `test_secret_echo.py`
+   - `gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets` and `gitea_actions_org_list_secrets` return the names
+     Gitea sends; the update tools never echo the submitted `data`, including in a Gitea 422
+     error that repeats it.
+   - SEC-02: hook list, get and edit responses never contain `authorization_header` values, in
+     every `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`.
+   - Submitted `password`, `secret`, `token`, `authorization_header` and migration credentials
+     are redacted from results.
+   - Credential-issuing operations return the new credential (documented exemption, W-07) but
+     the audit file and logs do not contain it.
+5. `test_malformed_input.py`
+   - Unknown arguments, wrong types, missing required arguments rejected before Gitea is
+     contacted.
+   - Path values with `..`, `.`, empty segment, `\`, `?`, `#`, `%`, `%2e`, NUL, CR, LF, U+2028
+     rejected for catalog path parameters and for the raw tool path; a raw path starting `//`
+     rejected.
+   - Query names `token`, `access_token`, `sudo`, `_sudo` in any case rejected.
+   - `sudo` with CR/LF, spaces or over 255 characters rejected.
+   - Upload: oversized base64 rejected before decoding, invalid base64, filenames with quotes or
+     CR/LF, unknown file keys.
+   - Raw method outside the enum; `READ_ONLY` with a non-GET raw call.
+   - Deeply nested JSON arguments and bodies give an error result, never an exception.
+   - HTTP: body over the cap gets 413, non-JSON content type 400, foreign `Host` 421, foreign
+     `Origin` 403.
+6. `test_base_url_validation.py`
+   - `GITEA_URL` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`: non-http schemes, credentials, query, fragment, bad port,
+     missing host, whitespace and control characters (SEC-10), http public base URL on a public
+     host; trailing `/api/v1` normalized.
+   - `MCP_PATH`, `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` and `OAUTH_SCOPES` (unknown scope) rejections.
+   - Redirect URIs at registration: http on non-loopback, fragment, credentials, `javascript:`,
+     custom schemes rejected.
+7. `test_oauth_csrf.py` (SEC-17, SEC-19): consent without the CSRF cookie, with a mismatched
+   token, without or with a foreign `Origin`; callback without the binding cookie, with a
+   replayed or expired state; none of them redirects.
+8. `test_oauth_input_bounds.py` (SEC-01, SEC-09).
+9. `test_audit_fail_closed.py` and `test_audit_file.py` (SEC-03, SEC-11, SEC-12).
+10. `test_env_file.py` (SEC-04).
+11. `test_token_store.py`: file mode 0600, directory 0700, symlink refused, wrong key stops
+    startup without wiping, store content is not plaintext, our tokens only as hashes, SEC-13.
+12. `test_rate_limits.py` (SEC-08).
+13. `test_ci_workflows.py` (SEC-06, SEC-07, SEC-14, SEC-15).
+
+## B5 checker verdict
+
+Verdict: CHANGES REQUIRED (at `ce5ae6c`; the blocking item was fixed in S2, `d5ca530`, and
+every non-blocking item below was fixed or waived, see the status column above).
+
+Blocking:
+
+- SEC-01: the unauthenticated consent POST reads unbounded multipart bodies into memory and
+  tmpfs. This is B5 code and reproducible with one request. Fix and its negative test are
+  required before B5 is accepted.
+
+Non-blocking (fix in S2, or record as waivers): SEC-05 (redirect allowlist, owner decision),
+SEC-09, SEC-12, SEC-13, SEC-17 (code or ADR), SEC-19.
+
+What was checked and holds:
+
+- Identity separation: an access token with the OAuth marker always resolves to its own
+  session or fails; it never falls back to the admin token, even when the session ends or the
+  upstream refresh fails. Only the static bearer (or no token on stdio and unauthenticated
+  loopback) reaches admin-token mode; an OAuth-only deployment fails closed for it. The session
+  login is checked against the token subject.
+- Authorization server: DCR client ids are minted by the SDK; PKCE S256 is mandatory towards
+  clients and used towards Gitea; redirect URIs are validated at registration and matched by the
+  SDK; codes are single use, bound to the client, replay revokes the grant; refresh tokens rotate
+  and reuse revokes the grant; revocation is limited to the owning client by the SDK; tokens are
+  bound to the MCP resource and scope.
+- Browser flow: consent CSRF double submit with a `SameSite=Strict` `__Host-` cookie, a
+  browser-binding cookie on the callback, single-use states, no redirect on any invalid callback,
+  `no-store`, `no-referrer`, `DENY` framing and CSP on every page, HTML escaping of the client
+  name and redirect URI, no request parameter echoed.
+- Upstream: confidential client with form-encoded credentials, no redirects followed, coarse
+  error kinds only, login validated against a strict pattern, token type and length checked,
+  unknown Gitea scopes rejected at configuration.
+- Store: Fernet with an HKDF-SHA256 key, mode 0600 through `O_EXCL` temporary files and atomic
+  rename, symlinks refused, a wrong key or corrupt file stops startup without wiping, our tokens
+  stored only as hashes, pruning of expired tokens and abandoned sessions, bounded clients and
+  sessions per login.
+- Secret handling: the user's refresh token, the store key and the client secret are redacted
+  from results; issued `agm_` tokens are masked by pattern; access-log query strings are dropped.
+- Quality gates at `ce5ae6c`: 157 OAuth tests and the whole unit suite pass (846 passed, 23
+  skipped), coverage 98.2 percent, `ruff check`, `ruff format --check` and `mypy` clean. The docs
+  drift check failed only on the stale `docs/security.md`, replaced in this changeset.

docs/security.md

@@ -1,108 +1,264 @@
 # Security
 
-## Core Controls
+AegisGitea-MCP is a full-access bridge into Gitea (ADR 0001): whoever can call it holds the
+power of the Gitea token it uses, which for the admin token means the whole instance. The
+server does not decide which operations are safe. It guarantees a small set of invariants
+(authentication off loopback, identity separation, audit, secret redaction, bounded and
+validated input and output, untrusted-content labelling) and leaves exposure to the owner
+(`READ_ONLY`, `TOOLSETS`, `DISABLED_TOOLS`, token scopes). The operator checklist is
+[hardening.md](hardening.md); open review findings are in
+[security-findings.md](security-findings.md) (all 19 findings of the S2 review are fixed or
+waived).
 
-- OAuth2/OIDC bearer-token authentication for MCP tool execution.
+## Threat model
-- OIDC discovery + JWKS validation cache for JWT tokens.
-- Userinfo validation fallback for opaque OAuth tokens.
-- Scope enforcement:
-  - `read:repository` for read tools.
-  - `write:repository` for write tools.
-- Policy engine checks before tool execution.
-- Per-IP and per-token rate limiting.
-- Strict schema validation (`extra=forbid`).
-- Tamper-evident audit logging with hash chaining.
-- Secret sanitization for logs and tool output.
-- Production-safe error responses (no internal stack traces).
 
-## Threat Model
+### Assets
 
-### Why shared bot tokens are dangerous
+| Asset | Where it lives | Impact if lost |
+|---|---|---|
+| Admin Gitea token (`GITEA_TOKEN`) | env file or container env; process memory | Full control of the instance, including Sudo as any user |
+| MCP bearer (`MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`) | env file; remote clients' configuration | Equivalent to the admin token over HTTP |
+| OAuth client secret (`GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`) | env file | Impersonating this server towards Gitea's OAuth endpoints |
+| Per-user Gitea access and refresh tokens | `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json` (encrypted), process memory | Acting as each signed-in user, for as long as Gitea accepts the refresh token |
+| Our issued `agm_` access and refresh tokens | clients; only SHA-256 hashes in the store | Acting as one user through this server until expiry or revocation |
+| Token store and its key (`TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) | store in `DATA_DIR`, key in env | Store plus key discloses every user's Gitea tokens and every client secret |
+| Action secret values, webhook auth headers, minted credentials | in transit through tool calls | Credentials of CI, webhooks and other systems |
+| Audit log (`DATA_DIR/audit.log`) | `DATA_DIR` | Loss of accountability; integrity is the asset, not secrecy |
 
-- A single leaked bot token can expose all repositories that bot can access.
+### Actors
-- Access is not naturally bounded per end user.
-- Blast radius is large and cross-tenant.
 
-### Why token-in-URL is insecure
+- Owner: configures the server, holds the admin token. Trusted.
+- OAuth users: Gitea accounts that sign in through a client. Trusted with their own Gitea
+  permissions only.
+- Remote MCP clients, including hosted ones (claude.ai, Mistral Le Chat): hold a bearer or an
+  OAuth token and act through a model that reads untrusted content.
+- Malicious Gitea content authors: anyone who can write an issue, comment, file, commit
+  message, release note or wiki page the model may read.
+- Network attackers: anyone who can reach the HTTP port or sit on the path to it or to Gitea.
+- Other tenants of the shared CI host: jobs and services on the same runner and Docker daemon.
 
-- URLs can be captured by reverse proxy logs, browser history, referer headers, and monitoring pipelines.
+### Trust boundaries
-- Bearer tokens must be passed in `Authorization` headers only.
 
-### Why per-user OAuth reduces lateral access
+1. MCP client to HTTP endpoint (`transports.py`): unauthenticated network input until a bearer
+   or `agm_` token is verified (`auth.py`, `oauth/provider.py`).
+2. Browser to OAuth routes (`oauth/callback.py`, SDK `/authorize`, `/token`, `/register`,
+   `/revoke`): unauthenticated, cross-site capable.
+3. Verified token to identity (`oauth/resolver.py`, `auth.py`): decides which Gitea token a
+   call uses.
+4. Server to Gitea (`gitea/executor.py`, `oauth/upstream.py`): Gitea is trusted for
+   authorization decisions, its content is not trusted.
+5. Tool result to model: everything Gitea returns crosses into a model context.
+6. Process to disk (`audit.py`, `oauth/store.py`, `config.py` reading `.env`).
+7. Repository to CI runner (`.gitea/workflows/*.yml`, `scripts/ci/*`): code under test runs
+   with access to the runner's Docker daemon.
 
-- Each MCP request executes with the signed-in user token.
+### Threats and mitigations
-- Gitea authorization stays source-of-truth for repository visibility.
-- A compromised token is limited to that user�s permissions.
 
-## Resource-type-aware authorization
+Spoofing
 
-The public server runs in *service-PAT mode*: a privileged bot token makes the
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
-actual Gitea calls while the per-user OAuth identity decides what the user may
+|---|---|---|
-reach. Repository calls are gated by the user's collaborator permission on
+| Calling the endpoint without credentials | Non-loopback bind refuses to start without a bearer or OAuth; SDK `RequireAuthMiddleware` answers 401 | `transports.py` (`http_startup_errors`, `build_http_app`) |
-`owner/repo`. The rest of the Gitea surface — reachable through the
+| Guessing the bearer | 32 character minimum; constant-time comparison of SHA-256 digests; per-IP and per-token rate limit before auth | `config.py`, `auth.py` (`StaticBearerVerifier`), `rate_limit.py` |
-`gitea_request` escape hatch — is gated by **resource-type-aware authorization**
+| Using a token minted for another resource | RFC 8707 resource binding and required scope `gitea` enforced by the SDK; `/authorize` with a foreign `resource` gets `invalid_target` | `transports.py` (`_auth_settings`), `oauth/provider.py` |
-(`authz.py`). Every call is classified by `(method, path)` and enforced against
+| Confused deputy through the shared Gitea OAuth app | Own consent page naming client and redirect URI, CSRF double submit with `SameSite=Strict` cookie, browser-binding cookie on the callback | `oauth/callback.py`, `oauth/provider.py` (residual: W-10, optional `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST`) |
-a type-specific rule. **Every decision fails closed**: a call that cannot be
+| Code or refresh token replay | Single-use codes; replay or reuse of a rotated refresh token revokes the grant | `oauth/provider.py` |
-classified, or whose permission cannot be positively verified against Gitea, is
-denied and audited.
 
-| Resource type | Rule (service-PAT mode) |
+Tampering
-|---------------|--------------------------|
-| `repository` | Per-user collaborator permission on `owner/repo` (existing check). A repo path that cannot be parsed to `owner/repo` is denied. |
-| `org` | The signed-in user must be a **verified member** of the target org (checked against Gitea, fail closed). |
-| `user_owned` | A resource owned by a named user/org (`/users/{name}`, `/packages/{owner}`): allowed only when the owner is the caller, or the caller is a verified member of the owning org. |
-| `user_self` | Token-owner-scoped endpoints (`/user`, `/notifications`): **denied** — in service-PAT mode the data belongs to the bot, not the caller. |
-| `misc_global` | Instance-wide read-only utilities (markdown render, version, gitignore templates): reads allowed; writes denied. |
-| `admin` | **Default deny.** Allowed only when the operator opts in (`RAW_API_ALLOW_SENSITIVE=true`) **and** the signed-in user is a verified Gitea site administrator. |
-| `unknown` | Denied. |
 
-This gate runs *in addition to* the policy engine and the `WRITE_MODE` gate — a
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
-write call is denied unless write mode is on, policy allows it, and the
+|---|---|---|
-resource-type rule passes. In pure-OAuth mode (no service PAT) the user's own
+| Path traversal or path reshaping into other Gitea routes | Path values rejected on `..`, `.`, empty segment, `\`, `?`, `#`, `%`, control characters; percent-encoded with `safe=""` except verified wildcard routes | `gitea/encoding.py` |
-token already scopes every call at Gitea, so the extra gate is unnecessary.
+| Header injection (Sudo, multipart) | Sudo restricted to `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,255}`; filenames and content types single line, no quotes; header parameters of the spec never forwarded | `gitea/encoding.py`, `catalog/build.py` |
+| Query smuggling of credentials or Sudo | `token`, `access_token`, `sudo`, `_sudo` refused as query names (any case) | `gitea/encoding.py` |
+| Malformed arguments | JSON Schema validation (Draft 2020-12, `additionalProperties: false`) before anything runs; messages never echo values | `server.py` |
+| Store tampering or wrong key | Fernet (authenticated encryption) with an HKDF-SHA256 key; undecryptable store stops startup instead of being wiped; symlinks refused | `oauth/store.py` (the directory must be owned by the running user and not group or world writable) |
+| Settings injection from a planted `.env` | `./.env` is loaded only when it is a regular file, not a symlink, owned by the user, mode 0600; otherwise ignored with a warning; `--env-file` or `AEGIS_ENV_FILE` name a file explicitly; the environment wins | `config.py` (`select_env_file`), `cli.py` |
 
-Positive verification results (org membership, site-admin) are cached briefly
+Repudiation
-and bounded; only successful checks are cached, so a transient failure never
-grants access.
 
-## Full-API coverage: classified `gitea_request`
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
+|---|---|---|
+| Unrecorded tool calls | Exactly one hash-chained result entry per call, preceded by a write-ahead `tool_call_started` entry; a call is refused when either the logger or that write fails; startup fails on an unwritable log | `server.py`, `audit.py`, `transports.py` |
+| Undetected edits of the log | SHA-256 hash chain, `scripts/validate_audit_log.py` | `audit.py` (unkeyed chain: waiver W-11) |
 
-`gitea_request` exposes the long tail of the Gitea API that the curated typed
+Information disclosure
-tools do not cover, safely:
 
-- **Deterministic read/write classifier.** `GET`/`HEAD` are reads; everything
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
-  else is a write. A small, explicit override table may only *downgrade*
+|---|---|---|
-  provably side-effect-free render endpoints (markdown/markup) to reads — never
+| Tokens in results or errors | Exact redaction of the identity token, refresh token, admin token, bearer, client secret, store key and submitted secret fields in every result and error; pattern masking per `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` | `gitea/executor.py`, `gitea/redaction.py`, `security.py` |
-  the reverse — so a mutating call can never be misclassified as a read and slip
+| Tokens in logs | JSON log formatter without tracebacks; query strings dropped from access logs; upstream errors reduced to coarse kinds | `logging_utils.py`, `transports.py` (`AccessLogQueryFilter`), `oauth/upstream.py` |
-  past the `WRITE_MODE` gate.
+| Secret values echoed back | Submitted `password`, `secret`, `token` style fields and Action secret `data` redacted from the result; secret-bearing response fields (stored webhook `authorization_header`, `secret`, `password` and the rest of `SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`, and `data` on Action secret operations) redacted by key name; secrets in object keys masked | `gitea/encoding.py` (`sensitive_body_values`, `SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`), `gitea/executor.py` |
-- **Known-path gate.** A request whose top path segment is not a recognized
+| Leaks across identities | No cookie jar, no redirects followed, a fresh upstream client per OAuth exchange | `gitea/executor.py`, `oauth/upstream.py` |
-  Gitea `/api/v1` route prefix is denied (fail closed): unknown paths are never
+| Stack traces | `EXPOSE_ERROR_DETAILS=false` by default; even when on, only the exception class name | `server.py`, `gitea/executor.py` |
-  passed straight through.
-- **Admin/credential denylist.** `/admin`, `*tokens*`, `*secrets*`, `*hooks*`,
-  `*keys*`, `applications/oauth2`, and runner registration tokens are blocked for
-  every method (including `GET`) and cannot be re-opened from `policy.yaml` —
-  only `RAW_API_ALLOW_SENSITIVE=true` overrides them, and admin then still
-  requires a verified site administrator (see above).
 
-## Prompt Injection Hardening
+Denial of service
 
-Repository content is treated as untrusted data.
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
+|---|---|---|
+| Large request bodies | SDK body limit on the MCP endpoint and SDK OAuth routes; upload cap checked before decoding | `server.py` (`max_request_body_size`), `gitea/encoding.py`, `oauth/callback.py` (16 KiB cap, form content type only) |
+| Large or hostile responses | 16 MiB text cap, `MAX_BINARY_BYTES`, 64 KiB error bodies, JSON depth 100, item and character limits | `gitea/executor.py` |
+| Request floods | Sliding window per IP and per token hash, bounded key sets, rate-limit events audited once per window | `rate_limit.py`, `transports.py` (`ForwardedHeadersMiddleware`) |
+| Unbounded OAuth state | Caps on clients (500), pending sign-ins (1024), codes (1024), sessions per login (50); per client address at most 20 pending sign-ins and 20 registrations per hour; clients younger than the pending window are never evicted; store pruning; the store write (fsync) runs in a worker thread | `oauth/provider.py`, `oauth/store.py` |
 
-- Tool outputs are bounded and sanitized.
+Elevation of privilege
-- No instructions from repository text are executed.
-- Text fields are size-limited before returning to LLM clients.
 
-## Secret Detection
+| Threat | Mitigation | Implemented in |
+|---|---|---|
+| OAuth user reaching the admin token | Tokens with the OAuth marker only ever resolve to their session; only the static bearer (or no token on stdio and unauthenticated loopback) reaches admin-token mode; OAuth-only deployments fail closed | `oauth/resolver.py`, `auth.py` |
+| OAuth user using Sudo | Sudo is sent with the caller's own token; Gitea honours it only for site admins | `gitea/executor.py` |
+| Unknown Gitea scopes granting full access | Only granular `read:`/`write:` scopes accepted for `OAUTH_SCOPES` | `config.py` |
+| Model tricked by injected content | Untrusted-content labelling and annotations (see below); exposure narrowed by configuration | `server.py`, `gitea/executor.py` |
+| Untrusted code on the shared CI host | Per-run resource names and targeted cleanup | `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`, `scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh`; fork pull requests do not run the Docker jobs |
 
-Detected classes include:
+### Residual risks and owner decisions
 
-- API key and token patterns.
+- Full access by default (ADR 0001). A leaked bearer equals the admin token. Sudo, admin,
-- JWT-like tokens.
+  secrets and delete tools are enabled unless the owner narrows them.
-- Private key block markers.
+- Unauthenticated loopback mode is allowed for development. Any local user or process on the
-- Common provider credential formats.
+  same host then acts with the admin token. Set a bearer on shared hosts.
+- Hosted clients (claude.ai, Le Chat) hold the bearer or an OAuth refresh token outside the
+  owner's control. Prefer per-user OAuth and narrow `OAUTH_SCOPES`; the default grants
+  `write:` on every category, including admin for site admins.
+- Credential-issuing operations (`gitea_user_create_token`, runner registration tokens such as
+  `gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token`, OAuth2 application secrets,
+  `gitea_repo_create_deploy_token`) return the new credential to the model by design; only the
+  caller's own tokens are still redacted.
+- Secret pattern masking is heuristic. Content containing third-party credentials (for example a
+  Gitea token committed to a file) is returned unless it matches a pattern.
+- SSRF through Gitea features (migrations, webhooks, mirrors) is Gitea's responsibility; this
+  server only ever contacts `GITEA_URL`.
+- With the default `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` (empty), the consent page is the only barrier
+  against phishing with a self-registered client (waiver W-10). For a public deployment set the
+  allowlist to the hosted clients you use, for example
+  `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST=https://claude.ai/,https://chat.mistral.ai/`.
+- Key rotation for `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is not supported: a new key means moving the store
+  away and signing every user out.
+- The audit chain is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof: anyone with write access to the file can
+  rewrite it consistently. Ship it off the host.
 
-Behavior:
+## Prompt injection
 
-- `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=mask`: redact in place.
+Everything returned from Gitea is untrusted data. Every success envelope carries the fixed
-- `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=block`: replace secret-bearing values.
+`untrusted_content` notice, the server instructions tell the model never to follow
-- `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off`: disable sanitization (not recommended).
+instructions found in Gitea content, and the server itself never interprets content (it does
+not follow links, render, execute or chain calls). Tool annotations mark read-only and
+destructive operations so clients can require confirmation. The realistic attack is a model
+that reads a hostile issue and then calls a destructive tool; the defences are client-side
+confirmation, `READ_ONLY`, `TOOLSETS`, `DISABLED_TOOLS` and narrow token scopes
+([hardening.md](hardening.md)).
+
+## Secret hygiene guarantees
+
+- Settings hold secrets as `SecretStr`; `Identity`, `SessionRecord`, `UpstreamTokens` and the
+  pending authorization exclude tokens from `repr`.
+- Results and errors: exact redaction of every known secret (identity token and refresh token,
+  `GITEA_TOKEN`, `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN`, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`, `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,
+  secret fields submitted in the request), then pattern masking or blocking.
+- Validation errors and argument errors never contain argument values.
+- Audit entries carry argument names, never values, and are masked again before writing.
+- Logs: JSON lines, exception type only, access-log query strings replaced by `[redacted]`.
+- Our own tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes; the store file is encrypted, mode 0600,
+  written through `O_EXCL` temporary files and an atomic rename.
+- Action secrets: Gitea's list endpoints (`gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets`,
+  `gitea_actions_org_list_secrets`) return names and descriptions only (a `data` field in an
+  Action secret response is redacted should Gitea ever send one), and a submitted value
+  (`gitea_actions_update_repo_secret` and siblings) is redacted from the result at any length.
+- A webhook's stored `authorization_header` (and any other field in `SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`)
+  is redacted by key name in every result, whatever `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE` says; an empty
+  value stays visible as empty. Credential-issuing operations are the only exemption (W-07).
+- With `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off` pattern matching is disabled, which also removes the only
+  protection of our own issued `agm_` tokens and of the MCP client secrets (only hashes of the
+  tokens exist on the server, so they cannot be redacted exactly). Exact redaction of every
+  other known secret stays on in all modes.
+- Configuration errors name the setting and the rule and never the value (including unknown
+  `OAUTH_SCOPES` and `TOOLSETS` entries).
+
+## Transport guarantees
+
+- Fail-closed bind: `MCP_HOST` defaults to `127.0.0.1`; any non-loopback bind without a bearer
+  or a working OAuth setup exits with code 2. A half-configured OAuth setup also exits 2.
+- Constant-time bearer check on SHA-256 digests, so neither content nor length leaks.
+- DNS-rebinding protection on the MCP endpoint: `Host` must be a loopback name, the bind
+  address, the `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` host or an `ALLOWED_HOSTS` entry (421 otherwise); a foreign
+  `Origin` gets 403; POST must be `application/json`.
+- Rate limits: sliding window per client IP (IPv6 per /64) and per Authorization hash on the
+  MCP path and the unauthenticated OAuth paths (`/register`, `/authorize`, `/token`, `/revoke`,
+  consent, callback), before authentication. Client IPs come from `X-Forwarded-For` only for
+  `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`; a forwarded header from any other peer is ignored and logged once.
+- `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` must be https unless loopback. `GITEA_URL` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` reject
+  whitespace, backslashes and control characters and are rebuilt from their parsed parts;
+  plain http `GITEA_URL` to a non-loopback host prints a startup warning. Gitea redirects are
+  never followed.
+- stdio: stdout carries JSON-RPC only; all logging goes to stderr.
+
+### Per-user OAuth design
+
+The server is an OAuth 2.1 authorization server for MCP clients (SDK provider, dynamic client
+registration, PKCE S256 required) and a confidential PKCE client of Gitea. Flow: `/authorize`
+parks the request and shows our consent page (client name, redirect URI, warning). Approval
+needs the form CSRF token, the matching `SameSite=Strict` cookie and a request `Origin` equal
+to the public origin (the `Referer` origin when `Origin` is absent; neither, or `null`, is
+refused). It sets a browser-binding cookie named per flow (`aegis-oauth-flow-<8 hex of the
+state hash>`, `__Host-` prefixed and `Secure` on https, `HttpOnly`), so concurrent sign-ins in
+one browser do not overwrite each other. The Gitea
+callback is completed only in the browser holding that cookie; unknown, expired or replayed
+states never redirect. Pages send `Cache-Control: no-store`, `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer`,
+`X-Frame-Options: DENY` and a CSP with `frame-ancestors 'none'`. Redirect URIs must be https,
+or http on loopback, without credentials or fragments. Issued tokens are opaque (`agm_` plus 256
+random bits), hashed at rest, bound to the MCP resource; access tokens live 1 hour, refresh
+tokens 30 days with rotation. Revocation ends the whole grant.
+
+## Supply chain
+
+- Base images pinned by digest (`python:3.12-slim`, `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv`), non-root runtime
+  user, root-owned virtualenv, no build arguments carrying secrets, `.dockerignore` excludes
+  `.env`.
+- Dependencies locked in `uv.lock` and installed with `uv sync --locked`.
+- `pip-audit` over the exported lock (`scripts/ci/pip_audit.sh`, waivers in
+  `security/pip-audit-ignore.txt`).
+- gitleaks pinned to 8.30.1 with sha256 verification, full-history scan with
+  `.gitleaks.toml`.
+- ruff `S` (bandit) rules enabled in the normal lint and run separately in the `security` job.
+- Every third-party action in `.gitea/workflows/*.yml` is pinned to a full commit SHA with the
+  version in a comment; no secret is passed to a third-party action (the registry login uses the
+  Docker CLI with the token on stdin in a per-job `DOCKER_CONFIG`, `uv publish` reads
+  `UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD`); checkout does not persist the job token.
+- Docker and secret jobs do not run for pull requests from forks.
+- The image built in `build-and-push` is scanned with a pinned Trivy (0.76.0, sha256 verified)
+  before it is pushed; fixable HIGH and CRITICAL findings fail the job (waivers in
+  `security/trivyignore.txt`). `scan.yml` repeats the image scan and the dependency audit weekly.
+- `publish.yml` needs the same `security` gates (gitleaks, security tests, pip-audit, ruff `S`).
+
+## Verification results
+
+Run on 2026-10-14 on branch `feat/full-api-coverage` after the S2 commits (`git log
+5baf73f..HEAD`).
+
+| Check | Command | Result |
+|---|---|---|
+| Security test suite | `uv run pytest tests/security --no-cov` | 683 passed, 0 failed (15 files: auth required, startup fail closed, redaction, secret echo, malformed input, base URL validation, OAuth CSRF, OAuth input bounds, OAuth redirects, token store, audit file, audit fail closed, rate limits, env file, CI workflows). |
+| Dependency audit | `bash scripts/ci/pip_audit.sh` (pip-audit 2.10.1, `--strict`) | No known vulnerabilities in 83 locked packages (runtime and dev groups). No ignores in use. |
+| Bandit rules | `uv run ruff check --select S .` (ruff 0.17.0) | All checks passed, with the inline waivers listed below. |
+| Secret scan | `scripts/ci/install_gitleaks.sh` into a scratch directory, then `gitleaks git --config .gitleaks.toml --redact --no-banner --verbose --exit-code 1 .` (gitleaks 8.30.1) | No leaks found, 137 commits scanned (about 6.4 MB). |
+| Image scan | `scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh`, then `scripts/ci/scan_image.sh <image built from docker/Dockerfile>` (Trivy 0.76.0, HIGH and CRITICAL, fixable only) | Clean: no findings in the Debian 13 base or the Python packages. |
+| Unit suite | `uv run pytest` (coverage gate 90) | 1529 passed, 23 skipped (live Gitea and Docker tests), coverage 97.8 percent. |
+
+## Waivers
+
+Accepted findings, each with its reason. A new waiver needs a reason here in the same
+changeset.
+
+| Id | Finding | Where | Reason |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| W-01 | S104 (bind to all interfaces) | `transports.py` `_WILDCARD_HOSTS`, `tests/test_server_helpers.py`, `tests/test_config.py` | The addresses are compared or used as test input, never bound. The container binds 0.0.0.0 through `MCP_HOST`, which requires authentication. |
+| W-02 | S105/S106 (hardcoded password) | `auth.py` (`token="static"`), `oauth/provider.py` (`TOKEN_PREFIX`, `token_type="Bearer"`), `audit.py` (mode string), `setup_snippets.py` (`TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER`) | Placeholders, public prefixes and type names, not secrets. |
+| W-03 | S101 (assert) | `setup_cmd.py` (two narrowing asserts) | Type narrowing after an explicit check; behaviour does not depend on the assert. |
+| W-04 | S101, S105, S106, S108 in `tests/**`; S603, S607 in `tests/integration/harness.py` and `tests/mcp/helpers.py` | `pyproject.toml` per-file ignores, inline noqa | Test fixtures use fake tokens and temporary paths; the harness drives the trusted local Docker CLI with fixed argv. |
+| W-05 | gitleaks allowlists | `.gitleaks.toml` | Only `generic-api-key` and `curl-auth-header`, only in `tests/`, `docs/`, removed legacy guides and one removed source file; every match was reviewed as a fake or placeholder. |
+| W-06 | pip-audit | `security/pip-audit-ignore.txt` | Empty: no advisory is ignored. |
+| W-07 | Credential-issuing operations bypass pattern masking | `gitea/executor.py` (`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS`) | Their purpose is to return a new credential; exact redaction of the caller's own tokens still applies. |
+| W-08 | Unauthenticated `/health` and `/` report version and tool count, `/health` reports Gitea reachability | `transports.py` | Needed by container health checks and clients; reveals no configuration or secret. The Gitea probe is cached for 10 seconds. |
+| W-09 | Pattern masking keeps the first and last 4 characters of a matched secret | `security.py` (`mask_secret`) | Applies only to pattern matches, which are at least 16 characters; the remainder keeps enough entropy, and the context helps users recognise the value. |
+| W-10 | Any https redirect URI can be registered when `OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST` is empty (SEC-05) | `oauth/provider.py` (`redirect_uri_problem`), `config.py` | Owner decision: the default stays open so any MCP client can register without configuration. The mitigation is the consent page (client name, redirect host and URI, explicit approval, CSRF and browser binding) and ADR 0004. The optional allowlist closes the gap: exact URIs or `https://host/` prefixes, checked at registration and at `/authorize`; recommended for every public deployment. |
+| W-11 | Audit chain is unkeyed (SEC-11) | `audit.py` | The chain is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof, and an `AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` kept next to the log would not change that for an attacker with host access. The integrity control is shipping the log off the host and comparing the latest `entry_hash` (see audit-logging.md). The directory is 0700 and the file 0600, and symlinks are refused. |

docs/troubleshooting.md

@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
 # Troubleshooting
 
 Start with the result of the failing call: errors carry `error.status`, `error.kind` and
-Gitea's sanitized message, and the audit log has one event per call (see
+Gitea's sanitized message, and the audit log has a result entry (`tool_invocation`) per call, preceded by a `tool_call_started` entry (see
 [audit-logging.md](audit-logging.md)).
 
 ## The server does not start
 
 | Message or exit | Cause and fix |
 |---|---|
-| Exit code 2, "GITEA_TOKEN" required (stdio) | stdio needs `GITEA_TOKEN`. Put it in the client's `env` block or in `.env` in the working directory the client starts the server in. |
+| Exit code 2, "GITEA_TOKEN" required (stdio) | stdio needs `GITEA_TOKEN`. Put it in the client's `env` block, or in an env file passed with `--env-file` (or `AEGIS_ENV_FILE`). A `.env` in the working directory counts only when it is a regular file you own with mode 0600. |
+| Warning "ignoring ./.env: ..." | The working directory's `.env` is a symlink, owned by someone else or accessible to group or others, so its settings are not loaded. Run `chmod 600 .env`, or pass `--env-file PATH`. See "Which env file is read" in [configuration.md](configuration.md). |
+| Exit code 2, "env file ... does not exist" | The file named by `--env-file` or `AEGIS_ENV_FILE` is missing or not a regular file. |
 | Exit code 2, refuses a non-loopback bind | `MCP_HOST` is not loopback and there is no `MCP_BEARER_TOKEN` or complete OAuth setup. Set one of them, or bind `127.0.0.1` behind a reverse proxy. |
 | Exit code 2, lists OAuth settings | `OAUTH_ENABLED=true` needs `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, `GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`, `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`. |
+| Exit code 2, "cannot decrypt .../oauth-store.json" | `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` differs from the key the store was written with (or the file is damaged). The server does not wipe it. Restore the original key, or move `DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json` away to start over (signs every OAuth user out). |
+| Exit code 2, "owned by another user" or "writable by group or others" (OAuth) | `DATA_DIR` must belong to the user the server runs as and not be group or world writable. Fix the owner or `chmod 700`. |
 | Validation error naming a setting | See the rules in [configuration.md](configuration.md): URLs must be http(s) without credentials, `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` must be https, secrets need 32 characters, `OAUTH_SCOPES` accepts only granular scopes. |
 | Startup error listing tool names | `DISABLED_TOOLS` contains names that are not registered. Check [tools.md](tools.md). |
 
@@ -18,8 +22,10 @@ Gitea's sanitized message, and the audit log has one event per call (see
 
 stdout carries only JSON-RPC. If a wrapper script prints to stdout before the server starts, the
 client fails to parse the stream. Logs go to stderr; look at the client's MCP server log.
-`uvx` needs access to the package index that hosts `aegis-gitea-mcp`, see
+`uvx` needs access to the package index that hosts `aegis-gitea-mcp`: pass
-[packaging.md](packaging.md).
+`--index https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/`, see
+[packaging.md](packaging.md). If you register the server with `claude mcp add`, put `--env`
+before `--transport stdio` and the server name, as `setup` prints it.
 
 ## Tool calls fail
 
@@ -34,6 +40,7 @@ client fails to parse the stream. Logs go to stderr; look at the client's MCP se
 | `redirect` | Gitea answered with a redirect, which is never followed. Use the final URL (for example https) as `GITEA_URL`. |
 | `payload_too_large` | The response is above `MAX_BINARY_BYTES`. Raise it or fetch a smaller object. |
 | `secret_blocked` | `SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=block` withheld a result containing secret-like content. Use `mask` if that is acceptable. |
+| `audit_unavailable` | The audit log could not be opened, so the call was refused before it reached Gitea. Fix the permissions of `AUDIT_LOG_PATH` (or `DATA_DIR`) and restart. |
 | `rate_limited` (429) | Gitea or this server's `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` limit. |
 
 A result with a `truncated` object was cut to `MAX_TOOL_RESPONSE_ITEMS` or
@@ -48,9 +55,15 @@ A tool the client cannot see is probably filtered by `TOOLSETS`, `READ_ONLY` or
   10 seconds). Fix connectivity from the server's host.
 - 401 on `/mcp`: no or wrong bearer token, and no valid OAuth token. The response has a
   `WWW-Authenticate` header that points clients to the OAuth metadata.
-- Request rejected with an invalid Host: the name you used is not allowed. Add it to
+- Request rejected with an invalid Host (421): the name you used is not allowed. Add it to
-  `ALLOWED_HOSTS` or set `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`.
+  `ALLOWED_HOSTS` or set `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`. With a non-loopback `MCP_HOST` and neither variable
-- 429: the client exceeded `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`.
+  the server prints a warning at startup that says so.
+- 429: the client exceeded `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`. If every client seems to share one limit,
+  the proxy address is not in `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`, so all requests look like they come from
+  the proxy.
+- The server exits with code 2 and "cannot open the audit log": the audit file or its directory
+  is not writable. Fix the permissions, or point `AUDIT_LOG_PATH` or `DATA_DIR` at a writable
+  location (in Docker, check the volume ownership). The server never runs without an audit log.
 - Responses arrive in one chunk or time out behind nginx: set `proxy_buffering off;`.
 
 ## OAuth sign-in
@@ -60,8 +73,13 @@ A tool the client cannot see is probably filtered by `TOOLSETS`, `READ_ONLY` or
 - Gitea shows a redirect URI error: the OAuth application's redirect URI must be exactly
   `<PUBLIC_BASE_URL>/oauth/callback`. Re-run `setup --public-base-url ...` or fix it in Gitea.
 - Signed in, but admin tools return 403: the user is not a site administrator. That is intended.
-- Users are asked to sign in again after a restart: `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` or the `DATA_DIR`
+- Users are asked to sign in again after a restart: the `DATA_DIR` volume changed or was not
-  volume changed. The key must stay stable and the volume persistent.
+  persistent (a changed `TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY` stops startup instead, see above). Keep the key
+  stable and the volume persistent.
+- The sign-in page says the request is invalid or expired: the consent page lives 10 minutes
+  and a form is single use. Start the sign-in again from the client. Registration or sign-in
+  refused with "too many": one client address may hold 20 pending sign-ins and register 20
+  clients per hour.
 - After fixing OAuth settings the client still fails: some clients cache tokens. Disconnect the
   server in the client and connect again, which starts a fresh flow. Users can also revoke the
   application under Settings, Applications, Authorized OAuth2 Applications in Gitea.

pyproject.toml

@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ ignore = [
     "B008",  # function calls in argument defaults (pydantic Field style)
 ]
 
+[tool.ruff.lint.isort]
+# tests/mcp is a directory, not the SDK: keep "mcp" classified as third party.
+known-third-party = ["mcp"]
+
 [tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
 "__init__.py" = ["F401"]
 "tests/integration/harness.py" = [
@@ -123,12 +127,13 @@ disallow_untyped_defs = false
 
 [tool.pytest.ini_options]
 minversion = "8.0"
-addopts = "-ra -q --strict-markers --cov=aegis_gitea_mcp --cov-report=term-missing --cov-fail-under=80"
+addopts = "-ra -q --strict-markers --cov=aegis_gitea_mcp --cov-report=term-missing --cov-fail-under=90"
 testpaths = ["tests"]
 pythonpath = ["src"]
 asyncio_mode = "auto"
 markers = [
     "integration: needs a live Gitea in Docker (opt-in via AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1)",
+    "mcp_smoke: MCP client smoke tests over real transports (opt-in via AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1)",
 ]
 
 [tool.coverage.run]
@@ -136,7 +141,7 @@ source = ["src"]
 omit = ["tests/*", "**/__pycache__/*"]
 
 [tool.coverage.report]
-fail_under = 80
+fail_under = 90
 exclude_lines = [
     "pragma: no cover",
     "def __repr__",

scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh

@@ -8,8 +8,14 @@
 #   * per-run networks named aegis-it-* that the job container is attached to
 #     (the integration harness joins the job container to its own per-run
 #     network only), plus the containers still attached to those networks;
-#   * containers started from the exact image refs given as arguments;
+#   * containers started from the per-run image refs given as arguments, and
-#   * the exact image refs given as arguments.
+#     those refs. Per-run refs are names containing "aegis-ci-" (named after the
+#     run id), such as the local build tag aegis-ci-<run id>-build:<sha>;
+#   * for any other ref (registry tags such as :sha-<12>, :latest, :main, :dev,
+#     which a deployment on the same daemon may use) only the tag is removed.
+#     Containers are never touched, and an image still used by a container simply
+#     stays. Pass registry tags before the per-run ref: the image itself goes away
+#     with its last tag.
 # Everything is best effort (a failing removal never fails the job).
 set -uo pipefail
 
@@ -40,12 +46,24 @@ if [ -n "${job_ref}" ] && docker container inspect "${job_ref}" > /dev/null 2>&1
   done
 fi
 
+is_per_run_ref() {
+  case "$1" in
+    *aegis-ci-*) return 0 ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
 for image in "$@"; do
-  for cid in $(docker ps -aq --filter "ancestor=${image}" 2> /dev/null); do
+  if is_per_run_ref "${image}"; then
-    docker rm -f -v "${cid}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    for cid in $(docker ps -aq --filter "ancestor=${image}" 2> /dev/null); do
-  done
+      docker rm -f -v "${cid}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
-  docker rmi "${image}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    done
-  echo "removed image ${image}"
+    docker rmi "${image}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    echo "removed image ${image}"
+  else
+    docker image rm "${image}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    echo "untagged shared ref ${image}"
+  fi
 done
 
 exit 0

scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Install a pinned Trivy release into a directory, verifying its sha256.
+#
+# Usage: scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh <dest-dir>
+#
+# The binary ends up at <dest-dir>/trivy. To upgrade, bump TRIVY_VERSION and both
+# digests from the release's trivy_<version>_checksums.txt.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+TRIVY_VERSION="0.76.0"
+SHA256_X64="e24b1c51293c1b15e4ba8d45bbc7891ba053f90278ec2698f3562c993e145fe7"
+SHA256_ARM64="aab21e677a7b7071fc79f1711480840754c18a1b9d9cefa7ccd06af63a0e8f4c"
+
+dest="${1:?usage: install_trivy.sh <dest-dir>}"
+
+case "$(uname -m)" in
+  x86_64 | amd64)
+    arch="64bit"
+    expected="${SHA256_X64}"
+    ;;
+  aarch64 | arm64)
+    arch="ARM64"
+    expected="${SHA256_ARM64}"
+    ;;
+  *)
+    echo "unsupported architecture: $(uname -m)" >&2
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+archive="trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-${arch}.tar.gz"
+url="https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/${archive}"
+
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "${work}"' EXIT
+
+curl --fail --silent --show-error --location --retry 3 --output "${work}/${archive}" "${url}"
+echo "${expected}  ${work}/${archive}" | sha256sum --check --status || {
+  echo "sha256 mismatch for ${archive}" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+mkdir -p "${dest}"
+tar -xzf "${work}/${archive}" -C "${dest}" trivy
+chmod 0755 "${dest}/trivy"
+"${dest}/trivy" version

scripts/ci/scan_image.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Scan a locally built image for known vulnerabilities with Trivy.
+#
+# Usage: scripts/ci/scan_image.sh <image-ref>
+#
+# Fails (exit 1) on HIGH or CRITICAL findings that have a fixed version. Findings
+# without a fix are reported by Trivy but do not fail the scan (nothing can be done
+# about them yet). Accepted findings are listed in security/trivyignore.txt, one
+# vulnerability id per line with a reason, and in docs/security.md. The image is
+# exported with `docker save` so Trivy needs no access to the Docker socket.
+#
+# Trivy itself is pinned (scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh); its vulnerability database
+# is fetched fresh on every run, which is the point of scanning.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+image="${1:?usage: scan_image.sh <image-ref>}"
+ignore_file="security/trivyignore.txt"
+
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "${work}"' EXIT
+
+docker save --output "${work}/image.tar" "${image}"
+
+args=(
+  image
+  --input "${work}/image.tar"
+  --cache-dir "${work}/cache"
+  --scanners vuln
+  --severity HIGH,CRITICAL
+  --ignore-unfixed
+  --exit-code 1
+  --no-progress
+  --db-repository "ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2,public.ecr.aws/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2"
+)
+if [ -f "${ignore_file}" ]; then
+  args+=(--ignorefile "${ignore_file}")
+fi
+
+trivy "${args[@]}"

security/trivyignore.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Accepted container image vulnerabilities (Trivy ignore file).
+#
+# One vulnerability id per line (CVE-...). Every entry needs a comment above it with
+# the reason and the date it must be reviewed, and a row in the waiver table of
+# docs/security.md. Empty means nothing is ignored.

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/audit.py

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import contextlib
 import hashlib
 import json
+import os
+import stat
 import threading
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
@@ -33,12 +35,37 @@ class AuditLogger:
         """
         self.settings = get_settings()
         self.log_path = log_path or self.settings.resolved_audit_log_path
-        self.log_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        # A new state directory is private (0700); an existing one is left alone.
+        self.log_path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         self._lock = threading.Lock()
         # Held open for the process lifetime; closed in close().
-        self._log_file = open(self.log_path, "a+", encoding="utf-8")  # noqa: SIM115
+        self._log_file = self._open_log()
         self._last_hash = self._read_last_hash()
 
+    def _open_log(self) -> Any:
+        """Open the log for append: mode 0600 when created, and never through a symlink.
+
+        Raises:
+            OSError: The path cannot be opened (a symlink at the path gives ``ELOOP``).
+        """
+        flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+        descriptor = os.open(self.log_path, flags, 0o600)
+        try:
+            info = os.fstat(descriptor)
+            if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+                raise OSError(f"{self.log_path} is not a regular file")
+            if (
+                info.st_uid == getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: info.st_uid)()
+                and stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o077
+            ):
+                # An older log created under a permissive umask: logins and paths of
+                # every call must not stay readable by other local users.
+                os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+            return os.fdopen(descriptor, "a", encoding="utf-8")
+        except BaseException:
+            os.close(descriptor)
+            raise
+
     def _read_last_hash(self) -> str:
         """Read the previous hash from the last log entry."""
         try:
@@ -129,13 +156,17 @@ class AuditLogger:
         identity_login: str | None = None,
         identity_mode: str | None = None,
         sudo: str | None = None,
+        client_id: str | None = None,
+        session: str | None = None,
+        client_ip: str | None = None,
         outcome: str | None = None,
         duration_ms: float | None = None,
     ) -> str:
         """Log an MCP tool invocation.
 
         The keyword-only fields describe a server tool call (tool domain, HTTP
-        method, path template, identity, sudo target, outcome and duration). They
+        method, path template, identity, sudo target, the MCP client id, a short hash
+        of the grant's session and the source address, outcome and duration). They
         are only written when given. Callers must pass argument names, never
         argument values, in ``params``.
         """
@@ -154,6 +185,9 @@ class AuditLogger:
             "identity_login": identity_login,
             "identity_mode": identity_mode,
             "sudo": sudo,
+            "client_id": client_id,
+            "session": session,
+            "client_ip": client_ip,
             "outcome": outcome,
             "duration_ms": duration_ms,
         }
@@ -162,6 +196,21 @@ class AuditLogger:
             payload["error"] = error
         return self._append_entry("tool_invocation", payload)
 
+    def log_tool_call_started(
+        self, tool_name: str, correlation_id: str, domain: str | None = None
+    ) -> str:
+        """Write the write-ahead entry of a call that is about to run.
+
+        The dispatcher writes it before executing a known tool and refuses the call
+        when it cannot be written, so an audit log that stopped accepting writes
+        after startup (full disk, revoked mount) stops the calls instead of letting
+        them run unrecorded. The final ``tool_invocation`` entry carries the result.
+        """
+        payload: dict[str, Any] = {"correlation_id": correlation_id, "tool_name": tool_name}
+        if domain is not None:
+            payload["domain"] = domain
+        return self._append_entry("tool_call_started", payload)
+
     def log_access_denied(
         self,
         tool_name: str,

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/auth.py

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ token to the :class:`~aegis_gitea_mcp.identity.Identity` a tool call runs as.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import asyncio
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import time
@@ -26,6 +27,9 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
 #: ``client_id`` of the access token the static bearer verifier returns.
 STATIC_CLIENT_ID = "aegis-static-bearer"
 
+#: The one OAuth scope this server grants and requires on the MCP endpoint.
+MCP_SCOPE = "gitea"
+
 # After a failed ``GET /user`` the admin login lookup is not retried for this long.
 _LOGIN_RETRY_SECONDS = 30.0
 
@@ -44,10 +48,14 @@ class StaticBearerVerifier:
 
     Args:
         token: The expected bearer token.
+        resource: Resource (MCP endpoint URL) reported on the access token, so
+            the SDK's RFC 8707 audience check accepts the static bearer when
+            per-user OAuth enables it.
     """
 
-    def __init__(self, token: str) -> None:
+    def __init__(self, token: str, *, resource: str | None = None) -> None:
         self._expected = _digest(token)
+        self._resource = resource
 
     async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
         """Return an admin access token when ``token`` matches, else ``None``."""
@@ -56,7 +64,8 @@ class StaticBearerVerifier:
         return AccessToken(
             token="static",  # noqa: S106 (placeholder, never the real secret)
             client_id=STATIC_CLIENT_ID,
-            scopes=["gitea"],
+            scopes=[MCP_SCOPE],
+            resource=self._resource,
             subject="admin",
         )
 
@@ -103,6 +112,7 @@ class AdminIdentityResolver:
         self._executor = executor
         self._login: str | None = None
         self._retry_at = 0.0
+        self._lookup_lock = asyncio.Lock()
 
     async def resolve(self, access: AccessToken | None) -> Identity:
         """Return the admin identity, or raise for an access token of another kind."""
@@ -113,9 +123,12 @@ class AdminIdentityResolver:
             raise ToolError("admin-token mode needs GITEA_TOKEN, which is not configured")
         token = secret.get_secret_value()
         if self._login is None and time.monotonic() >= self._retry_at:
-            self._login = await self._lookup_login(token)
+            # One lookup for concurrent first calls: later callers wait, then see the result.
-            if self._login is None:
+            async with self._lookup_lock:
-                self._retry_at = time.monotonic() + _LOGIN_RETRY_SECONDS
+                if self._login is None and time.monotonic() >= self._retry_at:
+                    self._login = await self._lookup_login(token)
+                    if self._login is None:
+                        self._retry_at = time.monotonic() + _LOGIN_RETRY_SECONDS
         return Identity(login=self._login, mode="admin-token", token=token)
 
     async def _lookup_login(self, token: str) -> str | None:

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/cli.py

@@ -13,10 +13,28 @@ from collections.abc import Sequence
 from pydantic import ValidationError
 
 from aegis_gitea_mcp import __version__, setup_cmd
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings, get_settings, reset_settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import (
+    ENV_FILE_VARIABLE,
+    EnvFileError,
+    Settings,
+    get_settings,
+    reset_settings,
+    set_env_file,
+)
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.logging_utils import configure_logging
 
 
+def _port(value: str) -> int:
+    """Parse ``--port`` (argparse ``type``): an integer from 1 to 65535."""
+    try:
+        port = int(value)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise argparse.ArgumentTypeError("must be an integer from 1 to 65535") from None
+    if not 1 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise argparse.ArgumentTypeError("must be between 1 and 65535")
+    return port
+
+
 def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     """Build the argument parser."""
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
@@ -35,12 +53,20 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     serve.add_argument("--host", default=None, help="HTTP bind address (default: MCP_HOST)")
     serve.add_argument(
         "--port",
-        type=int,
+        type=_port,
         default=None,
-        choices=range(1, 65536),
         metavar="PORT",
         help="HTTP port (default: MCP_PORT)",
     )
+    serve.add_argument(
+        "--env-file",
+        default=None,
+        metavar="PATH",
+        help=(
+            f"env file to load (default: {ENV_FILE_VARIABLE}, else ./.env when it is a regular "
+            "file owned by you with mode 0600; real environment variables always win)"
+        ),
+    )
 
     setup = subparsers.add_parser("setup", help="verify a Gitea instance and write the env file")
     setup_cmd.add_arguments(setup)
@@ -59,9 +85,13 @@ def _load_settings(args: argparse.Namespace) -> Settings | None:
     for name, value in overrides.items():
         if value is not None:
             os.environ[name] = value
+    set_env_file(getattr(args, "env_file", None))
     reset_settings()
     try:
         return get_settings()
+    except EnvFileError as exc:
+        print(f"aegis-gitea-mcp: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return None
     except ValidationError as exc:
         # Print field names and messages only: str(exc) would echo the offending values.
         print("aegis-gitea-mcp: invalid configuration:", file=sys.stderr)
@@ -79,6 +109,13 @@ def run_serve(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
     if settings is None:
         return 2
     configure_logging(settings.log_level)
+    if settings.insecure_gitea_url():
+        print(
+            "aegis-gitea-mcp: warning: GITEA_URL uses plain http to a host that is not loopback: "
+            "the Gitea token, the OAuth client secret and every user's token travel unencrypted. "
+            "Use https",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
     if settings.mcp_transport == "http":
         return transports.run_http(settings)
     return transports.run_stdio(settings)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/config.py

@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
 """Configuration management for AegisGitea MCP.
 
-All settings come from environment variables (case-insensitive) or a ``.env``
+All settings come from environment variables (case-insensitive) or an env file.
-file in the working directory. Secrets are ``SecretStr`` so they never appear in
+The env file is never trusted implicitly: see :func:`select_env_file`. Secrets
-``repr()`` or model dumps. Requirements that depend on how the server is started
+are ``SecretStr`` so they never appear in ``repr()`` or model dumps. Requirements that depend on how the server is started
 (for example ``GITEA_TOKEN`` for stdio) are checked at serve time, not on import.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import ipaddress
+import os
+import stat
+import sys
+from collections.abc import Mapping
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Annotated, Any, Literal
-from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
 
 from pydantic import Field, SecretStr, field_validator
 from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, NoDecode, SettingsConfigDict
@@ -84,9 +88,75 @@ def _split_list(value: Any) -> Any:
     return value
 
 
+def redirect_allowlist_entry_problem(entry: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return why ``entry`` cannot be an ``OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST`` item, or None when it can.
+
+    An item is an exact redirect URI (``https://client.example/cb``) or a prefix
+    that ends in ``/`` (``https://claude.ai/``, which allows every path on that
+    host). A bare origin without a path is refused as ambiguous.
+    """
+    if any(ch.isspace() or not ch.isprintable() for ch in entry):
+        return "whitespace or control characters"
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(entry)
+        parts.port  # noqa: B018  (accessing .port validates it)
+    except ValueError:
+        return "not a valid URL"
+    host = parts.hostname or ""
+    if not host:
+        return "no host"
+    if parts.username is not None or parts.password is not None:
+        return "credentials in the URL"
+    if parts.query or parts.fragment or "?" in entry or "#" in entry:
+        return "query string or fragment"
+    if parts.scheme == "http" and not is_loopback_host(host):
+        return "http is only allowed for loopback hosts"
+    if parts.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
+        return "scheme must be https (or http for loopback)"
+    if not parts.path:
+        return f"no path: write {entry}/ to allow the whole host or give the full callback URL"
+    return None
+
+
+def redirect_matches_allowlist(uri: str, allowlist: list[str]) -> bool:
+    """True when ``uri`` equals an allowlist item or lies under one of its ``/`` prefixes.
+
+    An empty allowlist allows every acceptable redirect URI. The comparison of a
+    prefix is by scheme, host (case-insensitive) and path prefix, so
+    ``https://claude.ai/`` never matches ``https://claude.ai.evil.example/``.
+    """
+    if not allowlist:
+        return True
+    try:
+        target = urlsplit(uri)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    for entry in allowlist:
+        if uri == entry:
+            return True
+        if not entry.endswith("/"):
+            continue
+        prefix = urlsplit(entry)
+        if (
+            target.scheme == prefix.scheme
+            and (target.netloc.lower() == prefix.netloc.lower())
+            and target.path.startswith(prefix.path)
+        ):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
 def _normalize_http_url(value: str, *, field: str) -> str:
-    """Validate an http(s) URL and return it without query, fragment or trailing slash."""
+    """Validate an http(s) URL and return it rebuilt without query, fragment or trailing slash.
+
+    The result is assembled from the parsed parts, so the string that is validated
+    is the string that is used. ``urlsplit`` silently drops tabs and newlines
+    before parsing, so any whitespace, backslash or non-printable character
+    (control and bidi characters included) is rejected up front.
+    """
     candidate = value.strip()
+    if any(ch.isspace() or not ch.isprintable() or ch == "\\" for ch in candidate):
+        raise ValueError(f"{field} must not contain whitespace, backslashes or control characters")
     parts = urlsplit(candidate)
     if parts.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
         raise ValueError(f"{field} must start with http:// or https://")
@@ -100,14 +170,14 @@ def _normalize_http_url(value: str, *, field: str) -> str:
         parts.port  # noqa: B018  (accessing .port validates it)
     except ValueError as exc:
         raise ValueError(f"{field} has an invalid port") from exc
-    return candidate.rstrip("/")
+    return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, parts.netloc, parts.path.rstrip("/"), "", ""))
 
 
 class Settings(BaseSettings):
     """Application settings loaded from environment variables."""
 
     model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
-        env_file=".env",
+        # No implicit env_file: get_settings() decides which file to load (SEC-04).
         env_file_encoding="utf-8",
         case_sensitive=False,
         extra="ignore",
@@ -128,6 +198,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     mcp_bearer_token: SecretStr | None = Field(default=None)
     public_base_url: str | None = Field(default=None)
     allowed_hosts: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    forwarded_allow_ips: str = Field(default="127.0.0.1")
 
     # Per-user OAuth (HTTP only)
     oauth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False)
@@ -137,6 +208,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     oauth_scopes: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = Field(
         default_factory=lambda: DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES.split(",")
     )
+    oauth_redirect_allowlist: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = Field(default_factory=list)
 
     # State
     data_dir: Path = Field(default_factory=default_data_dir)
@@ -199,6 +271,28 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
             raise ValueError("PUBLIC_BASE_URL must use https unless the host is loopback")
         return normalized
 
+    @field_validator("forwarded_allow_ips", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_forwarded_allow_ips(cls, value: Any) -> Any:
+        """Accept ``*`` or a comma list of IP addresses and networks (blank means the default)."""
+        if not isinstance(value, str):
+            return value
+        items = [item.strip() for item in value.split(",") if item.strip()]
+        if not items:
+            return "127.0.0.1"
+        if "*" in items and len(items) > 1:
+            raise ValueError("FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS: '*' cannot be combined with other entries")
+        for item in items:
+            if item == "*":
+                continue
+            try:
+                ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
+            except ValueError:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS must be '*' or a comma list of IP addresses or networks"
+                ) from None
+        return ",".join(items)
+
     @field_validator("mcp_path")
     @classmethod
     def _validate_mcp_path(cls, value: str) -> str:
@@ -223,7 +317,14 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
             )
         return value
 
-    @field_validator("allowed_hosts", "oauth_scopes", "toolsets", "disabled_tools", mode="before")
+    @field_validator(
+        "allowed_hosts",
+        "oauth_scopes",
+        "oauth_redirect_allowlist",
+        "toolsets",
+        "disabled_tools",
+        mode="before",
+    )
     @classmethod
     def _parse_list(cls, value: Any) -> Any:
         """Accept comma or whitespace separated strings for list settings."""
@@ -235,15 +336,28 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
         """Accept only granular Gitea scopes (unknown scopes make Gitea grant full access)."""
         unknown = sorted({scope for scope in value if scope not in GITEA_SCOPES})
         if unknown:
+            # The offending values are not echoed: a misplaced secret must not reach stderr.
             raise ValueError(
-                f"OAUTH_SCOPES contains unknown scope(s): {', '.join(unknown)}. "
+                f"OAUTH_SCOPES contains {len(unknown)} unknown scope(s). Gitea grants full "
-                "Gitea grants full access for unknown scopes, so only granular "
+                "access for unknown scopes, so only granular read:/write: scopes are accepted "
-                "read:/write: scopes are accepted"
+                f"({', '.join(sorted(GITEA_SCOPES))})"
             )
         if not value:
             raise ValueError("OAUTH_SCOPES must not be empty")
         return list(dict.fromkeys(value))
 
+    @field_validator("oauth_redirect_allowlist")
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_redirect_allowlist(cls, value: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+        """Accept exact redirect URIs and ``https://host/`` prefixes, nothing looser."""
+        checked: list[str] = []
+        for entry in value:
+            problem = redirect_allowlist_entry_problem(entry)
+            if problem is not None:
+                raise ValueError(f"OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST entry is not acceptable: {problem}")
+            checked.append(entry)
+        return list(dict.fromkeys(checked))
+
     @field_validator("toolsets")
     @classmethod
     def _validate_toolsets(cls, value: list[str]) -> list[str]:
@@ -252,9 +366,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
         unknown = sorted({item for item in lowered if item != "all" and item not in TOOL_DOMAINS})
         if unknown:
             allowed = ", ".join(sorted(TOOL_DOMAINS | {"all"}))
-            raise ValueError(
+            raise ValueError(f"TOOLSETS contains {len(unknown)} unknown domain(s); use {allowed}")
-                f"TOOLSETS contains unknown domain(s): {', '.join(unknown)}; use {allowed}"
-            )
         if not lowered:
             raise ValueError("TOOLSETS must not be empty (use 'all')")
         return list(dict.fromkeys(lowered))
@@ -298,6 +410,11 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
         """Audit log path, defaulting to ``DATA_DIR/audit.log``."""
         return self.audit_log_path or (self.data_dir / "audit.log")
 
+    def insecure_gitea_url(self) -> bool:
+        """True when ``GITEA_URL`` is plain http to a host that is not loopback."""
+        parts = urlsplit(self.gitea_url)
+        return parts.scheme == "http" and not is_loopback_host(parts.hostname or "")
+
     def is_loopback_bind(self) -> bool:
         """Return True when ``MCP_HOST`` is a loopback address (127.0.0.0/8, ::1, localhost)."""
         return is_loopback_host(self.mcp_host)
@@ -324,14 +441,105 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
         return self.oauth_enabled and not self.oauth_config_errors()
 
 
+#: Environment variable naming an env file (same as ``--env-file``).
+ENV_FILE_VARIABLE = "AEGIS_ENV_FILE"
+DEFAULT_ENV_FILE = ".env"
+
+
+class EnvFileError(ValueError):
+    """An explicitly requested env file cannot be used (the message is safe to print)."""
+
+
+def env_file_problem(path: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return why the implicit env file ``path`` is not trusted, or None when it may be loaded.
+
+    Trusted means: a regular file (not a symlink) owned by the current user that
+    group and others cannot access (mode 0600, which ``setup`` writes). A missing
+    file is not a problem here.
+    """
+    try:
+        info = os.lstat(path)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return None
+    except OSError as exc:
+        return f"it cannot be inspected ({exc.strerror or type(exc).__name__})"
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode):
+        return "it is a symlink"
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        return "it is not a regular file"
+    if info.st_uid != getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: info.st_uid)():
+        return "it is owned by another user"
+    mode = stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)
+    if mode & 0o077:
+        return f"its permissions are {mode:04o} (group or others have access)"
+    return None
+
+
+def select_env_file(
+    explicit: str | Path | None = None,
+    *,
+    environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    directory: Path | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Path | None, str | None]:
+    """Choose the env file to load; returns ``(path, warning)``.
+
+    Order: ``explicit`` (``--env-file``), then ``AEGIS_ENV_FILE``, then ``./.env``.
+    A file named explicitly is the operator's choice and is used as is. The
+    implicit ``./.env`` is loaded only when :func:`env_file_problem` finds nothing
+    wrong; otherwise it is ignored and ``warning`` says why and how to fix it. A
+    working directory is not trustworthy by itself: clients start stdio servers
+    inside the project (possibly a cloned repository) they are working on, and a
+    planted ``.env`` could switch off redaction or audit, or redirect the token.
+    Real environment variables always take precedence over the file.
+
+    Raises:
+        EnvFileError: An explicitly named file is missing or not a regular file.
+    """
+    env = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    named = explicit or env.get(ENV_FILE_VARIABLE, "").strip() or None
+    if named is not None:
+        path = Path(named).expanduser()
+        try:
+            regular = stat.S_ISREG(os.stat(path).st_mode)
+        except OSError:
+            regular = False
+        if not regular:
+            raise EnvFileError(f"env file {path} does not exist or is not a regular file")
+        return path, None
+    path = (directory or Path.cwd()) / DEFAULT_ENV_FILE
+    problem = env_file_problem(path)
+    if problem is not None:
+        return None, (
+            f"ignoring ./{DEFAULT_ENV_FILE}: {problem}. Run 'chmod 600 {DEFAULT_ENV_FILE}' "
+            f"(and make sure you own it), or pass --env-file PATH (or set {ENV_FILE_VARIABLE}) "
+            "to load a file explicitly"
+        )
+    return (path if path.exists() else None), None
+
+
 _settings: Settings | None = None
+_env_file_choice: str | Path | None = None
+
+
+def set_env_file(path: str | Path | None) -> None:
+    """Choose the env file for the next :func:`get_settings` call (``--env-file``)."""
+    global _env_file_choice
+    _env_file_choice = path
+    reset_settings()
 
 
 def get_settings() -> Settings:
-    """Get or create the global settings instance."""
+    """Get or create the global settings instance.
+
+    Raises:
+        EnvFileError: An explicitly named env file cannot be used.
+    """
     global _settings
     if _settings is None:
-        _settings = Settings()  # type: ignore[call-arg]
+        path, warning = select_env_file(_env_file_choice)
+        if warning:
+            print(f"aegis-gitea-mcp: warning: {warning}", file=sys.stderr)
+        _settings = Settings(_env_file=path)  # type: ignore[call-arg]
     return _settings
 
 

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/gitea/encoding.py

@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ _SENSITIVE_BODY_KEYS = frozenset(
 )
 _MIN_SENSITIVE_VALUE_CHARS = 4
 
+#: Response fields whose non-empty string values are replaced with ``[REDACTED]``
+#: in every result except those of credential-issuing operations (whose purpose
+#: is to return a credential). Gitea fills ``authorization_header`` on every
+#: webhook read, so a stored header would otherwise reach the model. Keep this
+#: next to :data:`_SENSITIVE_BODY_KEYS` so a new secret-bearing field is added
+#: in one place.
+SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS = _SENSITIVE_BODY_KEYS
+
 
 class ArgumentError(ValueError):
     """An argument cannot be turned into a safe request (message never echoes the value)."""
@@ -265,7 +273,8 @@ def validate_sudo(sudo: Any) -> str | None:
     """Validate the optional ``sudo`` login (None when not given)."""
     if sudo is None:
         return None
-    if not isinstance(sudo, str) or not _SUDO_PATTERN.match(sudo):
+    # fullmatch: ``$`` would also accept a trailing newline.
+    if not isinstance(sudo, str) or not _SUDO_PATTERN.fullmatch(sudo):
         raise ArgumentError("sudo must be a Gitea username (letters, digits, '-', '_', '.')")
     return sudo
 

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/gitea/executor.py

@@ -10,9 +10,13 @@ Security properties (all covered by tests):
 * path values are validated and percent-encoded (see :mod:`.encoding`);
 * redirects are never followed (a 3xx is an error of kind ``redirect``);
 * cookies are never stored, so one identity can not leak into another call;
-* the identity token, the configured Gitea token, the MCP bearer token, the
+* the identity token and ``Identity.redact``, the configured Gitea token, the MCP bearer token, the
   OAuth client secret, ``extra_secrets`` and secret values submitted in a
   request body are replaced with ``[REDACTED]`` in every result, always;
+* secret-bearing response fields (:data:`~.encoding.SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS`, for example a
+  webhook's stored ``authorization_header``, and ``data`` on Action secret operations) are
+  redacted by key name in every result except
+  those of :data:`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS`, whatever ``SECRET_DETECTION_MODE`` says;
 * secret-pattern masking/blocking follows ``SECRET_DETECTION_MODE``, except for
   :data:`CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS` whose purpose is to return a freshly
   minted credential (exact redaction still applies there);
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@ Security properties (all covered by tests):
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import base64
+import itertools
 import json
 from collections.abc import Iterable, Mapping
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@@ -38,6 +43,7 @@ from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.errors import kind_for_status, sanitize_message
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.encoding import (
     RAW_METHODS,
+    SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS,
     ArgumentError,
     PayloadTooLargeError,
     RequestBody,
@@ -50,7 +56,12 @@ from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.encoding import (
     validate_sudo,
 )
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.pagination import build_pagination
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.redaction import normalize_secrets, redact_exact, redact_text
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.redaction import (
+    normalize_secrets,
+    redact_exact,
+    redact_fields,
+    redact_text,
+)
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.identity import Identity
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.security import sanitize_data
 
@@ -162,6 +173,8 @@ class _Call:
     sudo: str | None = None
     paginated: bool = False
     credential_issuing: bool = False
+    #: Action secret operations: a ``data`` field in the response is a secret value.
+    action_secret: bool = False
     header_data: str | None = None
     call_secrets: tuple[str, ...] = ()
 
@@ -174,6 +187,13 @@ class _Call:
         return next((value for key, value in self.query if key == name), None)
 
 
+def _is_action_secret_path(segments: list[str]) -> bool:
+    """True for ``.../actions/secrets[/...]`` raw paths (an Action secrets endpoint)."""
+    return any(
+        first == "actions" and second == "secrets" for first, second in itertools.pairwise(segments)
+    )
+
+
 def _classify(media_type: str) -> str:
     """Return ``json``, ``text`` or ``binary`` for a response media type."""
     if not media_type or media_type == "application/json" or media_type.endswith("+json"):
@@ -349,6 +369,7 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
             sudo=sudo,
             paginated=operation.paginated,
             credential_issuing=credential_issuing,
+            action_secret="Secret" in operation.operation_id,
             header_data=HEADER_DATA_OPERATIONS.get(operation.operation_id),
             call_secrets=tuple(
                 sensitive_body_values(submitted, secret_data="Secret" in operation.operation_id)
@@ -406,13 +427,16 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
             call.body = RequestBody(json=body, has_json=True)
         segments = call.display_path.split("/")
         call.call_secrets = tuple(sensitive_body_values(body, secret_data="secrets" in segments))
+        call.action_secret = _is_action_secret_path(segments)
         call.paginated = any(key in {"page", "limit"} for key, _ in call.query)
         return await self._send(call, identity)
 
     # Sending
 
     def _secrets(self, identity: Identity, call: _Call) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-        return normalize_secrets([identity.token, *self._base_secrets, *call.call_secrets])
+        return normalize_secrets(
+            [identity.token, *identity.redact, *self._base_secrets, *call.call_secrets]
+        )
 
     async def _send(self, call: _Call, identity: Identity) -> ToolOutcome:
         headers = {
@@ -611,6 +635,17 @@ class GiteaExecutor:
         """Redact, mask or block, and bound the payload size."""
         secrets = self._secrets(identity, call)
         payload = redact_exact(payload, secrets)
+        if not exempt and "data" in payload:
+            # Stored secrets (webhook authorization headers, ...) by field name: pattern
+            # masking cannot recognise them and SECRET_DETECTION_MODE may be off. Gitea
+            # never returns an Action secret's value; should a response carry a ``data``
+            # field on a secret operation, it is the value and is redacted too.
+            keys = (
+                SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS | {"data"}
+                if call.action_secret
+                else SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_KEYS
+            )
+            payload = {**payload, "data": redact_fields(payload["data"], keys)}
         mode = self._settings.secret_detection_mode
         if mode != "off" and not exempt:
             if mode == "block":

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/gitea/redaction.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ they have, in every string of a payload (values and dict keys).
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from collections.abc import Iterable
+from collections.abc import Collection, Iterable
 from typing import Any
 
 REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
@@ -41,3 +41,36 @@ def redact_exact(value: Any, secrets: tuple[str, ...]) -> Any:
     if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
         return [redact_exact(item, secrets) for item in value]
     return value
+
+
+def redact_fields(value: Any, keys: Collection[str], *, max_depth: int = 128) -> Any:
+    """Replace the string values of secret-bearing fields, by key name, at any depth.
+
+    A non-empty string under a key in ``keys`` (compared lower-cased) becomes
+    ``[REDACTED]``; an empty value stays so the presence of the field is still
+    visible. Containers under such a key are searched like any other value.
+    Nesting deeper than ``max_depth`` is returned unchanged (the executor bounds
+    JSON depth before this runs).
+    """
+
+    def walk(item: Any, depth: int) -> Any:
+        if depth > max_depth:
+            return item
+        if isinstance(item, dict):
+            return {
+                key: (
+                    REDACTED
+                    if isinstance(key, str) and key.lower() in keys and _is_secret_value(sub)
+                    else walk(sub, depth + 1)
+                )
+                for key, sub in item.items()
+            }
+        if isinstance(item, (list, tuple)):
+            return [walk(sub, depth + 1) for sub in item]
+        return item
+
+    return walk(value, 0)
+
+
+def _is_secret_value(value: Any) -> bool:
+    return isinstance(value, str) and bool(value)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/identity.py

@@ -23,11 +23,15 @@ class Identity:
         mode: ``admin-token`` or ``oauth``.
         token: Gitea token for this identity. Excluded from ``repr`` and never
             part of :meth:`metadata`.
+        redact: Further secrets of this identity (for example the OAuth user's
+            Gitea refresh token) that the executor replaces in every result.
+            Excluded from ``repr`` and comparisons.
     """
 
     login: str | None
     mode: IdentityMode
     token: str = field(repr=False)
+    redact: tuple[str, ...] = field(default=(), repr=False, compare=False)
 
     def metadata(self, sudo: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         """Return result and audit metadata: ``{"login", "mode", "sudo"}``, never the token."""

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+"""Per-user OAuth mode (ADR 0004): authorization server for MCP clients, Gitea sign-in.
+
+Import :func:`build_oauth_components` from :mod:`aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.components`;
+this package module stays import-light so the transport can load it lazily.
+"""
+
+
+class OAuthSetupError(Exception):
+    """Per-user OAuth cannot start (the message is safe to print)."""

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/callback.py

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+"""Browser-facing OAuth routes: the consent page and the Gitea callback.
+
+``GET /oauth/consent`` shows which client asks for access and where the result
+is sent; ``POST /oauth/consent`` applies the decision (CSRF protected with a
+``SameSite=Strict`` double-submit cookie and an ``Origin`` check) and sends the
+browser to Gitea, setting a browser-binding cookie. ``GET /oauth/callback``
+completes the sign-in only in the browser that holds that cookie.
+
+Responses never echo request parameters: an invalid or expired request gets a
+fixed message with status 400. Pages are not cacheable and cannot be framed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from mcp.server.transport_security import RequestBodyLimitMiddleware
+from starlette.datastructures import Headers
+from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
+from starlette.routing import Route, request_response
+from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Receive, Scope, Send
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import CONSENT_PATH, GiteaOAuthProvider, flow_tag
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import CALLBACK_PATH
+
+COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS = 600
+#: Largest request body the consent form may send (three short fields).
+MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES = 16 * 1024
+_MAX_FORM_FIELDS = 8
+_MAX_FORM_PART_BYTES = 4096
+_INVALID_MESSAGE = (
+    "This sign-in request is invalid or has expired. Start the sign-in again from your MCP client."
+)
+_SECURITY_HEADERS = {
+    "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+    "Pragma": "no-cache",
+    "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
+    "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+    "X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
+    "Content-Security-Policy": (
+        "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
+    ),
+}
+_PAGE = """<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<title>{title}</title>
+<style>
+body{{font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:34rem;margin:3rem auto;padding:0 1rem;
+line-height:1.5;color:#1f2328;background:#fff}}
+code{{background:#f3f4f6;padding:.1rem .3rem;border-radius:4px;word-break:break-all}}
+.warn{{background:#fff8e1;border:1px solid #f0c36d;padding:.75rem;border-radius:6px}}
+button{{font-size:1rem;padding:.5rem 1.25rem;margin-right:.5rem;cursor:pointer}}
+</style></head><body>{body}</body></html>"""
+
+
+class _Cookies:
+    """Cookie names and attributes; ``__Host-`` names and ``Secure`` on https."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str) -> None:
+        self.secure = urlsplit(base_url).scheme == "https"
+        prefix = "__Host-" if self.secure else ""
+        self.csrf = f"{prefix}aegis-oauth-csrf"
+        self._binding_prefix = f"{prefix}aegis-oauth-flow-"
+
+    def binding(self, tag: str) -> str:
+        """Name of the binding cookie of the flow with the given tag (one per Gitea state)."""
+        return f"{self._binding_prefix}{tag}"
+
+    def set(self, response: Response, name: str, value: str, *, same_site: str) -> None:
+        response.set_cookie(
+            name,
+            value,
+            max_age=COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS,
+            path="/",
+            secure=self.secure,
+            httponly=True,
+            samesite=same_site,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def clear(self, response: Response, name: str, *, same_site: str) -> None:
+        response.delete_cookie(
+            name,
+            path="/",
+            secure=self.secure,
+            httponly=True,
+            samesite=same_site,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+
+def _page(title: str, body: str, status_code: int = 200) -> HTMLResponse:
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        _PAGE.format(title=html.escape(title), body=body),
+        status_code=status_code,
+        headers=_SECURITY_HEADERS,
+    )
+
+
+def _invalid() -> HTMLResponse:
+    return _page("Sign-in failed", f"<h1>Sign-in failed</h1><p>{_INVALID_MESSAGE}</p>", 400)
+
+
+def _redirect(location: str, status_code: int) -> RedirectResponse:
+    return RedirectResponse(location, status_code=status_code, headers=_SECURITY_HEADERS)
+
+
+def _request_origin(request: Request) -> str | None:
+    """Origin of a form POST: the ``Origin`` header, else the origin of ``Referer``.
+
+    Browsers send ``Origin`` on form POSTs. Without it (or with ``Origin: null``) the
+    ``Referer`` is the fallback; when neither names an origin the result is None
+    and the request is refused.
+    """
+    origin = request.headers.get("origin")
+    if origin is not None:
+        return origin
+    referer = request.headers.get("referer")
+    if not referer:
+        return None
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(referer)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return f"{parts.scheme}://{parts.netloc}" if parts.scheme and parts.netloc else None
+
+
+def _text(value: Any, limit: int = 200) -> str:
+    return value[:limit] if isinstance(value, str) else ""
+
+
+class _UrlencodedFormOnly:
+    """ASGI guard for the consent POST, applied before any body is read.
+
+    The route is reachable without authentication, so it must not parse
+    arbitrary bodies: anything but ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` gets
+    415 without reading a byte, and the body is capped at
+    :data:`MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES` (413 beyond it).
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
+        self._limited = RequestBodyLimitMiddleware(app, MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES)
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
+        if scope["type"] == "http":
+            content_type = Headers(scope=scope).get("content-type", "")
+            if content_type.split(";")[0].strip().lower() != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded":
+                response = Response("Unsupported media type", status_code=415)
+                await response(scope, receive, send)
+                return
+        await self._limited(scope, receive, send)
+
+
+def build_browser_routes(provider: GiteaOAuthProvider) -> list[Route]:
+    """Return the consent and callback routes for ``provider``."""
+    cookies = _Cookies(provider.base_url)
+    origin_parts = urlsplit(provider.base_url)
+    expected_origin = f"{origin_parts.scheme}://{origin_parts.netloc}"
+
+    async def consent_page(request: Request) -> Response:
+        request_id = _text(request.query_params.get("request"))
+        pending = provider.consent_request(request_id)
+        csrf = provider.begin_consent(request_id)
+        if pending is None or csrf is None:
+            return _invalid()
+        client = html.escape(pending.client_name or "An unnamed client")
+        destination = urlsplit(pending.redirect_uri)
+        host = html.escape(destination.netloc)
+        body = (
+            "<h1>Allow access to Gitea?</h1>"
+            f"<p><strong>{client}</strong> wants to use Gitea as you through this MCP server. "
+            "It can do everything your Gitea account can do within the configured scopes.</p>"
+            f"<p>The result goes to <code>{host}</code> "
+            f"(<code>{html.escape(pending.redirect_uri)}</code>).</p>"
+            '<p class="warn">Only continue if you started this sign-in yourself from your '
+            "MCP client. If a link sent by someone else brought you here, deny.</p>"
+            f'<form method="post" action="{CONSENT_PATH}">'
+            f'<input type="hidden" name="request" value="{html.escape(request_id)}">'
+            f'<input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="{html.escape(csrf)}">'
+            '<button type="submit" name="decision" value="approve">Continue to Gitea</button>'
+            '<button type="submit" name="decision" value="deny">Deny</button>'
+            "</form>"
+        )
+        response = _page("Allow access to Gitea?", body)
+        cookies.set(response, cookies.csrf, csrf, same_site="strict")
+        return response
+
+    async def consent_submit(request: Request) -> Response:
+        if _request_origin(request) != expected_origin:
+            return _invalid()
+        try:
+            form = await request.form(
+                max_files=0, max_fields=_MAX_FORM_FIELDS, max_part_size=_MAX_FORM_PART_BYTES
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            return _invalid()
+        decision = provider.finish_consent(
+            _text(form.get("request")),
+            _text(form.get("csrf")),
+            _text(request.cookies.get(cookies.csrf)),
+            approve=form.get("decision") == "approve",
+        )
+        if decision is None:
+            return _invalid()
+        response = _redirect(decision.redirect, 303)
+        cookies.clear(response, cookies.csrf, same_site="strict")
+        if decision.binding_token is not None and decision.flow_tag is not None:
+            # Lax: the cookie must come back on Gitea's top-level redirect to us.
+            cookies.set(
+                response,
+                cookies.binding(decision.flow_tag),
+                decision.binding_token,
+                same_site="lax",
+            )
+        return response
+
+    async def callback(request: Request) -> Response:
+        params = request.query_params
+        state = _text(params.get("state"))
+        cookie_name = cookies.binding(flow_tag(state))
+        location = await provider.complete_callback(
+            state,
+            _text(request.cookies.get(cookie_name)),
+            _text(params.get("code"), 4096),
+            _text(params.get("error")),
+        )
+        response = _invalid() if location is None else _redirect(location, 302)
+        cookies.clear(response, cookie_name, same_site="lax")
+        return response
+
+    return [
+        Route(CONSENT_PATH, consent_page, methods=["GET"]),
+        Route(
+            CONSENT_PATH, _UrlencodedFormOnly(request_response(consent_submit)), methods=["POST"]
+        ),
+        Route(
+            CALLBACK_PATH,
+            RequestBodyLimitMiddleware(request_response(callback), MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES),
+            methods=["GET"],
+        ),
+    ]

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/components.py

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+"""Assembles the per-user OAuth pieces for the HTTP transport."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from typing import cast
+
+import httpx
+from mcp.server.auth.routes import create_protected_resource_routes
+from mcp.server.auth.settings import AuthSettings, ClientRegistrationOptions, RevocationOptions
+from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, SecretStr
+from starlette.routing import Route
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import MCP_SCOPE, AdminIdentityResolver
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import OAuthSetupError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.callback import build_browser_routes
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import CONSENT_PATH, GiteaOAuthProvider, OAuthTokenVerifier
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.resolver import OAuthIdentityResolver
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import OAuthStore, OAuthStoreError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import CALLBACK_PATH, GiteaUpstream
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import HttpAuthExtras
+
+#: Unauthenticated OAuth endpoints that get the per-IP rate limit.
+RATE_LIMITED_PATHS = (
+    "/register",
+    "/authorize",
+    "/token",
+    "/revoke",
+    CONSENT_PATH,
+    CALLBACK_PATH,
+)
+PROTECTED_RESOURCE_PATH = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
+
+
+def bare_protected_resource_route(settings: Settings) -> Route:
+    """``/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`` serving the same document as the suffixed path.
+
+    The SDK only mounts the RFC 9728 path-suffixed URL; some clients probe the
+    bare path too.
+    """
+    base = settings.public_base_url or ""
+    auth = AuthSettings(
+        issuer_url=base,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        resource_server_url=f"{base}{settings.mcp_path}",  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        validate_token_resource=True,
+    )
+    (suffixed,) = create_protected_resource_routes(
+        resource_url=cast(AnyHttpUrl, auth.resource_server_url),
+        authorization_servers=[auth.issuer_url],
+        scopes_supported=[MCP_SCOPE],
+    )
+    return Route(PROTECTED_RESOURCE_PATH, endpoint=suffixed.endpoint, methods=["GET", "OPTIONS"])
+
+
+def build_oauth_components(
+    settings: Settings,
+    *,
+    clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    client_factory: Callable[[], httpx.AsyncClient] | None = None,
+    executor_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
+    audit: AuditLogger | None = None,
+) -> HttpAuthExtras:
+    """Build the provider, verifier, resolver, executor and routes for per-user OAuth.
+
+    An OAuth-only deployment (no ``GITEA_TOKEN``) is supported: users bring
+    their own Gitea tokens, and anything that would need admin-token mode
+    fails closed.
+
+    Args:
+        settings: Application settings with a complete OAuth configuration.
+        clock: Wall clock (epoch seconds); tests inject a fake one.
+        client_factory: Creates the HTTP client for Gitea OAuth exchanges.
+        executor_client: HTTP client for the tool executor (tests).
+        audit: Audit logger for OAuth security events.
+
+    Raises:
+        OAuthSetupError: The configuration is incomplete or the token store
+            cannot be opened.
+    """
+    problems = settings.oauth_config_errors()
+    if not settings.oauth_enabled or problems:
+        raise OAuthSetupError("; ".join(problems) or "OAUTH_ENABLED is not set")
+    key = cast(SecretStr, settings.token_encryption_key)  # checked by oauth_config_errors
+    try:
+        store = OAuthStore.load(settings.data_dir, key.get_secret_value(), clock)
+    except OAuthStoreError as exc:
+        raise OAuthSetupError(str(exc)) from None
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OAuthSetupError(
+            f"cannot read the OAuth token store in {settings.data_dir} ({type(exc).__name__})"
+        ) from None
+
+    upstream = GiteaUpstream(settings, client_factory=client_factory, clock=clock)
+    provider = GiteaOAuthProvider(settings, store, upstream, clock=clock, audit=audit)
+    executor = GiteaExecutor(
+        settings, client=executor_client, extra_secrets=[key.get_secret_value()]
+    )
+    admin = AdminIdentityResolver(settings, executor) if settings.gitea_token is not None else None
+    resolver = OAuthIdentityResolver(store, upstream, admin, clock=clock, audit=audit)
+    return HttpAuthExtras(
+        token_verifier=OAuthTokenVerifier(provider),
+        auth_server_provider=provider,
+        resolver=resolver,
+        executor=executor,
+        extra_routes=(*build_browser_routes(provider), bare_protected_resource_route(settings)),
+        client_registration_options=ClientRegistrationOptions(
+            enabled=True, valid_scopes=[MCP_SCOPE], default_scopes=[MCP_SCOPE]
+        ),
+        revocation_options=RevocationOptions(enabled=True),
+        rate_limited_paths=RATE_LIMITED_PATHS,
+    )

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/provider.py

@@ -0,0 +1,748 @@
+"""OAuth 2.1 authorization server for MCP clients, proxying sign-in to Gitea.
+
+Implements the SDK's ``OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider``. The SDK mounts
+``/authorize``, ``/token``, ``/register``, ``/revoke`` and the metadata, and
+does PKCE, redirect URI matching and client authentication; this module holds
+the state behind them.
+
+Sign-in flow (each step single use, every value 256-bit random):
+
+1. ``/authorize`` (SDK) calls :meth:`GiteaOAuthProvider.authorize`, which parks
+   the client's request under a random request id and sends the browser to our
+   consent page.
+2. The consent page (``callback.py``) shows which client asks for access and
+   where the result goes. Approving needs a CSRF token that is bound to the
+   browser by a ``SameSite=Strict`` cookie. On approval a fresh Gitea ``state``
+   and a browser-binding secret are created; the binding secret goes into a
+   cookie and the browser is sent to Gitea with our own PKCE challenge.
+3. ``/oauth/callback`` pops the state, checks the binding cookie (so a Gitea
+   redirect URL obtained by someone else cannot be completed in a victim's
+   browser), exchanges Gitea's code, looks up the user and mints our
+   authorization code for the client's registered redirect URI.
+4. ``/token`` (SDK, PKCE checked) calls :meth:`exchange_authorization_code`,
+   which issues opaque ``agm_`` access and refresh tokens. Only their SHA-256
+   hashes are stored.
+
+The consent step exists because Gitea remembers consent for our (single,
+static) Gitea application: without it, anyone could register a client with
+their own redirect URI and turn a victim's click on a link into a token for
+the victim's account (the confused-deputy problem of OAuth proxies).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import secrets
+import time
+import uuid
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Generic, TypeVar
+from urllib.parse import urlencode, urlsplit
+
+from mcp.server.auth.provider import (
+    AccessToken,
+    AuthorizationCode,
+    AuthorizationParams,
+    AuthorizeError,
+    OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider,
+    RefreshToken,
+    RegistrationError,
+    TokenError,
+    construct_redirect_uri,
+)
+from mcp.shared.auth import OAuthClientInformationFull, OAuthToken
+from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, ValidationError
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger, get_audit_logger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import MCP_SCOPE
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings, redirect_matches_allowlist
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import (
+    ClientRecord,
+    OAuthStore,
+    OAuthStoreError,
+    SessionRecord,
+    TokenRecord,
+    token_hash,
+)
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import GiteaUpstream, UpstreamError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.request_context import get_client_address
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+TOKEN_PREFIX = "agm_"  # noqa: S105 (public token prefix, not a secret)
+ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = 3600
+REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL = 30 * 24 * 3600
+AUTHORIZATION_CODE_TTL = 300
+PENDING_TTL = 600
+MAX_PENDING = 1024
+MAX_CODES = 1024
+MAX_CLIENTS = 500
+MAX_CLIENT_METADATA_BYTES = 8192
+MAX_REDIRECT_URIS = 10
+MAX_SESSIONS_PER_LOGIN = 50
+#: Per client address: sign-ins waiting for consent or Gitea, and registrations per hour.
+MAX_PENDING_PER_SOURCE = 20
+MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE = 20
+REGISTRATION_WINDOW = 3600
+CONSENT_PATH = "/oauth/consent"
+
+_LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_HOSTS = frozenset({"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"})
+_CLIENT_AUTH_METHODS = frozenset({"none", "client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"})
+_NOT_ALLOWED = "redirect URI is not on this server's allowlist (OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST)"
+_REDIRECT_RULE = (
+    "redirect URIs must use https://, or http:// on localhost, 127.0.0.1 or [::1], "
+    "without credentials or a fragment"
+)
+
+V = TypeVar("V")
+Clock = Callable[[], float]
+
+
+def redirect_uri_problem(uri: str, allowlist: list[str] | None = None) -> str | None:
+    """Return why ``uri`` is not an acceptable redirect URI, or None when it is.
+
+    With a non-empty ``allowlist`` an https URI must also match it; http loopback
+    URIs (native clients on the user's own machine) stay allowed.
+    """
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(uri)
+        parts.port  # noqa: B018  (accessing .port validates it)
+    except ValueError:
+        return _REDIRECT_RULE
+    if parts.fragment or "#" in uri or parts.username is not None or parts.password is not None:
+        return _REDIRECT_RULE
+    host = (parts.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not host:
+        return _REDIRECT_RULE
+    if parts.scheme == "http" and host in _LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_HOSTS:
+        return None
+    if parts.scheme == "https":
+        return None if redirect_matches_allowlist(uri, allowlist or []) else _NOT_ALLOWED
+    return _REDIRECT_RULE
+
+
+def same_resource(left: str, right: str) -> bool:
+    """Compare two resource URLs the way the SDK's bearer middleware does."""
+    try:
+        normalized = [str(AnyHttpUrl(value)).removesuffix("/") for value in (left, right)]
+    except ValidationError:
+        return False
+    return normalized[0] == normalized[1]
+
+
+def flow_tag(state: str) -> str:
+    """Eight hex characters derived from a Gitea ``state`` (names the browser-binding cookie).
+
+    Concurrent sign-ins in one browser each get their own cookie, so a second flow
+    cannot overwrite the binding of the first. The tag is public (it is a hash
+    prefix of a value that is in the callback URL anyway) and grants nothing.
+    """
+    return token_hash(state)[:8]
+
+
+def s256(verifier: str) -> str:
+    """PKCE S256 challenge for ``verifier``."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def _matches(value: str | None, expected_hash: str | None) -> bool:
+    if not value or not expected_hash:
+        return False
+    return secrets.compare_digest(token_hash(value), expected_hash)
+
+
+class _ExpiringMap(Generic[V]):
+    """Bounded in-memory map with per-entry expiry; the oldest entry is evicted when full."""
+
+    def __init__(self, capacity: int, clock: Clock) -> None:
+        self._capacity = capacity
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._entries: dict[str, tuple[float, V]] = {}
+
+    def __len__(self) -> int:
+        return len(self._entries)
+
+    def _purge(self) -> None:
+        now = self._clock()
+        for key in [key for key, (expires, _) in self._entries.items() if expires <= now]:
+            del self._entries[key]
+
+    def put(self, key: str, value: V, ttl: float) -> None:
+        self._purge()
+        while len(self._entries) >= self._capacity:
+            del self._entries[next(iter(self._entries))]
+        self._entries[key] = (self._clock() + ttl, value)
+
+    def count_where(self, predicate: Callable[[V], bool]) -> int:
+        """Number of live entries whose value satisfies ``predicate``."""
+        self._purge()
+        return sum(1 for _, value in self._entries.values() if predicate(value))
+
+    def get(self, key: str) -> V | None:
+        entry = self._entries.get(key)
+        if entry is None:
+            return None
+        if entry[0] <= self._clock():
+            del self._entries[key]
+            return None
+        return entry[1]
+
+    def pop(self, key: str) -> V | None:
+        value = self.get(key)
+        self._entries.pop(key, None)
+        return value
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PendingAuthorization:
+    """A client's authorization request waiting for consent and the Gitea sign-in."""
+
+    client_id: str
+    client_name: str | None
+    redirect_uri: str
+    redirect_uri_provided_explicitly: bool
+    code_challenge: str
+    client_state: str | None = field(repr=False)
+    scopes: list[str]
+    resource: str
+    code_verifier: str = field(repr=False)
+    csrf_hash: str | None = field(default=None, repr=False)
+    binding_hash: str | None = field(default=None, repr=False)
+    #: Rate-limit bucket of the client address that started the request (quota key).
+    source: str | None = None
+
+
+class StoredAuthorizationCode(AuthorizationCode):
+    """Our authorization code plus the session it grants (``code`` holds only its hash)."""
+
+    session_id: str
+
+
+class StoredRefreshToken(RefreshToken):
+    """A loaded refresh token (``token`` holds only its hash)."""
+
+    session_id: str
+    token_hash: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ConsentDecision:
+    """Where to send the browser after the consent form, plus the binding cookie value."""
+
+    redirect: str = field(repr=False)
+    binding_token: str | None = field(default=None, repr=False)
+    #: Short public tag of the Gitea state, used to name this flow's binding cookie.
+    flow_tag: str | None = None
+
+
+class GiteaOAuthProvider(
+    OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider[StoredAuthorizationCode, StoredRefreshToken, AccessToken]
+):
+    """The SDK authorization server provider backed by Gitea sign-in.
+
+    Args:
+        settings: Application settings (``PUBLIC_BASE_URL``, ``MCP_PATH``, scopes).
+        store: Persistent store for clients, sessions and token hashes.
+        upstream: Gitea OAuth client.
+        clock: Wall clock (epoch seconds).
+        audit: Audit logger for sign-in and revocation events (defaults to the
+            process-wide one).
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        settings: Settings,
+        store: OAuthStore,
+        upstream: GiteaUpstream,
+        *,
+        clock: Clock = time.time,
+        audit: AuditLogger | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._settings = settings
+        self._store = store
+        self._upstream = upstream
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._audit_logger = audit
+        base = settings.public_base_url or ""
+        self.base_url = base
+        self.resource = f"{base}{settings.mcp_path}"
+        self._requests: _ExpiringMap[PendingAuthorization] = _ExpiringMap(MAX_PENDING, clock)
+        self._states: _ExpiringMap[PendingAuthorization] = _ExpiringMap(MAX_PENDING, clock)
+        self._codes: _ExpiringMap[StoredAuthorizationCode] = _ExpiringMap(MAX_CODES, clock)
+        # Hashes of exchanged codes -> session id, to detect replays (RFC 6749 4.1.2).
+        self._used_codes: _ExpiringMap[str] = _ExpiringMap(MAX_CODES, clock)
+        # Registration times per client address (in memory), for the registration quota.
+        self._registrations: dict[str, list[float]] = {}
+
+    # Helpers
+
+    def _audit(self, event: str, description: str, severity: str, **metadata: Any) -> None:
+        try:
+            audit = self._audit_logger or get_audit_logger()
+            audit.log_security_event(event, description, severity=severity, metadata=metadata)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.error("audit log write failed: %s", type(exc).__name__)
+
+    def _end_session(self, session_id: str, event: str, description: str) -> None:
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(session_id)
+        if self._store.end_session(session_id) and session is not None:
+            self._audit(
+                event, description, "medium", login=session.login, client_id=session.client_id
+            )
+
+    async def _issue_tokens(
+        self, session: SessionRecord, access_scopes: list[str], refresh_scopes: list[str]
+    ) -> OAuthToken:
+        now = self._clock()
+        access = TOKEN_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        refresh = TOKEN_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        self._store.tokens[token_hash(access)] = TokenRecord(
+            kind="access",
+            session_id=session.session_id,
+            client_id=session.client_id,
+            scopes=list(access_scopes),
+            expires_at=now + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
+        )
+        self._store.tokens[token_hash(refresh)] = TokenRecord(
+            kind="refresh",
+            session_id=session.session_id,
+            client_id=session.client_id,
+            scopes=list(refresh_scopes),
+            expires_at=now + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL,
+        )
+        await self._store.save()
+        return OAuthToken(
+            access_token=access,
+            token_type="Bearer",  # noqa: S106 (token type name)
+            expires_in=ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
+            refresh_token=refresh,
+            scope=" ".join(access_scopes),
+        )
+
+    # Client registration
+
+    async def get_client(self, client_id: str) -> OAuthClientInformationFull | None:
+        """Return a registered client (and note that it was used)."""
+        record = self._store.clients.get(client_id)
+        if record is None:
+            return None
+        record.last_used_at = self._clock()
+        return OAuthClientInformationFull.model_validate(record.info)
+
+    async def register_client(self, client_info: OAuthClientInformationFull) -> None:
+        """Validate and persist a dynamically registered client.
+
+        Redirect URIs must be https, or http on a loopback host, and match
+        ``OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST`` when that is set. When
+        :data:`MAX_CLIENTS` is reached, the least recently used client without
+        any session is evicted; when every client has a session, registration
+        is refused.
+
+        Raises:
+            RegistrationError: Invalid redirect URIs, metadata or the client cap.
+        """
+        uris = [str(uri) for uri in client_info.redirect_uris or []]
+        if not uris or len(uris) > MAX_REDIRECT_URIS:
+            raise RegistrationError(
+                "invalid_redirect_uri", f"between 1 and {MAX_REDIRECT_URIS} redirect URIs required"
+            )
+        for uri in uris:
+            problem = redirect_uri_problem(uri, self._settings.oauth_redirect_allowlist)
+            if problem is not None:
+                raise RegistrationError("invalid_redirect_uri", problem)
+        if client_info.token_endpoint_auth_method not in _CLIENT_AUTH_METHODS:
+            raise RegistrationError(
+                "invalid_client_metadata", "unsupported token_endpoint_auth_method"
+            )
+        info = client_info.model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=True)
+        if len(json.dumps(info)) > MAX_CLIENT_METADATA_BYTES:
+            raise RegistrationError("invalid_client_metadata", "client metadata is too large")
+        self._check_registration_quota()
+        if len(self._store.clients) >= MAX_CLIENTS and not self._evict_one_client():
+            logger.warning("oauth client registration refused: client limit reached")
+            raise RegistrationError(
+                "invalid_client_metadata", "client registration limit reached; try again later"
+            )
+        now = self._clock()
+        self._store.clients[client_info.client_id] = ClientRecord(
+            info=info, registered_at=now, last_used_at=now
+        )
+        await self._store.save()
+        logger.info("oauth client registered: %s", client_info.client_id)
+
+    def _check_registration_quota(self) -> None:
+        """Refuse a registration when this address registered too many clients recently."""
+        source = get_client_address()
+        if source is None:
+            return
+        now = self._clock()
+        recent = [t for t in self._registrations.get(source, []) if t > now - REGISTRATION_WINDOW]
+        if len(recent) >= MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE:
+            self._registrations[source] = recent
+            logger.warning("oauth client registration refused: quota of one address reached")
+            raise RegistrationError(
+                "invalid_client_metadata", "too many registrations from this address; try later"
+            )
+        recent.append(now)
+        self._registrations[source] = recent
+        if len(self._registrations) > MAX_CLIENTS * 4:
+            for key in [
+                k
+                for k, times in self._registrations.items()
+                if times[-1] <= now - REGISTRATION_WINDOW
+            ]:
+                del self._registrations[key]
+
+    def _evict_one_client(self) -> bool:
+        """Evict the least recently used client without sessions, never a young one.
+
+        A client younger than :data:`PENDING_TTL` may still be on its way to its first
+        sign-in; evicting it would let a registration flood cancel those sign-ins.
+        """
+        now = self._clock()
+        candidates = [
+            (record.last_used_at, client_id)
+            for client_id, record in self._store.clients.items()
+            if not self._store.client_has_sessions(client_id)
+            and record.registered_at + PENDING_TTL <= now
+        ]
+        if not candidates:
+            return False
+        _, client_id = min(candidates)
+        del self._store.clients[client_id]
+        logger.info("oauth client evicted (least recently used, no sessions): %s", client_id)
+        return True
+
+    # Authorization
+
+    async def authorize(
+        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, params: AuthorizationParams
+    ) -> str:
+        """Park the request and send the browser to our consent page.
+
+        Raises:
+            AuthorizeError: ``invalid_target`` when the client asks for a token
+                for another resource than this server's MCP endpoint.
+        """
+        if params.resource is not None and not same_resource(params.resource, self.resource):
+            raise AuthorizeError("invalid_target", "unknown resource")
+        # A client registered before the allowlist was set must not slip through it.
+        if (
+            redirect_uri_problem(str(params.redirect_uri), self._settings.oauth_redirect_allowlist)
+            is not None
+        ):
+            raise AuthorizeError("invalid_request", "redirect URI is not allowed")
+        source = get_client_address()
+        if (
+            source is not None
+            and self._requests.count_where(lambda item: item.source == source)
+            >= MAX_PENDING_PER_SOURCE
+        ):
+            logger.warning("oauth authorize refused: pending sign-in quota of one address reached")
+            raise AuthorizeError("temporarily_unavailable", "too many pending sign-ins")
+        request_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        pending = PendingAuthorization(
+            client_id=client.client_id,
+            client_name=client.client_name,
+            redirect_uri=str(params.redirect_uri),
+            redirect_uri_provided_explicitly=params.redirect_uri_provided_explicitly,
+            code_challenge=params.code_challenge,
+            client_state=params.state,
+            scopes=list(params.scopes or [MCP_SCOPE]),
+            resource=self.resource,
+            code_verifier=secrets.token_urlsafe(64),
+            source=source,
+        )
+        self._requests.put(token_hash(request_id), pending, PENDING_TTL)
+        return f"{self.base_url}{CONSENT_PATH}?{urlencode({'request': request_id})}"
+
+    def consent_request(self, request_id: str) -> PendingAuthorization | None:
+        """The pending request shown on the consent page, or None when unknown or expired."""
+        return self._requests.get(token_hash(request_id)) if request_id else None
+
+    def begin_consent(self, request_id: str) -> str | None:
+        """Mint the CSRF token for the consent form (the newest page wins)."""
+        pending = self.consent_request(request_id)
+        if pending is None:
+            return None
+        csrf = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        pending.csrf_hash = token_hash(csrf)
+        return csrf
+
+    def finish_consent(
+        self, request_id: str, csrf_form: str, csrf_cookie: str, *, approve: bool
+    ) -> ConsentDecision | None:
+        """Apply the consent decision; None when the request or CSRF proof is invalid."""
+        key = token_hash(request_id) if request_id else ""
+        pending = self._requests.get(key) if key else None
+        if pending is None:
+            return None
+        # Double submit: the form value and the SameSite=Strict cookie must both
+        # carry the token minted for this request.
+        if not (
+            _matches(csrf_form, pending.csrf_hash) and _matches(csrf_cookie, pending.csrf_hash)
+        ):
+            logger.warning("oauth consent rejected: CSRF check failed")
+            return None
+        self._requests.pop(key)
+        if not approve:
+            logger.info("oauth consent denied for client %s", pending.client_id)
+            return ConsentDecision(
+                redirect=construct_redirect_uri(
+                    pending.redirect_uri, error="access_denied", state=pending.client_state
+                )
+            )
+        state = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        binding = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        pending.binding_hash = token_hash(binding)
+        self._states.put(token_hash(state), pending, PENDING_TTL)
+        location = self._upstream.authorize_url(
+            state=state, code_challenge=s256(pending.code_verifier)
+        )
+        return ConsentDecision(redirect=location, binding_token=binding, flow_tag=flow_tag(state))
+
+    async def complete_callback(
+        self, state: str, binding: str, code: str, error: str
+    ) -> str | None:
+        """Finish the Gitea sign-in; return the client redirect, or None for a bad request.
+
+        A bad request (unknown, expired or replayed state, or a browser that
+        did not start the flow) never redirects anywhere.
+        """
+        pending = self._states.pop(token_hash(state)) if state else None
+        if pending is None:
+            logger.warning("oauth callback rejected: unknown, expired or replayed state")
+            return None
+        if not _matches(binding, pending.binding_hash):
+            logger.warning("oauth callback rejected: the browser did not start this sign-in")
+            self._audit(
+                "oauth_callback_binding_mismatch",
+                "OAuth callback from a browser that did not start the sign-in",
+                "high",
+                client_id=pending.client_id,
+            )
+            return None
+        if pending.client_id not in self._store.clients:
+            logger.warning("oauth callback rejected: client no longer registered")
+            return None
+
+        def back(**params: str | None) -> str:
+            return construct_redirect_uri(
+                pending.redirect_uri, **params, state=pending.client_state
+            )
+
+        if error:
+            logger.info("oauth sign-in cancelled or refused at Gitea")
+            return back(error="access_denied")
+        if not code:
+            logger.warning("oauth sign-in failed: Gitea sent no code")
+            return back(error="server_error")
+        try:
+            tokens = await self._upstream.exchange_code(code, pending.code_verifier)
+            user = await self._upstream.fetch_user(tokens.access_token)
+        except UpstreamError as exc:
+            logger.warning("oauth sign-in failed: %s", exc)
+            return back(error="server_error")
+
+        now = self._clock()
+        session = SessionRecord(
+            session_id=uuid.uuid4().hex,
+            client_id=pending.client_id,
+            login=user.login,
+            is_admin=user.is_admin,
+            gitea_access_token=tokens.access_token,
+            gitea_refresh_token=tokens.refresh_token,
+            gitea_expires_at=tokens.expires_at,
+            scopes=list(pending.scopes),
+            resource=pending.resource,
+            created_at=now,
+        )
+        existing = sorted(self._store.sessions_of(user.login), key=lambda item: item.created_at)
+        for old in existing[: max(0, len(existing) - MAX_SESSIONS_PER_LOGIN + 1)]:
+            self._end_session(
+                old.session_id, "oauth_session_evicted", "Oldest OAuth session of the user ended"
+            )
+        self._store.sessions[session.session_id] = session
+        try:
+            await self._store.save()
+        except (OSError, OAuthStoreError) as exc:
+            self._store.sessions.pop(session.session_id, None)
+            logger.error(
+                "oauth sign-in failed: could not save the session (%s)", type(exc).__name__
+            )
+            return back(error="server_error")
+
+        our_code = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        self._codes.put(
+            token_hash(our_code),
+            StoredAuthorizationCode(
+                code=token_hash(our_code),
+                scopes=list(pending.scopes),
+                expires_at=now + AUTHORIZATION_CODE_TTL,
+                client_id=pending.client_id,
+                code_challenge=pending.code_challenge,
+                redirect_uri=pending.redirect_uri,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+                redirect_uri_provided_explicitly=pending.redirect_uri_provided_explicitly,
+                resource=pending.resource,
+                subject=user.login,
+                session_id=session.session_id,
+            ),
+            AUTHORIZATION_CODE_TTL,
+        )
+        logger.info("oauth sign-in: Gitea user %s via client %s", user.login, pending.client_id)
+        self._audit(
+            "oauth_login",
+            "User signed in with Gitea OAuth",
+            "low",
+            login=user.login,
+            client_id=pending.client_id,
+            gitea_admin=user.is_admin,
+        )
+        return back(code=our_code)
+
+    # Authorization codes
+
+    async def load_authorization_code(
+        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: str
+    ) -> StoredAuthorizationCode | None:
+        """Look up our code; a replayed code revokes the grant it produced."""
+        key = token_hash(authorization_code)
+        used_by = self._used_codes.get(key)
+        if used_by is not None:
+            logger.warning("oauth authorization code replayed; revoking the grant")
+            self._end_session(
+                used_by, "oauth_code_replay", "Authorization code replayed; grant revoked"
+            )
+            await self._store.save()
+            return None
+        code = self._codes.get(key)
+        if code is None or code.client_id != client.client_id:
+            return None
+        return code
+
+    async def exchange_authorization_code(
+        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: StoredAuthorizationCode
+    ) -> OAuthToken:
+        """Consume the code (single use) and issue our access and refresh tokens."""
+        code = self._codes.pop(authorization_code.code)
+        if code is None or code.client_id != client.client_id:
+            raise TokenError("invalid_grant", "authorization code does not exist")
+        self._used_codes.put(authorization_code.code, code.session_id, AUTHORIZATION_CODE_TTL)
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(code.session_id)
+        if session is None or session.client_id != client.client_id:
+            raise TokenError("invalid_grant", "authorization code does not exist")
+        return await self._issue_tokens(session, code.scopes, code.scopes)
+
+    # Refresh tokens
+
+    async def load_refresh_token(
+        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, refresh_token: str
+    ) -> StoredRefreshToken | None:
+        """Look up a refresh token; reuse of a rotated-out token revokes the grant."""
+        if not refresh_token.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX):
+            return None
+        key = token_hash(refresh_token)
+        record = self._store.tokens.get(key)
+        if record is None:
+            reused = self._store.session_by_previous_refresh(key)
+            if reused is not None:
+                logger.warning("oauth refresh token reused; revoking the grant")
+                self._end_session(
+                    reused.session_id,
+                    "oauth_refresh_reuse",
+                    "Rotated refresh token reused; grant revoked",
+                )
+                await self._store.save()
+            return None
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(record.session_id)
+        if record.kind != "refresh" or session is None or record.client_id != client.client_id:
+            return None
+        if record.expires_at <= self._clock():
+            return None
+        return StoredRefreshToken(
+            token=f"sha256:{key}",
+            client_id=record.client_id,
+            scopes=list(record.scopes),
+            expires_at=int(record.expires_at),
+            resource=session.resource,
+            subject=session.login,
+            session_id=record.session_id,
+            token_hash=key,
+        )
+
+    async def exchange_refresh_token(
+        self,
+        client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
+        refresh_token: StoredRefreshToken,
+        scopes: list[str],
+    ) -> OAuthToken:
+        """Rotate: revoke the old pair and issue a new pair for the same session."""
+        record = self._store.tokens.get(refresh_token.token_hash)
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(refresh_token.session_id)
+        if (
+            record is None
+            or record.kind != "refresh"
+            or record.client_id != client.client_id
+            or session is None
+        ):
+            raise TokenError("invalid_grant", "refresh token does not exist")
+        for key in self._store.session_token_hashes(session.session_id):
+            del self._store.tokens[key]
+        session.previous_refresh_hash = refresh_token.token_hash
+        logger.info("oauth tokens refreshed for %s", session.login)
+        return await self._issue_tokens(session, scopes, record.scopes)
+
+    # Access tokens and revocation
+
+    async def load_access_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
+        """Verify one of our access tokens (``token`` on the result is only a hash)."""
+        if not token.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX):
+            return None
+        key = token_hash(token)
+        record = self._store.tokens.get(key)
+        if record is None or record.kind != "access" or record.expires_at <= self._clock():
+            return None
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(record.session_id)
+        if session is None:
+            return None
+        return AccessToken(
+            token=f"sha256:{key}",
+            client_id=record.client_id,
+            scopes=list(record.scopes),
+            expires_at=int(record.expires_at),
+            resource=session.resource,
+            subject=session.login,
+            claims={"auth": "oauth", "session_id": session.session_id},
+        )
+
+    async def revoke_token(self, token: AccessToken | RefreshToken) -> None:
+        """Revoke the whole grant (access and refresh tokens and the Gitea session)."""
+        if isinstance(token, StoredRefreshToken):
+            session_id: Any = token.session_id
+        elif isinstance(token, AccessToken):
+            session_id = (token.claims or {}).get("session_id")
+        else:
+            return
+        if not isinstance(session_id, str):
+            return
+        self._end_session(session_id, "oauth_revoke", "OAuth grant revoked by the client")
+        await self._store.save()
+        logger.info("oauth grant revoked")
+
+
+class OAuthTokenVerifier:
+    """``TokenVerifier`` for our issued access tokens (anything else is not ours)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, provider: GiteaOAuthProvider) -> None:
+        self._provider = provider
+
+    async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
+        """Return the access token for an issued ``agm_`` token, else None."""
+        if not token.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX):
+            return None
+        return await self._provider.load_access_token(token)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/resolver.py

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""Identity resolution for per-user OAuth, with automatic upstream refresh.
+
+Static and OAuth identities never mix:
+
+* an access token carrying our OAuth marker (``claims["auth"] == "oauth"``)
+  always resolves to that session's Gitea user, or fails; it never falls back
+  to the admin token;
+* only the static bearer (``client_id == STATIC_CLIENT_ID`` and no OAuth
+  marker) or no token at all reaches the admin resolver, and in an OAuth-only
+  deployment (no ``GITEA_TOKEN``) that fails closed;
+* any other access token is refused.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import dataclasses
+import logging
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from mcp.server.auth.provider import AccessToken
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger, get_audit_logger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import STATIC_CLIENT_ID, IdentityResolver
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.errors import ToolError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.identity import Identity
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import OAuthStore, OAuthStoreError, SessionRecord
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import GiteaUpstream, UpstreamError, UpstreamInvalidGrant
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    pass
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+#: Refresh the user's Gitea token when it expires within this many seconds.
+REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS = 60.0
+
+SIGN_IN_AGAIN = "your Gitea sign-in has ended; sign in again through your MCP client"
+OAUTH_ONLY = (
+    "this server accepts only per-user OAuth sign-in (no GITEA_TOKEN is configured for "
+    "admin-token mode)"
+)
+
+
+class OAuthIdentityResolver:
+    """Maps a verified access token to the identity a tool call runs as.
+
+    Args:
+        store: OAuth store (sessions and Gitea tokens).
+        upstream: Gitea OAuth client used to refresh the user's Gitea token.
+        admin: Resolver for the static bearer (admin-token mode), or None in an
+            OAuth-only deployment.
+        clock: Wall clock (epoch seconds).
+        audit: Audit logger for ended sessions (defaults to the process-wide one).
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: OAuthStore,
+        upstream: GiteaUpstream,
+        admin: IdentityResolver | None,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        audit: AuditLogger | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._store = store
+        self._upstream = upstream
+        self._admin = admin
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._audit_logger = audit
+        self._locks: dict[str, asyncio.Lock] = {}
+
+    async def resolve(self, access: AccessToken | None) -> Identity:
+        """Return the user's identity for an OAuth token, the admin's for the static bearer.
+
+        Raises:
+            ToolError: Unknown token kind, ended session, failed upstream refresh,
+                or admin-token mode requested while it is not configured.
+        """
+        claims = (access.claims or {}) if access is not None else {}
+        if access is not None and claims.get("auth") == "oauth":
+            return await self._resolve_session(access, claims.get("session_id"))
+        if access is None or access.client_id == STATIC_CLIENT_ID:
+            if self._admin is None:
+                raise ToolError(OAUTH_ONLY, status_code=401)
+            return await self._admin.resolve(access)
+        raise ToolError("unknown identity", status_code=401)
+
+    async def _resolve_session(self, access: AccessToken, session_id: object) -> Identity:
+        if not isinstance(session_id, str):
+            raise ToolError("unknown identity", status_code=401)
+        session = self._store.sessions.get(session_id)
+        if session is None or session.login != access.subject:
+            raise ToolError(SIGN_IN_AGAIN, status_code=401)
+        if self._needs_refresh(session):
+            session = await self._refresh(session_id)
+        redact = (session.gitea_refresh_token,) if session.gitea_refresh_token else ()
+        # The executor redacts ``Identity.redact`` (the Gitea refresh token) from results.
+        return Identity(
+            login=session.login, mode="oauth", token=session.gitea_access_token, redact=redact
+        )
+
+    def _needs_refresh(self, session: SessionRecord) -> bool:
+        expires = session.gitea_expires_at
+        return expires is not None and expires - self._clock() <= REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS
+
+    async def _refresh(self, session_id: str) -> SessionRecord:
+        lock = self._locks.setdefault(session_id, asyncio.Lock())
+        async with lock:
+            session = self._store.sessions.get(session_id)
+            if session is None:
+                raise ToolError(SIGN_IN_AGAIN, status_code=401)
+            if not self._needs_refresh(session):
+                return session  # refreshed by a concurrent call
+            still_valid = (session.gitea_expires_at or 0.0) > self._clock()
+            if session.gitea_refresh_token is None:
+                if still_valid:
+                    return session
+                await self._end(session, "Gitea token expired and no refresh token was issued")
+                raise ToolError(SIGN_IN_AGAIN, status_code=401)
+            try:
+                tokens = await self._upstream.refresh(session.gitea_refresh_token)
+            except UpstreamInvalidGrant:
+                await self._end(session, "Gitea refused the refresh token")
+                raise ToolError(SIGN_IN_AGAIN, status_code=401) from None
+            except UpstreamError as exc:
+                logger.warning("gitea token refresh failed for %s: %s", session.login, exc)
+                if still_valid:
+                    return session
+                raise ToolError(
+                    "could not refresh your Gitea sign-in; try again shortly", status_code=503
+                ) from None
+            updated = dataclasses.replace(
+                session,
+                gitea_access_token=tokens.access_token,
+                gitea_refresh_token=tokens.refresh_token or session.gitea_refresh_token,
+                gitea_expires_at=tokens.expires_at,
+            )
+            self._store.sessions[session_id] = updated
+            try:
+                await self._store.save()
+            except (OSError, OAuthStoreError) as exc:
+                logger.error("could not save the refreshed Gitea token (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+            logger.info("gitea token refreshed for %s", session.login)
+            return updated
+
+    async def _end(self, session: SessionRecord, reason: str) -> None:
+        self._store.end_session(session.session_id)
+        self._locks.pop(session.session_id, None)
+        logger.warning("oauth session ended for %s: %s", session.login, reason)
+        try:
+            audit = self._audit_logger or get_audit_logger()
+            audit.log_security_event(
+                "oauth_session_ended",
+                reason,
+                severity="low",
+                metadata={"login": session.login, "client_id": session.client_id},
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.error("audit log write failed: %s", type(exc).__name__)
+        try:
+            await self._store.save()
+        except (OSError, OAuthStoreError) as exc:
+            logger.error("could not save the OAuth store (%s)", type(exc).__name__)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+"""Encrypted on-disk store for OAuth clients, sessions and token hashes.
+
+One file, ``DATA_DIR/oauth-store.json``, holds the whole state as a single
+Fernet-encrypted JSON document. The Fernet key is derived from
+``TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`` with HKDF-SHA256, so the setting can be any long random
+string (the setup command writes a ``secrets.token_urlsafe`` value, not a Fernet
+key).
+
+What is stored:
+
+* registered MCP clients, including their client secrets (the SDK compares the
+  presented secret with the stored one at ``/token``);
+* sessions: the Gitea login and the user's Gitea access and refresh tokens;
+* our own access and refresh tokens, only as SHA-256 hashes.
+
+File safety: the directory is created with mode 0700 (an existing one must be owned by the
+running user and is tightened to 0700, otherwise startup stops) and the file is written
+with mode 0600 through a fresh ``O_EXCL`` temporary file and an atomic
+``os.replace``. A symlink at the store path is refused. A file that cannot be
+decrypted or parsed stops startup with a clear message instead of being wiped,
+because wiping would silently sign every user out and hide a wrong key.
+
+Mutations happen synchronously in memory (so a check-and-delete is atomic under
+asyncio) and are persisted with :meth:`OAuthStore.save`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import secrets
+import stat
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Literal
+
+import anyio.to_thread
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+STORE_FILENAME = "oauth-store.json"
+STORE_VERSION = 1
+HKDF_INFO = b"aegis-gitea-mcp oauth store"
+
+#: A session that never received tokens (an abandoned sign-in) is dropped after this long.
+ABANDONED_SESSION_SECONDS = 600.0
+
+Clock = Callable[[], float]
+TokenKind = Literal["access", "refresh"]
+
+
+class OAuthStoreError(Exception):
+    """The OAuth store cannot be used (startup error; the message is safe to print)."""
+
+
+def derive_fernet_key(secret: str) -> bytes:
+    """Derive the Fernet key for the store from ``TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`` (HKDF-SHA256)."""
+    hkdf = HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None, info=HKDF_INFO)
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hkdf.derive(secret.encode("utf-8")))
+
+
+def token_hash(value: str) -> str:
+    """SHA-256 hex digest used as the stored form of our tokens, codes and states."""
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ClientRecord:
+    """A dynamically registered MCP client.
+
+    Attributes:
+        info: ``OAuthClientInformationFull`` as JSON (includes the client secret).
+        registered_at: Registration time (epoch seconds).
+        last_used_at: Last time the client was looked up (epoch seconds).
+    """
+
+    info: dict[str, Any] = field(repr=False)
+    registered_at: float
+    last_used_at: float
+
+
+@dataclass
+class SessionRecord:
+    """One signed-in grant: a Gitea user, the client it was granted to and the Gitea tokens.
+
+    Attributes:
+        session_id: Random identifier (never sent to clients).
+        client_id: MCP client the grant belongs to.
+        login: Gitea login of the user.
+        is_admin: Whether Gitea reported the user as site admin at sign-in
+            (informational only; Gitea enforces permissions).
+        gitea_access_token: The user's Gitea access token.
+        gitea_refresh_token: The user's Gitea refresh token, if Gitea issued one.
+        gitea_expires_at: Expiry of the Gitea access token (epoch seconds), if known.
+        scopes: Our scopes granted to the client.
+        resource: The resource (MCP endpoint URL) the grant is bound to.
+        created_at: Sign-in time (epoch seconds).
+        previous_refresh_hash: Hash of the last rotated-out refresh token (reuse detection).
+    """
+
+    session_id: str
+    client_id: str
+    login: str
+    is_admin: bool
+    gitea_access_token: str = field(repr=False)
+    gitea_refresh_token: str | None = field(repr=False)
+    gitea_expires_at: float | None
+    scopes: list[str]
+    resource: str
+    created_at: float
+    previous_refresh_hash: str | None = field(default=None, repr=False)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TokenRecord:
+    """One of our tokens, stored under its SHA-256 hash."""
+
+    kind: TokenKind
+    session_id: str
+    client_id: str
+    scopes: list[str]
+    expires_at: float
+
+
+def _restrict_directory(directory: Path) -> None:
+    """Create the state directory with mode 0700, or check and tighten an existing one.
+
+    Whoever controls the directory can swap the store for an older copy (which
+    resurrects revoked grants) or delete it, so an existing directory must belong
+    to the effective user and must not stay writable by group or others.
+
+    Raises:
+        OAuthStoreError: The directory is owned by another user or remains writable
+            by group or others after an attempt to tighten it.
+    """
+    if not directory.exists():
+        directory.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        return
+    info = os.stat(directory)
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
+        raise OAuthStoreError(f"{directory} is not a directory")
+    owner = getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: info.st_uid)()
+    if info.st_uid != owner:
+        raise OAuthStoreError(
+            f"{directory} is owned by another user (uid {info.st_uid}, this process runs as "
+            f"uid {owner}); refusing to keep the OAuth token store there. Use a DATA_DIR "
+            "owned by the service user"
+        )
+    mode = stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)
+    if mode & 0o077:
+        try:
+            directory.chmod(0o700)
+        except OSError:
+            logger.warning("could not restrict the permissions of the state directory to 0700")
+        if stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(directory).st_mode) & 0o022:
+            raise OAuthStoreError(
+                f"{directory} is writable by group or others and could not be restricted; "
+                "refusing to keep the OAuth token store there. Run 'chmod 700' on it"
+            )
+
+
+def _parse_document(document: Any) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not isinstance(document, dict) or document.get("version") != STORE_VERSION:
+        raise ValueError("unsupported store version")
+    clients_raw = document.get("clients", {})
+    sessions_raw = document.get("sessions", {})
+    tokens_raw = document.get("tokens", {})
+    if not all(isinstance(part, dict) for part in (clients_raw, sessions_raw, tokens_raw)):
+        raise ValueError("malformed store sections")
+    clients = {str(key): ClientRecord(**value) for key, value in clients_raw.items()}
+    sessions = {str(key): SessionRecord(**value) for key, value in sessions_raw.items()}
+    tokens = {str(key): TokenRecord(**value) for key, value in tokens_raw.items()}
+    for record in clients.values():
+        if not isinstance(record.info, dict):
+            raise ValueError("malformed client record")
+    for token in tokens.values():
+        if token.kind not in ("access", "refresh"):
+            raise ValueError("malformed token record")
+    return clients, sessions, tokens
+
+
+class OAuthStore:
+    """In-memory OAuth state backed by one encrypted file.
+
+    Use :meth:`load` to create it. All getters and mutators are synchronous;
+    :meth:`save` persists the current state (pruning expired entries first).
+
+    Args:
+        directory: State directory (``DATA_DIR``).
+        secret: ``TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY``.
+        clock: Wall clock (epoch seconds); tests inject a fake one.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, directory: Path, secret: str, clock: Clock = time.time) -> None:
+        self._directory = directory
+        self._path = directory / STORE_FILENAME
+        self._fernet = Fernet(derive_fernet_key(secret))
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._lock = asyncio.Lock()
+        self.clients: dict[str, ClientRecord] = {}
+        self.sessions: dict[str, SessionRecord] = {}
+        self.tokens: dict[str, TokenRecord] = {}
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load(cls, directory: Path, secret: str, clock: Clock = time.time) -> OAuthStore:
+        """Open the store, reading and decrypting the file when it exists.
+
+        Raises:
+            OAuthStoreError: The directory belongs to another user or stays group or
+                world writable, the path is a symlink or not a regular file, or the
+                file cannot be decrypted or parsed.
+        """
+        store = cls(directory, secret, clock)
+        _restrict_directory(directory)
+        store._read()
+        store.prune()
+        return store
+
+    @property
+    def path(self) -> Path:
+        """Location of the store file."""
+        return self._path
+
+    # Reading and writing the file
+
+    def _read(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            info = os.lstat(self._path)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return
+        if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode):
+            raise OAuthStoreError(
+                f"{self._path} is a symlink; refusing to use it as the OAuth token store"
+            )
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+            raise OAuthStoreError(f"{self._path} is not a regular file")
+        fd = os.open(self._path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0))
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "rb") as handle:
+            raw = handle.read()
+        if stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o077:
+            logger.warning("OAuth store file had loose permissions; restricting it to 0600")
+            os.chmod(self._path, 0o600)
+        try:
+            plain = self._fernet.decrypt(raw)
+        except InvalidToken:
+            raise OAuthStoreError(
+                f"cannot decrypt {self._path}: TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY does not match the key the "
+                "store was written with, or the file is damaged. Restore the original key, or "
+                "move the file away to start over (this signs every OAuth user out)."
+            ) from None
+        try:
+            self.clients, self.sessions, self.tokens = _parse_document(json.loads(plain))
+        except (ValueError, TypeError, KeyError):
+            raise OAuthStoreError(
+                f"{self._path} is not a valid OAuth store document; move the file away to "
+                "start over (this signs every OAuth user out)"
+            ) from None
+
+    def _document(self) -> bytes:
+        document = {
+            "version": STORE_VERSION,
+            "clients": {key: asdict(value) for key, value in self.clients.items()},
+            "sessions": {key: asdict(value) for key, value in self.sessions.items()},
+            "tokens": {key: asdict(value) for key, value in self.tokens.items()},
+        }
+        return json.dumps(document, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+    def _write(self, data: bytes) -> None:
+        _restrict_directory(self._directory)
+        with contextlib.suppress(FileNotFoundError):
+            if stat.S_ISLNK(os.lstat(self._path).st_mode):
+                raise OAuthStoreError(
+                    f"{self._path} is a symlink; refusing to write the OAuth token store"
+                )
+        temporary = self._directory / f".{STORE_FILENAME}.{secrets.token_hex(8)}.tmp"
+        flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+        fd = os.open(temporary, flags, 0o600)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as handle:
+                handle.write(data)
+                handle.flush()
+                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, self._path)
+        except BaseException:
+            with contextlib.suppress(FileNotFoundError):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+            raise
+
+    async def save(self) -> None:
+        """Prune expired entries and persist the state atomically (encrypted, mode 0600)."""
+        async with self._lock:
+            self.prune()
+            data = self._fernet.encrypt(self._document())
+            # The write fsyncs: keep that off the event loop (the bytes are already built,
+            # so the thread touches no shared state).
+            await anyio.to_thread.run_sync(self._write, data)
+
+    # Maintenance
+
+    def prune(self) -> None:
+        """Drop expired tokens, and sessions that have no tokens left."""
+        now = self._clock()
+        for key in [key for key, token in self.tokens.items() if token.expires_at <= now]:
+            del self.tokens[key]
+        live = {token.session_id for token in self.tokens.values()}
+        for session_id, session in list(self.sessions.items()):
+            if session_id in live:
+                continue
+            if session.created_at + ABANDONED_SESSION_SECONDS < now:
+                del self.sessions[session_id]
+
+    # Sessions and tokens
+
+    def session_token_hashes(self, session_id: str) -> list[str]:
+        """Hashes of every token issued for ``session_id``."""
+        return [key for key, token in self.tokens.items() if token.session_id == session_id]
+
+    def end_session(self, session_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Delete a session and all of its tokens; return whether it existed."""
+        for key in self.session_token_hashes(session_id):
+            del self.tokens[key]
+        return self.sessions.pop(session_id, None) is not None
+
+    def sessions_of(self, login: str) -> Iterator[SessionRecord]:
+        """Every session of one Gitea login."""
+        return (session for session in self.sessions.values() if session.login == login)
+
+    def session_by_previous_refresh(self, refresh_hash: str) -> SessionRecord | None:
+        """The session whose last rotated-out refresh token has ``refresh_hash``."""
+        for session in self.sessions.values():
+            if session.previous_refresh_hash is not None and secrets.compare_digest(
+                session.previous_refresh_hash, refresh_hash
+            ):
+                return session
+        return None
+
+    def client_has_sessions(self, client_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Whether any session belongs to ``client_id``."""
+        return any(session.client_id == client_id for session in self.sessions.values())

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/oauth/upstream.py

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+"""Gitea as the upstream OAuth2 provider: code exchange, refresh and the user lookup.
+
+We are a confidential client of Gitea (``GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`` and
+``GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET``, sent form-encoded). Errors never carry Gitea's
+response body or any token: callers only learn a coarse kind.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urlencode
+
+import httpx
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import __version__
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+
+#: Callback path on our server that Gitea redirects to (registered on the Gitea app).
+CALLBACK_PATH = "/oauth/callback"
+
+_MAX_TOKEN_CHARS = 32_767  # Gitea's MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH
+# Gitea user names: alphanumerics, dash, underscore and dot (also keeps logs clean).
+_LOGIN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,255}$")
+
+
+class UpstreamError(Exception):
+    """A request to Gitea's OAuth endpoints failed (message is a coarse, safe kind)."""
+
+
+class UpstreamInvalidGrant(UpstreamError):
+    """Gitea rejected the code or refresh token (``invalid_grant``): the user must sign in again."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class UpstreamTokens:
+    """Tokens returned by Gitea's token endpoint (excluded from ``repr``)."""
+
+    access_token: str = field(repr=False)
+    refresh_token: str | None = field(repr=False)
+    expires_at: float | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GiteaUser:
+    """The signed-in Gitea user."""
+
+    login: str
+    is_admin: bool
+
+
+def _default_client(settings: Settings) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
+    return httpx.AsyncClient(
+        timeout=httpx.Timeout(float(settings.request_timeout_seconds)),
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+
+def _valid_token(value: Any) -> bool:
+    return isinstance(value, str) and 0 < len(value) <= _MAX_TOKEN_CHARS and value.isprintable()
+
+
+class GiteaUpstream:
+    """Client for Gitea's ``/login/oauth/access_token`` and ``/api/v1/user``.
+
+    Args:
+        settings: Application settings (Gitea URL, OAuth app credentials, timeout).
+        client_factory: Creates the ``httpx.AsyncClient`` for one exchange. A new
+            client per exchange means no cookies or connections are shared.
+        clock: Wall clock used to turn ``expires_in`` into an expiry time.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        settings: Settings,
+        *,
+        client_factory: Callable[[], httpx.AsyncClient] | None = None,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._settings = settings
+        self._client_factory = client_factory or (lambda: _default_client(settings))
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._token_url = f"{settings.gitea_url}/login/oauth/access_token"
+        self._user_url = f"{settings.gitea_api_url}/user"
+        secret = settings.gitea_oauth_client_secret
+        self._client_id = settings.gitea_oauth_client_id or ""
+        self._client_secret = secret.get_secret_value() if secret is not None else ""
+        self._headers = {
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": f"aegis-gitea-mcp/{__version__}",
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def redirect_uri(self) -> str:
+        """Our callback URL as registered on the Gitea OAuth application."""
+        return f"{self._settings.public_base_url}{CALLBACK_PATH}"
+
+    def authorize_url(self, *, state: str, code_challenge: str) -> str:
+        """Gitea's authorization URL for one sign-in (PKCE S256, fixed scope list)."""
+        query = {
+            "client_id": self._client_id,
+            "redirect_uri": self.redirect_uri,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "state": state,
+            "scope": " ".join(self._settings.oauth_scopes),
+            "code_challenge": code_challenge,
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+        }
+        return f"{self._settings.gitea_url}/login/oauth/authorize?{urlencode(query)}"
+
+    async def exchange_code(self, code: str, code_verifier: str) -> UpstreamTokens:
+        """Exchange Gitea's authorization code (with our PKCE verifier) for tokens."""
+        return await self._token_request(
+            {
+                "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+                "code": code,
+                "redirect_uri": self.redirect_uri,
+                "code_verifier": code_verifier,
+            }
+        )
+
+    async def refresh(self, refresh_token: str) -> UpstreamTokens:
+        """Refresh the user's Gitea access token.
+
+        Raises:
+            UpstreamInvalidGrant: Gitea no longer accepts the refresh token.
+            UpstreamError: Any other failure (network, 5xx, malformed answer).
+        """
+        return await self._token_request(
+            {"grant_type": "refresh_token", "refresh_token": refresh_token}
+        )
+
+    async def fetch_user(self, access_token: str) -> GiteaUser:
+        """Look up the user that owns ``access_token`` (``GET /api/v1/user``)."""
+        headers = {**self._headers, "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"}
+        try:
+            async with self._client_factory() as client:
+                response = await client.get(self._user_url, headers=headers)
+        except httpx.HTTPError:
+            raise UpstreamError("user lookup failed: Gitea unreachable") from None
+        if response.status_code != 200:
+            raise UpstreamError(f"user lookup failed: HTTP {response.status_code}")
+        body = _json(response) or {}
+        login = body.get("login")
+        if not isinstance(login, str) or not _LOGIN.match(login):
+            raise UpstreamError("user lookup failed: malformed answer")
+        return GiteaUser(login=login, is_admin=body.get("is_admin") is True)
+
+    async def _token_request(self, form: dict[str, str]) -> UpstreamTokens:
+        payload = {**form, "client_id": self._client_id, "client_secret": self._client_secret}
+        try:
+            async with self._client_factory() as client:
+                response = await client.post(self._token_url, data=payload, headers=self._headers)
+        except httpx.HTTPError:
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: Gitea unreachable") from None
+        body = _json(response)
+        if response.status_code != 200:
+            if response.status_code in (400, 401) and body and body.get("error") == "invalid_grant":
+                raise UpstreamInvalidGrant("Gitea rejected the grant")
+            raise UpstreamError(f"token request failed: HTTP {response.status_code}")
+        if body is None:
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: malformed answer")
+        access = body.get("access_token")
+        refresh = body.get("refresh_token")
+        token_type = body.get("token_type", "bearer")
+        expires_in = body.get("expires_in")
+        if not isinstance(access, str) or not _valid_token(access):
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: malformed answer")
+        if not isinstance(token_type, str):
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: malformed answer")
+        if token_type.lower() != "bearer":
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: unexpected token type")
+        if refresh is not None and not _valid_token(refresh):
+            raise UpstreamError("token request failed: malformed answer")
+        expires_at: float | None = None
+        if isinstance(expires_in, bool):
+            expires_in = None
+        if isinstance(expires_in, (int, float)) and expires_in > 0:
+            expires_at = self._clock() + float(expires_in)
+        return UpstreamTokens(access_token=access, refresh_token=refresh, expires_at=expires_at)
+
+
+def _json(response: httpx.Response) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    try:
+        body = response.json()
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return body if isinstance(body, dict) else None

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/rate_limit.py

@@ -1,14 +1,48 @@
-"""In-memory request rate limiting for MCP endpoints."""
+"""In-memory request rate limiting for the HTTP MCP endpoint.
+
+The limiter runs before authentication, so every key it sees is attacker
+controlled. Memory is therefore bounded: a key whose window has emptied is
+dropped, and each limiter holds at most ``max_keys`` keys (least recently used
+keys are evicted first). Per-IP limiting always applies; the per-token bucket is
+keyed by a hash of the Authorization header and is only a second line.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import hashlib
+import ipaddress
+import logging
 import time
-from collections import defaultdict, deque
+from collections import OrderedDict, deque
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import get_audit_logger
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import get_settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+#: Maximum number of distinct client IPs tracked at once.
+MAX_IP_KEYS = 100_000
+#: Maximum number of distinct Authorization hashes tracked at once.
+MAX_TOKEN_KEYS = 10_000
+
+
+def client_bucket(client_ip: str) -> str:
+    """Rate-limit key of a client address: IPv6 clients share one bucket per /64.
+
+    A single IPv6 subscriber holds a whole /64, so keying by the full address would
+    give it an unlimited supply of buckets. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses count as
+    their IPv4 address; anything that is not an IP address is used as is.
+    """
+    try:
+        address = ipaddress.ip_address(client_ip.split("%")[0])
+    except ValueError:
+        return client_ip
+    if isinstance(address, ipaddress.IPv6Address):
+        if address.ipv4_mapped is not None:
+            return str(address.ipv4_mapped)
+        return str(ipaddress.IPv6Network((address, 64), strict=False))
+    return str(address)
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -20,25 +54,52 @@ class RateLimitDecision:
 
 
 class SlidingWindowLimiter:
-    """Sliding-window limiter keyed by arbitrary identifiers."""
+    """Sliding-window limiter keyed by arbitrary identifiers, with bounded memory."""
 
-    def __init__(self, max_requests: int, window_seconds: int) -> None:
+    def __init__(self, max_requests: int, window_seconds: int, max_keys: int = MAX_IP_KEYS) -> None:
-        """Initialize a fixed-window limiter.
+        """Initialize a sliding-window limiter.
 
         Args:
             max_requests: Maximum allowed requests within window.
             window_seconds: Rolling time window length.
+            max_keys: Maximum number of tracked keys; the least recently used key is
+                evicted beyond it.
         """
         self.max_requests = max_requests
         self.window_seconds = window_seconds
-        self._events: dict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
+        self.max_keys = max_keys
+        self._events: OrderedDict[str, deque[float]] = OrderedDict()
+        self._reported: dict[str, float] = {}
+        self._next_sweep = 0.0
+
+    def __len__(self) -> int:
+        return len(self._events)
+
+    def _sweep(self, now: float) -> None:
+        """Drop keys with no event inside the window (at most once per window)."""
+        if now < self._next_sweep:
+            return
+        self._next_sweep = now + self.window_seconds
+        boundary = now - self.window_seconds
+        for key in [k for k, events in self._events.items() if not events or events[-1] < boundary]:
+            del self._events[key]
+        for key in [k for k in self._reported if k not in self._events]:
+            del self._reported[key]
 
     def allow(self, key: str) -> bool:
         """Check and record request for the provided key."""
         now = time.time()
         boundary = now - self.window_seconds
+        self._sweep(now)
 
-        events = self._events[key]
+        events = self._events.get(key)
+        if events is None:
+            events = self._events[key] = deque()
+            while len(self._events) > self.max_keys:
+                evicted, _ = self._events.popitem(last=False)
+                self._reported.pop(evicted, None)
+        else:
+            self._events.move_to_end(key)
         while events and events[0] < boundary:
             events.popleft()
 
@@ -48,63 +109,77 @@ class SlidingWindowLimiter:
         events.append(now)
         return True
 
+    def first_excess(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        """Return True once per window for a key that is over its limit.
+
+        Callers use it to audit only the first rejected request of a burst instead
+        of every one (which would let an attacker fill the audit log).
+        """
+        now = time.time()
+        reported_at = self._reported.get(key)
+        if reported_at is not None and now - reported_at < self.window_seconds:
+            return False
+        self._reported[key] = now
+        return True
+
 
 class RequestRateLimiter:
-    """Combined per-IP and per-token request limiter."""
+    """Combined per-IP and per-token request limiter.
 
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
+    Args:
-        """Initialize with current settings."""
+        settings: Application settings (``RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE``).
-        settings = get_settings()
+    """
-        self._audit = get_audit_logger()
+
-        self._ip_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(settings.rate_limit_per_minute, 60)
+    def __init__(self, settings: Settings) -> None:
-        self._token_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(settings.rate_limit_per_minute, 60)
+        limit = settings.rate_limit_per_minute
+        self._ip_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(limit, 60, MAX_IP_KEYS)
+        self._token_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(limit, 60, MAX_TOKEN_KEYS)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _audit_excess(event_type: str, description: str, severity: str, client_ip: str) -> None:
+        """Record a limit hit; an unavailable audit log must not break request handling."""
+        try:
+            get_audit_logger().log_security_event(
+                event_type=event_type,
+                description=description,
+                severity=severity,
+                metadata={"client_ip": client_ip},
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.error("audit log write failed: %s", type(exc).__name__)
 
     def check(self, client_ip: str, token: str | None) -> RateLimitDecision:
         """Evaluate request against IP and token limits.
 
         Args:
             client_ip: Request source IP.
-            token: Optional authenticated API token.
+            token: Optional Authorization header value.
 
         Returns:
             Rate limit decision.
         """
-        if not self._ip_limiter.allow(client_ip):
+        bucket = client_bucket(client_ip)
-            self._audit.log_security_event(
+        if not self._ip_limiter.allow(bucket):
-                event_type="rate_limit_ip_exceeded",
+            if self._ip_limiter.first_excess(bucket):
-                description="Per-IP request rate limit exceeded",
+                self._audit_excess(
-                severity="medium",
+                    "rate_limit_ip_exceeded",
-                metadata={"client_ip": client_ip},
+                    "Per-IP request rate limit exceeded",
-            )
+                    "medium",
+                    client_ip,
+                )
             return RateLimitDecision(False, "Per-IP rate limit exceeded")
 
         if token:
             # Hash token before using it as a key to avoid storing secrets in memory maps.
             token_key = hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
             if not self._token_limiter.allow(token_key):
-                self._audit.log_security_event(
+                if self._token_limiter.first_excess(token_key):
-                    event_type="rate_limit_token_exceeded",
+                    self._audit_excess(
-                    description="Per-token request rate limit exceeded",
+                        "rate_limit_token_exceeded",
-                    severity="high",
+                        "Per-token request rate limit exceeded",
-                    metadata={"client_ip": client_ip},
+                        "high",
-                )
+                        client_ip,
+                    )
                 return RateLimitDecision(False, "Per-token rate limit exceeded")
 
         return RateLimitDecision(True, "within limits")
-
-
-_rate_limiter: RequestRateLimiter | None = None
-
-
-def get_rate_limiter() -> RequestRateLimiter:
-    """Get global request limiter."""
-    global _rate_limiter
-    if _rate_limiter is None:
-        _rate_limiter = RequestRateLimiter()
-    return _rate_limiter
-
-
-def reset_rate_limiter() -> None:
-    """Reset global limiter (primarily for tests)."""
-    global _rate_limiter
-    _rate_limiter = None

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/request_context.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from contextvars import ContextVar
 _REQUEST_ID: ContextVar[str] = ContextVar("request_id", default="-")
 _GITEA_USER_TOKEN: ContextVar[str | None] = ContextVar("gitea_user_token", default=None)
 _GITEA_USER_LOGIN: ContextVar[str | None] = ContextVar("gitea_user_login", default=None)
+_CLIENT_ADDRESS: ContextVar[str | None] = ContextVar("client_address", default=None)
 _GITEA_USER_SCOPES: ContextVar[tuple[str, ...]] = ContextVar("gitea_user_scopes", default=())
 
 
@@ -20,6 +21,16 @@ def get_request_id() -> str:
     return _REQUEST_ID.get()
 
 
+def set_client_address(address: str | None) -> None:
+    """Store the rate-limit bucket of the client address (set by the HTTP middleware)."""
+    _CLIENT_ADDRESS.set(address)
+
+
+def get_client_address() -> str | None:
+    """Rate-limit bucket of the current request's client address (None outside HTTP)."""
+    return _CLIENT_ADDRESS.get()
+
+
 def set_gitea_user_token(token: str) -> None:
     """Store the per-request Gitea OAuth user token in context-local state."""
     _GITEA_USER_TOKEN.set(token)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/security.py

@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ _SECRET_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
         "github_token",
         re.compile(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b"),
     ),
+    (
+        # Opaque OAuth tokens this server issues (``agm_`` + token_urlsafe(32)).
+        "aegis_oauth_token",
+        re.compile(r"\bagm_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}"),
+    ),
     (
         "jwt",
         re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}\b"),
@@ -85,7 +90,11 @@ def sanitize_data(value: Any, mode: str = "mask") -> Any:
         Sanitized payload value.
     """
     if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {str(key): sanitize_data(item, mode=mode) for key, item in value.items()}
+        # Keys are data too: a secret can sit in an object key (``{"<token>": 1}``).
+        return {
+            sanitize_data(str(key), mode=mode): sanitize_data(item, mode=mode)
+            for key, item in value.items()
+        }
 
     if isinstance(value, list):
         return [sanitize_data(item, mode=mode) for item in value]

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/server.py

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ values are never logged or echoed in validation errors.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import hashlib
+import ipaddress
 import json
 import logging
 import time
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ _MAX_ALLOWED_NAMES = 40
 _MAX_NAME_CHARS = 64
 _MAX_AUDIT_ARGUMENT_NAMES = 64
 _MAX_AUDIT_PATH_CHARS = 200
-_MAX_UNKNOWN_NAME_CHARS = 128
+_MAX_CLIENT_ID_CHARS = 128
 #: Slack added to the upload-derived HTTP body cap for JSON framing and other arguments.
 BODY_OVERHEAD_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
 
@@ -347,6 +349,7 @@ class _Record:
     """Everything one audit entry needs, filled in as the call progresses."""
 
     tool: str
+    request_id: str = ""
     domain: str | None = None
     method: str | None = None
     path: str | None = None
@@ -356,6 +359,34 @@ class _Record:
     is_error: bool = True
     http_status: int | None = None
     argument_names: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    rejected_arguments: int = 0
+    client_id: str | None = None
+    session: str | None = None
+    client_ip: str | None = None
+
+
+def _source_ip(ctx: ServerRequestContext[dict[str, Any]]) -> str | None:
+    """Client address of an HTTP request (None on stdio); only a valid IP address is recorded."""
+    client = getattr(getattr(ctx, "request", None), "client", None)
+    host = getattr(client, "host", None)
+    if not isinstance(host, str):
+        return None
+    try:
+        return str(ipaddress.ip_address(host.split("%")[0]))
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _caller_fields(record: _Record, ctx: ServerRequestContext[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+    """Fill the client, session and source address of the call from the verified token."""
+    access = get_access_token()
+    if access is not None:
+        record.client_id = access.client_id[:_MAX_CLIENT_ID_CHARS]
+        session_id = (access.claims or {}).get("session_id")
+        if isinstance(session_id, str) and session_id:
+            # A short hash: enough to correlate entries of one grant, useless as a credential.
+            record.session = hashlib.sha256(session_id.encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
+    record.client_ip = _source_ip(ctx)
 
 
 def _error_payload(kind: str, message: str, **extra: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -405,16 +436,53 @@ class _Dispatcher:
     ) -> types.CallToolResult:
         """Handle ``tools/call``; every call produces exactly one audit entry."""
         started = time.perf_counter()
-        set_request_id(uuid.uuid4().hex)
+        request_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
+        set_request_id(request_id)
         arguments = params.arguments or {}
-        record = _Record(tool=params.name[:_MAX_UNKNOWN_NAME_CHARS])
+        # The tool name and the argument names come from the caller: only names the
-        record.argument_names = sorted(_clip(key) for key in arguments)[:_MAX_AUDIT_ARGUMENT_NAMES]
+        # registry knows are recorded, as the audit entry must never hold a secret a
+        # model pasted into a name.
+        record = _Record(tool=f"(unknown tool, {len(params.name)} chars)", request_id=request_id)
+        record.rejected_arguments = len(arguments)
+        _caller_fields(record, ctx)
+        # Fail closed: the audit logger is obtained BEFORE anything runs, so a call is
+        # never executed (and its side effects never happen) without a way to record it.
+        try:
+            audit = self._audit_override or get_audit_logger()
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.error("audit log unavailable, refusing the call: %s", type(exc).__name__)
+            return _result(
+                _error_payload(
+                    "audit_unavailable",
+                    "The audit log is not writable, so the call was not executed",
+                ),
+                is_error=True,
+            )
         try:
             entry = self._registry.get(params.name)
             if entry is None:
                 record.outcome = "unknown_tool"
-                raise MCPError(types.INVALID_PARAMS, f"Unknown tool: {record.tool}")
+                raise MCPError(types.INVALID_PARAMS, "Unknown tool")
+            record.tool = entry.tool.name
             record.domain = entry.domain
+            known = set(entry.tool.input_schema.get("properties", {}))
+            record.argument_names = sorted(key for key in arguments if key in known)[
+                :_MAX_AUDIT_ARGUMENT_NAMES
+            ]
+            record.rejected_arguments = len(arguments) - len(record.argument_names)
+            # Write-ahead entry: a call whose start cannot be recorded does not run.
+            try:
+                audit.log_tool_call_started(entry.tool.name, request_id, entry.domain)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                logger.error("audit log write failed, refusing the call: %s", type(exc).__name__)
+                record.outcome = "audit_unavailable"
+                return _result(
+                    _error_payload(
+                        "audit_unavailable",
+                        "The audit log is not writable, so the call was not executed",
+                    ),
+                    is_error=True,
+                )
             try:
                 return await self._dispatch(entry, arguments, record)
             except Exception as exc:
@@ -426,7 +494,7 @@ class _Dispatcher:
                     message += f" ({type(exc).__name__})"
                 return _result(_error_payload("internal_error", message), is_error=True)
         finally:
-            self._audit(record, (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000)
+            self._audit(audit, record, (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000)
 
     async def _dispatch(
         self, entry: _Entry, arguments: dict[str, Any], record: _Record
@@ -434,20 +502,19 @@ class _Dispatcher:
         operation = entry.operation
         if operation is not None:
             record.method, record.path = operation.method, operation.path
-        else:
-            method, path = arguments.get("method"), arguments.get("path")
-            if isinstance(method, str):
-                record.method = method.upper()[:10]
-            if isinstance(path, str):
-                record.path = path[:_MAX_AUDIT_PATH_CHARS]
-        sudo = arguments.get("sudo")
-        record.sudo = sudo[:NAME_MAX_LENGTH] if isinstance(sudo, str) else None
 
         invalid = validate_arguments(self._registry.validator(entry.tool.name), arguments)
         if invalid is None and operation is not None:
             invalid = _upload_cap_error(operation, arguments, self._settings.max_binary_bytes)
         if invalid is not None:
             return self._failed(record, "invalid_argument", {"error": invalid})
+        # Only validated values reach the audit record: a rejected call may carry
+        # anything (including a secret) in its raw arguments.
+        sudo = arguments.get("sudo")
+        record.sudo = sudo[:NAME_MAX_LENGTH] if isinstance(sudo, str) else None
+        if operation is None:
+            record.method = arguments["method"]
+            record.path = arguments["path"][:_MAX_AUDIT_PATH_CHARS]
         if operation is None and self._settings.read_only and arguments["method"] != "GET":
             message = "READ_ONLY mode is on: gitea_api_request only accepts GET"
             return self._failed(record, "read_only", _error_payload("read_only", message))
@@ -492,15 +559,25 @@ class _Dispatcher:
             record.outcome = "success"
         return _result(outcome.payload, is_error=outcome.is_error, text=outcome.to_text())
 
-    def _audit(self, record: _Record, duration_ms: float) -> None:
+    @staticmethod
+    def _audit(audit: AuditLogger, record: _Record, duration_ms: float) -> None:
+        """Write the audit entry of a finished call.
+
+        A write failure here is logged and swallowed on purpose: the tool already
+        ran, its side effect (possibly a Gitea mutation) cannot be undone, and the
+        caller still has to learn the result. The fail-closed check happens before
+        execution, in :meth:`call_tool`.
+        """
         params: dict[str, Any] = {"argument_names": record.argument_names}
+        if record.rejected_arguments:
+            params["rejected_argument_count"] = record.rejected_arguments
         if record.http_status is not None:
             params["http_status"] = record.http_status
         try:
-            audit = self._audit_override or get_audit_logger()
             audit.log_tool_invocation(
                 record.tool,
                 params=params,
+                correlation_id=record.request_id,
                 result_status="error" if record.is_error else "success",
                 domain=record.domain,
                 method=record.method,
@@ -508,6 +585,9 @@ class _Dispatcher:
                 identity_login=record.identity.login if record.identity else None,
                 identity_mode=record.identity.mode if record.identity else None,
                 sudo=record.sudo,
+                client_id=record.client_id,
+                session=record.session,
+                client_ip=record.client_ip,
                 outcome=record.outcome,
                 duration_ms=round(duration_ms, 2),
             )

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/setup_cmd.py

@@ -744,7 +744,10 @@ def add_arguments(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
         help="public https URL of this MCP server (enables the OAuth app)",
     )
     parser.add_argument(
-        "--env-file", default=".env", help="env file to create or update (default: ./.env)"
+        "--env-file",
+        default=None,
+        metavar="PATH",
+        help="env file to create or update (default: AEGIS_ENV_FILE, else ./.env)",
     )
     parser.add_argument(
         "--template",
@@ -798,7 +801,7 @@ def _generated(existing: dict[str, EnvEntry], key: str, values: dict[str, str])
 
 
 def _run(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    env_file = Path(args.env_file)
+    env_file = Path(args.env_file or os.environ.get("AEGIS_ENV_FILE", "").strip() or ".env")
     check_env_target(env_file)
     template = _load_template(args.template)
     existing, old_mode = _read_existing(env_file)

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/setup_snippets.py

@@ -19,14 +19,22 @@ TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER = "<your-gitea-token>"  # noqa: S105
 BEARER_PLACEHOLDER = "<MCP_BEARER_TOKEN>"
 #: Loopback base URL used when no public base URL is configured.
 LOCAL_BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
+#: The project's own package index. The package name is not registered on public PyPI, so
+#: ``uvx`` must always be pointed at this index (otherwise a squatted PyPI package would
+#: receive the Gitea token from the environment).
+PACKAGE_INDEX = "https://git.hiddenden.cafe/api/packages/Hiddenden/pypi/simple/"
+PACKAGE_NAME = "aegis-gitea-mcp"
 
 
 def claude_code_stdio(gitea_url: str) -> str:
-    """Return the ``claude mcp add`` command for the local stdio server."""
+    """Return the ``claude mcp add`` command for the local stdio server.
+
+    ``--env`` takes several values, so the transport option must follow it: otherwise the
+    server name is swallowed as one more environment entry.
+    """
     return (
-        "claude mcp add --transport stdio "
+        f"claude mcp add --env GITEA_URL={gitea_url} --env GITEA_TOKEN={TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER} "
-        f"--env GITEA_URL={gitea_url} --env GITEA_TOKEN={TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER} "
+        f"--transport stdio {SERVER_NAME} -- uvx --index {PACKAGE_INDEX} {PACKAGE_NAME}"
-        f"{SERVER_NAME} -- uvx aegis-gitea-mcp"
     )
 
 
@@ -36,7 +44,7 @@ def mcp_servers_json(gitea_url: str) -> str:
         "mcpServers": {
             SERVER_NAME: {
                 "command": "uvx",
-                "args": ["aegis-gitea-mcp"],
+                "args": ["--index", PACKAGE_INDEX, PACKAGE_NAME],
                 "env": {"GITEA_URL": gitea_url, "GITEA_TOKEN": TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER},
             }
         }
@@ -88,6 +96,7 @@ def le_chat_connector(base_url: str, mcp_path: str = "/mcp", *, oauth: bool) ->
             "  or OAuth 2.1 with dynamic client registration (users sign in with their "
             "own Gitea account)."
         )
+    lines.append("  Adding connectors in Le Chat may require workspace admin rights.")
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/setup_template.py

@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ MCP_BEARER_TOKEN=
 PUBLIC_BASE_URL=
 # Extra Host header values accepted behind a reverse proxy (comma separated).
 ALLOWED_HOSTS=
+# Proxy addresses whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted (comma separated IPs or
+# networks). The default only trusts a proxy on this host. Behind a Docker proxy
+# on another address list that address; use * only if the port is reachable
+# solely from the proxy.
+FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=127.0.0.1
 
 # --- Per-user OAuth (HTTP only) -----------------------------------------------
 OAUTH_ENABLED=false
@@ -39,6 +44,11 @@ GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=
 # Encrypts stored user tokens. At least 32 characters. Generate with:
 # openssl rand -hex 32
 TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
+# Optional allowlist of redirect URIs clients may register (comma separated): exact
+# URIs, or https://host/ prefixes. Empty accepts any https URI (and http on
+# loopback); the consent page is then the only check. For a public deployment list the
+# hosted clients you use, e.g. https://claude.ai/,https://chat.mistral.ai/
+OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST=
 # Granular Gitea scopes only (read:/write: activitypub, admin, issue, misc,
 # notification, organization, package, repository, user). Unknown values are rejected.
 OAUTH_SCOPES=write:activitypub,write:admin,write:issue,write:misc,write:notification,write:organization,write:package,write:repository,write:user

src/aegis_gitea_mcp/transports.py

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ actionable message on stderr (never on stdout, which carries JSON-RPC on stdio).
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import asyncio
+import errno
+import ipaddress
 import logging
 import sys
 import time
@@ -29,11 +31,21 @@ from starlette.requests import Request
 from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response
 from starlette.routing import Route
 from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Receive, Scope, Send
+from uvicorn.middleware.proxy_headers import ProxyHeadersMiddleware
 
 from aegis_gitea_mcp import __version__
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import CompositeVerifier, IdentityResolver, StaticBearerVerifier
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import get_audit_logger
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import (
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.rate_limit import get_rate_limiter
+    MCP_SCOPE,
+    CompositeVerifier,
+    IdentityResolver,
+    StaticBearerVerifier,
+)
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings, is_loopback_host
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import OAuthSetupError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.rate_limit import RequestRateLimiter, client_bucket
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.request_context import set_client_address
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import (
     SERVER_NAME,
     AegisServer,
@@ -68,6 +80,8 @@ class HttpAuthExtras:
         extra_routes: Extra unauthenticated routes (for example ``/oauth/callback``).
         client_registration_options: Dynamic client registration settings.
         revocation_options: Token revocation settings.
+        executor: Gitea executor shared by the server and the resolver.
+        rate_limited_paths: Unauthenticated paths that get the per-IP rate limit.
     """
 
     token_verifier: TokenVerifier | None = None
@@ -76,12 +90,19 @@ class HttpAuthExtras:
     extra_routes: tuple[Route, ...] = ()
     client_registration_options: ClientRegistrationOptions | None = None
     revocation_options: RevocationOptions | None = None
+    executor: GiteaExecutor | None = None
+    rate_limited_paths: tuple[str, ...] = ()
 
 
-def load_oauth_components(settings: Settings) -> HttpAuthExtras | None:
+def load_oauth_components(settings: Settings) -> HttpAuthExtras:
-    """Return the per-user OAuth components for ``OAUTH_ENABLED``, or None when unavailable."""
+    """Build the per-user OAuth components for ``OAUTH_ENABLED``.
-    del settings
+
-    return None
+    Raises:
+        OAuthSetupError: Incomplete configuration or an unusable token store.
+    """
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.components import build_oauth_components
+
+    return build_oauth_components(settings)
 
 
 # Health probe
@@ -132,14 +153,24 @@ class GiteaProbe:
 
 
 class RateLimitMiddleware:
-    """ASGI middleware applying the per-IP and per-token limits to the MCP path."""
+    """ASGI middleware applying the per-IP and per-token limits to the MCP path.
 
-    def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp, mcp_path: str) -> None:
+    ``extra_paths`` (for example the unauthenticated OAuth endpoints) share the limits.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        app: ASGIApp,
+        mcp_path: str,
+        limiter: RequestRateLimiter,
+        extra_paths: Sequence[str] = (),
+    ) -> None:
         self.app = app
-        self._mcp_path = mcp_path
+        self._paths = frozenset({mcp_path, *(path.rstrip("/") for path in extra_paths)})
+        self._limiter = limiter
 
     async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
-        if scope["type"] != "http" or scope["path"].rstrip("/") != self._mcp_path:
+        if scope["type"] != "http" or scope["path"].rstrip("/") not in self._paths:
             await self.app(scope, receive, send)
             return
         client = scope.get("client")
@@ -149,8 +180,10 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware:
             if name == b"authorization":
                 authorization = value.decode("latin-1")
                 break
-        decision = get_rate_limiter().check(client_ip, authorization)
+        decision = self._limiter.check(client_ip, authorization)
         if decision.allowed:
+            # Lets the OAuth provider quota pending sign-ins and registrations per address.
+            set_client_address(client_bucket(client_ip))
             await self.app(scope, receive, send)
             return
         response = JSONResponse(
@@ -161,6 +194,62 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware:
         await response(scope, receive, send)
 
 
+# Forwarded headers
+
+
+class ForwardedHeadersMiddleware:
+    """Applies ``X-Forwarded-For`` and ``-Proto`` from trusted peers and warns about the rest.
+
+    Replaces uvicorn's own proxy-header handling (the runner passes
+    ``proxy_headers=False``) so the original peer address is still known here:
+    a request that carries ``X-Forwarded-For`` from a peer outside
+    ``FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`` is not honoured (the peer's own address is used) and
+    logs one warning, because that usually means the reverse proxy is not listed
+    (for example a Docker network address) and every client then shares the
+    proxy's rate-limit bucket.
+
+    Args:
+        app: The ASGI application.
+        trusted: ``FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`` (``*`` or a comma list of IPs and networks).
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp, trusted: str) -> None:
+        self.trusted = trusted
+        self._all = trusted.strip() == "*"
+        self._networks = [
+            ipaddress.ip_network(item.strip(), strict=False)
+            for item in trusted.split(",")
+            if item.strip() and item.strip() != "*"
+        ]
+        self._app = ProxyHeadersMiddleware(app, trusted_hosts=trusted)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        self._warned = False
+
+    def _peer_trusted(self, host: str) -> bool:
+        if self._all:
+            return True
+        try:
+            address = ipaddress.ip_address(host.split("%")[0])
+        except ValueError:
+            return False
+        return any(
+            address in network for network in self._networks if network.version == address.version
+        )
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
+        if scope["type"] == "http" and not self._warned:
+            client = scope.get("client")
+            has_forwarded = any(name == b"x-forwarded-for" for name, _ in scope.get("headers", []))
+            if has_forwarded and client and not self._peer_trusted(client[0]):
+                self._warned = True
+                logger.warning(
+                    "a request carried X-Forwarded-For from a peer that is not in "
+                    "FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS, so the header is ignored and the peer address is used "
+                    "as the client address; if this peer is your reverse proxy, add its address "
+                    "to FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS (all clients otherwise share one rate-limit bucket)"
+                )
+        await self._app(scope, receive, send)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+
 # HTTP app
 
 
@@ -189,19 +278,27 @@ def transport_security(settings: Settings) -> TransportSecuritySettings:
     )
 
 
+def _resource_url(settings: Settings) -> str:
+    return f"{_base_url(settings)}{settings.mcp_path}"
+
+
 def _auth_settings(
     settings: Settings,
     client_registration_options: ClientRegistrationOptions | None,
     revocation_options: RevocationOptions | None,
+    *,
+    authorization_server: bool,
 ) -> AuthSettings:
     issuer = _base_url(settings)
     return AuthSettings(
         issuer_url=issuer,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
-        resource_server_url=f"{issuer}{settings.mcp_path}",  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        resource_server_url=_resource_url(settings),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
-        required_scopes=None,
+        # With our own authorization server every token (OAuth-issued and the
-        # The static bearer carries no RFC 8707 resource; a per-user verifier
+        # static bearer) names this endpoint as its RFC 8707 resource and carries
-        # that binds tokens to this resource checks the audience itself.
+        # the one scope we grant, so the SDK enforces both. Without it, extra
-        validate_token_resource=False,
+        # verifiers are trusted to check the audience themselves.
+        required_scopes=[MCP_SCOPE] if authorization_server else None,
+        validate_token_resource=authorization_server,
         client_registration_options=client_registration_options,
         revocation_options=revocation_options,
     )
@@ -217,6 +314,7 @@ def build_http_app(
     client_registration_options: ClientRegistrationOptions | None = None,
     revocation_options: RevocationOptions | None = None,
     probe: GiteaProbe | None = None,
+    rate_limited_paths: Sequence[str] = (),
 ) -> Starlette:
     """Build the streamable HTTP ASGI app (MCP endpoint, ``/health``, ``/``).
 
@@ -234,6 +332,8 @@ def build_http_app(
         client_registration_options: Dynamic client registration settings.
         revocation_options: Token revocation settings.
         probe: Gitea reachability probe for ``/health`` (defaults to a new one).
+        rate_limited_paths: Further paths (besides the MCP endpoint) that get the
+            rate limit, for example the OAuth endpoints.
 
     Raises:
         ValueError: ``auth_server_provider`` given without any token verifier.
@@ -243,7 +343,11 @@ def build_http_app(
 
     verifiers: list[TokenVerifier] = []
     if settings.mcp_bearer_token is not None:
-        verifiers.append(StaticBearerVerifier(settings.mcp_bearer_token.get_secret_value()))
+        verifiers.append(
+            StaticBearerVerifier(
+                settings.mcp_bearer_token.get_secret_value(), resource=_resource_url(settings)
+            )
+        )
     if token_verifier is not None:
         verifiers.append(token_verifier)
     if auth_server_provider is not None and not verifiers:
@@ -287,7 +391,12 @@ def build_http_app(
         transport_security=transport_security(settings),
         host=settings.mcp_host,
         auth=(
-            _auth_settings(settings, client_registration_options, revocation_options)
+            _auth_settings(
+                settings,
+                client_registration_options,
+                revocation_options,
+                authorization_server=auth_server_provider is not None,
+            )
             if verifier is not None
             else None
         ),
@@ -307,7 +416,12 @@ def build_http_app(
             await gitea_probe.aclose()
 
     app.router.lifespan_context = lifespan
-    app.add_middleware(RateLimitMiddleware, mcp_path=settings.mcp_path)
+    app.add_middleware(
+        RateLimitMiddleware,
+        mcp_path=settings.mcp_path,
+        limiter=RequestRateLimiter(settings),
+        extra_paths=tuple(rate_limited_paths),
+    )
     return app
 
 
@@ -315,13 +429,22 @@ def build_http_app(
 
 
 def http_startup_errors(settings: Settings, extras: HttpAuthExtras | None) -> list[str]:
-    """List reasons the HTTP server must not start (empty when startup may proceed)."""
+    """List reasons the HTTP server must not start (empty when startup may proceed).
+
+    An OAuth-only deployment (OAuth on, no ``MCP_BEARER_TOKEN``, no
+    ``GITEA_TOKEN``) may start: every user brings their own Gitea token and
+    admin-token mode is simply unavailable. ``GITEA_TOKEN`` stays required
+    whenever admin-token mode is reachable (a static bearer, or no HTTP auth).
+    """
     errors: list[str] = []
     bearer = settings.mcp_bearer_token is not None
     if settings.oauth_enabled:
         errors.extend(settings.oauth_config_errors())
-        if not settings.oauth_config_errors() and extras is None and not bearer:
+        if not settings.oauth_config_errors() and extras is None:
-            errors.append("OAUTH_ENABLED=true but per-user OAuth is not available in this build")
+            errors.append("OAUTH_ENABLED=true but per-user OAuth could not be set up")
+        public = urlsplit(settings.public_base_url or "")
+        if public.scheme == "http" and not is_loopback_host(public.hostname or ""):
+            errors.append("PUBLIC_BASE_URL must use https unless the host is loopback")
     authenticated = bearer or extras is not None
     if not settings.is_loopback_bind() and not authenticated:
         errors.append(
@@ -329,23 +452,100 @@ def http_startup_errors(settings: Settings, extras: HttpAuthExtras | None) -> li
             "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN (or enable OAuth), or bind to 127.0.0.1"
         )
     if (bearer or extras is None) and settings.gitea_token is None:
-        errors.append("GITEA_TOKEN is required for admin-token mode (static bearer or no auth)")
+        message = "GITEA_TOKEN is required for admin-token mode (static bearer or no auth)"
+        if settings.oauth_enabled and bearer:
+            message += "; for an OAuth-only deployment unset MCP_BEARER_TOKEN"
+        errors.append(message)
     return errors
 
 
+def http_startup_warnings(settings: Settings, extras: HttpAuthExtras | None) -> list[str]:
+    """List non-fatal startup problems of the HTTP server (printed to stderr)."""
+    warnings: list[str] = []
+    if (
+        not settings.is_loopback_bind()
+        and not settings.public_base_url
+        and not settings.allowed_hosts
+    ):
+        warnings.append(
+            f"MCP_HOST={settings.mcp_host} is not loopback and neither PUBLIC_BASE_URL nor "
+            "ALLOWED_HOSTS is set: requests whose Host header is not a loopback name or the "
+            "bind address are rejected with 421. Set PUBLIC_BASE_URL (the public https URL) "
+            "or ALLOWED_HOSTS (comma separated host names clients use)"
+        )
+    if settings.forwarded_allow_ips == "*":
+        warnings.append(
+            "FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=*: X-Forwarded-For is trusted from any peer, so clients can "
+            "spoof their IP and dodge the per-IP rate limit. List the proxy addresses instead"
+        )
+    return warnings
+
+
+def _audit_startup_error(settings: Settings) -> str | None:
+    """Open the audit log now; return an error message when it is not writable.
+
+    A server that cannot record its calls must not start: the dispatcher refuses
+    calls without an audit log, so every call would fail anyway.
+    """
+    try:
+        get_audit_logger()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        reason = exc.strerror or str(exc) or type(exc).__name__
+        if exc.errno == errno.ELOOP:
+            reason = "the path is a symbolic link, which is refused"
+        return (
+            f"cannot open the audit log {settings.resolved_audit_log_path} for append "
+            f"({reason}). Fix the permissions or point AUDIT_LOG_PATH (or DATA_DIR) at a "
+            "writable location"
+        )
+    return None
+
+
+class AccessLogQueryFilter(logging.Filter):
+    """Drops query strings from uvicorn access log lines.
+
+    OAuth redirects carry one-time codes and states in the query string
+    (``/oauth/callback?code=...&state=...``); they must not reach the logs.
+    """
+
+    def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool:
+        """Rewrite the path argument of an access log record; never drops the record."""
+        args = record.args
+        if isinstance(args, tuple) and len(args) >= 3 and isinstance(args[2], str):
+            path, separator, _ = args[2].partition("?")
+            if separator:
+                record.args = (*args[:2], f"{path}?[redacted]", *args[3:])
+        return True
+
+
 def run_http(settings: Settings) -> int:
     """Run the streamable HTTP server; return a process exit code.
 
-    Returns 2 without starting when a startup check fails.
+    Returns 2 without starting when a startup check fails (including an audit
+    log that cannot be opened for append).
     """
-    extras = load_oauth_components(settings) if settings.oauth_enabled else None
+    extras: HttpAuthExtras | None = None
+    if settings.oauth_enabled and not settings.oauth_config_errors():
+        try:
+            extras = load_oauth_components(settings)
+        except OAuthSetupError as exc:
+            return _fail(f"per-user OAuth cannot start: {exc}")
     errors = http_startup_errors(settings, extras)
     if errors:
         for message in errors:
             _fail(message)
         return EXIT_USAGE
+    audit_error = _audit_startup_error(settings)
+    if audit_error is not None:
+        return _fail(audit_error)
+    for message in http_startup_warnings(settings, extras):
+        print(f"aegis-gitea-mcp: warning: {message}", file=sys.stderr)
     try:
-        server = build_server(settings, resolver=extras.resolver if extras else None)
+        server = build_server(
+            settings,
+            resolver=extras.resolver if extras else None,
+            executor=extras.executor if extras else None,
+        )
     except ServerConfigError as exc:
         return _fail(str(exc))
     app = build_http_app(
@@ -356,14 +556,17 @@ def run_http(settings: Settings) -> int:
         extra_routes=extras.extra_routes if extras else (),
         client_registration_options=extras.client_registration_options if extras else None,
         revocation_options=extras.revocation_options if extras else None,
+        rate_limited_paths=extras.rate_limited_paths if extras else (),
     )
+    access_logger = logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access")
+    if not any(isinstance(item, AccessLogQueryFilter) for item in access_logger.filters):
+        access_logger.addFilter(AccessLogQueryFilter())
     uvicorn.run(
-        app,
+        ForwardedHeadersMiddleware(app, settings.forwarded_allow_ips),
         host=settings.mcp_host,
         port=settings.mcp_port,
         log_level=settings.log_level.lower(),
-        proxy_headers=True,
+        proxy_headers=False,  # ForwardedHeadersMiddleware applies them (and warns)
-        forwarded_allow_ips=getattr(settings, "forwarded_allow_ips", None) or "127.0.0.1",
         server_header=False,
     )
     return 0
@@ -377,11 +580,14 @@ async def _serve_stdio(server: AegisServer) -> None:
 def run_stdio(settings: Settings) -> int:
     """Run the local stdio server (single identity: the owner of ``GITEA_TOKEN``).
 
-    Returns 2 without starting when ``GITEA_TOKEN`` is missing or the tool
+    Returns 2 without starting when ``GITEA_TOKEN`` is missing, the audit log is
-    filters are invalid. All logging goes to stderr; stdout carries JSON-RPC only.
+    not writable or the tool filters are invalid. All logging goes to stderr; stdout carries JSON-RPC only.
     """
     if settings.gitea_token is None:
         return _fail("stdio needs GITEA_TOKEN; create a Gitea access token and set it in .env")
+    audit_error = _audit_startup_error(settings)
+    if audit_error is not None:
+        return _fail(audit_error)
     try:
         server = build_server(settings)
     except ServerConfigError as exc:

tests/conftest.py

@@ -13,16 +13,15 @@ from pathlib import Path
 import pytest
 
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import reset_audit_logger
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings, reset_settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings, reset_settings, set_env_file
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.rate_limit import reset_rate_limiter
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.request_context import clear_gitea_auth_context
 
 
 def _reset_singletons() -> None:
     """Reset every module-level singleton."""
+    set_env_file(None)
     reset_settings()
     reset_audit_logger()
-    reset_rate_limiter()
     clear_gitea_auth_context()
 
 
@@ -31,6 +30,7 @@ def reset_globals(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Generator[
     """Isolate each test: clean env, tmp cwd, tmp state paths, fresh singletons."""
     for field_name in Settings.model_fields:
         monkeypatch.delenv(field_name.upper(), raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("AEGIS_ENV_FILE", raising=False)
     monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
 
     data_dir = tmp_path / "data"

tests/integration/README.md

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ message instead of skipping.
 - Gitea is configured through `GITEA__section__KEY` env vars (sqlite3,
   `INSTALL_LOCK`, random `SECRET_KEY`/`INTERNAL_TOKEN`/OAuth2 JWT secret,
   Actions, packages and OAuth2 enabled, mailer off, webhook allowed host list
-  `*`, `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS=50`).
+  `*`, local network migrations allowed so the instance can mirror itself, repository
+  hook scripts editable, `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS=50`).
 - Readiness: polls `GET /api/v1/version` for up to 90 s. On failure the last 100
   log lines of the container are written to stderr.
 - Seeding: admin `aegis-admin` (random password) via `gitea admin user create`,
@@ -50,3 +51,55 @@ message instead of skipping.
   `create_org`, `create_repo`, `unique`.
 - `regular_user` (session): non-admin user with its own full-scope token.
 - `unique_name` (function): a unique name derived from the test name.
+
+## The suite
+
+Tests call tools through the MCP server (an in-memory `Client` on `build_server`, run as
+the admin of the throwaway instance), so schema validation, the result envelope, the audit
+log and the executor are all exercised. State lives in `tmp_path`.
+
+- `test_scenario_*.py`: happy paths with real state changes (org and team, repository
+  files, branches and tags, issues, pull requests and reviews, releases and attachments,
+  secrets and variables, webhooks, admin and sudo, notifications, current-user features,
+  generic packages, and a workflow run on an `act_runner` container).
+- `test_sweep.py`: every one of the 538 tools is called once against a seeded instance
+  (`sweep_seed.py` creates the data, `sweep_plan.py` builds arguments and expectations).
+  Order: read-only first, then creates, updates and deletes (leaf resources first). A call
+  passes with a 2xx, a status the swagger documents for that operation, or an entry of
+  `ALLOWANCES` (each with a reason). All failing tools are listed at once.
+  `sweep_baseline.json` pins the outcome class of every tool (`2xx`, or the exact status of
+  a documented non-2xx or allowance). A downgrade (2xx to anything else, or a different
+  status) fails the run and all of them are reported together, so an argument or path
+  regression cannot hide behind a documented 404. An upgrade only prints a note to refresh
+  the file. Regenerate it with `AEGIS_IT_WRITE_BASELINE=1` (only for an intended change,
+  and review the diff). `test_sweep_isolated.py` covers the tools the sweep must not call.
+- `test_failure_paths.py`: write tools Gitea refuses (missing repository, invalid color,
+  duplicate repository, stale file sha) keep their status and error kind and are audited.
+- `test_per_user_oauth.py`: the HTTP app with per-user OAuth, driven in process with a
+  seeded OAuth store; calls run as the signed-in user, admin tools and private repositories
+  of others are refused by Gitea, the static bearer still runs as admin.
+- `test_setup_live.py`: `aegis-gitea-mcp setup` against the instance (OAuth app, env file
+  mode, idempotence, non-admin token).
+- `tests/test_sweep_plan.py` (no Docker) keeps the sweep plan consistent with the catalog.
+
+`AEGIS_IT_WRITE_REPORT=1` makes the session write `docs/integration-coverage.md` (per
+domain: tools with a 2xx, documented non-2xx statuses, allowances).
+
+### Actions runner
+
+`start_runner` starts `gitea/act_runner` (digest-pinned in `ACT_RUNNER_IMAGE`) on the run's
+network, registered with a token from `gitea_actions_repo_create_runner_registration_token`,
+label `aegis-host:host`. Jobs run inside the runner container itself: no Docker socket, no
+bind mounts. The runner reaches Gitea by container name, so it works in both network modes.
+It is removed with the rest of the run. If it cannot start or come online, the test is
+marked xfail with the reason, unless `CI` or `AEGIS_IT_REQUIRE_RUNNER=1` is set (the CI job
+sets it), in which case it fails: a pipeline must not silently skip the Actions scenario. A
+failure after the run completed is always a real failure.
+
+With the runner the scenario also exercises the completed run: the runner get, update and
+delete tools at repository scope, the logs archive, rerun of the run and of one job, and
+deleting the run. `test_runner_management_at_every_scope` registers one more runner for the
+organization, the user and the instance (each serving its own label) and manages it through
+the matching tools.
+
+Runtime: about two minutes locally (Gitea start 15 s, sweep 40 s, runner 10 s).

tests/integration/conftest.py

@@ -6,14 +6,22 @@ Tests in this directory are marked ``integration`` and skipped unless
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import asyncio
+import base64
+import json
 import os
 import re
-from collections.abc import Iterator
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator, Iterator
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
 
 import pytest
+from mcp import Client
 
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import build_server
 from tests.integration.harness import (
     GiteaInstance,
     HarnessError,
@@ -21,11 +29,31 @@ from tests.integration.harness import (
     stop_gitea,
     unique,
 )
+from tests.integration.sweep_plan import LOG, write_report_if_enabled
 
 _HERE = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
 ENABLE_ENV = "AEGIS_INTEGRATION"
 
 
+REQUIRE_RUNNER_ENV = "AEGIS_IT_REQUIRE_RUNNER"
+
+
+def runner_required() -> bool:
+    """True when a runner that cannot start must fail the test instead of xfailing it.
+
+    Set by the CI job (``AEGIS_IT_REQUIRE_RUNNER=1``) and implied by ``CI``: a pipeline that
+    silently skips the Actions scenario would hide a broken runner setup.
+    """
+    return os.environ.get(REQUIRE_RUNNER_ENV) == "1" or bool(os.environ.get("CI"))
+
+
+def runner_unavailable(reason: str) -> None:
+    """Report that the act_runner could not start or come online (fails or xfails)."""
+    if runner_required():
+        pytest.fail(f"act_runner unavailable: {reason}", pytrace=False)
+    pytest.xfail(reason)
+
+
 def integration_enabled() -> bool:
     """Return True when the opt-in env var is set."""
     return os.environ.get(ENABLE_ENV) == "1"
@@ -62,6 +90,14 @@ def pytest_collection_modifyitems(config: pytest.Config, items: list[pytest.Item
                 namespace.cov_fail_under = 0
 
 
+def pytest_sessionfinish(session: pytest.Session, exitstatus: int) -> None:
+    """Write ``docs/integration-coverage.md`` when ``AEGIS_IT_WRITE_REPORT=1`` and the sweep ran."""
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.catalog import load_catalog
+
+    catalog = load_catalog()
+    write_report_if_enabled(catalog, catalog.spec_version)
+
+
 @pytest.fixture(scope="session")
 def gitea() -> Iterator[GiteaInstance]:
     """A throwaway Gitea in Docker, shared by the whole session."""
@@ -97,3 +133,233 @@ def regular_user(gitea: GiteaInstance) -> RegularUser:
     login, password = gitea.create_user(gitea.unique("it-user"))
     token = gitea.mint_token(login, password, ["all"])
     return RegularUser(login=login, password=password, token=token)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Calling tools through the MCP server
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ToolResult:
+    """One tool call result: the parsed envelope plus the raw text."""
+
+    tool: str
+    is_error: bool
+    payload: dict[str, Any]
+    text: str
+
+    @property
+    def status(self) -> int | None:
+        """HTTP status Gitea answered with (None when the call never reached Gitea)."""
+        error = self.payload.get("error")
+        if isinstance(error, dict):
+            status = error.get("status")
+            return status if isinstance(status, int) else None
+        status = self.payload.get("status")
+        return status if isinstance(status, int) else None
+
+    @property
+    def data(self) -> Any:
+        """The ``data`` member of a success envelope."""
+        return self.payload.get("data")
+
+    @property
+    def error_kind(self) -> str | None:
+        """The ``error.kind`` of a failed call."""
+        error = self.payload.get("error")
+        return error.get("kind") if isinstance(error, dict) else None
+
+    @property
+    def identity(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """The ``identity`` object of the envelope."""
+        identity = self.payload.get("identity")
+        return identity if isinstance(identity, dict) else {}
+
+
+class McpSession:
+    """A connected in-memory MCP client plus bookkeeping for secret-leak assertions.
+
+    Every result text is kept in :attr:`texts` so a test can assert that a secret value
+    never came back, whatever tool returned it.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, client: Client, audit_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.client = client
+        self.audit_path = audit_path
+        self.texts: list[str] = []
+
+    async def call(self, tool: str, /, **arguments: Any) -> ToolResult:
+        """Call ``tool`` with ``arguments`` and return the parsed result (never raises)."""
+        raw = await self.client.call_tool(tool, arguments)
+        assert raw.content, f"{tool}: empty result"
+        block = raw.content[0]
+        text = getattr(block, "text", None)
+        assert isinstance(text, str), f"{tool}: result is not text"
+        self.texts.append(text)
+        payload = json.loads(text)
+        assert isinstance(payload, dict)
+        result = ToolResult(tool=tool, is_error=bool(raw.is_error), payload=payload, text=text)
+        LOG.add(tool, result.status, result.is_error)
+        return result
+
+    async def ok(
+        self, tool: str, /, *, status: int | tuple[int, ...] = (200, 201, 204), **arguments: Any
+    ) -> ToolResult:
+        """Call ``tool`` and assert it succeeded with one of the expected statuses."""
+        result = await self.call(tool, **arguments)
+        allowed = (status,) if isinstance(status, int) else status
+        assert not result.is_error and result.status in allowed, f"{tool} failed: {_brief(result)}"
+        return result
+
+    async def fail(self, tool: str, /, status: int, **arguments: Any) -> ToolResult:
+        """Call ``tool`` and assert Gitea refused it with ``status``."""
+        result = await self.call(tool, **arguments)
+        assert result.is_error and result.status == status, (
+            f"{tool} expected HTTP {status}: {_brief(result)}"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    def audit_entries(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        """Payloads of the ``tool_invocation`` entries written to the audit log so far."""
+        lines = self.audit_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+        entries = [json.loads(line) for line in lines if line.strip()]
+        return [e["payload"] for e in entries if e.get("event_type") == "tool_invocation"]
+
+    def audit_text(self) -> str:
+        """The whole audit log file as text."""
+        return self.audit_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def _brief(result: ToolResult) -> str:
+    """A short, secret-free description of a result for assertion messages."""
+    error = result.payload.get("error")
+    detail = error if isinstance(error, dict) else {"status": result.status}
+    return json.dumps(detail, ensure_ascii=False)[:400]
+
+
+def integration_settings(gitea: GiteaInstance, data_dir: Path, **overrides: Any) -> Settings:
+    """Server settings for the live instance: admin token, state under ``data_dir``."""
+    values: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "gitea_url": gitea.base_url,
+        "gitea_token": gitea.admin_token,
+        "data_dir": data_dir,
+        "audit_log_path": data_dir / "audit.log",
+        "request_timeout_seconds": 60,
+    }
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return Settings(**values)
+
+
+class BackgroundContext:
+    """Enter an async context manager in its own task and leave it from that same task.
+
+    The MCP client uses anyio task groups, which must be exited by the task that entered
+    them. Async pytest fixtures set up and tear down in different tasks, so the context
+    lives in a helper task instead.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: Any) -> None:
+        self._manager = manager
+        self._ready = asyncio.Event()
+        self._stop = asyncio.Event()
+        self._value: Any = None
+        self._error: BaseException | None = None
+        self._task: asyncio.Task[None] | None = None
+
+    async def _run(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            async with self._manager as value:
+                self._value = value
+                self._ready.set()
+                await self._stop.wait()
+        except BaseException as exc:
+            self._error = exc
+            raise
+        finally:
+            self._ready.set()
+
+    async def open(self) -> Any:
+        """Enter the context and return its value (raises what entering raised)."""
+        self._task = asyncio.create_task(self._run())
+        await self._ready.wait()
+        if self._error is not None:
+            raise self._error
+        return self._value
+
+    async def close(self) -> None:
+        """Leave the context from the task that entered it."""
+        self._stop.set()
+        if self._task is not None:
+            await self._task
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def mcp(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> AsyncIterator[McpSession]:
+    """An in-memory MCP client on a server running as the admin of the live instance."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", gitea.base_url)
+    settings = integration_settings(gitea, tmp_path / "mcp-state")
+    audit = AuditLogger(settings.resolved_audit_log_path)
+    server = build_server(settings, audit=audit)
+    holder = BackgroundContext(Client(server))
+    try:
+        client = await holder.open()
+        yield McpSession(client, settings.resolved_audit_log_path)
+    finally:
+        await holder.close()
+        audit.close()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def b64(text: str | bytes) -> str:
+    """Base64 text of ``text`` (the contents API and file arguments take base64)."""
+    raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else text
+    return base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RepoRef:
+    """A repository created for one test."""
+
+    owner: str
+    name: str
+
+    @property
+    def args(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        """The ``owner`` and ``repo`` tool arguments."""
+        return {"owner": self.owner, "repo": self.name}
+
+    @property
+    def full(self) -> str:
+        """``owner/name``."""
+        return f"{self.owner}/{self.name}"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fresh_repo(gitea: GiteaInstance, unique_name: str) -> Iterator[RepoRef]:
+    """A public repository with a README on ``main`` owned by the admin, deleted afterwards."""
+    gitea.create_repo(gitea.admin_login, unique_name)
+    try:
+        yield RepoRef(gitea.admin_login, unique_name)
+    finally:
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{gitea.admin_login}/{unique_name}")
+
+
+def drop_org(gitea: GiteaInstance, org: str) -> None:
+    """Best effort: delete an organization together with its repositories."""
+    listing = gitea.api("GET", f"/orgs/{org}/repos", params={"limit": 50})
+    if listing.status_code == 200:
+        for repo in listing.json():
+            gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{org}/{repo['name']}")
+    gitea.api("DELETE", f"/orgs/{org}")
+
+
+def drop_user(gitea: GiteaInstance, login: str) -> None:
+    """Best effort: purge a user created by a test."""
+    gitea.api("DELETE", f"/admin/users/{login}", params={"purge": "true"})

tests/integration/harness.py

@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ import httpx
 GITEA_IMAGE = (
     "gitea/gitea:28.1.0@sha256:f505a0d3a41323b786e05942fc7a4075e07ae7c169fd9485649aa55ee543a21a"
 )
+# Actions runner image (digest-pinned, tag 0.6.1 at the time of writing). Jobs run in
+# host mode inside this very container, so no Docker socket and no bind mounts are needed.
+ACT_RUNNER_IMAGE = (
+    "gitea/act_runner:0.6.1@sha256:b5c35d6bdbb9bb25e531230bfc7cc663cb751406cbec90a2a891b85fea54de86"
+)
+RUNNER_LABEL = "aegis-host"
+RUNNER_REGISTRATION_ENV = "GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN"
 NAME_PREFIX = "aegis-it-"
 GITEA_PORT = 3000
 ADMIN_LOGIN = "aegis-admin"
@@ -176,6 +183,7 @@ class RunResources:
     container: str
     network: str
     attached_container: str | None = None  # job container joined in CI mode
+    extra_containers: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)  # e.g. the act_runner
     cleaned: bool = False
 
 
@@ -194,6 +202,8 @@ def cleanup_resources(res: RunResources) -> None:
         _ACTIVE.pop(res.run_id, None)
     if res.attached_container:
         run_docker("network", "disconnect", "-f", res.network, res.attached_container, check=False)
+    for extra in res.extra_containers:
+        run_docker("rm", "-f", "-v", extra, check=False)
     run_docker("rm", "-f", "-v", res.container, check=False)
     run_docker("network", "rm", res.network, check=False)
 
@@ -262,6 +272,8 @@ def _gitea_env(root_url: str) -> dict[str, str]:
         "GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK": "true",
         "GITEA__security__SECRET_KEY": secrets.token_hex(32),
         "GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN": secrets.token_hex(32),
+        # Repository hook scripts are editable through the API (site admins only) when enabled.
+        "GITEA__security__DISABLE_GIT_HOOKS": "false",
         "GITEA__server__ROOT_URL": root_url,
         "GITEA__server__HTTP_PORT": str(GITEA_PORT),
         "GITEA__server__DISABLE_SSH": "true",
@@ -275,6 +287,8 @@ def _gitea_env(root_url: str) -> dict[str, str]:
         "GITEA__repository__ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG": "false",
         "GITEA__mailer__ENABLED": "false",
         "GITEA__webhook__ALLOWED_HOST_LIST": "*",
+        # Lets repository migration and mirrors use this very instance as their remote.
+        "GITEA__migrations__ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS": "true",
         "GITEA__packages__ENABLED": "true",
         "GITEA__api__MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS": "50",
     }
@@ -311,11 +325,27 @@ class GiteaInstance:
         ``token`` defaults to the admin token; pass ``anonymous=True`` for an
         unauthenticated call, or ``auth=(login, password)`` for basic auth.
         """
+        return self.request(
+            method, f"/api/v1/{path.lstrip('/')}", token, anonymous=anonymous, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        token: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        anonymous: bool = False,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> httpx.Response:
+        """Call any absolute ``path`` of the instance (for example ``/api/packages/...``).
+
+        Authentication works like :meth:`api`.
+        """
         headers: dict[str, str] = dict(kwargs.pop("headers", None) or {})
         if not anonymous and "auth" not in kwargs:
             headers["Authorization"] = f"token {token or self.admin_token}"
-        url = f"{self.base_url}/api/v1/{path.lstrip('/')}"
+        return self._client.request(method, f"{self.base_url}{path}", headers=headers, **kwargs)
-        return self._client.request(method, url, headers=headers, **kwargs)
 
     def unique(self, prefix: str) -> str:
         """Return ``<prefix>-<8 hex>``, valid as a Gitea user, org or repo name."""
@@ -529,3 +559,58 @@ def stop_gitea(instance: GiteaInstance) -> None:
         res = _ACTIVE.get(instance.run_id)
     if res is not None:
         cleanup_resources(res)
+
+
+def start_runner(
+    instance: GiteaInstance,
+    registration_token: str,
+    *,
+    suffix: str = "runner",
+    label: str = RUNNER_LABEL,
+) -> str:
+    """Start an ``act_runner`` container registered with ``registration_token``.
+
+    ``suffix`` names the container (``aegis-it-<run id>-<suffix>``, also the runner's name in
+    Gitea) and ``label`` is the single label it serves, so extra runners at other scopes
+    never pick up the jobs of the Actions scenario.
+
+    The runner joins the run's private network, reaches Gitea by its container name
+    (so it works in local and in container network mode) and runs jobs labelled
+    ``aegis-host`` in host mode inside its own container. The token travels in the
+    environment of the docker CLI and is forwarded with ``-e NAME`` (never in argv).
+    The container is registered for cleanup before it is created. Returns its name.
+    """
+    with _LOCK:
+        res = _ACTIVE.get(instance.run_id)
+    if res is None:
+        raise HarnessError("the Gitea instance is not tracked (already stopped?)")
+    ensure_image(ACT_RUNNER_IMAGE)
+    name = f"{NAME_PREFIX}{instance.run_id}-{suffix}"
+    res.extra_containers.append(name)
+    run_docker(
+        "run",
+        "-d",
+        "--name",
+        name,
+        "--network",
+        instance.network,
+        "--label",
+        "aegis-it=1",
+        "-e",
+        RUNNER_REGISTRATION_ENV,
+        "-e",
+        f"GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://{instance.container}:{GITEA_PORT}",
+        "-e",
+        f"GITEA_RUNNER_NAME={name}",
+        "-e",
+        f"GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS={label}:host",
+        ACT_RUNNER_IMAGE,
+        env={RUNNER_REGISTRATION_ENV: registration_token},
+        timeout=300,
+    )
+    return name
+
+
+def runner_logs(name: str, lines: int = 60) -> str:
+    """Return the last log lines of a runner container (for failure diagnostics)."""
+    return _container_logs_tail(name, lines)

tests/integration/static_keys.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Static fixtures for the integration suite: throwaway OpenPGP public keys.
+
+Both keys were generated offline for a fake identity (``Aegis IT Fixture N`` with an
+``example.test`` address); only the public halves are committed. Gitea accepts a GPG key
+only when one of its identities carries an activated email address of the account, so the
+tests first add the matching address to the account (``GPG_EMAILS``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+GPG_EMAILS = (
+    "aegis-it-fixture-1@example.test",
+    "aegis-it-fixture-2@example.test",
+)
+
+GPG_PUBLIC_KEYS = (
+    """\
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+mDMEas+oDBYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdA7yjFLeF4uUtwBS9tSHRfz1p3CO3zX5G01SqY
+Kq4Ebuu0NEFlZ2lzIElUIEZpeHR1cmUgMSA8YWVnaXMtaXQtZml4dHVyZS0xQGV4
+YW1wbGUudGVzdD6IkwQTFgoAOxYhBLEDZkoa8oLNuNJlafBqtfhHw71yBQJqz6gM
+AhsDBQsJCAcCAiICBhUKCQgLAgQWAgMBAh4HAheAAAoJEPBqtfhHw71yXN8BAPZ7
+ShczPrCQqX+YN/YP5gU+Cnfnopt3yo66chupK6ADAQD3fdC2kwi8DQQGPdeLb7qC
+TPcxXQWSnXeVTr3EQKFFAQ==
+=KK0/
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+""",
+    """\
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+mDMEas+oDBYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAfUIIJtFAtjCsr39V+TnKqtUrWINy+9KsJdgq
+4CWgjnS0NEFlZ2lzIElUIEZpeHR1cmUgMiA8YWVnaXMtaXQtZml4dHVyZS0yQGV4
+YW1wbGUudGVzdD6IkwQTFgoAOxYhBFk8Jp2uNta24tbmPees4IAGb9G9BQJqz6gM
+AhsDBQsJCAcCAiICBhUKCQgLAgQWAgMBAh4HAheAAAoJEOes4IAGb9G9880BAJwB
+Kl2G944vYVF2XXS3S/PspgOj9Gcm6Q8T/07MPLTIAP0TUTvS2gg2CF3GXp7YCgUf
+0hZziR0B882mz4IWtfroAQ==
+=teCc
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+""",
+)

tests/integration/sweep_baseline.json

@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+{
+  "gitea": "28.1.0",
+  "comment": "Expected outcome class per tool in the sweep: 2xx, or the exact status of a documented non-2xx or allowance. Regenerate with AEGIS_IT_WRITE_BASELINE=1.",
+  "tools": {
+    "gitea_actions_approve_workflow_run": 409,
+    "gitea_actions_cancel_workflow_run": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_create_org_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_create_repo_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_create_user_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_action_run": 400,
+    "gitea_actions_delete_artifact": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_delete_org_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_delete_org_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_org_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_repo_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_delete_repo_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_repo_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_user_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_delete_user_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_delete_user_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_disable_workflow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_dispatch_workflow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_download_artifact": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_download_run_job_logs": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_enable_workflow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_force_cancel_workflow_run": 409,
+    "gitea_actions_get_artifact": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_get_artifacts": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_artifacts_of_run": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_runners": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_variables_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_workflow_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_org_workflow_runs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_repo_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_get_repo_runners": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_repo_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_repo_variables_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_runners": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_variables_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_workflow_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_user_workflow_runs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow_job": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow_run": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow_run_attempt": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow_run_logs": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_get_workflow_runs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_action_tasks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_repository_workflows": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_workflow_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_attempt_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_list_workflow_runs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_org_create_runner_registration_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_org_list_secrets": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_repo_create_runner_registration_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_rerun_failed_workflow_run": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_job": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_run": 400,
+    "gitea_actions_update_org_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_update_org_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_update_org_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_update_repo_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_update_repo_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_update_user_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_actions_update_user_secret": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_update_user_variable": "2xx",
+    "gitea_actions_user_create_runner_registration_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_add_user_badges": 500,
+    "gitea_admin_adopt_repository": 404,
+    "gitea_admin_create_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_create_org": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_create_public_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_create_repo": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_create_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_cron_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_cron_run": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_delete_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_delete_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_admin_delete_unadopted_repository": 404,
+    "gitea_admin_delete_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_delete_user_badges": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_delete_user_public_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_edit_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_edit_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_get_all_emails": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_get_all_orgs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_get_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_get_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_admin_get_runners": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_list_hooks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_list_packages": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_list_user_badges": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_list_workflow_jobs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_list_workflow_runs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_rename_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_search_emails": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_search_users": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_unadopted_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_admin_update_runner": 404,
+    "gitea_api_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_org_create_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_org_delete_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_org_edit_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_org_get_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_org_list_hooks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_create_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_delete_git_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_delete_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_edit_git_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_edit_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_get_git_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_get_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_list_git_hooks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_list_hooks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_repo_test_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_user_create_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_user_delete_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_user_edit_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_user_get_hook": "2xx",
+    "gitea_hook_user_list_hooks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_add_assignees": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_add_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_add_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_add_time": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_check_assignee": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_check_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_clear_labels": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_issue_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_issue_blocking": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_issue_comment_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_issue_dependencies": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_create_milestone": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_comment_deprecated": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_comment_reaction": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_issue_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_issue_comment_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_issue_reaction": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_milestone": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_stopwatch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_delete_time": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_comment_deprecated": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_issue_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_issue_comment_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_issue_deadline": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_edit_milestone": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_comment_reactions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_comments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_comments_and_timeline": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_issue_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_issue_comment_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_issue_reactions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_labels": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_milestone": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_milestones_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_get_repo_comments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_blocks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_issue_attachments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_issue_comment_attachments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_issue_dependencies": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_labels": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_list_pinned_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_lock_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_move_issue_pin": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_pin_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_post_comment_reaction": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_post_issue_reaction": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_remove_assignees": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_remove_issue_blocking": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_remove_issue_dependencies": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_remove_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_replace_labels": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_reset_time": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_search_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_start_stopwatch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_stop_stopwatch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_subscriptions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_tracked_times": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_unlock_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_issue_unpin_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_current_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_general_api_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_general_attachment_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_general_repository_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_general_ui_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_gitignore_template_info": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_label_template_info": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_license_template_info": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_get_signing_key": 404,
+    "gitea_misc_get_signing_key_ssh": 404,
+    "gitea_misc_get_version": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_list_gitignores_templates": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_list_label_templates": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_list_license_templates": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_render_markdown": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_render_markdown_raw": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_render_markup": "2xx",
+    "gitea_misc_topic_search": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_get_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_get_repo_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_get_thread": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_new_available": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_read_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_read_repo_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_notification_read_thread": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_add_issue_to_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_block_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_check_user_block": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_conceal_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create_org_repo": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create_org_repo_deprecated": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_create_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_delete_repos": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_edit": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_edit_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_edit_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_edit_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_get": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_get_all": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_get_label": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_get_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_get_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_is_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_is_public_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_activity_feeds": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_blocks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_labels": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_members": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_project_column_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_projects": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_public_members": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_list_repos": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_move_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_move_project_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_publicize_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_remove_issue_from_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_rename": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_set_default_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_unblock_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_org_update_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_delete_package": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_delete_package_version": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_get_latest_package_version": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_get_package": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_link_package": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_list_package_files": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_list_package_versions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_list_packages": "2xx",
+    "gitea_package_unlink_package": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_cancel_scheduled_auto_merge": 404,
+    "gitea_pull_create_pull_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_create_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_create_pull_review_comment_reply": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_create_pull_review_requests": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_delete_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_delete_pull_review_requests": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_dismiss_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_download_pull_diff_or_patch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_edit_pull_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_request_by_base_head": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_request_commits": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_request_files": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_get_pull_review_comments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_list_pinned_pull_requests": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_list_pull_requests": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_list_pull_reviews": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_merge_pull_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_pull_request_is_merged": 404,
+    "gitea_pull_resolve_pull_review_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_submit_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_undismiss_pull_review": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_unresolve_pull_review_comment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_pull_update_pull_request": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_create_release": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_create_release_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_delete_release": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_delete_release_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_delete_release_by_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_edit_release": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_edit_release_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_get_latest_release": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_get_release": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_get_release_attachment": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_get_release_by_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_list_release_attachments": "2xx",
+    "gitea_release_list_releases": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_accept_repo_transfer": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_add_collaborator": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_add_issue_to_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_add_push_mirror": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_add_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_add_topic": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_apply_diff_patch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_change_files": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_check_assignee": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_check_collaborator": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_check_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_check_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_compare_diff": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_branch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_branch_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_deploy_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_file": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_fork": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_status": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_create_tag_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_branch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_branch_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_collaborator": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_file": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_push_mirror": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_tag_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_delete_topic": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_download_commit_diff_or_patch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_edit": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_edit_branch_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_edit_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_edit_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_edit_tag_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_generate_repo": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_all_commits": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_annotated_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_archive": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_assignees": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_blob": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_branch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_branch_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_by_id": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_combined_status_by_ref": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_commit_pull_request": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_get_contents": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_contents_ext": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_contents_list": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_editor_config": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_file_contents": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_file_contents_post": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_issue_config": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_issue_templates": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_languages": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_licenses": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_note": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_get_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_push_mirror_by_remote_name": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_raw_file": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_raw_file_or_lfs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_repo_permissions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_reviewers": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_single_commit": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_tag": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_tag_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_get_tree": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_activity_feeds": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_all_git_refs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_branch_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_branches": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_collaborators": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_forks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_git_refs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_keys": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_project_column_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_projects": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_push_mirrors": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_stargazers": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_statuses": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_statuses_by_ref": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_subscribers": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_tag_protection": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_tags": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_teams": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_topics": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_list_user_tracked_times": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_merge_upstream": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_migrate": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_mirror_sync": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_move_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_move_project_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_new_pin_allowed": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_push_mirror_sync": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_put_subscription": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_reject_repo_transfer": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_remove_issue_from_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_rename_branch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_search": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_set_default_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_signing_key": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_signing_key_ssh": 404,
+    "gitea_repo_tracked_times": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_transfer": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_update_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_update_branch": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_update_branch_protection_priorities": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_update_file": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_update_topics": "2xx",
+    "gitea_repo_validate_issue_config": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_add_team_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_add_team_repository": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_create_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_delete_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_edit_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_get_team": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_team_activity_feeds": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_team_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_team_members": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_team_repo": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_team_repos": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_list_teams": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_remove_team_member": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_remove_team_repository": "2xx",
+    "gitea_team_search": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_add_email": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_block_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_check_following": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_check_user_block": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_create_oauth2_application": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_create_token": 401,
+    "gitea_user_current_add_issue_to_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_check_following": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_check_starring": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_create_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_create_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_create_repo": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_follow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_gpg_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_delete_star": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_edit_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_edit_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_get_gpg_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_get_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_get_project": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_get_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_followers": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_following": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_gpg_keys": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_keys": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_orgs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_project_column_issues": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_projects": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_repos": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_starred": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_list_subscriptions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_move_project_columns": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_move_project_issue": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_post_gpg_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_post_key": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_put_follow": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_put_star": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_remove_issue_from_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_set_default_project_column": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_current_tracked_times": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_delete_access_token": 401,
+    "gitea_user_delete_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_delete_email": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_delete_oauth2_application": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_current": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_heatmap_data": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_oauth2_application": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_org_permissions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_stopwatches": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_get_tokens": 401,
+    "gitea_user_get_verification_token": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_activity_feeds": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_blocks": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_emails": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_followers": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_following": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_gpg_keys": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_keys": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_oauth2_applications": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_orgs": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_projects": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_repos": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_starred": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_subscriptions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_list_teams": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_search": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_unblock_user": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_update_avatar": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_update_oauth2_application": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_update_settings": "2xx",
+    "gitea_user_verify_gpg_key": 422,
+    "gitea_wiki_create_wiki_page": "2xx",
+    "gitea_wiki_delete_wiki_page": "2xx",
+    "gitea_wiki_edit_wiki_page": "2xx",
+    "gitea_wiki_get_wiki_page": "2xx",
+    "gitea_wiki_get_wiki_page_revisions": "2xx",
+    "gitea_wiki_get_wiki_pages": "2xx"
+  }
+}

tests/integration/sweep_seed.py

@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+"""Seed data for the all-tools sweep.
+
+:func:`seed` creates the resources the sweep's arguments point at (through the Gitea API,
+not through the tools under test) and returns the context dictionary. Everything created
+here is fake data in a disposable instance.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import secrets
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance, HarnessError
+from tests.integration.static_keys import GPG_EMAILS, GPG_PUBLIC_KEYS
+
+Ctx = dict[str, Any]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Small helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def b64(text: str | bytes) -> str:
+    """Base64 text of ``text``."""
+    raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else text
+    return base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
+
+
+def ssh_public_key() -> str:
+    """A fresh ed25519 public key in OpenSSH format (throwaway)."""
+    key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
+    raw = key.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.OpenSSH, serialization.PublicFormat.OpenSSH)
+    return raw.decode("ascii")
+
+
+# A 1x1 transparent PNG, for the avatar endpoints.
+PNG_1X1 = "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNkYPhfDwAChwGA60e6kgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Seeding
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class Seeder:
+    """Creates the sweep's seed data through the Gitea API (not through the tools)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, gitea: GiteaInstance, user: str, user_token: str) -> None:
+        self.gitea = gitea
+        self.user = user
+        self.user_token = user_token
+
+    def call(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        *,
+        token: str | None = None,
+        ok: tuple[int, ...] = (200, 201, 202, 204),
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> Any:
+        """Call the API, require a status in ``ok`` and return the JSON body (or None)."""
+        response = self.gitea.api(method, path, token=token, **kwargs)
+        if response.status_code not in ok:
+            raise HarnessError(
+                f"seed {method} {path} failed: HTTP {response.status_code}: {response.text[:200]}"
+            )
+        if response.content and "json" in response.headers.get("content-type", ""):
+            return response.json()
+        return None
+
+    def put_file(self, repo: str, path: str, text: str, branch: str = "main") -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Create a file through the contents API."""
+        owner = self.gitea.admin_login
+        body = {"content": b64(text), "message": f"add {path}", "branch": branch}
+        result: dict[str, Any] = self.call(
+            "POST", f"/repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents/{path}", json=body
+        )
+        return result
+
+
+WORKFLOW = """\
+name: sweep
+on: [push, workflow_dispatch]
+jobs:
+  hello:
+    runs-on: aegis-sweep-nonexistent
+    steps:
+      - run: echo hello
+"""
+
+
+def seed(gitea: GiteaInstance, user: str, user_token: str) -> Ctx:
+    """Create the sweep's seed data and return the context the arguments are built from."""
+    s = Seeder(gitea, user, user_token)
+    admin = gitea.admin_login
+    sfx = secrets.token_hex(3)
+    c: Ctx = {"admin": admin, "user": user, "owner": admin, "sfx": sfx}
+    c["admin_password"] = gitea.admin_password
+
+    # A second user plus throwaway users for the destructive admin tools.
+    c["user2"] = gitea.create_user(f"sw-u2-{sfx}")[0]
+    c["user3"] = gitea.create_user(f"sw-u3-{sfx}")[0]
+    c["del_user"] = gitea.create_user(f"sw-del-{sfx}")[0]
+    c["rename_user"] = gitea.create_user(f"sw-ren-{sfx}")[0]
+
+    # Organization with a team and a repository.
+    c["org"] = org = f"sw-org-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", "/orgs", json={"username": org, "visibility": "public"})
+    c["org_repo"] = f"sw-orgrepo-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", f"/orgs/{org}/repos", json={"name": c["org_repo"], "auto_init": True})
+    team = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"/orgs/{org}/teams",
+        json={
+            "name": "sweepers",
+            "permission": "write",
+            "includes_all_repositories": False,
+            "units": ["repo.code", "repo.issues", "repo.pulls"],
+        },
+    )
+    c["team_id"], c["team_name"] = team["id"], team["name"]
+    team2 = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"/orgs/{org}/teams",
+        json={"name": "sweepers2", "permission": "read", "units": ["repo.code"]},
+    )
+    c["team2_name"] = team2["name"]
+    s.call("PUT", f"/teams/{c['team_id']}/members/{user}")
+    s.call("PUT", f"/teams/{c['team_id']}/repos/{org}/{c['org_repo']}")
+    s.call("PUT", f"/orgs/{org}/public_members/{user}")
+    s.call("PUT", f"/orgs/{org}/blocks/{c['user2']}")
+    c["org_label"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"/orgs/{org}/labels", json={"name": "org-bug", "color": "#ff0000"}
+    )["id"]
+    c["org_hook"] = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"/orgs/{org}/hooks",
+        json={"type": "gitea", "config": {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9/h", "content_type": "json"}},
+    )["id"]
+    s.call("PUT", f"/orgs/{org}/actions/secrets/ORG_SECRET", json={"data": "org-secret-value"})
+    s.call("POST", f"/orgs/{org}/actions/variables/ORG_VAR", json={"value": "1"})
+    c["org_issue_id"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"/repos/{org}/{c['org_repo']}/issues", json={"title": "org issue"}
+    )["id"]
+    _project(s, c, "org", f"/orgs/{org}/projects")
+
+    # Throwaway org and repository for the destructive tools.
+    c["del_org"] = f"sw-delorg-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", "/orgs", json={"username": c["del_org"]})
+    c["del_org2"] = f"sw-delorg2-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", "/orgs", json={"username": c["del_org2"]})
+    c["rename_org"] = f"sw-renorg-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", "/orgs", json={"username": c["rename_org"]})
+    c["del_repo"] = f"sw-delrepo-{sfx}"
+    gitea.create_repo(admin, c["del_repo"])
+    c["xfer_repo"] = f"sw-xfer-{sfx}"
+    gitea.create_repo(admin, c["xfer_repo"])
+    c["template_repo"] = f"sw-tpl-{sfx}"
+    gitea.create_repo(admin, c["template_repo"])
+    s.call("PATCH", f"/repos/{admin}/{c['template_repo']}", json={"template": True})
+
+    # The main seed repository.
+    c["repo"] = repo = f"sw-repo-{sfx}"
+    created = gitea.create_repo(admin, repo)
+    c["repo_id"] = created["id"]
+    base = f"/repos/{admin}/{repo}"
+    branch = s.call("GET", f"{base}/branches/main")
+    c["sha"] = branch["commit"]["id"]
+    s.put_file(repo, ".editorconfig", "root = true\n")
+    s.put_file(repo, "docs/a.txt", "alpha\n")
+    s.put_file(repo, ".gitea/workflows/sweep.yml", WORKFLOW)
+    c["sha"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/branches/main")["commit"]["id"]
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/collaborators/{user}", json={"permission": "write"})
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/collaborators/{c['user2']}", json={"permission": "write"})
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/topics", json={"topics": ["sweep", "seed"]})
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/topics/extra")
+    # A fork (for merge-upstream), a pull mirror and push-mirror targets, all from this instance.
+    local = f"http://127.0.0.1:3000/{admin}"
+    c["fork_repo"] = f"sw-fork-{sfx}"
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/forks", json={"organization": org, "name": c["fork_repo"]})
+    c["mirror_repo"] = f"sw-mirror-{sfx}"
+    s.call(
+        "POST",
+        "/repos/migrate",
+        json={
+            "clone_addr": f"{local}/{c['template_repo']}.git",
+            "repo_name": c["mirror_repo"],
+            "service": "git",
+            "mirror": True,
+            "mirror_interval": "8h0m0s",
+        },
+    )
+    c["push_target"] = f"sw-ptarget-{sfx}"
+    gitea.create_repo(admin, c["push_target"], auto_init=False)
+    c["push_target2"] = f"sw-ptarget2-{sfx}"
+    gitea.create_repo(admin, c["push_target2"], auto_init=False)
+    c["push_mirror"] = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/push_mirrors",
+        json={
+            "remote_address": f"{local}/{c['push_target']}.git",
+            "remote_username": admin,
+            "remote_password": gitea.admin_password,
+            "interval": "8h0m0s",
+            "sync_on_commit": False,
+        },
+    )["remote_name"]
+    s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/statuses/{c['sha']}",
+        json={"state": "success", "context": "ci/sweep"},
+    )
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/tags", json={"tag_name": "v0.0.1", "target": "main"})
+    annotated = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{base}/tags", json={"tag_name": "v0.0.3", "target": "main", "message": "note"}
+    )
+    c["tag_sha"] = annotated["id"]
+    for name in ("feat", "feat2", "feat3", "rn", "del-branch"):
+        s.call(
+            "POST", f"{base}/branches", json={"new_branch_name": name, "old_branch_name": "main"}
+        )
+    s.put_file(repo, "feat.txt", "feature\n", branch="feat")
+    s.put_file(repo, "feat2.txt", "feature two\n", branch="feat2")
+    s.put_file(repo, "feat3.txt", "feature three\n", branch="feat3")
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/branch_protections", json={"rule_name": "release/*"})
+    c["protection"] = "release/*"
+    s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/tag_protections",
+        json={"name_pattern": "v9*", "whitelist_usernames": [admin]},
+    )
+    c["tag_protection"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/tag_protections")[0]["id"]
+    s.put_file(repo, "to-delete.txt", "bye\n")
+    s.put_file(repo, "to-update.txt", "before\n")
+    c["delete_file_sha"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/contents/to-delete.txt")["sha"]
+    c["update_file_sha"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/contents/to-update.txt")["sha"]
+    c["blob_sha"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/contents/README.md")["sha"]
+    c["page_name"] = "Home"
+    c["cron_task"] = "cleanup_hook_task_table"
+
+    # Issues: 1 main, 2 dependency target, 3 pinned, 4/5 more targets.
+    for number, title in enumerate(("main", "dependency", "pinned", "target four", "target five")):
+        issue = s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues", json={"title": f"Sweep {title}", "body": "x"})
+        assert issue["number"] == number + 1
+    c["issue"], c["issue2"], c["issue3"], c["issue4"], c["issue5"] = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
+    c["issue1_id"] = s.call("GET", f"{base}/issues/1")["id"]
+    c["comment"] = s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/comments", json={"body": "one"})["id"]
+    c["comment2"] = s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/comments", json={"body": "two"})["id"]
+    c["label"] = s.call("POST", f"{base}/labels", json={"name": "bug", "color": "#d73a4a"})["id"]
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/labels", json={"labels": [c["label"]]})
+    c["milestone"] = s.call("POST", f"{base}/milestones", json={"title": "m1"})["id"]
+    c["milestone_name"] = "m1"
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/assignees", json={"assignees": [admin]})
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/issues/1/subscriptions/{user}")
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/reactions", json={"content": "+1"})
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/comments/{c['comment']}/reactions", json={"content": "+1"})
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/dependencies", json={"index": 2, "owner": admin, "repo": repo})
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/blocks", json={"index": 3, "owner": admin, "repo": repo})
+    # A comment by another user notifies the admin (author and assignee of issue 1).
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/comments", token=user_token, json={"body": "ping"})
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/3/pin")
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/2/stopwatch/start", token=user_token)
+    time_entry = s.call("POST", f"{base}/issues/1/times", json={"time": 60})
+    c["time_id"] = time_entry["id"]
+    attachment = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/issues/1/assets",
+        files={"attachment": ("issue.txt", b"issue attachment", "text/plain")},
+        params={"name": "issue.txt"},
+    )
+    c["issue_attachment"] = attachment["id"]
+    attachment = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/issues/comments/{c['comment']}/assets",
+        files={"attachment": ("comment.txt", b"comment attachment", "text/plain")},
+        params={"name": "comment.txt"},
+    )
+    c["comment_attachment"] = attachment["id"]
+
+    # Pull requests: 6 is the main one, 7 is merged by the sweep.
+    pr = s.call("POST", f"{base}/pulls", json={"title": "Sweep PR", "base": "main", "head": "feat"})
+    c["pr"] = pr["number"]
+    pr2 = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{base}/pulls", json={"title": "Sweep PR two", "base": "main", "head": "feat2"}
+    )
+    c["pr2"] = pr2["number"]
+    pr_path = f"{base}/pulls/{c['pr']}"
+    review = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{pr_path}/reviews",
+        token=user_token,
+        json={
+            "event": "REQUEST_CHANGES",
+            "body": "please change",
+            "comments": [{"path": "feat.txt", "new_position": 1, "body": "line note"}],
+        },
+    )
+    c["review"] = review["id"]
+    c["review_comment"] = s.call("GET", f"{pr_path}/reviews/{review['id']}/comments")[0]["id"]
+    c["review2"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{pr_path}/reviews", token=user_token, json={"event": "COMMENT", "body": "fyi"}
+    )["id"]
+    c["pending_review"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{pr_path}/reviews", token=user_token, json={"body": "draft"}
+    )["id"]
+    s.call(
+        "POST", f"{pr_path}/requested_reviewers", json={"reviewers": [c["user2"]]}, ok=(201, 422)
+    )
+
+    # Release with an asset (and a second release removed by tag).
+    release = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{base}/releases", json={"tag_name": "v1.0.0", "target_commitish": "main"}
+    )
+    c["release"], c["release_tag"] = release["id"], "v1.0.0"
+    asset = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/releases/{release['id']}/assets",
+        files={"attachment": ("rel.bin", b"release bytes", "application/octet-stream")},
+        params={"name": "rel.bin"},
+    )
+    c["release_asset"] = asset["id"]
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/releases", json={"tag_name": "v2.0.0", "target_commitish": "main"})
+    c["release_tag2"] = "v2.0.0"
+
+    # Hooks, keys, secrets, variables, wiki, projects.
+    hook_body = {"type": "gitea", "config": {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9/h", "content_type": "json"}}
+    c["repo_hook"] = s.call("POST", f"{base}/hooks", json=hook_body)["id"]
+    s.call(
+        "PATCH",
+        f"{base}/hooks/git/pre-receive",
+        json={"content": "#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n"},
+        ok=(200,),
+    )
+    c["git_hook"] = "pre-receive"
+    c["user_hook"] = s.call("POST", "/user/hooks", json=hook_body)["id"]
+    c["admin_hook"] = s.call("POST", "/admin/hooks", json=hook_body)["id"]
+    c["deploy_key"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"{base}/keys", json={"title": f"deploy-{sfx}", "key": ssh_public_key()}
+    )["id"]
+    c["user_key"] = s.call(
+        "POST", "/user/keys", json={"title": f"mine-{sfx}", "key": ssh_public_key()}
+    )["id"]
+    c["admin_user_key"] = s.call(
+        "POST", f"/admin/users/{user}/keys", json={"title": f"k-{sfx}", "key": ssh_public_key()}
+    )["id"]
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/actions/secrets/REPO_SECRET", json={"data": "repo-secret-value"})
+    c["user_secret"] = f"USER_SECRET_{sfx.upper()}"
+    c["user_var"] = f"USER_VAR_{sfx.upper()}"
+    s.call("PUT", f"/user/actions/secrets/{c['user_secret']}", json={"data": "user-secret-value"})
+    s.call("POST", f"{base}/actions/variables/REPO_VAR", json={"value": "1"})
+    s.call("POST", f"/user/actions/variables/{c['user_var']}", json={"value": "1"})
+    s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"{base}/wiki/new",
+        json={"title": "Home", "content_base64": b64("# home\n"), "message": "home"},
+    )
+    _project(s, c, "repo", f"{base}/projects")
+    _project(s, c, "user", "/user/projects")
+    c["oauth_app"] = s.call(
+        "POST",
+        "/user/applications/oauth2",
+        json={"name": f"sweep-{sfx}", "redirect_uris": ["http://127.0.0.1:1/cb"]},
+    )["id"]
+
+    # Current user: email, follow, star, watch, block.
+    c["email"] = f"sweep-{sfx}@example.test"
+    s.call("POST", "/user/emails", json={"emails": [c["email"], *GPG_EMAILS]})
+    # Gitea only accepts a GPG key whose identity matches an email of the account.
+    c["gpg_key"] = s.call(
+        "POST", "/user/gpg_keys", json={"armored_public_key": GPG_PUBLIC_KEYS[0]}
+    )["id"]
+    s.call("PUT", f"/user/following/{user}")
+    s.call("PUT", f"/user/starred/{admin}/{repo}")
+    s.call("PUT", f"{base}/subscription")
+    s.call("PUT", f"/user/blocks/{c['user2']}")
+    # A throwaway access token of the admin (basic auth), deleted by name.
+    token_name = f"sweep-{sfx}"
+    s.call(
+        "POST",
+        f"/users/{admin}/tokens",
+        auth=(admin, gitea.admin_password),
+        json={"name": token_name, "scopes": ["read:user"]},
+    )
+    c["throwaway_token"] = token_name
+
+    # A generic package.
+    c["pkg"] = pkg = f"sweep-pkg-{sfx}"
+    upload = gitea.request(
+        "PUT", f"/api/packages/{admin}/generic/{pkg}/1.0.0/payload.bin", content=b"package"
+    )
+    if upload.status_code != 201:
+        raise HarnessError(f"seed package upload failed: HTTP {upload.status_code}")
+    c["pkg_version"] = "1.0.0"
+    c["pkg2"] = f"sweep-pkg2-{sfx}"
+    upload = gitea.request(
+        "PUT", f"/api/packages/{admin}/generic/{c['pkg2']}/1.0.0/payload.bin", content=b"package"
+    )
+    if upload.status_code != 201:
+        raise HarnessError(f"seed package upload failed: HTTP {upload.status_code}")
+
+    # The workflow run created by the push of the workflow file (queued, no runner).
+    c["run"], c["job_id"] = _find_run(s, base)
+    c["notification"] = _find_notification(s, admin)
+    return c
+
+
+def _project(s: Seeder, c: Ctx, scope: str, path: str) -> None:
+    """Create a project with two extra columns; store ids as ``<scope>_project/_column...``."""
+    project = s.call("POST", path, json={"title": f"{scope} project"})["id"]
+    c[f"{scope}_project"] = project
+    ids: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for title in ("todo", "done"):
+        ids[title] = s.call("POST", f"{path}/{project}/columns", json={"title": title})["id"]
+    c[f"{scope}_column"], c[f"{scope}_column2"] = ids["todo"], ids["done"]
+    columns = s.call("GET", f"{path}/{project}/columns")
+    c[f"{scope}_columns"] = [column["id"] for column in columns]
+
+
+def _find_run(s: Seeder, base: str) -> tuple[Any, Any]:
+    """Return ``(run id, job id)`` of the first workflow run; fail when none appears.
+
+    A made-up id would only turn every dependent tool into a 404, which the sweep would
+    accept as documented, so a missing run is a seeding failure.
+    """
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 30
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        runs = s.call("GET", f"{base}/actions/runs")
+        entries = runs.get("workflow_runs") or []
+        if entries:
+            run_id = entries[0]["id"]
+            jobs = s.call("GET", f"{base}/actions/runs/{run_id}/jobs")
+            job_entries = jobs.get("jobs") or []
+            if job_entries:
+                return run_id, job_entries[0]["id"]
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+    raise HarnessError("seed: the push of the workflow file did not create a workflow run")
+
+
+def _find_notification(s: Seeder, admin: str) -> Any:
+    """Return the id of a notification of the admin; fail when none appears."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 30
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        listing = s.call("GET", "/notifications", params={"all": "true"})
+        if listing:
+            return listing[0]["id"]
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+    raise HarnessError(f"seed: no notification arrived for {admin}")

tests/integration/test_failure_paths.py

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Write tools that Gitea refuses: the status and error kind reach the client intact."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RepoRef, b64
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+
+async def test_creating_in_a_missing_repository_is_not_found(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance
+) -> None:
+    missing = {"owner": gitea.admin_login, "repo": "missing-" + secrets.token_hex(4)}
+    issue = await mcp.fail("gitea_issue_create_issue", 404, body={"title": "x"}, **missing)
+    assert issue.error_kind == "not_found"
+    label = await mcp.fail(
+        "gitea_issue_create_label", 404, body={"name": "x", "color": "#ffffff"}, **missing
+    )
+    assert label.error_kind == "not_found"
+    # The audit log records the failure with the same kind.
+    failed = [e for e in mcp.audit_entries() if e["tool_name"] == "gitea_issue_create_issue"]
+    assert failed and failed[-1]["outcome"] == "not_found"
+    assert failed[-1]["result_status"] == "error"
+
+
+async def test_invalid_values_are_validation_errors(mcp: McpSession, fresh_repo: RepoRef) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    bad_color = await mcp.call(
+        "gitea_issue_create_label", body={"name": "bad", "color": "not-a-color"}, **repo
+    )
+    assert bad_color.is_error
+    assert bad_color.error_kind in ("validation_failed", "bad_request")
+    assert bad_color.status in (400, 422)
+
+    # Gitea itself refuses a missing body.
+    missing_body = await mcp.call("gitea_issue_create_issue", **repo)
+    assert missing_body.is_error and missing_body.status == 422
+    assert missing_body.error_kind == "validation_failed"
+
+    # A field of the wrong type never reaches Gitea: the schema rejects it first.
+    wrong_type = await mcp.call(
+        "gitea_issue_create_issue", body={"title": ["not", "a", "string"]}, **repo
+    )
+    assert wrong_type.is_error and wrong_type.status is None
+    assert wrong_type.error_kind == "invalid_argument"
+
+
+async def test_conflicting_writes_are_conflicts(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    duplicate = await mcp.fail(
+        "gitea_user_current_create_repo", 409, body={"name": fresh_repo.name}
+    )
+    assert duplicate.error_kind == "conflict"
+
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_file",
+        status=201,
+        filepath="a.txt",
+        body={"content": b64("one"), "message": "one"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    again = await mcp.call(
+        "gitea_repo_create_file",
+        filepath="a.txt",
+        body={"content": b64("two"), "message": "two"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert again.is_error and again.status in (409, 422)
+
+    stale = await mcp.call(
+        "gitea_repo_update_file",
+        filepath="a.txt",
+        body={"content": b64("three"), "message": "three", "sha": "0" * 40},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert stale.is_error and stale.status in (409, 422)

tests/integration/test_harness.py

@@ -127,7 +127,10 @@ def test_cleanup_removes_container_and_network() -> None:
     assert run_id not in harness._ACTIVE
 
 
-def test_cleanup_all_handles_registered_runs() -> None:
+def test_cleanup_all_handles_registered_runs(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    # cleanup_all removes every tracked run, including the session's own Gitea, so this
+    # test works on a private registry instead of the real one.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(harness, "_ACTIVE", {})
     run_id = harness.secrets.token_hex(4)
     name = f"{harness.NAME_PREFIX}{run_id}"
     harness.register_resources(RunResources(run_id=run_id, container=name, network=name))

tests/integration/test_per_user_oauth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+"""Per-user mode against the live instance: calls run as the signed-in Gitea user.
+
+The OAuth store is seeded directly (a session for a non-admin user whose Gitea token is a
+personal access token, plus our own issued access token) instead of running the browser
+flow, then the real HTTP app is driven in process with the MCP SDK client.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+import time
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import httpx2
+import pytest
+from mcp import Client
+from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import MCP_SCOPE
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.components import build_oauth_components
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL, TOKEN_PREFIX
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import OAuthStore, SessionRecord, TokenRecord, token_hash
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import build_server
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import build_http_app
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RegularUser
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+PUBLIC_BASE = "https://mcp.example.test"
+RESOURCE = f"{PUBLIC_BASE}/mcp"
+ENCRYPTION_KEY = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+OAUTH_CLIENT_ID = "it-oauth-client"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class OAuthStack:
+    """The HTTP app with its seeded tokens and the secrets the tests must never see."""
+
+    app: Starlette
+    audit_path: Path
+    bearer: str
+    user_login: str
+    user_access_token: str
+    expired_access_token: str
+    secrets: list[str]
+
+
+async def build_stack(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, user: RegularUser, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> OAuthStack:
+    """Build the app with per-user OAuth enabled and a signed-in session for ``user``."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", gitea.base_url)
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "oauth-state"
+    bearer = secrets.token_urlsafe(36)
+    oauth_client_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(36)
+    settings = Settings(
+        gitea_url=gitea.base_url,
+        gitea_token=gitea.admin_token,
+        mcp_bearer_token=bearer,
+        oauth_enabled=True,
+        gitea_oauth_client_id=OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        gitea_oauth_client_secret=oauth_client_secret,
+        token_encryption_key=ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        public_base_url=PUBLIC_BASE,
+        data_dir=data_dir,
+        audit_log_path=data_dir / "audit.log",
+        request_timeout_seconds=60,
+    )
+
+    # Seed the encrypted store: one session (the user's own Gitea token) and one of our
+    # access tokens (stored only as a hash), exactly what the browser flow would leave.
+    store = OAuthStore.load(data_dir, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    session_id = secrets.token_hex(16)
+    store.sessions[session_id] = SessionRecord(
+        session_id=session_id,
+        client_id=OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        login=user.login,
+        is_admin=False,
+        gitea_access_token=user.token,
+        gitea_refresh_token=None,
+        gitea_expires_at=None,
+        scopes=[MCP_SCOPE],
+        resource=RESOURCE,
+        created_at=time.time(),
+    )
+    access = TOKEN_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+    store.tokens[token_hash(access)] = TokenRecord(
+        kind="access",
+        session_id=session_id,
+        client_id=OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        scopes=[MCP_SCOPE],
+        expires_at=time.time() + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
+    )
+    # A token of the same valid session whose lifetime ended a minute ago.
+    expired = TOKEN_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+    store.tokens[token_hash(expired)] = TokenRecord(
+        kind="access",
+        session_id=session_id,
+        client_id=OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        scopes=[MCP_SCOPE],
+        expires_at=time.time() - 60,
+    )
+    await store.save()
+
+    audit = AuditLogger(settings.resolved_audit_log_path)
+    extras = build_oauth_components(settings, audit=audit)
+    server = build_server(settings, resolver=extras.resolver, executor=extras.executor, audit=audit)
+    app = build_http_app(
+        settings,
+        server=server,
+        token_verifier=extras.token_verifier,
+        auth_server_provider=extras.auth_server_provider,
+        extra_routes=extras.extra_routes,
+        client_registration_options=extras.client_registration_options,
+        revocation_options=extras.revocation_options,
+        rate_limited_paths=extras.rate_limited_paths,
+    )
+    return OAuthStack(
+        app=app,
+        audit_path=settings.resolved_audit_log_path,
+        bearer=bearer,
+        user_login=user.login,
+        user_access_token=access,
+        expired_access_token=expired,
+        secrets=[
+            bearer,
+            access,
+            expired,
+            user.token,
+            gitea.admin_token,
+            oauth_client_secret,
+            ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        ],
+    )
+
+
+@asynccontextmanager
+async def http_session(app: Starlette, token: str, audit_path: Path) -> AsyncIterator[McpSession]:
+    """An MCP session over the real HTTP app (in process) with ``token`` as bearer."""
+    async with (
+        app.router.lifespan_context(app),
+        httpx2.AsyncClient(
+            transport=httpx2.ASGITransport(app=app),
+            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+            base_url=PUBLIC_BASE,
+            timeout=60.0,
+        ) as http_client,
+        Client(streamable_http_client(RESOURCE, http_client=http_client)) as client,
+    ):
+        yield McpSession(client, audit_path)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def stack(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance,
+    regular_user: RegularUser,
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> OAuthStack:
+    return await build_stack(gitea, regular_user, tmp_path, monkeypatch)
+
+
+async def test_calls_run_as_the_signed_in_user(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, stack: OAuthStack
+) -> None:
+    private_repo = gitea.unique("it-private")
+    created = gitea.api(
+        "POST",
+        f"/admin/users/{gitea.admin_login}/repos",
+        json={"name": private_repo, "private": True, "auto_init": True},
+    )
+    assert created.status_code == 201
+    try:
+        async with http_session(stack.app, stack.user_access_token, stack.audit_path) as mcp:
+            me = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_current")
+            assert me.identity == {"login": regular_user.login, "mode": "oauth", "sudo": None}
+            assert me.data["login"] == regular_user.login
+            assert me.data["is_admin"] is False
+
+            # The user can create and read their own repository ...
+            own = gitea.unique("it-own")
+            await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_create_repo", status=201, body={"name": own})
+            assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=regular_user.login, repo=own)).data[
+                "owner"
+            ]["login"] == regular_user.login
+
+            # ... but not another user's private repository: Gitea hides it.
+            hidden = await mcp.call("gitea_repo_get", owner=gitea.admin_login, repo=private_repo)
+            assert hidden.is_error
+            assert hidden.status in (403, 404)
+            assert hidden.error_kind in ("forbidden", "not_found")
+            assert (
+                await mcp.call(
+                    "gitea_repo_get_contents",
+                    owner=gitea.admin_login,
+                    repo=private_repo,
+                    filepath="README.md",
+                )
+            ).status in (403, 404)
+
+            # Admin tools and sudo are refused by Gitea with 403, not by the server: every
+            # admin list endpoint and an admin create, all for this non-admin user.
+            for tool in (
+                "gitea_admin_cron_list",
+                "gitea_admin_search_users",
+                "gitea_admin_get_all_orgs",
+                "gitea_admin_get_all_emails",
+                "gitea_admin_list_hooks",
+                "gitea_admin_list_packages",
+                "gitea_admin_get_runners",
+                "gitea_admin_unadopted_list",
+            ):
+                refused = await mcp.call(tool)
+                assert refused.is_error and refused.status == 403, tool
+                assert refused.error_kind == "forbidden", tool
+                assert refused.identity["mode"] == "oauth"
+            created = await mcp.call(
+                "gitea_admin_create_user",
+                body={
+                    "username": gitea.unique("it-nope"),
+                    "email": f"{gitea.unique('nope')}@example.test",
+                    "password": secrets.token_urlsafe(24),
+                },
+            )
+            assert created.is_error and created.status == 403
+            assert created.error_kind == "forbidden"
+            sudo = await mcp.call("gitea_user_get_current", sudo=gitea.admin_login)
+            assert sudo.is_error and sudo.status == 403
+
+            entries = mcp.audit_entries()
+            assert entries and all(e["identity_mode"] == "oauth" for e in entries)
+            assert all(e["identity_login"] == regular_user.login for e in entries)
+            assert {e["tool_name"] for e in entries} >= {
+                "gitea_user_get_current",
+                "gitea_admin_cron_list",
+                "gitea_admin_create_user",
+            }
+            gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{regular_user.login}/{own}")
+
+            texts = "\n".join(mcp.texts) + stack.audit_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            for secret in stack.secrets:
+                assert secret not in texts
+    finally:
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{gitea.admin_login}/{private_repo}")
+
+
+async def test_static_bearer_in_the_same_app_runs_as_admin(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, stack: OAuthStack
+) -> None:
+    async with http_session(stack.app, stack.bearer, stack.audit_path) as mcp:
+        me = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_current")
+        assert me.identity == {"login": gitea.admin_login, "mode": "admin-token", "sudo": None}
+        assert me.data["is_admin"] is True
+        cron = await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_cron_list")
+        assert cron.data
+        entries = mcp.audit_entries()
+        assert {e["identity_mode"] for e in entries} == {"admin-token"}
+        texts = "\n".join(mcp.texts)
+        for secret in stack.secrets:
+            assert secret not in texts
+
+
+async def test_unknown_and_expired_tokens_never_reach_gitea(
+    stack: OAuthStack, regular_user: RegularUser
+) -> None:
+    body: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+        "id": 1,
+        "method": "initialize",
+        "params": {
+            "protocolVersion": "2025-11-25",
+            "capabilities": {},
+            "clientInfo": {"name": "it", "version": "0"},
+        },
+    }
+    headers = {"Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream"}
+    async with (
+        stack.app.router.lifespan_context(stack.app),
+        httpx2.AsyncClient(
+            transport=httpx2.ASGITransport(app=stack.app), base_url=PUBLIC_BASE
+        ) as http_client,
+    ):
+        for token in (
+            TOKEN_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32),  # looks like ours, unknown
+            stack.expired_access_token,  # ours and known, but past its expiry
+            regular_user.token,  # the user's own Gitea token is not an MCP token
+            secrets.token_urlsafe(36),
+        ):
+            response = await http_client.post(
+                "/mcp", json=body, headers={**headers, "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+            )
+            assert response.status_code == 401
+            assert token not in response.text
+        anonymous = await http_client.post("/mcp", json=body, headers=headers)
+        assert anonymous.status_code == 401
+        # The expiry is what excluded the token above: the live one of the same session works.
+        live = await http_client.post(
+            "/mcp",
+            json=body,
+            headers={**headers, "Authorization": f"Bearer {stack.user_access_token}"},
+        )
+        assert live.status_code == 200

tests/integration/test_scenario_actions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Scenario: a real Actions run on an act_runner container, read back through the tools."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RepoRef, b64, drop_org, runner_unavailable
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance, HarnessError, runner_logs, start_runner
+
+WORKFLOW_PATH = ".gitea/workflows/it.yml"
+WORKFLOW = """\
+name: it
+on: [push, workflow_dispatch]
+jobs:
+  hello:
+    runs-on: aegis-host
+    steps:
+      - name: Say hello
+        run: echo hello
+"""
+RUNNER_ONLINE_TIMEOUT = 90.0
+RUN_TIMEOUT = 180.0
+
+
+async def _wait_for(probe: Any, *, timeout: float, interval: float = 2.0) -> Any:
+    """Await ``probe()`` until it returns something truthy; return it (or None on timeout)."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while True:
+        value = await probe()
+        if value or time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+            return value
+        await asyncio.sleep(interval)
+
+
+async def test_workflow_run_on_act_runner(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    token = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_repo_create_runner_registration_token", **repo)
+    assert isinstance(token.data["token"], str) and token.data["token"]
+    try:
+        runner = start_runner(gitea, token.data["token"])
+    except HarnessError as exc:
+        runner_unavailable(f"the act_runner container could not be started: {exc}")
+
+    async def online() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        runners = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_repo_runners", **repo)
+        entries = runners.data["runners"] if isinstance(runners.data, dict) else runners.data
+        for entry in entries or []:
+            if entry.get("status") in ("online", "idle", "active"):
+                found: dict[str, Any] = entry
+                return found
+        return None
+
+    registered = await _wait_for(online, timeout=RUNNER_ONLINE_TIMEOUT)
+    if not registered:
+        runner_unavailable(
+            "the act_runner did not come online within "
+            f"{RUNNER_ONLINE_TIMEOUT:.0f}s; runner log tail: {runner_logs(runner, 15)}"
+        )
+    assert token.data["token"] not in runner_logs(runner, 200)
+
+    # Commit the workflow through the contents tool, then dispatch it explicitly.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_file",
+        status=201,
+        filepath=WORKFLOW_PATH,
+        body={"content": b64(WORKFLOW), "message": "add it workflow", "branch": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    workflows = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_list_repository_workflows", **repo)
+    assert any(w["path"].endswith("it.yml") for w in workflows.data["workflows"])
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_actions_dispatch_workflow",
+        status=(200, 204),
+        workflow_id="it.yml",
+        body={"ref": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+
+    async def finished() -> list[dict[str, Any]] | None:
+        runs = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_workflow_runs", **repo)
+        entries = runs.data["workflow_runs"]
+        if len(entries) >= 2 and all(r["status"] == "completed" for r in entries):
+            done: list[dict[str, Any]] = entries
+            return done
+        return None
+
+    runs = await _wait_for(finished, timeout=RUN_TIMEOUT)
+    assert runs, (
+        f"workflow runs did not complete within {RUN_TIMEOUT:.0f}s; "
+        f"runner log tail: {runner_logs(runner, 20)}"
+    )
+    assert {r["event"] for r in runs} == {"push", "workflow_dispatch"}
+    assert [r["conclusion"] for r in runs] == ["success", "success"]
+
+    run_id = runs[0]["id"]
+    one = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_workflow_run", run=run_id, **repo)
+    assert one.data["status"] == "completed"
+    jobs = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_jobs", run=run_id, **repo)
+    job = jobs.data["jobs"][0]
+    assert job["conclusion"] == "success"
+    job_id = str(job["id"])  # the job id is a string argument
+    fetched = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_workflow_job", job_id=job_id, **repo)
+    assert fetched.data["id"] == job["id"]
+    logs = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_download_run_job_logs", job_id=job["id"], **repo)
+    assert isinstance(logs.data, str)
+    assert "hello" in logs.data
+    artifacts = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_artifacts_of_run", run=run_id, **repo)
+    assert artifacts.data["artifacts"] == []
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_artifacts", **repo)).data["total_count"] == 0
+    tasks = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_list_action_tasks", **repo)
+    assert tasks.data["total_count"] >= 2
+
+    # The runner registered above, managed through the repository-scope runner tools.
+    runner_id = registered["id"]
+    got = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_repo_runner", runner_id=str(runner_id), **repo)
+    assert got.data["id"] == runner_id and got.data["name"] == registered["name"]
+    off = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_actions_update_repo_runner",
+        runner_id=str(runner_id),
+        body={"disabled": True},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert off.data["disabled"] is True
+    on = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_actions_update_repo_runner",
+        runner_id=str(runner_id),
+        body={"disabled": False},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert on.data["disabled"] is False
+
+    # The completed run: logs archive, rerun of the run and of one job, then delete the run.
+    archive = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_workflow_run_logs", run=run_id, **repo)
+    assert archive.data
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_run", status=201, run=run_id, **repo)
+    await _wait_for_attempt(mcp, repo, run_id, attempt=2)
+    rerun_jobs = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_list_workflow_run_jobs", run=run_id, **repo)
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_actions_rerun_workflow_job",
+        status=201,
+        run=run_id,
+        job_id=rerun_jobs.data["jobs"][0]["id"],
+        **repo,
+    )
+    await _wait_for_attempt(mcp, repo, run_id, attempt=3)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_delete_action_run", run=run_id, **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_actions_get_workflow_run", 404, run=run_id, **repo)
+
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_delete_repo_runner", runner_id=str(runner_id), **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_actions_get_repo_runner", 404, runner_id=str(runner_id), **repo)
+
+
+async def _wait_for_attempt(
+    mcp: McpSession, repo: dict[str, str], run_id: int, *, attempt: int
+) -> None:
+    """Wait until ``run_id`` reaches ``attempt`` and is completed again."""
+
+    async def done() -> bool:
+        run = (await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_get_workflow_run", run=run_id, **repo)).data
+        return bool(run["status"] == "completed" and run.get("run_attempt", 1) >= attempt)
+
+    assert await _wait_for(done, timeout=RUN_TIMEOUT), (
+        f"run {run_id} did not finish attempt {attempt}"
+    )
+
+
+async def test_runner_management_at_every_scope(mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance) -> None:
+    """Register one runner per scope (org, user, admin) and manage it through the tools."""
+    org = gitea.unique("it-runner")
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_org_create", status=201, body={"username": org})
+    try:
+        scopes: list[tuple[str, str, dict[str, str], str]] = [
+            ("org", "gitea_actions_org_create_runner_registration_token", {"org": org}, "org"),
+            ("user", "gitea_actions_user_create_runner_registration_token", {}, "user"),
+            ("admin", "gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token", {}, "admin"),
+        ]
+        for scope, token_tool, args, _ in scopes:
+            token = await mcp.ok(token_tool, **args)
+            suffix = f"{scope}-runner"
+            try:
+                container = start_runner(
+                    gitea, token.data["token"], suffix=suffix, label=f"aegis-{scope}"
+                )
+            except HarnessError as exc:
+                runner_unavailable(f"the {scope} runner could not be started: {exc}")
+                return
+            listing = (
+                "gitea_admin_get_runners"
+                if scope == "admin"
+                else (f"gitea_actions_get_{scope}_runners")
+            )
+            getter = (
+                "gitea_admin_get_runner"
+                if scope == "admin"
+                else (f"gitea_actions_get_{scope}_runner")
+            )
+            updater = (
+                "gitea_admin_update_runner"
+                if scope == "admin"
+                else (f"gitea_actions_update_{scope}_runner")
+            )
+            deleter = (
+                "gitea_admin_delete_runner"
+                if scope == "admin"
+                else (f"gitea_actions_delete_{scope}_runner")
+            )
+
+            async def registered(
+                listing: str = listing, args: dict[str, str] = args, container: str = container
+            ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+                runners = await mcp.ok(listing, **args)
+                entries = (
+                    runners.data["runners"] if isinstance(runners.data, dict) else runners.data
+                )
+                for entry in entries or []:
+                    if entry["name"] == container:
+                        found: dict[str, Any] = entry
+                        return found
+                return None
+
+            runner = await _wait_for(registered, timeout=RUNNER_ONLINE_TIMEOUT)
+            if not runner:
+                runner_unavailable(
+                    f"the {scope} runner did not register; log tail: {runner_logs(container, 15)}"
+                )
+                return
+            assert token.data["token"] not in runner_logs(container, 200)
+            got = await mcp.ok(getter, runner_id=str(runner["id"]), **args)
+            assert got.data["name"] == container
+            changed = await mcp.ok(
+                updater, runner_id=str(runner["id"]), body={"disabled": True}, **args
+            )
+            assert changed.data["disabled"] is True
+            await mcp.ok(deleter, runner_id=str(runner["id"]), **args)
+            await mcp.fail(getter, 404, runner_id=str(runner["id"]), **args)
+    finally:
+        drop_org(gitea, org)

tests/integration/test_scenario_admin_user.py

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+"""Scenarios: site administration, sudo, notifications, current-user features and packages."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import secrets
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RegularUser, RepoRef, drop_org, drop_user
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+
+def ssh_public_key() -> str:
+    """A fresh ed25519 public key in OpenSSH format (throwaway, the private half is dropped)."""
+    key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
+    raw = key.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.OpenSSH, serialization.PublicFormat.OpenSSH)
+    return raw.decode("ascii")
+
+
+def logins(items: Any, key: str = "login") -> list[str]:
+    """The ``key`` member of every dict in a list result."""
+    return [item[key] for item in items]
+
+
+# Cron tasks that are safe to trigger on a throwaway instance.
+SAFE_CRON_TASKS = ("cleanup_hook_task_table", "cleanup_expired_actions_assets", "check_repo_stats")
+
+
+async def test_admin_manages_users_orgs_keys_and_cron(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    # fresh_repo makes sure the repository root exists (the unadopted scan needs it).
+    login = gitea.unique("it-adm")
+    org = gitea.unique("it-adm-org")
+    email = f"{login}@example.test"
+    try:
+        created = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_admin_create_user",
+            status=201,
+            body={
+                "username": login,
+                "email": email,
+                "password": secrets.token_urlsafe(18),
+                "must_change_password": False,
+            },
+        )
+        assert created.data["login"] == login
+        edited = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_admin_edit_user",
+            username=login,
+            body={"source_id": 0, "login_name": login, "full_name": "Integration User"},
+        )
+        assert edited.data["full_name"] == "Integration User"
+
+        found = await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_search_users", q=login)
+        assert login in logins(found.data)
+        assert email in logins(
+            (await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_get_all_emails")).data, "email"
+        ) or email in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_search_emails", q=login)).data, "email")
+
+        # SSH key for the user, listed as the user, then removed.
+        key = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_admin_create_public_key",
+            status=201,
+            username=login,
+            body={"title": "it key", "key": ssh_public_key()},
+        )
+        listed = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_keys", username=login)
+        assert key.data["id"] in [item["id"] for item in listed.data]
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_delete_user_public_key", username=login, id=key.data["id"])
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_keys", username=login)).data == []
+
+        # An organization created on behalf of the user.
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_create_org", status=201, username=login, body={"username": org})
+        assert org in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_get_all_orgs")).data, "name")
+        assert org in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_orgs", username=login)).data, "name")
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_org_delete", org=org)
+
+        # Cron: list the tasks and run one safe task.
+        tasks = await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_cron_list")
+        task_names = logins(tasks.data, "name")
+        assert task_names
+        chosen = next((name for name in SAFE_CRON_TASKS if name in task_names), task_names[0])
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_cron_run", task=chosen)
+
+        # Unadopted repositories and runner registration token.
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_unadopted_list")
+        token = await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token", status=(200, 201))
+        assert isinstance(token.data["token"], str) and token.data["token"]
+        assert await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_get_runners")
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_admin_delete_user", username=login, purge=True)
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_user_get", 404, username=login)
+    finally:
+        drop_org(gitea, org)
+        drop_user(gitea, login)
+
+
+async def test_sudo_acts_as_the_named_user(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser
+) -> None:
+    me = regular_user.login
+    plain = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_current")
+    assert plain.data["login"] == gitea.admin_login
+    assert plain.identity == {"login": gitea.admin_login, "mode": "admin-token", "sudo": None}
+
+    sudoed = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_current", sudo=me)
+    assert sudoed.data["login"] == me
+    assert sudoed.identity["sudo"] == me
+    assert sudoed.identity["login"] == gitea.admin_login
+
+    repo = gitea.unique("sudo-repo")
+    try:
+        made = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_user_current_create_repo", status=201, sudo=me, body={"name": repo}
+        )
+        assert made.data["owner"]["login"] == me
+        assert gitea.api("GET", f"/repos/{me}/{repo}").status_code == 200
+    finally:
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{me}/{repo}")
+
+    # The audit log records who acted and who they acted as.
+    entries = [e for e in mcp.audit_entries() if e.get("sudo") == me]
+    assert {e["tool_name"] for e in entries} == {
+        "gitea_user_get_current",
+        "gitea_user_current_create_repo",
+    }
+    assert all(e["identity_login"] == gitea.admin_login for e in entries)
+    assert all(e["identity_mode"] == "admin-token" for e in entries)
+
+
+async def test_notifications_list_and_mark_read(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    # A second user assigns the admin to a new issue, which notifies the admin.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_add_collaborator",
+        collaborator=regular_user.login,
+        body={"permission": "write"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_create_issue",
+        status=201,
+        sudo=regular_user.login,
+        body={"title": "Ping", "assignees": [gitea.admin_login]},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 30
+    notices: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline and not notices:
+        notices = (await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_get_list", **{"status-types": ["unread"]})).data
+        if not notices:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    assert notices, "no notification arrived within 30 seconds"
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_new_available")).data["new"] >= 1
+    repo_list = await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_get_repo_list", **repo)
+    assert repo_list.data
+
+    thread_id = str(notices[0]["id"])
+    thread = await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_get_thread", id=thread_id)
+    assert thread.data["unread"] is True
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_read_thread", status=(200, 205), id=thread_id)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_get_thread", id=thread_id)).data["unread"] is False
+
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_read_list", status=(200, 205))
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_notification_get_list", **{"status-types": ["unread"]})).data == []
+
+
+async def test_current_user_features(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    other = regular_user.login
+    me = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_current")
+    assert me.data["is_admin"] is True
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get", username=other)).data["login"] == other
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_settings")).data is not None
+
+    # Email addresses.
+    address = f"extra-{secrets.token_hex(3)}@example.test"
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_add_email", status=201, body={"emails": [address]})
+    assert address in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_emails")).data, "email")
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_delete_email", body={"emails": [address]})
+    assert address not in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_emails")).data, "email")
+
+    # SSH keys and GPG keys.
+    key = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_user_current_post_key",
+        status=201,
+        body={"title": "it key", "key": ssh_public_key()},
+    )
+    key_id = key.data["id"]
+    assert key_id in [k["id"] for k in (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_list_keys")).data]
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_get_key", id=key_id)).data["title"] == "it key"
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_delete_key", id=key_id)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_list_gpg_keys")).data == []
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_gpg_keys", username=other)).data == []
+
+    # Follow and unfollow.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_put_follow", username=other)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_check_following", username=other)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_check_following", username=gitea.admin_login, target=other)
+    assert other in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_list_following")).data)
+    assert gitea.admin_login in logins(
+        (await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_followers", username=other)).data
+    )
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_delete_follow", username=other)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_user_current_check_following", 404, username=other)
+
+    # Block and unblock.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_block_user", username=other)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_check_user_block", username=other)
+    assert other in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_list_blocks")).data)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_unblock_user", username=other)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_user_check_user_block", 404, username=other)
+
+    # Starred and watched repositories.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_put_star", **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_check_starring", **repo)
+    assert fresh_repo.name in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_list_starred")).data, "name")
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_delete_star", **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_put_subscription", **repo)
+    watched = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_current_list_subscriptions")
+    assert fresh_repo.name in logins(watched.data, "name")
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete_subscription", **repo)
+
+    # Search.
+    assert other in logins((await mcp.ok("gitea_user_search", q=other)).data["data"])
+
+
+async def test_generic_package_roundtrip(mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance) -> None:
+    owner = gitea.admin_login
+    name = gitea.unique("it-pkg")
+    content = b"package bytes " + secrets.token_bytes(16)
+    upload = gitea.request(
+        "PUT", f"/api/packages/{owner}/generic/{name}/1.0.0/payload.bin", content=content
+    )
+    assert upload.status_code == 201, upload.text
+
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 15
+    listed: list[Any] = []
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline and not listed:
+        listed = (
+            await mcp.ok("gitea_package_list_packages", owner=owner, type="generic", q=name)
+        ).data
+        if not listed:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    assert [item["name"] for item in listed] == [name]
+    assert listed[0]["version"] == "1.0.0"
+
+    pkg = {"owner": owner, "type": "generic", "name": name}
+    got = await mcp.ok("gitea_package_get_package", version="1.0.0", **pkg)
+    assert got.data["name"] == name
+    files = await mcp.ok("gitea_package_list_package_files", version="1.0.0", **pkg)
+    assert [item["name"] for item in files.data] == ["payload.bin"]
+    assert files.data[0]["size"] == len(content)
+    latest = await mcp.ok("gitea_package_get_latest_package_version", **pkg)
+    assert latest.data["version"] == "1.0.0"
+    assert [
+        v["version"] for v in (await mcp.ok("gitea_package_list_package_versions", **pkg)).data
+    ] == ["1.0.0"]
+
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_package_delete_package_version", version="1.0.0", **pkg)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_package_get_package", 404, version="1.0.0", **pkg)

tests/integration/test_scenario_issue_pull.py

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+"""Scenarios: issues (labels, milestones, time tracking, reactions) and pull requests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import time
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RegularUser, RepoRef, b64
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+
+async def test_issue_lifecycle(
+    mcp: McpSession, regular_user: RegularUser, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    watcher = regular_user.login
+
+    issue = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_create_issue",
+        status=201,
+        body={"title": "Broken widget", "body": "It does not widget."},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    index = issue.data["number"]
+    assert issue.data["state"] == "open"
+
+    # Comments.
+    comment = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_create_comment", status=201, index=index, body={"body": "first"}, **repo
+    )
+    comment_id = comment.data["id"]
+    edited = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_edit_comment", id=comment_id, body={"body": "first, edited"}, **repo
+    )
+    assert edited.data["body"] == "first, edited"
+    comments = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_comments", index=index, **repo)
+    assert [item["body"] for item in comments.data] == ["first, edited"]
+
+    # Labels: create, add, remove.
+    label = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_create_label",
+        status=201,
+        body={"name": "bug", "color": "#d73a4a", "description": "something is broken"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    label_id = label.data["id"]
+    added = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_add_label", index=index, body={"labels": [label_id]}, **repo)
+    assert [item["name"] for item in added.data] == ["bug"]
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_labels", index=index, **repo)).data
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_remove_label", index=index, id=label_id, **repo)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_labels", index=index, **repo)).data == []
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_replace_labels", index=index, body={"labels": [label_id]}, **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_clear_labels", index=index, **repo)
+
+    # Milestone.
+    milestone = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_create_milestone", status=201, body={"title": "v1"}, **repo
+    )
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_edit_issue", index=index, body={"milestone": milestone.data["id"]}, **repo
+    )
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_issue", index=index, **repo)).data["milestone"][
+        "title"
+    ] == "v1"
+
+    # Pin and unpin.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_pin_issue", index=index, **repo)
+    pinned = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_list_pinned_issues", **repo)
+    assert [item["number"] for item in pinned.data] == [index]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_unpin_issue", index=index, **repo)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_list_pinned_issues", **repo)).data == []
+
+    # Subscriptions.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_add_subscription", status=(200, 201), index=index, user=watcher, **repo
+    )
+    subscribers = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_subscriptions", index=index, **repo)
+    assert watcher in [item["login"] for item in subscribers.data]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_subscription", index=index, user=watcher, **repo)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_subscriptions", index=index, **repo)).data == []
+
+    # Time tracking and the stopwatch.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_add_time", index=index, body={"time": 3600}, **repo)
+    times = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_tracked_times", index=index, **repo)
+    assert [item["time"] for item in times.data] == [3600]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_time", index=index, id=times.data[0]["id"], **repo)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_tracked_times", index=index, **repo)).data == []
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_start_stopwatch", status=201, index=index, **repo)
+    running = await mcp.ok("gitea_user_get_stopwatches")
+    assert index in [item["issue_index"] for item in running.data]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_stop_stopwatch", status=201, index=index, **repo)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_tracked_times", index=index, **repo)).data
+
+    # Reactions.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_issue_post_issue_reaction",
+        status=(200, 201),
+        index=index,
+        body={"content": "+1"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    reactions = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_issue_reactions", index=index, **repo)
+    assert [item["content"] for item in reactions.data] == ["+1"]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_issue_reaction", index=index, body={"content": "+1"}, **repo)
+
+    # Search finds the issue (indexing is asynchronous, so poll briefly).
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 20
+    hits: list[int] = []
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline and index not in hits:
+        found = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_list_issues", q="widget", **repo)
+        hits = [item["number"] for item in found.data]
+        if index not in hits:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    assert index in hits
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_search_issues", q="Broken widget")).data is not None
+
+    # Close.
+    closed = await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_edit_issue", index=index, body={"state": "closed"}, **repo)
+    assert closed.data["state"] == "closed"
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_get_issue", index=index, **repo)).data["state"] == "closed"
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_comment", id=comment_id, **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_label", id=label_id, **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_issue_delete_milestone", id=str(milestone.data["id"]), **repo)
+
+
+async def test_pull_request_review_and_merge(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    reviewer = regular_user.login
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_add_collaborator",
+        collaborator=reviewer,
+        body={"permission": "write"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    try:
+        # A branch with a change, pushed through the contents API.
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_repo_create_branch",
+            status=201,
+            body={"new_branch_name": "feat/greeting", "old_branch_name": "main"},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_repo_create_file",
+            status=201,
+            filepath="greeting.txt",
+            body={
+                "content": b64("hello pull request\n"),
+                "message": "add greeting",
+                "branch": "feat/greeting",
+            },
+            **repo,
+        )
+        pull = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_create_pull_request",
+            status=201,
+            body={"title": "Add greeting", "base": "main", "head": "feat/greeting"},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        index = pull.data["number"]
+        assert pull.data["state"] == "open"
+        assert not pull.data["merged"]
+
+        files = await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_get_pull_request_files", index=index, **repo)
+        assert [item["filename"] for item in files.data] == ["greeting.txt"]
+        commits = await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_get_pull_request_commits", index=index, **repo)
+        assert len(commits.data) == 1
+
+        diff = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_download_pull_diff_or_patch", index=index, diffType="diff", **repo
+        )
+        assert isinstance(diff.data, str)
+        assert "+hello pull request" in diff.data
+
+        # Requested reviewer, then a pending review with an inline comment (as the
+        # reviewer, through sudo), submitted as an approval.
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_create_pull_review_requests",
+            status=201,
+            index=index,
+            body={"reviewers": [reviewer]},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        pending = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_create_pull_review",
+            sudo=reviewer,
+            index=index,
+            body={
+                "body": "looks fine",
+                "comments": [{"path": "greeting.txt", "new_position": 1, "body": "nice"}],
+            },
+            **repo,
+        )
+        assert pending.identity["sudo"] == reviewer
+        review_id = pending.data["id"]
+        assert pending.data["state"] == "PENDING"
+        submitted = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_submit_pull_review",
+            sudo=reviewer,
+            index=index,
+            id=review_id,
+            body={"event": "APPROVED", "body": "approved"},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        assert submitted.data["state"] == "APPROVED"
+        reviews = await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_list_pull_reviews", index=index, **repo)
+        assert "APPROVED" in [item["state"] for item in reviews.data]
+        comments = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_pull_get_pull_review_comments", index=index, id=review_id, **repo
+        )
+        assert [item["body"] for item in comments.data] == ["nice"]
+
+        # Not merged yet, then merged.
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_pull_pull_request_is_merged", 404, index=index, **repo)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_merge_pull_request", index=index, body={"do": "merge"}, **repo)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_pull_request_is_merged", index=index, **repo)
+        merged = await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_get_pull_request", index=index, **repo)
+        assert merged.data["merged"] is True
+        assert merged.data["state"] == "closed"
+        readme = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_contents", filepath="greeting.txt", **repo)
+        assert readme.data["path"] == "greeting.txt"
+
+        # The merge commit resolves back to the pull request.
+        merge_sha = merged.data["merge_commit_sha"]
+        by_commit = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_commit_pull_request", sha=merge_sha, **repo)
+        assert by_commit.data["number"] == index
+
+        # Merging it again is refused with the documented status, not silently accepted.
+        again = await mcp.fail(
+            "gitea_pull_merge_pull_request", 405, index=index, body={"do": "merge"}, **repo
+        )
+        assert again.error_kind == "method_not_allowed"
+        assert "already merged" in again.payload["error"]["message"]
+    finally:
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{fresh_repo.owner}/{fresh_repo.name}/collaborators/{reviewer}")
+
+
+async def test_scheduled_auto_merge_can_be_cancelled(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    """A required status check that is still pending turns the merge into a scheduled one."""
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_branch",
+        status=201,
+        body={"new_branch_name": "feat/auto", "old_branch_name": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_file",
+        status=201,
+        filepath="auto.txt",
+        body={"content": b64("auto\n"), "message": "add auto", "branch": "feat/auto"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_branch_protection",
+        status=201,
+        body={
+            "rule_name": "main",
+            "enable_status_check": True,
+            "status_check_contexts": ["ci/required"],
+        },
+        **repo,
+    )
+    pull = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_pull_create_pull_request",
+        status=201,
+        body={"title": "Auto merge", "base": "main", "head": "feat/auto"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    index = pull.data["number"]
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_status",
+        status=201,
+        sha=pull.data["head"]["sha"],
+        body={"state": "pending", "context": "ci/required"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    scheduled = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_pull_merge_pull_request",
+        status=201,
+        index=index,
+        body={"do": "merge", "merge_when_checks_succeed": True},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert scheduled.status == 201  # scheduled, not merged
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_get_pull_request", index=index, **repo)).data[
+        "merged"
+    ] is False
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_pull_cancel_scheduled_auto_merge", index=index, **repo)
+    # Nothing is scheduled any more.
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_pull_cancel_scheduled_auto_merge", 404, index=index, **repo)

tests/integration/test_scenario_org_repo.py

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+"""Scenarios: organizations, teams and repositories, driven through the MCP server."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import base64
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import (
+    McpSession,
+    RegularUser,
+    RepoRef,
+    b64,
+    drop_org,
+    drop_user,
+)
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+
+def names(items: Any, key: str = "name") -> list[str]:
+    """The ``key`` member of every dict in a list result."""
+    return [item[key] for item in items]
+
+
+async def test_org_and_team_lifecycle(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser
+) -> None:
+    org = gitea.unique("it-org")
+    repo = gitea.unique("team-repo")
+    try:
+        created = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_org_create", status=201, body={"username": org, "visibility": "public"}
+        )
+        assert created.data["name"] == org
+
+        fetched = await mcp.ok("gitea_org_get", org=org)
+        assert fetched.data["name"] == org
+
+        team = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_team_create_team",
+            status=201,
+            org=org,
+            body={
+                "name": "devs",
+                "permission": "write",
+                "includes_all_repositories": False,
+                "units": ["repo.code", "repo.issues", "repo.pulls"],
+            },
+        )
+        team_id = team.data["id"]
+        assert team.data["name"] == "devs"
+
+        listed = await mcp.ok("gitea_team_list_teams", org=org)
+        assert {"devs", "Owners"} <= set(names(listed.data))
+        found = await mcp.ok("gitea_team_search", org=org, q="dev")
+        assert "devs" in names(found.data["data"])
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_add_team_member", id=team_id, username=regular_user.login)
+        members = await mcp.ok("gitea_team_list_team_members", id=team_id)
+        assert regular_user.login in names(members.data, "login")
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_list_team_member", id=team_id, username=regular_user.login)
+        assert regular_user.login in names(
+            (await mcp.ok("gitea_org_list_members", org=org)).data, "login"
+        )
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_org_create_org_repo", status=201, org=org, body={"name": repo})
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_add_team_repository", id=team_id, org=org, repo=repo)
+        repos = await mcp.ok("gitea_team_list_team_repos", id=team_id)
+        assert repo in names(repos.data)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_list_team_repo", id=team_id, org=org, repo=repo)
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_org_list_repos", org=org)).data
+
+        edited = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_team_edit_team", id=team_id, body={"name": "devs", "description": "the devs"}
+        )
+        assert edited.data["description"] == "the devs"
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_remove_team_repository", id=team_id, org=org, repo=repo)
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_team_list_team_repo", 404, id=team_id, org=org, repo=repo)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_remove_team_member", id=team_id, username=regular_user.login)
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_team_list_team_member", 404, id=team_id, username=regular_user.login)
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_team_delete_team", id=team_id)
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_team_get_team", 404, id=team_id)
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete", owner=org, repo=repo)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_org_delete", org=org)
+        await mcp.fail("gitea_org_get", 404, org=org)
+    finally:
+        drop_org(gitea, org)
+
+
+async def test_repo_files_branches_tags_and_topics(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    info = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", **repo)
+    assert info.data["full_name"] == fresh_repo.full
+    assert info.data["default_branch"] == "main"
+
+    # Files through the contents API: create, read, update, delete.
+    path = "docs/hello.txt"
+    created = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_file",
+        status=201,
+        filepath=path,
+        body={"content": b64("hello"), "message": "add hello", "branch": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert created.data["content"]["path"] == path
+    got = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_contents", filepath=path, **repo)
+    assert base64.b64decode(got.data["content"]) == b"hello"
+    sha = got.data["sha"]
+    updated = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_update_file",
+        filepath=path,
+        body={"content": b64("hello again"), "sha": sha, "message": "update hello"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    new_sha = updated.data["content"]["sha"]
+    assert new_sha != sha
+    raw = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_raw_file", filepath=path, **repo)
+    body = raw.data
+    if isinstance(body, dict):  # served as a binary type: base64 envelope
+        body = base64.b64decode(body["content_base64"]).decode("utf-8")
+    assert body == "hello again"
+    listing = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_contents_list", **repo)
+    assert "README.md" in names(listing.data)
+    deleted = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_delete_file",
+        filepath=path,
+        body={"sha": new_sha, "message": "remove hello"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert deleted.data["commit"]["message"].startswith("remove hello")
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_repo_get_contents", 404, filepath=path, **repo)
+
+    # Branches.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_branch",
+        status=201,
+        body={"new_branch_name": "feature", "old_branch_name": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert "feature" in names((await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_branches", **repo)).data)
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_branch", branch="feature", **repo)).data["name"] == (
+        "feature"
+    )
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete_branch", branch="feature", **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_repo_get_branch", 404, branch="feature", **repo)
+
+    # Tags.
+    tag = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_create_tag",
+        status=201,
+        body={"tag_name": "v0.1.0", "target": "main", "message": "first"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert tag.data["name"] == "v0.1.0"
+    assert "v0.1.0" in names((await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_tags", **repo)).data)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_tag", tag="v0.1.0", **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete_tag", tag="v0.1.0", **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_repo_get_tag", 404, tag="v0.1.0", **repo)
+
+    # Topics.
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_update_topics", body={"topics": ["aegis", "integration"]}, **repo)
+    assert set((await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_topics", **repo)).data["topics"]) == {
+        "aegis",
+        "integration",
+    }
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_add_topic", topic="extra", **repo)
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete_topic", topic="aegis", **repo)
+    assert set((await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_topics", **repo)).data["topics"]) == {
+        "integration",
+        "extra",
+    }
+
+    # Edit and read back.
+    edited = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_edit", body={"description": "edited by it"}, **repo)
+    assert edited.data["description"] == "edited by it"
+
+
+async def test_repo_collaborators_fork_transfer_archive_search(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    me = regular_user.login
+
+    # Collaborators.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_repo_add_collaborator", collaborator=me, body={"permission": "write"}, **repo
+    )
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_check_collaborator", collaborator=me, **repo)
+    assert me in names((await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_collaborators", **repo)).data, "login")
+    permission = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_repo_permissions", collaborator=me, **repo)
+    assert permission.data["permission"] == "write"
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete_collaborator", collaborator=me, **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_repo_check_collaborator", 404, collaborator=me, **repo)
+
+    # Archive: a binary envelope (base64, content type, size).
+    archive = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get_archive", archive="main.zip", **repo)
+    blob = base64.b64decode(archive.data["content_base64"])
+    assert blob.startswith(b"PK")
+    assert archive.data["size"] == len(blob)
+    assert archive.data["content_type"].startswith("application/")
+
+    # Search finds the repository by name.
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 15
+    found: list[str] = []
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline and fresh_repo.name not in found:
+        search = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_search", q=fresh_repo.name)
+        found = names(search.data["data"])
+        if fresh_repo.name not in found:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    assert fresh_repo.name in found
+
+    # Fork as another user (admin sudo), then list forks.
+    fork = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_create_fork", status=(201, 202), sudo=me, body={}, **repo)
+    assert fork.identity["sudo"] == me
+    assert fork.data["owner"]["login"] == me
+    forks = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_list_forks", **repo)
+    assert me in [item["owner"]["login"] for item in forks.data]
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_delete", owner=me, repo=fresh_repo.name)
+
+    # Transfer to an organization created for the purpose.
+    org = gitea.unique("it-xfer")
+    try:
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_org_create", status=201, body={"username": org})
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_transfer", status=(201, 202), body={"new_owner": org}, **repo)
+        moved = await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=org, repo=fresh_repo.name)
+        assert moved.data["owner"]["login"] == org
+        # Gitea redirects the old path to the new owner; redirects are never followed.
+        redirected = await mcp.fail("gitea_repo_get", 301, **repo)
+        assert redirected.error_kind == "redirect"
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_edit", owner=org, repo=fresh_repo.name, body={"archived": True})
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=org, repo=fresh_repo.name)).data["archived"]
+    finally:
+        drop_org(gitea, org)
+
+
+async def test_repository_transfer_accept_and_reject(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser
+) -> None:
+    """A transfer started by a non-admin stays pending until the receiving user answers it."""
+    owner = regular_user.login
+    recipient, _ = gitea.create_user(gitea.unique("it-recv"))
+    accepted = gitea.unique("it-xfer-ok")
+    rejected = gitea.unique("it-xfer-no")
+    gitea.create_repo(owner, accepted)
+    gitea.create_repo(owner, rejected)
+    try:
+        for name in (accepted, rejected):
+            # Started by the owner (through sudo): not an admin, so Gitea keeps the
+            # transfer pending (answering 201 although the swagger lists 202).
+            await mcp.ok(
+                "gitea_repo_transfer",
+                status=(201, 202),
+                sudo=owner,
+                owner=owner,
+                repo=name,
+                body={"new_owner": recipient},
+            )
+            # Still the owner's repository until the recipient answers.
+            assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=owner, repo=name)).data["owner"][
+                "login"
+            ] == owner
+        took = await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_repo_accept_repo_transfer",
+            status=202,
+            sudo=recipient,
+            owner=owner,
+            repo=accepted,
+        )
+        assert took.identity["sudo"] == recipient
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=recipient, repo=accepted)).data["owner"][
+            "login"
+        ] == recipient
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_reject_repo_transfer", sudo=recipient, owner=owner, repo=rejected)
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_repo_get", owner=owner, repo=rejected)).data["owner"][
+            "login"
+        ] == owner
+        # The transfer is gone: answering it again finds nothing.
+        await mcp.fail(
+            "gitea_repo_accept_repo_transfer", 404, sudo=recipient, owner=owner, repo=rejected
+        )
+    finally:
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{owner}/{rejected}")
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{owner}/{accepted}")
+        gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{recipient}/{accepted}")
+        drop_user(gitea, recipient)

tests/integration/test_scenario_release_hooks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+"""Scenarios: releases and attachments, Action secrets and variables, webhooks."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RepoRef, b64, drop_org
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+HOOK_CONFIG = {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9/hook", "content_type": "json"}
+
+
+async def test_release_with_attachment(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    release = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_create_release",
+        status=201,
+        body={
+            "tag_name": "v1.0.0",
+            "target_commitish": "main",
+            "name": "One point oh",
+            "body": "first release",
+        },
+        **repo,
+    )
+    release_id = release.data["id"]
+    assert release.data["tag_name"] == "v1.0.0"
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_release_get_latest_release", **repo)).data["id"] == release_id
+    assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_release_get_release_by_tag", tag="v1.0.0", **repo)).data["id"] == (
+        release_id
+    )
+
+    # Upload an attachment through the file argument (base64), then list and download it.
+    payload = b"release asset " + secrets.token_bytes(24)
+    asset = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_create_release_attachment",
+        status=201,
+        id=release_id,
+        name="notes.bin",
+        attachment={
+            "filename": "notes.bin",
+            "content_base64": b64(payload),
+            "content_type": "application/octet-stream",
+        },
+        **repo,
+    )
+    attachment_id = asset.data["id"]
+    assert asset.data["name"] == "notes.bin"
+    assert asset.data["size"] == len(payload)
+    listed = await mcp.ok("gitea_release_list_release_attachments", id=release_id, **repo)
+    assert [item["name"] for item in listed.data] == ["notes.bin"]
+    meta = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_get_release_attachment", id=release_id, attachment_id=attachment_id, **repo
+    )
+    download = gitea.request("GET", meta.data["browser_download_url"].removeprefix(gitea.base_url))
+    assert download.status_code == 200
+    assert download.content == payload
+
+    renamed = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_edit_release_attachment",
+        status=(200, 201),
+        id=release_id,
+        attachment_id=attachment_id,
+        body={"name": "renamed.bin"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert renamed.data["name"] == "renamed.bin"
+    edited = await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_edit_release",
+        id=release_id,
+        body={"name": "Renamed", "draft": False},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert edited.data["name"] == "Renamed"
+    assert [r["id"] for r in (await mcp.ok("gitea_release_list_releases", **repo)).data] == [
+        release_id
+    ]
+
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_delete_release_attachment",
+        id=release_id,
+        attachment_id=attachment_id,
+        **repo,
+    )
+    assert (
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_release_list_release_attachments", id=release_id, **repo)
+    ).data == []
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_release_delete_release", id=release_id, **repo)
+    await mcp.fail("gitea_release_get_release", 404, id=release_id, **repo)
+
+    # A second release is removed through its tag.
+    await mcp.ok(
+        "gitea_release_create_release",
+        status=201,
+        body={"tag_name": "v1.1.0", "target_commitish": "main"},
+        **repo,
+    )
+    await mcp.ok("gitea_release_delete_release_by_tag", tag="v1.1.0", **repo)
+
+
+def _names(result: Any) -> list[str]:
+    return [item["name"] for item in result.data]
+
+
+async def test_secrets_and_variables_never_leak_values(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef
+) -> None:
+    repo = fresh_repo.args
+    org = gitea.unique("it-secrets")
+    values = [f"S3cr3t-{secrets.token_hex(12)}" for _ in range(4)]
+    repo_secret, org_secret, user_secret, probe = values
+    try:
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_org_create", status=201, body={"username": org})
+
+        # Repository, organization and user-level secrets: set, list (names only), delete.
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret",
+            secretname="REPO_KEY",
+            body={"data": repo_secret, "description": "repo key"},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret",
+            secretname="REPO_KEY",
+            body={"data": repo_secret + "x"},
+            **repo,
+        )
+        listed = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets", **repo)
+        assert _names(listed) == ["REPO_KEY"]
+        assert set(listed.data[0]) <= {"name", "description", "created_at"}
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_actions_update_org_secret",
+            org=org,
+            secretname="ORG_KEY",
+            body={"data": org_secret},
+        )
+        org_listed = await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_org_list_secrets", org=org)
+        assert _names(org_listed) == ["ORG_KEY"]
+        assert set(org_listed.data[0]) <= {"name", "description", "created_at"}
+        await mcp.ok(
+            "gitea_actions_update_user_secret", secretname="USER_KEY", body={"data": user_secret}
+        )
+
+        # A failing call carrying a secret must not echo it either.
+        denied = await mcp.fail(
+            "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret",
+            404,
+            owner=gitea.admin_login,
+            repo="does-not-exist-" + secrets.token_hex(3),
+            secretname="NOPE",
+            body={"data": probe},
+        )
+        assert probe not in denied.text
+
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_delete_repo_secret", secretname="REPO_KEY", **repo)
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_delete_org_secret", org=org, secretname="ORG_KEY")
+        await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_delete_user_secret", secretname="USER_KEY")
+        assert (await mcp.ok("gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets", **repo)).data == []
+
+        # Variables are not secret: create, get, update, list, delete at every level.
+        scopes: list[tuple[str, dict[str, str]]] = [
+            ("repo", repo),
+            ("org", {"org": org}),
+            ("user", {}),
+        ]
+        for level, scope in scopes:
+            create = f"gitea_actions_create_{level}_variable"
+            await mcp.ok(
+                create,
+                status=(200, 201, 204),
+                variablename="GREETING",
+                body={"value": "one"},
+                **scope,
+            )
+            got = await mcp.ok(
+                f"gitea_actions_get_{level}_variable", variablename="GREETING", **scope
+            )
+            assert got.data["data"] == "one"
+            await mcp.ok(
+                f"gitea_actions_update_{level}_variable",
+                variablename="GREETING",
+                body={"value": "two"},
+                **scope,
+            )
+            changed = await mcp.ok(
+                f"gitea_actions_get_{level}_variable", variablename="GREETING", **scope
+            )
+            assert changed.data["data"] == "two"
+            names = await mcp.ok(f"gitea_actions_get_{level}_variables_list", **scope)
+            assert "GREETING" in _names(names)
+            await mcp.ok(f"gitea_actions_delete_{level}_variable", variablename="GREETING", **scope)
+            await mcp.fail(
+                f"gitea_actions_get_{level}_variable", 404, variablename="GREETING", **scope
+            )
+    finally:
+        drop_org(gitea, org)
+        gitea.api("DELETE", "/user/actions/secrets/USER_KEY")
+
+    # No secret value in any tool result, and none in the audit log.
+    for value in values:
+        assert all(value not in text for text in mcp.texts)
+        assert value not in mcp.audit_text()
+    audited = [entry["tool_name"] for entry in mcp.audit_entries()]
+    assert "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret" in audited
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("level", ["repo", "org", "user", "admin"])
+async def test_webhook_lifecycle(
+    mcp: McpSession, gitea: GiteaInstance, fresh_repo: RepoRef, level: str
+) -> None:
+    org = gitea.unique("it-hooks")
+    scope: dict[str, str] = {}
+    prefix = f"gitea_hook_{level}"
+    try:
+        if level == "repo":
+            scope = fresh_repo.args
+        elif level == "org":
+            await mcp.ok("gitea_org_create", status=201, body={"username": org})
+            scope = {"org": org}
+        if level == "admin":
+            create, get, listing, edit, delete = (
+                "gitea_admin_create_hook",
+                "gitea_admin_get_hook",
+                "gitea_admin_list_hooks",
+                "gitea_admin_edit_hook",
+                "gitea_admin_delete_hook",
+            )
+        else:
+            create, get, listing, edit, delete = (
+                f"{prefix}_create_hook",
+                f"{prefix}_get_hook",
+                f"{prefix}_list_hooks",
+                f"{prefix}_edit_hook",
+                f"{prefix}_delete_hook",
+            )
+        # The signing secret and the Authorization header are credentials: neither may come
+        # back in any result or reach the audit log (Gitea itself omits the secret).
+        secret = f"hook-secret-{secrets.token_hex(12)}"
+        header = f"Bearer hook-auth-{secrets.token_hex(12)}"
+        config = {**HOOK_CONFIG, "secret": secret, "authorization_header": header}
+        hook = await mcp.ok(
+            create,
+            status=201,
+            body={"type": "gitea", "config": config, "events": ["push"], "active": True},
+            **scope,
+        )
+        hook_id = hook.data["id"]
+        assert hook.data["type"] == "gitea"
+        # Hooks created through /admin/hooks count as "default" hooks, so list both kinds.
+        query = {"type": "all"} if level == "admin" else {}
+        hooks = await mcp.ok(listing, **scope, **query)
+        assert hook_id in [item["id"] for item in hooks.data]
+        assert (await mcp.ok(get, id=hook_id, **scope)).data["config"]["url"] == HOOK_CONFIG["url"]
+        edited = await mcp.ok(
+            edit,
+            id=hook_id,
+            body={"active": False, "events": ["push", "issues"], "config": config},
+            **scope,
+        )
+        assert edited.data["active"] is False
+        assert "issues" in edited.data["events"]
+        if level == "repo":
+            await mcp.ok("gitea_hook_repo_test_hook", id=hook_id, **scope)
+        await mcp.ok(delete, id=hook_id, **scope)
+        await mcp.fail(get, 404, id=hook_id, **scope)
+        for credential in (secret, header, header.removeprefix("Bearer ")):
+            assert all(credential not in text for text in mcp.texts), "a webhook credential leaked"
+            assert credential not in mcp.audit_text(), "a webhook credential reached the audit log"
+    finally:
+        if level == "org":
+            drop_org(gitea, org)

tests/integration/test_setup_live.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""The ``aegis-gitea-mcp setup`` command against the live instance."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.setup_cmd import OAUTH_APP_NAME, parse_env_text
+from tests.integration.conftest import RegularUser
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+
+PUBLIC_URL = "https://mcp.example.test"
+REDIRECT_URI = f"{PUBLIC_URL}/oauth/callback"
+SECRET_KEYS = (
+    "GITEA_TOKEN",
+    "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN",
+    "TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
+    "GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET",
+)
+_PASSTHROUGH_ENV = ("PATH", "HOME", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "TMPDIR")
+
+
+def run_setup(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, token: str, env_file: Path, cwd: Path
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    """Run the setup command in a subprocess; the Gitea token goes in the environment only."""
+    env = {name: os.environ[name] for name in _PASSTHROUGH_ENV if name in os.environ}
+    env["GITEA_TOKEN"] = token
+    return subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "aegis_gitea_mcp.cli",
+            "setup",
+            "--gitea-url",
+            gitea.base_url,
+            "--public-base-url",
+            PUBLIC_URL,
+            "--env-file",
+            str(env_file),
+            "--yes",
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=120,
+        check=False,
+        env=env,
+        cwd=cwd,
+    )
+
+
+def oauth_apps(gitea: GiteaInstance) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
+    """The admin's OAuth2 applications named like the one setup registers."""
+    response = gitea.api("GET", "/user/applications/oauth2", params={"limit": 50})
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    return [app for app in response.json() if app["name"] == OAUTH_APP_NAME]
+
+
+def read_env(path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Key/value pairs of an env file."""
+    return {key: entry.value for key, entry in parse_env_text(path.read_text("utf-8")).items()}
+
+
+def test_setup_registers_the_oauth_app_and_writes_a_private_env_file(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path
+) -> None:
+    env_file = tmp_path / ".env"
+    assert oauth_apps(gitea) == []
+
+    first = run_setup(gitea, gitea.admin_token, env_file, tmp_path)
+    assert first.returncode == 0, first.stderr
+    assert "setup failed" not in first.stderr
+
+    # The OAuth2 application exists with the callback of the public URL.
+    apps = oauth_apps(gitea)
+    assert len(apps) == 1
+    assert apps[0]["redirect_uris"] == [REDIRECT_URI]
+    assert apps[0]["confidential_client"] is True
+
+    # The env file is private, complete and loads without errors.
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(env_file.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    values = read_env(env_file)
+    assert values["GITEA_URL"] == gitea.base_url
+    assert values["PUBLIC_BASE_URL"] == PUBLIC_URL
+    assert values["OAUTH_ENABLED"] == "true"
+    assert values["GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID"] == apps[0]["client_id"]
+    settings = Settings(_env_file=str(env_file))  # type: ignore[call-arg]
+    assert settings.oauth_enabled
+    assert settings.oauth_config_errors() == []
+    assert settings.gitea_token is not None
+    assert settings.gitea_token.get_secret_value() == gitea.admin_token
+    assert settings.mcp_bearer_token is not None
+
+    # No secret value reaches stdout or stderr.
+    for key in SECRET_KEYS:
+        assert values[key], key
+        assert values[key] not in first.stdout, f"{key} leaked to stdout"
+        assert values[key] not in first.stderr, f"{key} leaked to stderr"
+    assert gitea.admin_token not in first.stdout + first.stderr
+
+    # Running it again is idempotent: same app, same secrets, no duplicate.
+    second = run_setup(gitea, gitea.admin_token, env_file, tmp_path)
+    assert second.returncode == 0, second.stderr
+    assert len(oauth_apps(gitea)) == 1
+    assert read_env(env_file) == values
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(env_file.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    for key in SECRET_KEYS:
+        assert values[key] not in second.stdout + second.stderr
+
+
+def test_setup_with_a_non_admin_token_fails_with_an_actionable_message(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser, tmp_path: Path
+) -> None:
+    env_file = tmp_path / "non-admin.env"
+    result = run_setup(gitea, regular_user.token, env_file, tmp_path)
+
+    assert result.returncode == 1
+    assert "not a site administrator" in result.stderr
+    assert "Generate New Token" in result.stderr
+    assert not env_file.exists()
+    assert regular_user.token not in result.stdout + result.stderr

tests/integration/test_sweep.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""The sweep: every tool is called at least once through the MCP server."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+
+import pytest
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import validate_audit_log_integrity
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.catalog import load_catalog
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, RegularUser
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+from tests.integration.sweep_plan import (
+    BASELINE_ENV,
+    EXCLUDED,
+    LOG,
+    RAW_TOOL,
+    compare_baseline,
+    failing,
+    load_baseline,
+    load_spec,
+    run_sweep,
+    summarize,
+    write_baseline,
+)
+from tests.integration.sweep_seed import Ctx, seed
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def sweep_context(gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser) -> Ctx:
+    """The seeded resources the sweep's arguments point at."""
+    return seed(gitea, regular_user.login, regular_user.token)
+
+
+async def test_every_tool_reaches_gitea(
+    mcp: McpSession, sweep_context: Ctx, gitea: GiteaInstance, regular_user: RegularUser
+) -> None:
+    catalog = load_catalog()
+    listed = {tool.name for tool in (await mcp.client.list_tools()).tools}
+    expected = {op.tool_name for op in catalog.operations} | {RAW_TOOL}
+    assert listed == expected
+    assert len(expected) == 538
+
+    records = await run_sweep(mcp.call, catalog, load_spec(), sweep_context)
+    LOG.sweep = records
+
+    called = [record.tool for record in records]
+    assert len(called) == len(set(called)), "a tool was called twice"
+    assert set(called) == expected - set(EXCLUDED), "tools missing from the sweep"
+
+    bad = failing(records)
+    summary = summarize(records)
+    report = "\n".join(
+        f"  {r.tool}: status={r.status} kind={r.kind} {r.method} {r.path} :: {r.message}"
+        for r in bad
+    )
+    assert not bad, f"{len(bad)} tool(s) with an unexpected result ({summary}):\n{report}"
+
+    # The pinned outcome per tool: an argument or path regression cannot hide behind a
+    # documented 404, because a 2xx that turns into any other status fails here.
+    if os.environ.get(BASELINE_ENV) == "1":
+        write_baseline(records, load_catalog().spec_version)
+    else:
+        diff = compare_baseline(records, load_baseline())
+        if diff.upgrades:
+            print(
+                f"\n{len(diff.upgrades)} tool(s) improved on the baseline; refresh it with "
+                f"{BASELINE_ENV}=1:\n  " + "\n  ".join(diff.upgrades)
+            )
+        assert not diff.regressions, (
+            f"{len(diff.regressions)} tool(s) differ from sweep_baseline.json "
+            f"(regenerate with {BASELINE_ENV}=1 only when the change is intended):\n  "
+            + "\n  ".join(diff.regressions)
+        )
+
+    # Whatever the 538 calls did, no credential or secret value came back in a result.
+    hidden = [
+        gitea.admin_token,
+        gitea.admin_password,
+        regular_user.token,
+        regular_user.password,
+        "rotated-org-value",
+        "rotated-repo-value",
+        "rotated-user-value",
+        "org-secret-value",
+        "repo-secret-value",
+        "user-secret-value",
+    ]
+    for value in hidden:
+        assert all(value not in text for text in mcp.texts), "a secret leaked into a result"
+        assert value not in mcp.audit_text(), "a secret leaked into the audit log"
+
+    # One audit entry per call, and the hash chain over all of them is intact.
+    assert len(mcp.audit_entries()) == len(records)
+    valid, errors = validate_audit_log_integrity(mcp.audit_path)
+    assert valid, errors[:3]

tests/integration/test_sweep_isolated.py

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+"""Tools the generic sweep must not call because they would break the run itself."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from mcp import Client
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import build_server
+from tests.integration.conftest import McpSession, integration_settings
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+from tests.integration.sweep_plan import EXCLUDED
+
+
+async def test_delete_current_token_deletes_only_a_throwaway_token(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    assert set(EXCLUDED) == {"gitea_misc_delete_current_token"}
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", gitea.base_url)
+    throwaway = gitea.mint_token(gitea.admin_login, gitea.admin_password, ["all"])
+    settings = integration_settings(gitea, tmp_path / "state", gitea_token=throwaway)
+    audit = AuditLogger(settings.resolved_audit_log_path)
+    try:
+        async with Client(build_server(settings, audit=audit)) as client:
+            session = McpSession(client, settings.resolved_audit_log_path)
+            current = await session.ok("gitea_misc_get_current_token")
+            assert "all" in current.data["scopes"]
+            assert gitea.api("GET", "/user", token=throwaway).status_code == 200
+
+            deleted = await session.ok("gitea_misc_delete_current_token")
+            assert deleted.data is None
+            assert throwaway not in session.audit_text()
+
+            # The token is gone: Gitea now refuses it, while the harness admin token lives on.
+            assert gitea.api("GET", "/user", token=throwaway).status_code == 401
+            assert gitea.api("GET", "/user").status_code == 200
+            again = await session.call("gitea_misc_get_current_token")
+            assert again.is_error and again.status == 401
+            assert throwaway not in again.text
+    finally:
+        audit.close()

tests/mcp/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Opt-in fixtures for the MCP smoke tests.
+
+Tests in this directory are marked ``mcp_smoke`` and skipped unless
+``AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1``. They reuse the live-Gitea harness from
+``tests/integration`` (one disposable Gitea per session, admin token with the
+``all`` scope) and drive the server through a real MCP client over stdio and
+streamable HTTP, from source and (when ``AEGIS_MCP_IMAGE`` is set) from the
+built image.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import secrets
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.integration.conftest import ENABLE_ENV, gitea, integration_enabled
+from tests.integration.harness import GITEA_PORT, GiteaInstance
+
+__all__ = ["ENABLE_ENV", "gitea"]
+
+_HERE = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
+IMAGE_ENV = "AEGIS_MCP_IMAGE"
+
+
+def pytest_configure(config: pytest.Config) -> None:
+    """Register the ``mcp_smoke`` marker (idempotent with pyproject)."""
+    config.addinivalue_line(
+        "markers", "mcp_smoke: MCP client smoke tests, opt-in via AEGIS_INTEGRATION=1"
+    )
+
+
+def _is_mcp_smoke(item: pytest.Item) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return _HERE in Path(str(item.path)).resolve().parents
+    except (OSError, ValueError):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return False
+
+
+def pytest_collection_modifyitems(config: pytest.Config, items: list[pytest.Item]) -> None:
+    """Mark and (unless opted in) skip every test under tests/mcp."""
+    selected = [item for item in items if _is_mcp_smoke(item)]
+    skip = pytest.mark.skip(reason=f"MCP smoke tests need {ENABLE_ENV}=1 and Docker")
+    for item in selected:
+        item.add_marker(pytest.mark.mcp_smoke)
+        if not integration_enabled():
+            item.add_marker(skip)
+    if selected and len(selected) == len(items):
+        # A smoke-only run starts the server in subprocesses, so the in-process
+        # coverage gate does not apply.
+        for namespace in (config.option, config.known_args_namespace):
+            if getattr(namespace, "cov_fail_under", None) is not None:
+                namespace.cov_fail_under = 0
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
+def gitea_internal_url(gitea: GiteaInstance) -> str:
+    """URL of the Gitea container for other containers on the harness network."""
+    return f"http://{gitea.container}:{GITEA_PORT}"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
+def mcp_image() -> str:
+    """The built image under test; the test is skipped when ``AEGIS_MCP_IMAGE`` is unset."""
+    image = os.environ.get(IMAGE_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not image:
+        pytest.skip(f"{IMAGE_ENV} is not set; image smoke tests need a built image")
+    return image
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def bearer_token() -> str:
+    """A random 48 character MCP bearer token."""
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(36)

tests/mcp/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+"""Shared helpers for the MCP smoke tests: client flows, subprocess and docker plumbing.
+
+Secrets (Gitea token, MCP bearer token) are always passed through environment
+variables, never through argv, and every captured stderr/stdout is checked for
+them by the tests.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import time
+from collections.abc import Iterator, Mapping, Sequence
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import httpx
+import mcp.types as types
+from mcp import Client
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.catalog import load_catalog
+from tests.integration.harness import NAME_PREFIX, GiteaInstance
+
+# Raw-protocol version used for the hand-driven stdio session (handshake era).
+RAW_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-11-25"
+SOURCE_SERVE_ARGS = [sys.executable, "-m", "aegis_gitea_mcp.cli", "serve"]
+HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
+RAW_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
+# Environment variables a child process needs to find its interpreter and docker.
+_PASSTHROUGH_ENV = (
+    "PATH",
+    "HOME",
+    "LANG",
+    "LC_ALL",
+    "TMPDIR",
+    "DOCKER_HOST",
+    "DOCKER_CONFIG",
+    "DOCKER_CONTEXT",
+    "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR",
+)
+
+
+def expected_tool_count() -> int:
+    """Number of tools a full server exposes: every catalog operation plus the raw tool."""
+    return len(load_catalog().operations) + 1
+
+
+def unique_container_name() -> str:
+    """Return a unique ``aegis-it-mcp-<hex>`` container name."""
+    return f"{NAME_PREFIX}mcp-{secrets.token_hex(4)}"
+
+
+def free_loopback_port() -> int:
+    """Return a free TCP port on 127.0.0.1 (same approach as the Gitea harness)."""
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
+        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        return int(sock.getsockname()[1])
+
+
+def child_env(extra: Mapping[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Minimal environment for a child process: passthrough variables plus ``extra``."""
+    env = {name: os.environ[name] for name in _PASSTHROUGH_ENV if name in os.environ}
+    env.update(extra)
+    return env
+
+
+def server_env(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_url: str, data_dir: Path, **extra: str
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Server settings for a subprocess (``GITEA_TOKEN`` included, so keep it out of argv)."""
+    return child_env(
+        {
+            "GITEA_URL": gitea_url,
+            "GITEA_TOKEN": gitea.admin_token,
+            "DATA_DIR": str(data_dir),
+            "LOG_LEVEL": "DEBUG",
+            **extra,
+        }
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Client flows
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def result_text(result: types.CallToolResult) -> str:
+    """Return the text of the first content block of a tool result."""
+    assert result.content, "tool result has no content"
+    block = result.content[0]
+    assert isinstance(block, types.TextContent)
+    return block.text
+
+
+def result_payload(result: types.CallToolResult) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Parse the JSON envelope of a tool result."""
+    payload = json.loads(result_text(result))
+    assert isinstance(payload, dict)
+    return payload
+
+
+async def exercise_server(
+    client: Client, gitea: GiteaInstance, secrets_to_hide: Sequence[str]
+) -> None:
+    """List tools, run a read call and a write call (create then delete a repo).
+
+    Asserts the tool count, the identity in the envelope, that the repo really
+    existed on Gitea after creation and was gone after deletion, and that no
+    secret appears in any tool result.
+    """
+    listing = await client.list_tools()
+    names = {tool.name for tool in listing.tools}
+    assert len(listing.tools) == expected_tool_count()
+    assert {"gitea_user_get_current", "gitea_repo_delete", "gitea_api_request"} <= names
+
+    texts: list[str] = []
+
+    current = await client.call_tool("gitea_user_get_current", {})
+    texts.append(result_text(current))
+    assert not current.is_error
+    envelope = result_payload(current)
+    assert envelope["status"] == 200
+    assert envelope["identity"]["login"] == gitea.admin_login
+    assert envelope["identity"]["mode"] == "admin-token"
+    assert envelope["data"]["login"] == gitea.admin_login
+
+    repo = gitea.unique("mcp-smoke")
+    created = False
+    try:
+        create = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_user_current_create_repo",
+            {"body": {"name": repo, "auto_init": False, "private": True}},
+        )
+        texts.append(result_text(create))
+        assert not create.is_error, result_text(create)
+        created = True
+        assert result_payload(create)["status"] == 201
+        assert gitea.api("GET", f"/repos/{gitea.admin_login}/{repo}").status_code == 200
+
+        delete = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_repo_delete", {"owner": gitea.admin_login, "repo": repo}
+        )
+        texts.append(result_text(delete))
+        assert not delete.is_error, result_text(delete)
+        created = False
+        assert gitea.api("GET", f"/repos/{gitea.admin_login}/{repo}").status_code == 404
+    finally:
+        if created:
+            gitea.api("DELETE", f"/repos/{gitea.admin_login}/{repo}")
+
+    for secret in secrets_to_hide:
+        assert all(secret not in text for text in texts), "a secret leaked into a tool result"
+
+
+def assert_no_secrets(text: str, secrets_to_hide: Sequence[str], where: str) -> None:
+    """Fail when any secret appears in ``text`` (the message never prints the secret)."""
+    for index, secret in enumerate(secrets_to_hide):
+        assert secret not in text, f"secret #{index} found in {where}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Hand-driven stdio session (checks that stdout carries JSON-RPC only)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RawSession:
+    """Everything a hand-driven stdio run produced."""
+
+    stdout_lines: list[str]
+    stderr: str
+    returncode: int | None
+
+
+async def _read_response(stdout: asyncio.StreamReader, request_id: int, lines: list[str]) -> None:
+    """Read stdout lines until the response for ``request_id`` arrived (lines are recorded)."""
+    while True:
+        raw = await asyncio.wait_for(stdout.readline(), timeout=RAW_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        if not raw:
+            raise AssertionError("server closed stdout before answering")
+        line = raw.decode("utf-8").rstrip("\r\n")
+        lines.append(line)
+        message = json.loads(line)
+        if (
+            isinstance(message, dict)
+            and message.get("id") == request_id
+            and "method" not in message
+        ):
+            assert "result" in message, f"request {request_id} failed"
+            return
+
+
+async def run_raw_stdio(
+    argv: Sequence[str], env: Mapping[str, str], cwd: Path | None = None
+) -> RawSession:
+    """Start ``argv`` and run initialize + tools/list by hand, then close stdin.
+
+    Returns every stdout line the process wrote (so the caller can assert that
+    each one is a JSON-RPC message), its stderr and the exit code.
+    """
+    proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
+        *argv,
+        stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+        stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+        env=dict(env),
+        cwd=cwd,
+        limit=64 * 1024 * 1024,
+    )
+    assert proc.stdin is not None
+    assert proc.stdout is not None
+    assert proc.stderr is not None
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    stderr_task = asyncio.create_task(proc.stderr.read())
+    try:
+
+        async def send(message: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+            proc.stdin.write((json.dumps(message) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+            await proc.stdin.drain()  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+
+        await send(
+            {
+                "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+                "id": 1,
+                "method": "initialize",
+                "params": {
+                    "protocolVersion": RAW_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                    "capabilities": {},
+                    "clientInfo": {"name": "aegis-smoke", "version": "0"},
+                },
+            }
+        )
+        await _read_response(proc.stdout, 1, lines)
+        await send({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized"})
+        await send({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/list"})
+        await _read_response(proc.stdout, 2, lines)
+        proc.stdin.close()
+        rest = await asyncio.wait_for(proc.stdout.read(), timeout=30.0)
+        lines.extend(rest.decode("utf-8").splitlines())
+        await asyncio.wait_for(proc.wait(), timeout=30.0)
+    finally:
+        if proc.returncode is None:
+            with contextlib.suppress(ProcessLookupError):
+                proc.kill()
+            await proc.wait()
+    stderr = (await stderr_task).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    return RawSession(stdout_lines=lines, stderr=stderr, returncode=proc.returncode)
+
+
+def assert_jsonrpc_only(lines: Sequence[str]) -> None:
+    """Assert that every non-empty stdout line is a JSON-RPC 2.0 message."""
+    assert lines, "no output on stdout"
+    for line in lines:
+        if not line.strip():
+            continue
+        message = json.loads(line)
+        assert isinstance(message, dict) and message.get("jsonrpc") == "2.0"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# HTTP readiness
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def wait_for_health(
+    url: str, *, alive: Any = None, timeout: float = HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+) -> httpx.Response:
+    """Poll ``url`` until it answers 200 and return the response.
+
+    ``alive`` is an optional callable returning False when the server died, so
+    the wait fails fast instead of running into the timeout.
+    """
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    last = "no response"
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if alive is not None and not alive():
+            raise AssertionError("the server process exited before /health answered")
+        try:
+            response = httpx.get(url, timeout=3.0)
+            if response.status_code == 200:
+                return response
+            last = f"HTTP {response.status_code}"
+        except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+            last = type(exc).__name__
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+    raise AssertionError(f"{url} was not healthy within {timeout:.0f}s ({last})")
+
+
+def assert_rejects_without_valid_token(mcp_url: str, bearer_token: str) -> None:
+    """A missing and a wrong bearer token both get 401 (and the real token never echoes back)."""
+    initialize = {
+        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+        "id": 1,
+        "method": "initialize",
+        "params": {
+            "protocolVersion": RAW_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            "capabilities": {},
+            "clientInfo": {"name": "aegis-smoke", "version": "0"},
+        },
+    }
+    base = {"Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream"}
+    anonymous = httpx.post(mcp_url, json=initialize, headers=base, timeout=10.0)
+    assert anonymous.status_code == 401
+    wrong = httpx.post(
+        mcp_url,
+        json=initialize,
+        headers={**base, "Authorization": f"Bearer {secrets.token_urlsafe(36)}"},
+        timeout=10.0,
+    )
+    assert wrong.status_code == 401
+    assert bearer_token not in anonymous.text + wrong.text
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Source HTTP server
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass
+class HttpServer:
+    """A source-installed HTTP server subprocess."""
+
+    process: subprocess.Popen[bytes]
+    base_url: str
+    stderr_path: Path
+    stdout_path: Path
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_url(self) -> str:
+        """URL of the MCP endpoint."""
+        return f"{self.base_url}/mcp"
+
+    def alive(self) -> bool:
+        """Return True while the process is running."""
+        return self.process.poll() is None
+
+    def stderr_text(self) -> str:
+        """Return what the server wrote to stderr so far."""
+        return self.stderr_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+
+
+@contextlib.contextmanager
+def run_source_http_server(env: Mapping[str, str], workdir: Path) -> Iterator[HttpServer]:
+    """Run ``aegis-gitea-mcp serve --transport http`` on a free loopback port.
+
+    The working directory is an empty temp dir so no ambient ``.env`` is read.
+    Waits for ``/health`` and always stops the process afterwards.
+    """
+    port = free_loopback_port()
+    stderr_path = workdir / "server.stderr"
+    stdout_path = workdir / "server.stdout"
+    with stderr_path.open("wb") as err, stdout_path.open("wb") as out:
+        process = subprocess.Popen(  # noqa: S603
+            [
+                *SOURCE_SERVE_ARGS,
+                "--transport",
+                "http",
+                "--host",
+                "127.0.0.1",
+                "--port",
+                str(port),
+            ],
+            env=dict(env),
+            cwd=workdir,
+            stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stdout=out,
+            stderr=err,
+        )
+        server = HttpServer(
+            process=process,
+            base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}",
+            stderr_path=stderr_path,
+            stdout_path=stdout_path,
+        )
+        try:
+            wait_for_health(f"{server.base_url}/health", alive=server.alive)
+            yield server
+        finally:
+            process.terminate()
+            try:
+                process.wait(timeout=15)
+            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=15)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Docker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def docker(
+    *args: str,
+    env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    check: bool = True,
+    timeout: float = 120.0,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    """Run ``docker <args>``; ``env`` adds variables the CLI can forward with ``-e NAME``."""
+    full_env = {**os.environ, **(env or {})}
+    proc = subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603
+        ["docker", *args],  # noqa: S607
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        check=False,
+        env=full_env,
+    )
+    if check and proc.returncode != 0:
+        # Never echo argv: it may carry non-secret config, and stderr is enough to debug.
+        raise AssertionError(
+            f"docker {' '.join(args[:2])} failed (exit {proc.returncode}): {proc.stderr.strip()}"
+        )
+    return proc
+
+
+def remove_container(name: str) -> None:
+    """Force-remove one container by its exact name (best effort, never prunes)."""
+    docker("rm", "-f", "-v", name, check=False, timeout=60)

tests/mcp/test_http.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""MCP smoke tests: the streamable HTTP transport from source, against a live Gitea."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import httpx2
+from mcp import Client
+from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client
+
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+from tests.mcp.helpers import (
+    assert_no_secrets,
+    assert_rejects_without_valid_token,
+    exercise_server,
+    expected_tool_count,
+    run_source_http_server,
+    server_env,
+)
+
+
+async def test_http_lists_reads_and_writes(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path, bearer_token: str
+) -> None:
+    """A real MCP client over streamable HTTP with a bearer token, plus the 401 negatives."""
+    env = server_env(gitea, gitea.base_url, tmp_path, MCP_BEARER_TOKEN=bearer_token)
+    hidden = [gitea.admin_token, bearer_token]
+    with run_source_http_server(env, tmp_path) as server:
+        health = server.base_url + "/health"
+        body = httpx2.get(health, timeout=10.0).json()
+        assert body["status"] == "ok"
+        assert body["tools"] == expected_tool_count()
+
+        async with httpx2.AsyncClient(
+            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {bearer_token}"}, timeout=60.0
+        ) as http_client:
+            transport = streamable_http_client(server.mcp_url, http_client=http_client)
+            async with Client(transport, read_timeout_seconds=60.0) as client:
+                await exercise_server(client, gitea, hidden)
+
+        assert_rejects_without_valid_token(server.mcp_url, bearer_token)
+        assert server.alive()
+
+    assert_no_secrets(server.stderr_text(), hidden, "the server stderr")
+    stdout = server.stdout_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    assert_no_secrets(stdout, hidden, "the server stdout")

tests/mcp/test_image.py

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+"""MCP smoke tests against the built Docker image (``AEGIS_MCP_IMAGE``).
+
+The MCP container joins the harness's per-run network and reaches Gitea by its
+container name. Secrets go into the container with ``-e NAME`` (the value comes
+from the docker CLI's environment, never from argv). Every container started
+here has a unique ``aegis-it-mcp-<hex>`` name and is removed in a ``finally``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import os
+from collections.abc import Iterator
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import httpx2
+import pytest
+from mcp import Client, StdioServerParameters
+from mcp.client.stdio import stdio_client
+
+from tests.integration.harness import NETWORK_MODE_ENV, GiteaInstance
+from tests.mcp.helpers import (
+    assert_jsonrpc_only,
+    assert_no_secrets,
+    assert_rejects_without_valid_token,
+    child_env,
+    docker,
+    exercise_server,
+    expected_tool_count,
+    free_loopback_port,
+    remove_container,
+    run_raw_stdio,
+    unique_container_name,
+    wait_for_health,
+)
+
+CONTAINER_HTTP_PORT = 8080
+HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True)
+def _image_present(mcp_image: str) -> None:
+    """Fail (not skip) when the configured image does not exist locally."""
+    proc = docker("image", "inspect", mcp_image, check=False, timeout=60)
+    assert proc.returncode == 0, f"AEGIS_MCP_IMAGE={mcp_image!r} is not available locally"
+
+
+def _stdio_argv(name: str, network: str, gitea_url: str, image: str) -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "run",
+        "--rm",
+        "-i",
+        "--name",
+        name,
+        "--network",
+        network,
+        "--label",
+        "aegis-it=1",
+        "-e",
+        f"GITEA_URL={gitea_url}",
+        "-e",
+        "GITEA_TOKEN",
+        image,
+        "serve",
+        "--transport",
+        "stdio",
+    ]
+
+
+async def test_image_stdio_lists_reads_and_writes(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_internal_url: str, mcp_image: str, tmp_path: Path
+) -> None:
+    """The image over stdio (docker run -i): list, read, create and delete a repo."""
+    name = unique_container_name()
+    argv = _stdio_argv(name, gitea.network, gitea_internal_url, mcp_image)
+    params = StdioServerParameters(
+        command="docker", args=argv, env=child_env({"GITEA_TOKEN": gitea.admin_token})
+    )
+    stderr_path = tmp_path / "container.stderr"
+    try:
+        with stderr_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8") as errlog:
+            async with Client(stdio_client(params, errlog=errlog), read_timeout_seconds=60.0) as c:
+                await exercise_server(c, gitea, [gitea.admin_token])
+    finally:
+        remove_container(name)
+    assert_no_secrets(
+        stderr_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace"),
+        [gitea.admin_token],
+        "the container stderr",
+    )
+
+
+async def test_image_stdio_stdout_is_json_rpc_only(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_internal_url: str, mcp_image: str
+) -> None:
+    """Nothing but JSON-RPC reaches the image's stdout; stderr carries no secret."""
+    name = unique_container_name()
+    argv = ["docker", *_stdio_argv(name, gitea.network, gitea_internal_url, mcp_image)]
+    try:
+        session = await run_raw_stdio(argv, child_env({"GITEA_TOKEN": gitea.admin_token}))
+    finally:
+        remove_container(name)
+    assert_jsonrpc_only(session.stdout_lines)
+    assert session.returncode == 0
+    assert_no_secrets(session.stderr, [gitea.admin_token], "the container stderr")
+
+
+@contextlib.contextmanager
+def _image_http_server(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_internal_url: str, image: str, bearer_token: str
+) -> Iterator[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """Run the image in HTTP mode; yield ``(base_url, container_name)``.
+
+    Local mode publishes the port on 127.0.0.1 only; container mode (the job
+    container shares the per-run network) reaches the MCP container by name.
+    """
+    name = unique_container_name()
+    container_mode = os.environ.get(NETWORK_MODE_ENV, "").lower() == "container"
+    if container_mode:
+        base_url = f"http://{name}:{CONTAINER_HTTP_PORT}"
+        allowed_host = f"{name}:{CONTAINER_HTTP_PORT}"
+        publish: list[str] = []
+    else:
+        port = free_loopback_port()
+        base_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
+        allowed_host = f"127.0.0.1:{port}"
+        publish = ["-p", f"127.0.0.1:{port}:{CONTAINER_HTTP_PORT}"]
+    try:
+        docker(
+            "run",
+            "-d",
+            "--name",
+            name,
+            "--network",
+            gitea.network,
+            "--label",
+            "aegis-it=1",
+            *publish,
+            "-e",
+            f"GITEA_URL={gitea_internal_url}",
+            "-e",
+            f"ALLOWED_HOSTS={allowed_host}",
+            "-e",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN",
+            "-e",
+            "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN",
+            image,
+            env={"GITEA_TOKEN": gitea.admin_token, "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN": bearer_token},
+        )
+
+        def alive() -> bool:
+            state = docker("inspect", "--format", "{{.State.Running}}", name, check=False)
+            return state.stdout.strip() == "true"
+
+        wait_for_health(f"{base_url}/health", alive=alive)
+        yield base_url, name
+    finally:
+        remove_container(name)
+
+
+async def test_image_http_lists_reads_and_writes(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_internal_url: str, mcp_image: str, bearer_token: str
+) -> None:
+    """The image over streamable HTTP: list, read, write, 401 negatives, no secret in the logs."""
+    from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client
+
+    hidden = [gitea.admin_token, bearer_token]
+    with _image_http_server(gitea, gitea_internal_url, mcp_image, bearer_token) as (base, name):
+        health = httpx2.get(f"{base}/health", timeout=10.0).json()
+        assert health["status"] == "ok"
+        assert health["tools"] == expected_tool_count()
+
+        async with httpx2.AsyncClient(
+            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {bearer_token}"}, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+        ) as http_client:
+            transport = streamable_http_client(f"{base}/mcp", http_client=http_client)
+            async with Client(transport, read_timeout_seconds=60.0) as client:
+                await exercise_server(client, gitea, hidden)
+
+        assert_rejects_without_valid_token(f"{base}/mcp", bearer_token)
+        logs = docker("logs", name, check=False, timeout=60)
+        assert_no_secrets(logs.stdout + logs.stderr, hidden, "the container logs")
+
+
+def test_image_refuses_open_bind_without_auth(
+    gitea: GiteaInstance, gitea_internal_url: str, mcp_image: str
+) -> None:
+    """The image binds 0.0.0.0 by default and must exit 2 without MCP_BEARER_TOKEN."""
+    name = unique_container_name()
+    try:
+        proc = docker(
+            "run",
+            "--rm",
+            "--name",
+            name,
+            "--label",
+            "aegis-it=1",
+            "-e",
+            f"GITEA_URL={gitea_internal_url}",
+            "-e",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN",
+            mcp_image,
+            "serve",
+            env={"GITEA_TOKEN": gitea.admin_token},
+            check=False,
+            timeout=90,
+        )
+    finally:
+        remove_container(name)
+    assert proc.returncode == 2
+    assert "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN" in proc.stderr
+    assert_no_secrets(proc.stdout + proc.stderr, [gitea.admin_token], "the container output")

tests/mcp/test_stdio.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""MCP smoke tests: the stdio transport from source, against a live Gitea."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from mcp import Client, StdioServerParameters
+from mcp.client.stdio import stdio_client
+
+from tests.integration.harness import GiteaInstance
+from tests.mcp.helpers import (
+    SOURCE_SERVE_ARGS,
+    assert_jsonrpc_only,
+    assert_no_secrets,
+    exercise_server,
+    server_env,
+)
+
+
+def _stdio_params(gitea: GiteaInstance, data_dir: Path) -> StdioServerParameters:
+    return StdioServerParameters(
+        command=SOURCE_SERVE_ARGS[0],
+        args=[*SOURCE_SERVE_ARGS[1:], "--transport", "stdio"],
+        # The working directory is the empty temp dir so no ambient .env is read.
+        env=server_env(gitea, gitea.base_url, data_dir),
+        cwd=data_dir,
+    )
+
+
+async def test_stdio_lists_reads_and_writes(gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """A real MCP client over stdio: initialize, list 538 tools, read, create and delete a repo."""
+    stderr_path = tmp_path / "server.stderr"
+    with stderr_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8") as errlog:
+        transport = stdio_client(_stdio_params(gitea, tmp_path), errlog=errlog)
+        async with Client(transport, read_timeout_seconds=60.0) as client:
+            assert client.server_info is not None
+            assert client.server_info.name == "aegis-gitea-mcp"
+            await exercise_server(client, gitea, [gitea.admin_token])
+
+    stderr = stderr_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    assert_no_secrets(stderr, [gitea.admin_token], "the server stderr")
+
+
+async def test_stdio_stdout_is_json_rpc_only(gitea: GiteaInstance, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """Every stdout line of the stdio server is JSON-RPC; logs go to stderr without secrets."""
+    from tests.mcp.helpers import run_raw_stdio
+
+    params = _stdio_params(gitea, tmp_path)
+    session = await run_raw_stdio([params.command, *params.args], params.env or {}, tmp_path)
+    assert_jsonrpc_only(session.stdout_lines)
+    assert session.returncode == 0
+    assert_no_secrets("\n".join(session.stdout_lines), [gitea.admin_token], "the server stdout")
+    assert_no_secrets(session.stderr, [gitea.admin_token], "the server stderr")

tests/security/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""Helpers shared by the security tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from collections.abc import Iterable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+
+from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Message, Scope
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AsgiResult:
+    """What one raw ASGI call produced and how much of the request body it consumed."""
+
+    status: int = 0
+    body: bytes = b""
+    headers: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    bytes_read: int = 0
+    receive_calls: int = 0
+
+    def json(self) -> Any:
+        return json.loads(self.body)
+
+
+async def asgi_request(
+    app: ASGIApp,
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    chunks: Iterable[bytes] = (),
+    host: str = "mcp.example.com",
+    scheme: str = "https",
+    client: tuple[str, int] = ("198.51.100.7", 4000),
+) -> AsgiResult:
+    """Drive ``app`` with a counting ``receive`` so tests can assert how much body was read."""
+    result = AsgiResult()
+    pending = list(chunks)
+    raw_headers = [(b"host", host.encode())]
+    for name, value in (headers or {}).items():
+        raw_headers.append((name.lower().encode(), value.encode()))
+    scope: Scope = {
+        "type": "http",
+        "asgi": {"version": "3.0"},
+        "http_version": "1.1",
+        "method": method,
+        "scheme": scheme,
+        "path": path,
+        "raw_path": path.encode(),
+        "query_string": b"",
+        "root_path": "",
+        "headers": raw_headers,
+        "client": client,
+        "server": (host, 443),
+    }
+
+    async def receive() -> Message:
+        result.receive_calls += 1
+        if not pending:
+            return {"type": "http.disconnect"}
+        chunk = pending.pop(0)
+        result.bytes_read += len(chunk)
+        return {"type": "http.request", "body": chunk, "more_body": bool(pending)}
+
+    async def send(message: Message) -> None:
+        if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
+            result.status = message["status"]
+            result.headers = {
+                key.decode().lower(): value.decode() for key, value in message["headers"]
+            }
+        elif message["type"] == "http.response.body":
+            result.body += message.get("body", b"")
+
+    await app(scope, receive, send)
+    return result

tests/security/test_audit_fail_closed.py

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+"""The audit log is fail closed after startup too (SEC-03) and names the client (SEC-12)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp import MCPError
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import get_audit_logger
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import BEARER_TOKEN, browser, build_oauth_app, mcp_client, sign_in
+from tests.test_server_helpers import API, audit_entries, connected, mock_user
+
+REPO_ARGS = {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"}
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+class FailingFile:
+    """Stands in for the open audit file and fails every write like a full disk."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.attempts = 0
+
+    def write(self, data: str) -> int:
+        self.attempts += 1
+        raise OSError(28, "No space left on device")
+
+    def flush(self) -> None:  # pragma: no cover - never reached
+        raise OSError(28, "No space left on device")
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        return None
+
+
+def payload_of(result: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    decoded: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(result.content[0].text)
+    return decoded
+
+
+async def test_calls_stop_when_the_audit_log_stops_accepting_writes(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"name": "demo"}, is_reusable=True)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        first = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+        assert not first.is_error
+        sent_before = len(httpx_mock.get_requests())
+
+        audit = get_audit_logger()
+        healthy_file = audit._log_file
+        audit._log_file = FailingFile()  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        second = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+        mutation = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_issue_create_issue", {**REPO_ARGS, "body": {"title": "x"}}
+        )
+
+        assert second.is_error and mutation.is_error
+        assert payload_of(second)["error"]["kind"] == "audit_unavailable"
+        assert payload_of(mutation)["error"]["kind"] == "audit_unavailable"
+        # Gitea was not contacted at all while the log was broken.
+        assert len(httpx_mock.get_requests()) == sent_before
+
+        audit._log_file = healthy_file
+        resumed = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+        assert not resumed.is_error
+
+
+async def test_the_refusal_does_not_leak_the_failure_reason() -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        get_audit_logger()._log_file = FailingFile()  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+
+    text = result.content[0].text  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    assert "No space left" not in text and "OSError" not in text
+
+
+# SEC-12: who made the call
+
+
+async def test_oauth_call_entry_names_the_client_and_never_a_token_or_session_id(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    session_ids = list(oauth.store.sessions)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"full_name": "octo/demo"})
+    access = flow.tokens["access_token"]
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, access) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+    assert not result.is_error
+
+    audit_text = get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    (entry,) = audit_entries()
+    assert entry["client_id"] == flow.client_id
+    assert re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{12}", entry["session"])
+    assert entry["client_ip"] == "127.0.0.1"
+    assert entry["identity_login"] == "alice"
+    assert access not in audit_text
+    assert flow.tokens["refresh_token"] not in audit_text
+    assert all(session_id not in audit_text for session_id in session_ids)
+
+
+async def test_static_bearer_call_entry_names_the_static_client(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={})
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, BEARER_TOKEN) as mcp:
+        await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO_ARGS)
+
+    (entry,) = audit_entries()
+    assert entry["client_id"] == "aegis-static-bearer"
+    assert "session" not in entry
+    assert BEARER_TOKEN not in get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+# SEC-18: caller-chosen names
+
+TOKEN_LIKE = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
+
+
+async def test_extra_argument_names_are_counted_not_recorded() -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {**REPO_ARGS, TOKEN_LIKE: "x"})
+
+    assert result.is_error
+    assert TOKEN_LIKE not in result.content[0].text  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    (entry,) = audit_entries()
+    assert entry["params"] == {"argument_names": ["owner", "repo"], "rejected_argument_count": 1}
+    assert TOKEN_LIKE not in get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+async def test_unknown_tool_names_are_neither_echoed_nor_recorded() -> None:
+    name = "gitea_" + TOKEN_LIKE
+    async with connected() as client:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPError) as caught:
+            await client.call_tool(name, {TOKEN_LIKE: 1})
+
+    assert TOKEN_LIKE not in caught.value.message
+    (entry,) = audit_entries()
+    assert entry["tool_name"] == f"(unknown tool, {len(name)} chars)"
+    assert entry["params"] == {"argument_names": [], "rejected_argument_count": 1}
+    assert TOKEN_LIKE not in get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

tests/security/test_audit_file.py

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+"""The audit file is private and is never reached through a symlink (SEC-11)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import errno
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import transports
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger, get_audit_logger, validate_audit_log_integrity
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import run_http
+from tests.test_server_helpers import API, connected, mock_user, server_settings
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings; a startup that passes must not serve."""
+
+    def refuse(*args: object, **kwargs: object) -> None:
+        raise AssertionError("uvicorn.run must not be reached")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", refuse)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def open_umask() -> object:
+    """A permissive umask: what an unprepared host or container would hand out."""
+    previous = os.umask(0)
+    yield None
+    os.umask(previous)
+
+
+def mode_of(path: Path) -> int:
+    return stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode)
+
+
+async def test_audit_log_is_0600_and_a_new_state_directory_is_0700(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, open_umask: object
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={})
+    async with connected() as client:
+        await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+
+    path = get_audit_logger().log_path
+    assert mode_of(path) == 0o600
+    assert mode_of(path.parent) == 0o700
+    assert validate_audit_log_integrity(path) == (True, [])
+
+
+def test_an_older_world_readable_log_is_tightened(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "audit.log"
+    path.write_text("")
+    path.chmod(0o644)
+
+    AuditLogger(path).close()
+
+    assert mode_of(path) == 0o600
+
+
+def test_a_symlink_at_the_audit_path_is_not_followed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere.log"
+    target.write_text("")
+    link = tmp_path / "audit.log"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OSError) as caught:
+        AuditLogger(link)
+    assert caught.value.errno == errno.ELOOP
+    assert target.read_text() == ""
+
+
+def test_startup_exits_2_for_a_symlinked_audit_path(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere.log"
+    target.write_text("")
+    link = tmp_path / "state" / "audit.log"
+    link.parent.mkdir()
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUDIT_LOG_PATH", str(link))
+
+    assert run_http(server_settings(audit_log_path=link)) == 2
+
+    assert "symbolic link" in capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert target.read_text() == ""
+
+
+def test_startup_exits_2_for_an_audit_path_that_is_a_directory(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "audit.log"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUDIT_LOG_PATH", str(directory))
+
+    assert run_http(server_settings(audit_log_path=directory)) == 2
+    assert "audit log" in capsys.readouterr().err

tests/security/test_auth_required.py

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+"""The MCP endpoint rejects every request that does not carry a valid credential."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.routing import Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import auth as auth_module
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import StaticBearerVerifier
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import TOKEN_PREFIX
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import build_http_app
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    API,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    FakeClock,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    mcp_client,
+    mcp_status_lifespan,
+    sign_in,
+)
+from tests.test_server_helpers import BEARER_TOKEN, server_settings
+
+MCP_BODY = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}
+HOST = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def bearer_app() -> Starlette:
+    return build_http_app(server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN))
+
+
+def post_mcp(client: TestClient, authorization: str | None) -> Any:
+    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream"}
+    if authorization is not None:
+        headers["Authorization"] = authorization
+    return client.post("/mcp", json=MCP_BODY, headers=headers)
+
+
+# No credential, wrong credential
+
+
+def test_mcp_without_a_bearer_is_401_with_a_challenge_on_the_bearer_app() -> None:
+    client = TestClient(bearer_app(), base_url=HOST)
+
+    response = post_mcp(client, None)
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert response.headers["www-authenticate"].lower().startswith("bearer")
+
+
+def test_mcp_without_a_bearer_is_401_with_a_challenge_on_the_oauth_app() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    response = post_mcp(client, None)
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    challenge = response.headers["www-authenticate"]
+    assert challenge.lower().startswith("bearer")
+    assert "resource_metadata" in challenge  # tells clients where to find the OAuth server
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["GET", "POST", "DELETE"])
+def test_every_method_on_the_endpoint_needs_authentication(method: str) -> None:
+    client = TestClient(bearer_app(), base_url=HOST)
+
+    assert client.request(method, "/mcp").status_code == 401
+
+
+WRONG_BEARERS = {
+    "same length": "x" * len(BEARER_TOKEN),
+    "one character off": BEARER_TOKEN[:-1] + ("A" if BEARER_TOKEN[-1] != "A" else "B"),
+    "shorter": BEARER_TOKEN[:-1],
+    "longer": BEARER_TOKEN + "x",
+    "prefix only": BEARER_TOKEN[:8],
+    "doubled": BEARER_TOKEN * 2,
+    "upper case": BEARER_TOKEN.upper(),
+    "trailing space": BEARER_TOKEN + " ",
+    "trailing newline": BEARER_TOKEN + "\n",
+    "another deployment": "another-deployments-bearer-0123456789abcdef",
+    "admin gitea token": GITEA_TOKEN,
+    "null byte": BEARER_TOKEN + "\x00",
+}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", WRONG_BEARERS)
+def test_a_wrong_bearer_is_401(name: str) -> None:
+    client = TestClient(bearer_app(), base_url=HOST)
+
+    try:
+        response = post_mcp(client, f"Bearer {WRONG_BEARERS[name]}")
+    except Exception as exc:  # an invalid header value is refused before it leaves the client
+        assert "header" in str(exc).lower() or isinstance(exc, (ValueError, UnicodeError))
+        return
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "header",
+    [
+        "",
+        "Bearer",
+        "Bearer ",
+        f"Basic {BEARER_TOKEN}",
+        f"token {BEARER_TOKEN}",
+        f"Token {BEARER_TOKEN}",
+        BEARER_TOKEN,
+        f"Bearer  {BEARER_TOKEN} extra",
+        f"Digest {BEARER_TOKEN}",
+    ],
+)
+def test_wrong_scheme_or_shape_of_the_authorization_header_is_401(header: str) -> None:
+    client = TestClient(bearer_app(), base_url=HOST)
+
+    assert post_mcp(client, header).status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_the_right_bearer_is_not_401() -> None:
+    assert mcp_status_lifespan(bearer_app(), BEARER_TOKEN) != 401
+
+
+def test_the_bearer_is_never_accepted_from_a_query_string_or_a_cookie() -> None:
+    client = TestClient(bearer_app(), base_url=HOST)
+
+    by_query = client.post(f"/mcp?access_token={BEARER_TOKEN}&token={BEARER_TOKEN}", json=MCP_BODY)
+    client.cookies.set("token", BEARER_TOKEN)
+    by_cookie = client.post("/mcp", json=MCP_BODY)
+
+    assert by_query.status_code == 401 and by_cookie.status_code == 401
+
+
+# Constant-time comparison
+
+
+async def test_the_static_bearer_is_compared_in_constant_time_on_digests(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    seen: list[tuple[Any, Any]] = []
+    real = hmac.compare_digest
+
+    def spy(a: Any, b: Any) -> bool:
+        seen.append((a, b))
+        return real(a, b)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_module.hmac, "compare_digest", spy)
+    verifier = StaticBearerVerifier(BEARER_TOKEN)
+
+    for candidate in ("", "x", BEARER_TOKEN[:-1], BEARER_TOKEN, BEARER_TOKEN + "x" * 500):
+        accepted = await verifier.verify_token(candidate)
+        assert (accepted is not None) == (candidate == BEARER_TOKEN)
+
+    assert len(seen) == 5
+    # Digests of equal length whatever the candidate length: nothing about the length leaks.
+    assert {len(a) for a, _ in seen} == {len(b) for _, b in seen} == {32}
+    assert all(isinstance(a, bytes) and isinstance(b, bytes) for a, b in seen)
+    assert seen[3][0] == hashlib.sha256(BEARER_TOKEN.encode()).digest()
+
+
+def test_the_source_has_no_plain_equality_on_the_secret() -> None:
+    import inspect
+
+    source = inspect.getsource(StaticBearerVerifier)
+
+    assert "compare_digest" in source
+    assert "== self._token" not in source and "self._token ==" not in source
+
+
+async def test_the_access_token_of_the_static_bearer_never_carries_the_secret() -> None:
+    access = await StaticBearerVerifier(BEARER_TOKEN).verify_token(BEARER_TOKEN)
+
+    assert access is not None
+    assert BEARER_TOKEN not in repr(access) and BEARER_TOKEN not in access.model_dump_json()
+
+
+# OAuth tokens
+
+
+def test_unknown_expired_revoked_and_foreign_oauth_tokens_are_401(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(clock=clock)
+    web = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(web, httpx_mock)
+    access = flow.tokens["access_token"]
+    assert access.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX)
+    assert mcp_status_lifespan(oauth.app, access) != 401
+
+    unknown = TOKEN_PREFIX + "A" * 43
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {unknown}").status_code == 401
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {TOKEN_PREFIX}").status_code == 401
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {access}x").status_code == 401
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {access[:-1]}").status_code == 401
+
+    # Bound to another resource: the token does not work here.
+    (session,) = oauth.store.sessions.values()
+    real_resource = session.resource
+    session.resource = "https://other.example.com/mcp"
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {access}").status_code == 401
+    session.resource = real_resource
+
+    # Revoked by its client.
+    revoked = web.post(
+        "/revoke",
+        data={"token": access, "client_id": flow.client_id, "client_secret": flow.client_secret},
+    )
+    assert revoked.status_code == 200
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {access}").status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_an_expired_oauth_token_is_401(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(clock=clock)
+    web = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(web, httpx_mock)
+    access = flow.tokens["access_token"]
+
+    clock.advance(3600 + 1)
+
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {access}").status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_an_oauth_token_never_resolves_to_the_admin_identity(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={})
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/admin/users", status_code=403, json={"message": "no"})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+        await mcp.call_tool("gitea_admin_search_users", {})
+
+    calls = [
+        r for r in httpx_mock.get_requests() if "/repos/" in str(r.url) or "/admin/" in str(r.url)
+    ]
+    assert len(calls) == 2
+    for request in calls:
+        assert request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+        assert GITEA_TOKEN not in request.headers["Authorization"]
+
+
+def test_an_oauth_only_deployment_has_no_static_bearer_to_guess(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    from tests.test_oauth_helpers import oauth_settings
+
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(gitea_token=None, mcp_bearer_token=None))
+    web = browser(oauth.app)
+
+    assert post_mcp(web, f"Bearer {BEARER_TOKEN}").status_code == 401
+    assert post_mcp(web, None).status_code == 401
+
+
+# Route inventory
+
+#: Routes reachable without authentication, with the reason each one exists.
+PUBLIC_ROUTES = {
+    "/": "service banner",
+    "/health": "container and client health check",
+    "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource": "RFC 9728 discovery (bare path, OAuth only)",
+    "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp": "RFC 9728 discovery",
+    "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server": "RFC 8414 discovery (OAuth only)",
+    "/authorize": "OAuth authorization endpoint (OAuth only)",
+    "/token": "OAuth token endpoint (OAuth only)",
+    "/register": "OAuth dynamic client registration (OAuth only)",
+    "/revoke": "OAuth revocation (OAuth only)",
+    "/oauth/consent": "consent page (OAuth only)",
+    "/oauth/callback": "Gitea callback (OAuth only)",
+}
+
+
+def inventory(app: Starlette) -> tuple[set[str], set[str]]:
+    """Paths without authentication, and paths guarded by the SDK's bearer middleware."""
+    open_paths: set[str] = set()
+    guarded: set[str] = set()
+    for route in app.routes:
+        assert isinstance(route, Route)
+        endpoint = type(route.endpoint).__name__
+        (guarded if endpoint == "RequireAuthMiddleware" else open_paths).add(route.path)
+    return open_paths, guarded
+
+
+def test_the_routes_reachable_without_authentication_are_exactly_the_known_ones() -> None:
+    oauth_open, oauth_guarded = inventory(build_oauth_app().app)
+    bearer_open, bearer_guarded = inventory(bearer_app())
+
+    assert oauth_open == set(PUBLIC_ROUTES)
+    assert bearer_open <= set(PUBLIC_ROUTES)
+    assert {"/", "/health"} <= bearer_open
+    # The MCP endpoint is the only guarded route, and it is guarded in both modes.
+    assert oauth_guarded == bearer_guarded == {"/mcp"}

tests/security/test_base_url_validation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+"""``GITEA_URL``, ``PUBLIC_BASE_URL`` and the other path-like settings are validated strictly (SEC-10)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import transports
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.cli import main
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import redirect_uri_problem
+
+
+def make(**values: Any) -> Settings:
+    base: dict[str, Any] = {"gitea_url": "https://gitea.example.com"}
+    base.update(values)
+    return Settings(**base)
+
+
+BAD_CHARACTERS = [
+    ("tab", "\t"),
+    ("newline", "\n"),
+    ("carriage return", "\r"),
+    ("space", " "),
+    ("nul", "\x00"),
+    ("vertical tab", "\x0b"),
+    ("line separator", chr(0x2028)),
+    ("no-break space", chr(0xA0)),
+    ("bidi override", chr(0x202E)),
+    ("bidi isolate", chr(0x2066)),
+    ("zero width space", chr(0x200B)),
+    ("backslash", "\\"),
+]
+POSITIONS = [
+    "https://gi{c}tea.example.com",
+    "https://gitea.example.com/a{c}b",
+    "https://gitea.example.com:44{c}3",
+    "https://gitea.example.com/{c}x",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", POSITIONS)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("name", "char"), BAD_CHARACTERS, ids=[n for n, _ in BAD_CHARACTERS])
+def test_gitea_url_rejects_whitespace_and_control_characters(
+    template: str, name: str, char: str
+) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(gitea_url=template.format(c=char))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", POSITIONS)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("name", "char"), BAD_CHARACTERS, ids=[n for n, _ in BAD_CHARACTERS])
+def test_public_base_url_rejects_whitespace_and_control_characters(
+    template: str, name: str, char: str
+) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(public_base_url=template.format(c=char).replace("gitea", "mcp"))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "url",
+    [
+        "ftp://gitea.example.com",
+        "file:///etc/passwd",
+        "javascript:alert(1)",
+        "gitea.example.com",
+        "//gitea.example.com",
+        "https://",
+        "https:///path",
+        "https://user:pass@gitea.example.com",
+        "https://user@gitea.example.com",
+        "https://gitea.example.com?x=1",
+        "https://gitea.example.com/?",
+        "https://gitea.example.com#frag",
+        "https://gitea.example.com:99999",
+        "https://gitea.example.com:abc",
+        "",
+    ],
+)
+def test_gitea_url_rejects_bad_schemes_credentials_query_fragment_port_and_missing_host(
+    url: str,
+) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(gitea_url=url)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "url",
+    [
+        "http://mcp.example.com",
+        "http://203.0.113.5",
+        "ftp://mcp.example.com",
+        "https://user:pass@mcp.example.com",
+        "https://mcp.example.com?x=1",
+        "https://mcp.example.com#f",
+        "https://mcp.example.com:99999",
+    ],
+)
+def test_public_base_url_rejects_http_on_public_hosts_and_the_shared_url_rules(url: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(public_base_url=url)
+
+
+def test_http_public_base_url_is_only_allowed_on_loopback() -> None:
+    assert make(public_base_url="http://localhost:8080").public_base_url == "http://localhost:8080"
+    assert make(public_base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080").public_base_url == "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
+    assert make(public_base_url="http://[::1]:8080").public_base_url == "http://[::1]:8080"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("given", "used"),
+    [
+        ("https://gitea.example.com/", "https://gitea.example.com"),
+        ("https://gitea.example.com/api/v1", "https://gitea.example.com"),
+        ("https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/", "https://gitea.example.com"),
+        ("https://gitea.example.com/git/api/v1", "https://gitea.example.com/git"),
+        ("  https://gitea.example.com  ", "https://gitea.example.com"),
+        ("HTTPS://gitea.example.com:3000/sub/", "https://gitea.example.com:3000/sub"),
+        ("http://127.0.0.1:3000", "http://127.0.0.1:3000"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_the_validated_url_is_the_url_that_is_used(given: str, used: str) -> None:
+    settings = make(gitea_url=given)
+
+    assert settings.gitea_url == used
+    assert settings.gitea_api_url == f"{used}/api/v1"
+
+
+def test_serve_warns_about_plain_http_gitea_on_a_non_loopback_host(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp import cli
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.internal")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", "t" * 20)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "configure_logging", lambda level: None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports, "run_stdio", lambda settings: 0)
+
+    assert main(["serve"]) == 0
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "plain http" in err and "unencrypted" in err
+    assert "t" * 20 not in err
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["https://gitea.example.com", "http://localhost:3000"])
+def test_serve_does_not_warn_for_https_or_loopback(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], url: str
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp import cli
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", url)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", "t" * 20)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "configure_logging", lambda level: None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports, "run_stdio", lambda settings: 0)
+
+    assert main(["serve"]) == 0
+
+    assert "plain http" not in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+# Other path-like and list settings
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    ["mcp", "//mcp", "/", "//", "/mcp?x=1", "/mcp#f", "/m cp", ""],
+)
+def test_mcp_path_rejections(path: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(mcp_path=path)
+
+
+def test_mcp_path_trailing_slash_is_normalized() -> None:
+    assert make(mcp_path="/mcp/").mcp_path == "/mcp"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    ["not-an-ip", "10.0.0.0/33", "*,10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,*", "10.0.0.1;10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.256"],
+)
+def test_forwarded_allow_ips_rejections(value: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(forwarded_allow_ips=value)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "scopes",
+    [
+        ["all"],
+        ["read:unknown"],
+        ["repo"],
+        ["write:repository", "sudo"],
+        ["admin"],
+        [""],
+        [],
+    ],
+)
+def test_oauth_scopes_reject_unknown_scopes_because_gitea_would_grant_everything(
+    scopes: list[str],
+) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(oauth_scopes=scopes)
+
+
+def test_oauth_scopes_accept_granular_scopes_only() -> None:
+    assert make(oauth_scopes=["read:repository", "write:issue"]).oauth_scopes == [
+        "read:repository",
+        "write:issue",
+    ]
+
+
+def test_secret_length_minimums() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(mcp_bearer_token="short")
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        make(token_encryption_key="x" * 31)
+
+
+# Redirect URIs at client registration
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "http://example.com/cb",
+        "http://localhost.evil.example/cb",
+        "https://example.com/cb#frag",
+        "https://user:pass@example.com/cb",
+        "javascript:alert(1)",
+        "data:text/html,hi",
+        "file:///etc/passwd",
+        "myapp://callback",
+        "claude://callback",
+        "https:///cb",
+        "https://example.com:99999/cb",
+        "",
+    ],
+)
+def test_redirect_uri_rules(uri: str) -> None:
+    assert redirect_uri_problem(uri) is not None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+        "http://localhost:3000/callback",
+        "http://127.0.0.1/cb",
+        "http://[::1]:5000/cb",
+    ],
+)
+def test_acceptable_redirect_uris(uri: str) -> None:
+    assert redirect_uri_problem(uri) is None

tests/security/test_ci_workflows.py

@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+"""CI hygiene: pinned actions, fork guards, cleanup scope and the security gates (SEC-06/07/14/15/16).
+
+The workflow files are simple enough to read line by line, so no YAML library is needed
+(none is a dependency of the project).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+WORKFLOWS = sorted((ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows").glob("*.yml"))
+FORK_GUARD = (
+    "github.event_name != 'pull_request' || "
+    "github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository"
+)
+PINNED = re.compile(r"^[\w.-]+/[\w.-]+@[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+VERSION_COMMENT = re.compile(r"#\s*v\d+\.\d+\.\d+\s*$")
+DOCKER_USE = re.compile(
+    r"\bdocker\s+(build|run|push|pull|login|save|tag|rmi|rm|image|ps|network|compose)\b"
+    r"|cleanup_job_resources\.sh|scan_image\.sh|tests/integration|tests/mcp"
+)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Step:
+    lines: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+
+    @property
+    def text(self) -> str:
+        return "\n".join(self.lines)
+
+    @property
+    def uses(self) -> str | None:
+        for line in self.lines:
+            match = re.match(r"\s*(?:-\s*)?uses:\s*(.*)$", line)
+            if match:
+                return match.group(1).strip()
+        return None
+
+    def with_block(self) -> str:
+        collected: list[str] = []
+        inside = False
+        for line in self.lines:
+            if re.match(r"^\s{8}with:\s*$", line):
+                inside = True
+                continue
+            if inside and re.match(r"^\s{8}\S", line):
+                break
+            if inside:
+                collected.append(line)
+        return "\n".join(collected)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Job:
+    name: str
+    lines: list[str]
+
+    @property
+    def text(self) -> str:
+        return "\n".join(self.lines)
+
+    @property
+    def condition(self) -> str | None:
+        for line in self.lines:
+            match = re.match(r"^ {4}if:\s*(.*)$", line)
+            if match:
+                return match.group(1).strip()
+        return None
+
+    @property
+    def needs(self) -> list[str]:
+        for line in self.lines:
+            match = re.match(r"^ {4}needs:\s*\[(.*)\]\s*$", line)
+            if match:
+                return [item.strip() for item in match.group(1).split(",")]
+        return []
+
+    def steps(self) -> list[Step]:
+        steps: list[Step] = []
+        in_steps = False
+        for line in self.lines:
+            if re.match(r"^ {4}steps:\s*$", line):
+                in_steps = True
+                continue
+            if not in_steps:
+                continue
+            if re.match(r"^ {6}-\s", line):
+                steps.append(Step())
+            if steps:
+                steps[-1].lines.append(line)
+        return steps
+
+
+def jobs_of(path: Path) -> list[Job]:
+    jobs: list[Job] = []
+    in_jobs = False
+    for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("jobs:"):
+            in_jobs = True
+            continue
+        if not in_jobs:
+            continue
+        if line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
+            continue  # comment lines (the banner of the next job sits at the end of a block)
+        match = re.match(r"^ {2}([\w-]+):\s*$", line)
+        if match:
+            jobs.append(Job(match.group(1), []))
+        if jobs:
+            jobs[-1].lines.append(line)
+    return jobs
+
+
+def has_pull_request_trigger(path: Path) -> bool:
+    return (
+        re.search(r"^ {2}pull_request:", path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), re.MULTILINE) is not None
+    )
+
+
+def test_there_are_workflows_to_check() -> None:
+    assert {path.name for path in WORKFLOWS} >= {"ci.yml", "publish.yml"}
+    for path in WORKFLOWS:
+        assert jobs_of(path), path.name
+
+
+# SEC-07
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WORKFLOWS, ids=lambda p: p.name)
+def test_every_action_is_pinned_to_a_full_commit_sha_with_a_version_comment(path: Path) -> None:
+    seen = 0
+    for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        match = re.match(r"^\s*(?:-\s*)?uses:\s*(\S+)(.*)$", line)
+        if match is None or line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        seen += 1
+        assert PINNED.match(match.group(1)), f"{path.name}: {line.strip()}"
+        assert VERSION_COMMENT.search(match.group(2)), f"{path.name}: no version comment: {line}"
+    assert seen, f"{path.name} uses no action, so the pin check proved nothing"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WORKFLOWS, ids=lambda p: p.name)
+def test_no_secret_is_handed_to_a_third_party_action(path: Path) -> None:
+    for job in jobs_of(path):
+        for step in job.steps():
+            if step.uses is not None:
+                assert "secrets." not in step.with_block(), f"{path.name}/{job.name}"
+                assert "secrets." not in step.text, f"{path.name}/{job.name}: {step.text}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WORKFLOWS, ids=lambda p: p.name)
+def test_checkout_does_not_persist_the_job_token(path: Path) -> None:
+    for job in jobs_of(path):
+        for step in job.steps():
+            if step.uses and step.uses.startswith("actions/checkout@"):
+                assert "persist-credentials: false" in step.with_block(), f"{path.name}/{job.name}"
+
+
+def test_the_registry_login_uses_the_cli_with_the_token_on_stdin() -> None:
+    text = (ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "docker/login-action" not in text
+    assert "--password-stdin" in text
+    assert not re.search(r"docker login[^\n]*--password(?!-stdin)", text)
+
+
+# SEC-06
+
+
+def test_docker_and_secret_jobs_do_not_run_for_fork_pull_requests() -> None:
+    path = ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml"
+    assert has_pull_request_trigger(path)
+    guarded = []
+    for job in jobs_of(path):
+        if DOCKER_USE.search(job.text) or "secrets." in job.text:
+            guarded.append(job.name)
+            assert job.condition == FORK_GUARD, f"job {job.name} runs docker or uses secrets"
+    assert {"test-integration", "test-mcp", "build-and-push"} <= set(guarded)
+
+
+def test_workflows_without_a_pull_request_trigger_cannot_run_fork_code() -> None:
+    for path in WORKFLOWS:
+        if not has_pull_request_trigger(path):
+            assert "pull_request_target" not in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+# SEC-15
+
+
+def test_publish_needs_the_security_job_with_every_gate() -> None:
+    path = ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "publish.yml"
+    jobs = {job.name: job for job in jobs_of(path)}
+
+    assert "security" in jobs["publish"].needs
+    security = jobs["security"].text
+    for gate in (
+        "scripts/ci/install_gitleaks.sh",
+        "gitleaks git",
+        "tests/security",
+        "scripts/ci/pip_audit.sh",
+        "ruff check --select S",
+    ):
+        assert gate in security
+    assert "fetch-depth: 0" in security  # the history scan needs it
+
+
+def test_ci_security_job_runs_the_security_suite() -> None:
+    jobs = {job.name: job for job in jobs_of(ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml")}
+
+    assert "uv run pytest tests/security --no-cov" in jobs["security"].text
+
+
+# SEC-14
+
+
+def test_publish_passes_the_token_through_the_environment_not_the_command_line() -> None:
+    text = (ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "publish.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "--password" not in text
+    assert "UV_PUBLISH_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}" in text
+
+
+def test_the_build_job_logs_out_by_deleting_its_own_credential_directory() -> None:
+    text = (ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "docker logout" not in text
+    assert "DOCKER_CONFIG" in text
+
+
+FAKE_DOCKER = """#!/usr/bin/env bash
+echo "$*" >> "$DOCKER_LOG"
+if [ "$1" = "ps" ]; then
+  # one container per ancestor filter value
+  for arg in "$@"; do
+    case "$arg" in ancestor=*) echo "cid-of-${arg#ancestor=}" ;; esac
+  done
+fi
+exit 0
+"""
+
+
+def run_cleanup(tmp_path: Path, *refs: str) -> list[str]:
+    bin_dir = tmp_path / "bin"
+    bin_dir.mkdir()
+    fake = bin_dir / "docker"
+    fake.write_text(FAKE_DOCKER)
+    fake.chmod(fake.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IXUSR)
+    log = tmp_path / "docker.log"
+    log.write_text("")
+    env = {
+        "PATH": f"{bin_dir}:/usr/bin:/bin",
+        "DOCKER_LOG": str(log),
+        "HOME": str(tmp_path),
+    }
+    work = tmp_path / "work"
+    work.mkdir()
+    subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603 (fixed script path, fake docker on PATH)
+        ["bash", str(ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" / "cleanup_job_resources.sh"), *refs],  # noqa: S607
+        cwd=work,
+        env=env,
+        check=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+    return log.read_text().splitlines()
+
+
+def test_cleanup_removes_containers_only_for_per_run_refs(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    registry = "git.hiddenden.cafe/hiddenden/aegisgitea-mcp"
+    per_run = "aegis-ci-4242-build:0123456789abcdef"
+    shared = [
+        f"{registry}:sha-0123456789ab",
+        f"{registry}:latest",
+        f"{registry}:main",
+        f"{registry}:dev",
+    ]
+
+    calls = run_cleanup(tmp_path, *shared, per_run)
+
+    removed = [call for call in calls if call.startswith("rm -f")]
+    assert removed == [f"rm -f -v cid-of-{per_run}"]
+    queried = [call for call in calls if call.startswith("ps ")]
+    assert len(queried) == 1 and per_run in queried[0]
+    # Registry tags (the immutable sha tag included) are only untagged.
+    for ref in shared:
+        assert f"image rm {ref}" in calls
+        assert f"rmi {ref}" not in calls
+    assert f"rmi {per_run}" in calls
+
+
+def test_cleanup_treats_names_with_the_run_prefix_as_per_run(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    calls = run_cleanup(tmp_path, "aegis-ci-4242-mcp:test")
+
+    assert "rm -f -v cid-of-aegis-ci-4242-mcp:test" in calls
+    assert "rmi aegis-ci-4242-mcp:test" in calls
+
+
+def test_cleanup_without_arguments_touches_nothing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert not any(call.startswith(("rm", "rmi", "image rm")) for call in run_cleanup(tmp_path))
+
+
+# SEC-16
+
+
+def test_the_image_scan_is_pinned_verified_and_gates_the_push() -> None:
+    install = (ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" / "install_trivy.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    scan = (ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" / "scan_image.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    ci = (ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert re.search(r'^TRIVY_VERSION="\d+\.\d+\.\d+"$', install, re.MULTILINE)
+    assert len(re.findall(r'^SHA256_\w+="[0-9a-f]{64}"$', install, re.MULTILINE)) == 2
+    assert "sha256sum --check" in install
+    assert "--severity HIGH,CRITICAL" in scan and "--exit-code 1" in scan
+    assert "--ignore-unfixed" in scan
+    jobs = {job.name: job for job in jobs_of(ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml")}
+    build = jobs["build-and-push"].text
+    assert build.index("scripts/ci/scan_image.sh") < build.index("docker push")
+    assert "scripts/ci/install_trivy.sh" in ci
+
+
+def test_scripts_are_executable_and_parse() -> None:
+    for script in (ROOT / "scripts" / "ci").glob("*.sh"):
+        assert os.access(script, os.X_OK), script.name
+        subprocess.run(["bash", "-n", str(script)], check=True, timeout=30)  # noqa: S603, S607
+
+
+def test_build_and_push_builds_under_a_per_run_tag_and_gates_on_every_test_job() -> None:
+    jobs = {job.name: job for job in jobs_of(ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml")}
+    build = jobs["build-and-push"]
+
+    assert {"lint", "test-unit", "test-integration", "test-mcp", "security"} <= set(build.needs)
+    text = build.text
+    assert 'BUILD_TAG="aegis-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-build:${GITHUB_SHA}"' in text
+    # Nothing is built, scanned or smoke-tested under a registry tag.
+    assert '-t "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}"' in text
+    assert 'scan_image.sh "${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_tag }}"' in text
+    assert '-t "${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha_tag }}"' not in text
+    # Registry tags are applied only in the push step, and cleanup removes the build tag last.
+    assert text.index("docker build") < text.index("docker tag") < text.index("docker push")
+    assert text.count("docker tag") == 1
+    cleanup = text[text.index("scripts/ci/cleanup_job_resources.sh") :]
+    assert cleanup.index("sha_tag") < cleanup.index("build_tag")
+
+
+def test_the_integration_job_requires_the_actions_runner() -> None:
+    jobs = {job.name: job for job in jobs_of(ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "ci.yml")}
+
+    assert 'AEGIS_IT_REQUIRE_RUNNER: "1"' in jobs["test-integration"].text

tests/security/test_env_file.py

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+"""``./.env`` is not trusted implicitly (SEC-04).
+
+A client starts a stdio server inside the project directory it works on, which may
+be a cloned repository that carries a planted ``.env``. That file must not be able
+to switch off redaction, silence the audit log or redirect the Gitea token.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.cli import main
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import (
+    ENV_FILE_VARIABLE,
+    EnvFileError,
+    get_settings,
+    reset_settings,
+    select_env_file,
+    set_env_file,
+)
+
+PLANTED = (
+    "SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off\n"
+    "EXPOSE_ERROR_DETAILS=true\n"
+    "AUDIT_LOG_PATH=/dev/null\n"
+    "GITEA_URL=https://attacker.example.com\n"
+    "READ_ONLY=true\n"
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """GITEA_URL and GITEA_TOKEN come from the real environment."""
+
+
+def write_env(path: Path, text: str = PLANTED, mode: int = 0o600) -> Path:
+    path.write_text(text)
+    path.chmod(mode)
+    return path
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", [0o644, 0o640, 0o604, 0o666, 0o660])
+def test_group_or_world_accessible_dotenv_is_ignored_with_a_warning(
+    tmp_path: Path, mode: int, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env", mode=mode)
+    os.environ.pop("AUDIT_LOG_PATH")
+
+    settings = get_settings()
+
+    assert settings.secret_detection_mode == "mask"
+    assert settings.expose_error_details is False
+    assert settings.read_only is False
+    assert settings.gitea_url == "https://gitea.example.com"
+    assert settings.resolved_audit_log_path == settings.data_dir / "audit.log"
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "ignoring ./.env" in err
+    assert "chmod 600 .env" in err and "--env-file" in err
+    assert "attacker" not in err  # the warning never prints file content
+
+
+def test_symlinked_dotenv_is_ignored(tmp_path: Path, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]) -> None:
+    target = write_env(tmp_path / "real.env")
+    (tmp_path / ".env").symlink_to(target)
+
+    assert get_settings().secret_detection_mode == "mask"
+    assert "it is a symlink" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_dotenv_that_is_not_a_regular_file_is_ignored(
+    tmp_path: Path, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / ".env").mkdir()
+
+    assert get_settings().secret_detection_mode == "mask"
+    assert "not a regular file" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_dotenv_owned_by_another_user_is_ignored(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: os.stat(tmp_path / ".env").st_uid + 1)
+
+    assert get_settings().secret_detection_mode == "mask"
+    assert "owned by another user" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_private_dotenv_owned_by_the_user_is_honoured(
+    tmp_path: Path, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env", "READ_ONLY=true\nMCP_PORT=9191\n")
+
+    settings = get_settings()
+
+    assert settings.read_only is True and settings.mcp_port == 9191
+    assert capsys.readouterr().err == ""
+
+
+def test_environment_variables_win_over_the_env_file(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env", "MCP_PORT=9191\nGITEA_URL=https://file.example.com\n")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("MCP_PORT", "9000")
+
+    settings = get_settings()
+
+    assert settings.mcp_port == 9000
+    assert settings.gitea_url == "https://gitea.example.com"
+
+
+def test_missing_dotenv_is_silent(capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]) -> None:
+    get_settings()
+
+    assert capsys.readouterr().err == ""
+
+
+def test_explicit_env_file_is_used_even_outside_the_working_directory(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    elsewhere = tmp_path / "conf" / "aegis.env"
+    elsewhere.parent.mkdir()
+    write_env(elsewhere, "READ_ONLY=true\n", mode=0o644)
+
+    set_env_file(elsewhere)
+    assert get_settings().read_only is True
+
+
+def test_env_file_variable_selects_the_file(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    chosen = write_env(tmp_path / "chosen.env", "READ_ONLY=true\n")
+    # The (untrusted) ./.env must not matter when a file is named.
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env", mode=0o644)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(ENV_FILE_VARIABLE, str(chosen))
+    reset_settings()
+
+    assert get_settings().read_only is True
+
+
+def test_explicit_option_beats_the_variable(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    option = write_env(tmp_path / "option.env", "MCP_PORT=9001\n")
+    variable = write_env(tmp_path / "variable.env", "MCP_PORT=9002\n")
+
+    path, warning = select_env_file(option, environ={ENV_FILE_VARIABLE: str(variable)})
+
+    assert path == option and warning is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", ["missing", "directory"])
+def test_explicit_env_file_that_cannot_be_used_is_an_error(tmp_path: Path, kind: str) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "nope.env"
+    if kind == "directory":
+        target.mkdir()
+
+    with pytest.raises(EnvFileError):
+        select_env_file(target)
+
+
+def test_serve_with_a_missing_env_file_exits_2(
+    tmp_path: Path, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert main(["serve", "--env-file", str(tmp_path / "nope.env")]) == 2
+    assert "does not exist" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_serve_ignores_a_planted_dotenv_and_audits_to_the_real_location(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp import cli, transports
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "configure_logging", lambda level: None)
+    write_env(tmp_path / ".env", mode=0o644)
+    seen: list[object] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports, "run_stdio", lambda settings: seen.append(settings) or 0)
+
+    assert main(["serve"]) == 0
+
+    (settings,) = seen
+    assert settings.secret_detection_mode == "mask"  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    assert str(settings.resolved_audit_log_path) != "/dev/null"  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    assert "ignoring ./.env" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_setup_takes_env_file_from_the_variable_and_the_option() -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.cli import build_parser
+
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(["setup", "--env-file", "/tmp/x.env"])
+    assert args.env_file == "/tmp/x.env"
+    assert build_parser().parse_args(["setup"]).env_file is None

tests/security/test_malformed_input.py

@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
+"""Malformed input is rejected at the boundary, before Gitea is contacted."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp import Client, MCPError
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import server as server_module
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import max_request_body_size
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import build_http_app
+from tests.test_server_helpers import API, BEARER_TOKEN, connected, mock_user, server_settings
+
+# Many cases are refused before anything is sent, others only after the admin identity lookup:
+# what matters here is which requests reach Gitea, asserted explicitly in every test.
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.httpx_mock(
+    assert_all_responses_were_requested=False, assert_all_requests_were_expected=False
+)
+
+REPO = {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"}
+UPLOAD = "gitea_release_create_release_attachment"
+UPLOAD_ARGS = {**REPO, "id": 1}
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def error_of(result: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    assert result.is_error, result.content[0].text
+    error: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(result.content[0].text)["error"]
+    return error
+
+
+def gitea_calls(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> list[str]:
+    """Requests that reached Gitea, without the admin identity lookup."""
+    return [
+        str(r.url) for r in httpx_mock.get_requests() if not str(r.url).endswith("/api/v1/user")
+    ]
+
+
+# Schema: unknown arguments, wrong types, missing arguments
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("tool", "arguments", "fragment"),
+    [
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {**REPO, "unexpected": 1}, "unexpected argument"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo"}, "missing required"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {}, "missing required"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": 7, "repo": "demo"}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": ["octo"], "repo": "demo"}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": None, "repo": "demo"}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "", "repo": "demo"}, "minLength"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "a" * 256, "repo": "demo"}, "maxLength"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "bad owner", "repo": "demo"}, "pattern"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo/evil", "repo": "demo"}, "pattern"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "de%6Dmo"}, "pattern"),
+        ("gitea_repo_get", {**REPO, "sudo": 1}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_issue_get_issue", {**REPO, "index": "one"}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_issue_get_issue", {**REPO, "index": 1.5}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_issue_get_issue", {**REPO, "index": True}, "type"),
+        (
+            "gitea_issue_create_issue",
+            {**REPO, "body": {"title": "x", "labels": ["a"]}},
+            "type",
+        ),
+        ("gitea_issue_create_issue", {**REPO, "body": {"title": "x", "extra": 1}}, "unexpected"),
+        ("gitea_issue_create_issue", {**REPO, "body": {"body": "no title"}}, "missing required"),
+        ("gitea_issue_create_issue", {**REPO, "body": "not an object"}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET"}, "missing required"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/x", "extra": 1}, "unexpected"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": 5}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": ""}, "minLength"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "x"}, "pattern"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/" + "a" * 2048}, "maxLength"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/x", "query": [1]}, "type"),
+        ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/x", "query": {"a": {"b": 1}}}, ""),
+    ],
+)
+async def test_invalid_arguments_are_rejected_before_gitea(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, tool: str, arguments: dict[str, Any], fragment: str
+) -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(tool, arguments)
+
+    error = error_of(result)
+    assert error["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert fragment in error["message"]
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+async def test_a_trailing_newline_passes_the_schema_but_not_the_executor(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    # Python's `$` also matches before a trailing newline, so the schema pattern lets
+    # this through and the executor's own character check is what refuses it.
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo\n"})
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+async def test_rejection_messages_never_echo_the_values() -> None:
+    planted = "planted-secret-value-123456"
+    async with connected() as client:
+        results = [
+            await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": planted + " x", "repo": "demo"}),
+            await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": 1, "repo": planted}),
+            await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {**REPO, planted: planted}),
+        ]
+
+    for result in results:
+        assert planted not in result.content[0].text
+
+
+# Path values (catalog tools and the raw tool)
+
+BAD_PATH_VALUES = [
+    "..",
+    "a/../b",
+    "../a",
+    "a/..",
+    ".",
+    "./a",
+    "a/./b",
+    "a//b",
+    "/a",
+    "a/",
+    "a\\b",
+    "a?b",
+    "a#b",
+    "a%b",
+    "a%2e%2e/b",
+    "%2e%2e",
+    "a%2Fb",
+    "a\x00b",
+    "a\rb",
+    "a\nb",
+    "a" + chr(0x2028) + "b",
+    "a" + chr(0x2029) + "b",
+    "a\tb",
+    "a\x7fb",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", BAD_PATH_VALUES, ids=lambda v: repr(v))
+async def test_unsafe_path_values_are_rejected_for_catalog_tools(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, value: str
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get_raw_file", {**REPO, "filepath": value})
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [v for v in BAD_PATH_VALUES if v not in {"/a"}], ids=repr)
+async def test_unsafe_path_values_are_rejected_for_the_raw_tool(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, value: str
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": f"/repos/{value}/x"}
+        )
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", ["//evil.example/x", "///x", "//", "/a/../b", "/.", "/.."])
+async def test_raw_paths_that_reshape_the_url_are_rejected(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, path: str
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": path})
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+async def test_safe_path_values_are_encoded_not_interpreted(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo/raw/docs/a%20b.md", text="ok")
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_repo_get_raw_file", {**REPO, "filepath": "docs/a b.md"}
+        )
+
+    assert not result.is_error
+
+
+# Query names and sudo
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "name", ["token", "access_token", "sudo", "_sudo", "TOKEN", "Access_Token", "SuDo", "_SUDO"]
+)
+async def test_credential_query_names_are_refused_on_the_raw_tool(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, name: str
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/user", "query": {name: "x"}}
+        )
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "sudo",
+    [
+        "bob\r\nX-Injected: 1",
+        "bob\n",
+        "bob ",
+        " bob",
+        "bo b",
+        "a" * 256,
+        "",
+        "b" + chr(0xF6) + "b",
+        "bob;",
+        "bob\x00",
+    ],
+    ids=repr,
+)
+async def test_sudo_values_that_could_inject_headers_are_rejected(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, sudo: str
+) -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        for tool, arguments in (
+            ("gitea_repo_get", {**REPO, "sudo": sudo}),
+            ("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/user", "sudo": sudo}),
+        ):
+            result = await client.call_tool(tool, arguments)
+            assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+# Uploads
+
+
+async def test_an_oversized_upload_is_rejected_before_it_is_decoded(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    # Not valid base64 at all: only a size check that runs before decoding reports "limit".
+    huge = "!" * 4000
+    async with connected(server_settings(max_binary_bytes=1000)) as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            UPLOAD, {**UPLOAD_ARGS, "attachment": {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": huge}}
+        )
+
+    error = error_of(result)
+    assert error["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert "limit" in error["message"] and "MAX_BINARY_BYTES" in error["message"]
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+async def test_an_upload_at_the_limit_is_accepted(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo/releases/1/assets", status_code=201, json={}
+    )
+    content = base64.b64encode(b"x" * 1000).decode()
+    async with connected(server_settings(max_binary_bytes=1000)) as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            UPLOAD, {**UPLOAD_ARGS, "attachment": {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": content}}
+        )
+
+    assert not result.is_error
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "attachment",
+    [
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "not base64!!"},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "YQ"},  # missing padding
+        {"filename": 'a".bin', "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "a\r\nb.bin", "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "a\nb.bin", "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "a" + chr(0x2028) + "b.bin", "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "", "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "x" * 300, "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "YQ==", "content_type": "text/plain\r\nX: 1"},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "YQ==", "content_type": 5},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "YQ==", "path": "/etc/passwd"},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": "YQ==", "unknown": 1},
+        {"filename": "a.bin"},
+        {"content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": 1, "content_base64": "YQ=="},
+        {"filename": "a.bin", "content_base64": 1},
+        "just a string",
+        ["a.bin", "YQ=="],
+    ],
+    ids=lambda a: json.dumps(a)[:60],
+)
+async def test_malformed_uploads_are_rejected_before_gitea(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, attachment: Any
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(UPLOAD, {**UPLOAD_ARGS, "attachment": attachment})
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert gitea_calls(httpx_mock) == []
+
+
+# Raw method and READ_ONLY
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "method", ["TRACE", "CONNECT", "OPTIONS", "HEAD", "get", "G ET", "", "GET\r\n"]
+)
+async def test_raw_methods_outside_the_enum_are_rejected(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, method: str
+) -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_api_request", {"method": method, "path": "/user"})
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "invalid_argument"
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"])
+async def test_read_only_mode_refuses_every_non_get_raw_call(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, method: str
+) -> None:
+    async with connected(server_settings(read_only=True)) as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_api_request", {"method": method, "path": "/repos/o/r/issues", "body": {}}
+        )
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "read_only"
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+async def test_read_only_mode_does_not_list_or_run_write_tools(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    async with connected(server_settings(read_only=True)) as client:
+        names = {tool.name for tool in (await client.list_tools()).tools}
+        with pytest.raises(MCPError):
+            await client.call_tool("gitea_issue_create_issue", {**REPO, "body": {"title": "x"}})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPError):
+            await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_delete", REPO)
+
+    assert "gitea_issue_create_issue" not in names and "gitea_repo_delete" not in names
+    assert "gitea_repo_get" in names
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+# Deep JSON
+
+
+def nest(depth: int, leaf: Any = "x") -> Any:
+    value = leaf
+    for _ in range(depth):
+        value = {"a": value}
+    return value
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [10, 60, 95])
+async def test_deeply_nested_arguments_give_a_result_not_an_exception(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, depth: int
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/issues", status_code=422, json={"message": "no"}
+    )
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool(
+            "gitea_api_request",
+            {"method": "POST", "path": "/repos/o/r/issues", "body": nest(depth)},
+        )
+
+    assert result.is_error
+    assert json.loads(result.content[0].text)["error"]["kind"] == "validation_failed"
+
+
+async def test_a_recursion_error_during_validation_is_a_generic_error_result(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    def explode(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        raise RecursionError("maximum recursion depth exceeded")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "validate_arguments", explode)
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO)
+
+    assert error_of(result)["kind"] == "internal_error"
+    assert "RecursionError" not in result.content[0].text
+    assert httpx_mock.get_requests() == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [101, 2000, 50_000])
+async def test_deeply_nested_gitea_responses_are_returned_as_text(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, depth: int
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo",
+        content=("[" * depth + "]" * depth).encode(),
+        headers={"content-type": "application/json"},
+    )
+    async with connected() as client:
+        result = await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", REPO)
+
+    assert not result.is_error
+    assert isinstance(result.structured_content["data"], str)  # type: ignore[index]
+
+
+# HTTP boundary
+
+
+def http_client(app: Any) -> TestClient:
+    return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080")
+
+
+def mcp_headers(**extra: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {
+        "Authorization": f"Bearer {BEARER_TOKEN}",
+        "Content-Type": "application/json",
+        "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream",
+        **extra,
+    }
+
+
+def test_a_body_over_the_cap_gets_413() -> None:
+    settings = server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN)
+    with http_client(build_http_app(settings)) as client:
+        response = client.post(
+            "/mcp", content=b"x" * (max_request_body_size(settings) + 1), headers=mcp_headers()
+        )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 413
+
+
+def test_a_non_json_content_type_gets_400() -> None:
+    with http_client(build_http_app(server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN))) as client:
+        for content_type in (
+            "text/plain",
+            "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+            "multipart/form-data",
+        ):
+            response = client.post(
+                "/mcp", content=b"{}", headers=mcp_headers(**{"Content-Type": content_type})
+            )
+            assert response.status_code == 400, content_type
+
+
+def test_a_foreign_host_header_gets_421() -> None:
+    with http_client(build_http_app(server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN))) as client:
+        for host in ("evil.example.com", "evil.example.com:8080", "127.0.0.1.evil.example.com"):
+            response = client.post("/mcp", content=b"{}", headers=mcp_headers(Host=host))
+            assert response.status_code == 421, host
+
+
+def test_a_foreign_origin_gets_403() -> None:
+    with http_client(build_http_app(server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN))) as client:
+        for origin in ("https://evil.example.com", "http://127.0.0.1.evil.example.com", "null"):
+            response = client.post("/mcp", content=b"{}", headers=mcp_headers(Origin=origin))
+            assert response.status_code == 403, origin
+
+
+def test_malformed_and_deeply_nested_json_rpc_gets_a_parse_error_not_a_crash() -> None:
+    deep = "[" * 5000 + "]" * 5000
+    bodies = [
+        b"not json",
+        b"{",
+        b"[]",
+        b'{"jsonrpc":"2.0"}',
+        (
+            '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"gitea_api_request",'
+            f'"arguments":{{"method":"POST","path":"/x","body":{deep}}}}}}}'
+        ).encode(),
+    ]
+    for body in bodies:
+        with http_client(build_http_app(server_settings(mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN))) as client:
+            response = client.post("/mcp", content=body, headers=mcp_headers())
+        assert response.status_code in {400, 422}, body[:20]
+        assert "Traceback" not in response.text
+
+
+async def test_the_listing_is_unaffected_by_all_of_the_above() -> None:
+    async with connected() as client:
+        assert isinstance(client, Client)
+        assert len((await client.list_tools()).tools) == 538

tests/security/test_oauth_csrf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+"""CSRF, origin and browser-binding checks of the consent and callback routes (SEC-17, SEC-19)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import PENDING_TTL
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    BASE,
+    CLIENT_STATE,
+    CSRF_FIELD,
+    GITEA_CODE,
+    REDIRECT,
+    FakeClock,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    exchange_code,
+    gitea_requests,
+    mock_gitea_login,
+    pkce,
+    query_of,
+    register,
+    start_flow,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def open_consent(client: TestClient, registration: dict[str, str]) -> tuple[dict[str, str], str]:
+    """Register and call /authorize, open the consent page; return (form fields, consent URL)."""
+    authorize = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "redirect_uri": REDIRECT,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+        },
+    )
+    consent_url = authorize.headers["location"]
+    match = CSRF_FIELD.search(client.get(consent_url).text)
+    assert match is not None
+    form = {"request": query_of(consent_url)["request"], "csrf": match.group(1)}
+    return {**form, "decision": "approve"}, consent_url
+
+
+def assert_refused(response: object) -> None:
+    assert response.status_code == 400  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    assert "location" not in response.headers  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+# Consent POST (SEC-17)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "headers",
+    [
+        {},
+        {"Origin": "null"},
+        {"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
+        {"Origin": "http://mcp.example.com"},
+        {"Origin": "https://mcp.example.com.evil.example"},
+        {"Referer": "https://evil.example/page"},
+        {"Referer": "not a url"},
+        {"Origin": "https://evil.example", "Referer": f"{BASE}/oauth/consent"},
+    ],
+    ids=lambda headers: ",".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in headers.items()) or "no-origin-no-referer",
+)
+def test_consent_post_without_a_matching_origin_is_refused(headers: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    form, _ = open_consent(client, register(client).json())
+
+    response = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers=headers)
+
+    assert_refused(response)
+    # The request was not consumed: the real form still works afterwards.
+    assert client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Origin": BASE}).status_code == 303
+
+
+def test_consent_post_falls_back_to_the_referer_origin() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    form, consent_url = open_consent(client, register(client).json())
+
+    response = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Referer": consent_url})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+
+
+def test_consent_post_without_the_csrf_cookie_is_refused() -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    form, _ = open_consent(client, register(client).json())
+
+    assert_refused(browser(oauth.app).post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Origin": BASE}))
+
+
+def test_consent_post_with_a_mismatched_csrf_token_is_refused() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    form, _ = open_consent(client, register(client).json())
+
+    assert_refused(
+        client.post("/oauth/consent", data={**form, "csrf": "x" * 43}, headers={"Origin": BASE})
+    )
+    assert_refused(
+        client.post("/oauth/consent", data={**form, "csrf": ""}, headers={"Origin": BASE})
+    )
+    missing = {key: value for key, value in form.items() if key != "csrf"}
+    assert_refused(client.post("/oauth/consent", data=missing, headers={"Origin": BASE}))
+
+
+def test_a_valid_consent_still_works_and_is_single_use() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    form, _ = open_consent(client, register(client).json())
+
+    approved = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Origin": BASE})
+    replay = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Origin": BASE})
+
+    assert approved.status_code == 303
+    assert approved.headers["location"].startswith(
+        "https://gitea.example.com/login/oauth/authorize"
+    )
+    assert_refused(replay)
+
+
+# Callback
+
+
+def test_callback_without_the_binding_cookie_is_refused_and_audited(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, register(client).json(), pkce()[1])
+
+    response = browser(oauth.app).get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+
+    assert_refused(response)
+    assert gitea_requests(httpx_mock, "https://gitea.example.com") == []
+    audit = oauth.settings.resolved_audit_log_path.read_text("utf-8")
+    assert "oauth_callback_binding_mismatch" in audit
+
+
+def test_callback_with_another_flows_cookie_is_refused(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    first = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    cookies = dict(client.cookies)
+    second_client = browser(oauth.app)
+    second = start_flow(second_client, register(second_client).json(), pkce()[1])
+
+    # The cookie of flow one is presented for flow two's state.
+    attacker = browser(oauth.app)
+    for name, value in cookies.items():
+        attacker.cookies.set(name, value)
+    response = attacker.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(second)["state"]}
+    )
+
+    assert_refused(response)
+    assert query_of(first)["state"] != query_of(second)["state"]
+    assert gitea_requests(httpx_mock, "https://gitea.example.com") == []
+
+
+def test_callback_with_a_replayed_state_is_refused(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    state = query_of(start_flow(client, register(client).json(), pkce()[1]))["state"]
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+
+    first = client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+    replay = client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+
+    assert first.status_code == 302
+    assert_refused(replay)
+
+
+def test_callback_with_an_expired_or_unknown_state_is_refused() -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(clock=clock)
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    state = query_of(start_flow(client, register(client).json(), pkce()[1]))["state"]
+    clock.advance(PENDING_TTL + 1)
+
+    assert_refused(client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state}))
+    assert_refused(client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": "unknown"}))
+    assert_refused(client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE}))
+    assert_refused(client.get("/oauth/callback"))
+
+
+def test_callback_never_echoes_its_parameters() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    response = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": "code-value-123", "state": "state-value-123"}
+    )
+
+    assert "code-value-123" not in response.text and "state-value-123" not in response.text
+
+
+# Concurrent sign-ins in one browser (SEC-19)
+
+
+def test_two_interleaved_flows_in_one_browser_both_complete(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    verifier_one, challenge_one = pkce()
+    verifier_two, challenge_two = pkce()
+    first = start_flow(client, registration, challenge_one)
+    second = start_flow(client, registration, challenge_two)
+    assert len({name for name in client.cookies if "oauth-flow" in name}) == 2
+
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock, login="alice")
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock, login="alice")
+    done_first = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(first)["state"]}
+    )
+    done_second = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(second)["state"]}
+    )
+
+    assert done_first.status_code == 302 and done_second.status_code == 302
+    for done, verifier in ((done_first, verifier_one), (done_second, verifier_two)):
+        code = query_of(done.headers["location"])["code"]
+        assert exchange_code(client, registration, code, verifier).status_code == 200
+    audit = oauth.settings.resolved_audit_log_path.read_text("utf-8")
+    assert "oauth_callback_binding_mismatch" not in audit

tests/security/test_oauth_input_bounds.py

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+"""Input bounds of the unauthenticated OAuth routes (SEC-01, SEC-09)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp.server.auth.provider import RegistrationError
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import provider as provider_module
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.callback import MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import MAX_PENDING_PER_SOURCE, MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.request_context import set_client_address
+from tests.security.helpers import asgi_request
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    BASE,
+    REDIRECT,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    oauth_settings,
+    pkce,
+    register,
+)
+from tests.test_oauth_provider import client_info
+
+CHUNK = 64 * 1024
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def chunks_of(total: int) -> list[bytes]:
+    return [b"a" * CHUNK for _ in range(total // CHUNK)]
+
+
+async def test_consent_post_over_the_cap_is_413_without_reading_the_body() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app().app
+    result = await asgi_request(
+        app,
+        "POST",
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        headers={
+            "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+            "content-length": str(1024 * 1024),
+            "origin": BASE,
+        },
+        chunks=chunks_of(1024 * 1024),
+    )
+    assert result.status == 413
+    assert result.bytes_read == 0
+
+
+async def test_consent_post_without_declared_length_stops_reading_at_the_cap() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app().app
+    result = await asgi_request(
+        app,
+        "POST",
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        headers={"content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "origin": BASE},
+        chunks=chunks_of(1024 * 1024),
+    )
+    assert result.status == 413
+    assert result.bytes_read <= MAX_CONSENT_BODY_BYTES + CHUNK
+
+
+async def test_consent_multipart_is_415_without_reading_any_body() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app().app
+    result = await asgi_request(
+        app,
+        "POST",
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        headers={"content-type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=x", "origin": BASE},
+        chunks=chunks_of(512 * 1024),
+    )
+    assert result.status == 415
+    assert result.bytes_read == 0
+
+
+async def test_consent_json_body_is_415() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app().app
+    result = await asgi_request(
+        app,
+        "POST",
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        headers={"content-type": "application/json", "origin": BASE},
+        chunks=[b"{}"],
+    )
+    assert result.status == 415
+
+
+async def test_small_urlencoded_consent_post_still_reaches_the_handler() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app().app
+    result = await asgi_request(
+        app,
+        "POST",
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        headers={"content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "origin": BASE},
+        chunks=[b"request=unknown&csrf=x&decision=approve"],
+    )
+    # Reaches the handler, which answers its fixed 400 page for an unknown request.
+    assert result.status == 400
+    assert b"invalid or has expired" in result.body
+
+
+# SEC-09: pre-sign-in state cannot be flushed by one address
+
+
+def client_at(app: Starlette, address: str) -> TestClient:
+    """A browser-like client whose requests come from ``address``."""
+    return TestClient(app, base_url=BASE, client=(address, 50000), follow_redirects=False)
+
+
+def authorize(client: TestClient, registration: dict[str, str]) -> Any:
+    return client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "redirect_uri": REDIRECT,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_a_flood_of_authorize_calls_from_one_address_does_not_evict_another_users_request() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=1_000_000)).app
+    victim = client_at(app, "198.51.100.20")
+    consent_url = authorize(victim, register(victim).json()).headers["location"]
+    assert victim.get(consent_url).status_code == 200
+
+    attacker = client_at(app, "203.0.113.66")
+    registration = register(attacker).json()
+    accepted = refused = 0
+    for _ in range(1100):
+        location = authorize(attacker, registration).headers["location"]
+        if "/oauth/consent" in location:
+            accepted += 1
+        else:
+            refused += 1
+            assert "error=temporarily_unavailable" in location
+
+    assert accepted == MAX_PENDING_PER_SOURCE
+    assert refused == 1100 - MAX_PENDING_PER_SOURCE
+    assert victim.get(consent_url).status_code == 200  # still pending
+
+
+def test_registrations_per_address_are_limited() -> None:
+    app = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=1_000_000)).app
+    flooder = client_at(app, "203.0.113.66")
+
+    statuses = [register(flooder).status_code for _ in range(MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE + 5)]
+
+    assert statuses[:MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE] == [201] * MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE
+    assert statuses[MAX_REGISTRATIONS_PER_SOURCE:] == [400] * 5
+    # Another address is unaffected.
+    assert register(client_at(app, "198.51.100.20")).status_code == 201
+
+
+async def test_a_young_client_survives_a_registration_flood(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "MAX_CLIENTS", 10)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    provider = oauth.provider
+    set_client_address("198.51.100.20")
+    await provider.register_client(client_info("legit"))
+    oauth.clock.advance(60)
+
+    refused = 0
+    for number in range(40):
+        set_client_address(f"203.0.113.{number}")
+        try:
+            await provider.register_client(client_info(f"flood-{number}"))
+        except RegistrationError:
+            refused += 1
+
+    assert "legit" in provider._store.clients
+    assert refused > 0 and len(provider._store.clients) == 10
+
+    # Once clients are older than the pending window, old ones can be evicted again.
+    oauth.clock.advance(provider_module.PENDING_TTL + 1)
+    set_client_address("198.51.100.99")
+    await provider.register_client(client_info("later"))
+    assert "later" in provider._store.clients
+
+
+async def test_the_store_write_runs_off_the_event_loop(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    store = build_oauth_app().store
+    threads: list[str] = []
+    original = store._write
+
+    def recording(data: bytes) -> None:
+        threads.append(threading.current_thread().name)
+        original(data)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store, "_write", recording)
+
+    await store.save()
+
+    assert threads and threads[0] != threading.main_thread().name

tests/security/test_oauth_redirects.py

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+"""Redirect URIs accepted at dynamic client registration (SEC-05 and the base rules)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import redirect_matches_allowlist
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import browser, build_oauth_app, oauth_settings, register
+
+ALLOWLIST = ["https://claude.ai/", "https://chat.mistral.ai/", "https://client.example/cb"]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def web(**settings: object) -> TestClient:
+    return browser(build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(**settings)).app)
+
+
+def error_of(response: object) -> str:
+    assert response.status_code == 400  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    return str(response.json()["error"])  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "https://evil.example/cb",
+        "https://claude.ai.evil.example/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+        "https://evilclaude.ai/cb",
+        "https://claude.ai@evil.example/cb",
+        "https://client.example/cb2",
+        "https://client.example/other",
+        "http://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+    ],
+)
+def test_redirect_outside_the_allowlist_is_refused(uri: str) -> None:
+    response = register(web(oauth_redirect_allowlist=ALLOWLIST), [uri])
+
+    assert error_of(response) == "invalid_redirect_uri"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+        "https://CLAUDE.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+        "https://chat.mistral.ai/oauth/callback",
+        "https://client.example/cb",
+        "http://localhost:3000/callback",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:8123/cb",
+        "http://[::1]:8123/cb",
+    ],
+)
+def test_allowlisted_and_loopback_redirects_register(uri: str) -> None:
+    response = register(web(oauth_redirect_allowlist=ALLOWLIST), [uri])
+
+    assert response.status_code == 201, response.text
+
+
+def test_one_bad_uri_among_good_ones_refuses_the_registration() -> None:
+    response = register(
+        web(oauth_redirect_allowlist=ALLOWLIST),
+        ["https://claude.ai/cb", "https://evil.example/cb"],
+    )
+
+    assert error_of(response) == "invalid_redirect_uri"
+
+
+def test_default_allowlist_is_empty_and_accepts_any_https_redirect() -> None:
+    assert oauth_settings().oauth_redirect_allowlist == []
+    assert register(web(), ["https://anything.example/cb"]).status_code == 201
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "http://example.com/cb",
+        "https://example.com/cb#frag",
+        "https://user:pass@example.com/cb",
+        "javascript:alert(1)",
+        "custom-app://callback",
+        "file:///etc/passwd",
+        "data:text/html,x",
+        "ftp://example.com/cb",
+    ],
+)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("allowlist", [[], ALLOWLIST])
+def test_the_base_redirect_rules_hold_with_and_without_an_allowlist(
+    uri: str, allowlist: list[str]
+) -> None:
+    response = register(web(oauth_redirect_allowlist=allowlist), [uri])
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400, response.text
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "entry",
+    [
+        "https://claude.ai",
+        "claude.ai/",
+        "http://claude.ai/",
+        "https://user@claude.ai/",
+        "https://claude.ai/?x=1",
+        "https://claude.ai/#f",
+        "https://claude .ai/",
+        "ftp://claude.ai/",
+        "https:///",
+    ],
+)
+def test_malformed_allowlist_entries_stop_startup(entry: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        oauth_settings(oauth_redirect_allowlist=[entry])
+
+
+def test_allowlist_is_read_from_a_comma_separated_variable(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST", "https://claude.ai/, https://chat.mistral.ai/")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com")
+
+    assert Settings().oauth_redirect_allowlist == ["https://claude.ai/", "https://chat.mistral.ai/"]
+
+
+def test_prefix_matching_is_by_host_not_by_string_prefix() -> None:
+    assert redirect_matches_allowlist("https://claude.ai/x", ["https://claude.ai/"])
+    assert not redirect_matches_allowlist(
+        "https://claude.ai.evil.example/x", ["https://claude.ai/"]
+    )
+    assert not redirect_matches_allowlist("https://claude.ai:8443/x", ["https://claude.ai/"])
+    assert redirect_matches_allowlist("https://anything/x", [])
+
+
+def test_a_client_registered_before_the_allowlist_cannot_authorize() -> None:
+    from tests.test_oauth_helpers import pkce
+
+    unrestricted = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings())
+    client = browser(unrestricted.app)
+    registration = register(client, ["https://evil.example/cb"]).json()
+    assert registration["client_id"]
+
+    # Same store, allowlist now set: /authorize must refuse the old client.
+    restricted = build_oauth_app(
+        oauth_settings(oauth_redirect_allowlist=ALLOWLIST), clock=unrestricted.clock
+    )
+    restricted.store.clients.update(unrestricted.store.clients)
+    response = browser(restricted.app).get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "redirect_uri": "https://evil.example/cb",
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+        },
+    )
+
+    location = response.headers["location"]
+    assert response.status_code == 302
+    assert "error=invalid_request" in location
+    assert "/oauth/consent" not in location and "code=" not in location

tests/security/test_rate_limits.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Rate limiting covers the OAuth endpoints, IPv6 subscribers and untrusted proxies (SEC-08)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.types import Message, Receive, Scope, Send
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.rate_limit import RequestRateLimiter, client_bucket
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import ForwardedHeadersMiddleware
+from tests.test_executor_helpers import make_settings
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import browser, build_oauth_app, oauth_settings
+
+LIMIT = 3
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("method", "path"),
+    [
+        ("POST", "/token"),
+        ("POST", "/revoke"),
+        ("POST", "/register"),
+        ("GET", "/authorize"),
+        ("GET", "/oauth/callback"),
+        ("POST", "/oauth/consent"),
+        ("POST", "/mcp"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_every_unauthenticated_endpoint_is_rate_limited(method: str, path: str) -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=LIMIT)).app)
+
+    statuses = [client.request(method, path).status_code for _ in range(LIMIT + 1)]
+
+    assert statuses[LIMIT] == 429
+    assert 429 not in statuses[:LIMIT]
+
+
+def test_the_429_answer_has_retry_after_and_no_detail() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=1)).app)
+    client.post("/token")
+
+    response = client.post("/token")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 429
+    assert response.headers["retry-after"] == "60"
+    assert response.json() == {"error": {"kind": "rate_limited", "message": "Too many requests"}}
+
+
+def test_ipv6_addresses_of_one_slash_64_share_a_bucket() -> None:
+    limiter = RequestRateLimiter(make_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=2))
+
+    first = limiter.check("2001:db8:1:2::1", None)
+    second = limiter.check("2001:db8:1:2:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff", None)
+    third = limiter.check("2001:db8:1:2::abcd", None)
+    other_network = limiter.check("2001:db8:1:3::1", None)
+
+    assert first.allowed and second.allowed
+    assert not third.allowed
+    assert other_network.allowed
+
+
+def test_ipv4_clients_and_mapped_addresses_keep_their_own_bucket() -> None:
+    assert client_bucket("192.0.2.10") == "192.0.2.10"
+    assert client_bucket("::ffff:192.0.2.10") == "192.0.2.10"
+    assert client_bucket("2001:db8:1:2::1") == "2001:db8:1:2::/64"
+    assert client_bucket("fe80::1%eth0") == "fe80::/64"
+    assert client_bucket("testclient") == "testclient"
+    limiter = RequestRateLimiter(make_settings(rate_limit_per_minute=1))
+    assert limiter.check("192.0.2.10", None).allowed
+    assert limiter.check("192.0.2.11", None).allowed
+    assert not limiter.check("192.0.2.10", None).allowed
+
+
+# Forwarded headers
+
+
+class Recorder:
+    """Downstream ASGI app that remembers the client address it saw."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.clients: list[Any] = []
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
+        self.clients.append(scope.get("client"))
+
+
+def http_scope(peer: str, forwarded: str | None) -> Scope:
+    headers = [(b"host", b"mcp.example.com")]
+    if forwarded is not None:
+        headers.append((b"x-forwarded-for", forwarded.encode()))
+    return {
+        "type": "http",
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "/",
+        "scheme": "http",
+        "headers": headers,
+        "client": (peer, 5000),
+    }
+
+
+async def noop_receive() -> Message:
+    return {"type": "http.disconnect"}
+
+
+async def noop_send(message: Message) -> None:
+    return None
+
+
+async def test_forwarded_for_from_an_untrusted_peer_is_ignored_and_warned_about_once(
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+) -> None:
+    app = Recorder()
+    middleware = ForwardedHeadersMiddleware(app, "127.0.0.1")
+
+    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="aegis_gitea_mcp.transports"):
+        for _ in range(3):
+            await middleware(http_scope("172.18.0.5", "203.0.113.9"), noop_receive, noop_send)
+
+    # Spoofed header: the peer address stays the client address.
+    assert app.clients == [("172.18.0.5", 5000)] * 3
+    warnings = [r for r in caplog.records if "FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS" in r.getMessage()]
+    assert len(warnings) == 1
+    assert "203.0.113.9" not in warnings[0].getMessage()
+    assert "172.18.0.5" not in warnings[0].getMessage()
+
+
+async def test_forwarded_for_from_a_trusted_peer_is_applied_without_a_warning(
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+) -> None:
+    app = Recorder()
+    middleware = ForwardedHeadersMiddleware(app, "172.18.0.0/16, 127.0.0.1")
+
+    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="aegis_gitea_mcp.transports"):
+        await middleware(http_scope("172.18.0.5", "203.0.113.9"), noop_receive, noop_send)
+        await middleware(http_scope("127.0.0.1", "203.0.113.10"), noop_receive, noop_send)
+
+    assert [client[0] for client in app.clients] == ["203.0.113.9", "203.0.113.10"]
+    assert caplog.records == []
+
+
+async def test_requests_without_forwarded_for_never_warn(caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+    app = Recorder()
+    middleware = ForwardedHeadersMiddleware(app, "127.0.0.1")
+
+    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="aegis_gitea_mcp.transports"):
+        await middleware(http_scope("198.51.100.7", None), noop_receive, noop_send)
+
+    assert caplog.records == []
+    assert app.clients == [("198.51.100.7", 5000)]
+
+
+async def test_wildcard_trusts_every_peer_without_a_warning(
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+) -> None:
+    app = Recorder()
+    middleware = ForwardedHeadersMiddleware(app, "*")
+
+    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="aegis_gitea_mcp.transports"):
+        await middleware(http_scope("198.51.100.7", "203.0.113.9"), noop_receive, noop_send)
+
+    assert app.clients[0][0] == "203.0.113.9"
+    assert caplog.records == []

tests/security/test_redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+"""Credentials never reach results, errors, logs, the audit file or ``repr`` output.
+
+Every secret the server knows (the Gitea token, the MCP bearer, the OAuth client secret,
+the store key, a user's Gitea access and refresh tokens and our own issued tokens) is
+planted in Gitea's answers, successful and failed, and in the incoming requests.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import get_audit_logger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.identity import Identity
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import PendingAuthorization
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import SessionRecord
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import UpstreamTokens
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import AccessLogQueryFilter, run_http
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    API,
+    APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    BEARER_TOKEN,
+    ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    USER_REFRESH,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    mcp_client,
+    oauth_settings,
+    sign_in,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def static_secrets() -> list[str]:
+    return [GITEA_TOKEN, BEARER_TOKEN, APP_CLIENT_SECRET, ENCRYPTION_KEY, USER_TOKEN, USER_REFRESH]
+
+
+def everything_secret(extra: list[str]) -> str:
+    return " ".join([*static_secrets(), *extra])
+
+
+def assert_clean(text: str, secrets: list[str]) -> None:
+    for secret in secrets:
+        assert secret not in text, f"secret leaked: {secret[:6]}..."
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", ["off", "mask", "block"])
+async def test_no_secret_reaches_a_result_the_audit_file_or_the_logs(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
+    mode: str,
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode))
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    # The client secret the SDK issues at registration is plain hex without a recognisable
+    # prefix: it is stored (encrypted) but cannot be pattern masked, and Gitea never sees it.
+    issued = [flow.tokens["access_token"], flow.tokens["refresh_token"]]
+    # SECRET_DETECTION_MODE=off disables pattern matching, which is what protects our own
+    # issued agm_ tokens (only hashes of them live on the server, so they cannot be redacted
+    # exactly); every other secret is redacted exactly in all modes.
+    secrets = static_secrets() if mode == "off" else [*static_secrets(), *issued]
+    # The admin identity is not the OAuth user: Gitea never shows it that user's tokens, so
+    # only the server's own secrets (and, with pattern masking, our issued tokens) apply.
+    admin_secrets = [GITEA_TOKEN, BEARER_TOKEN, APP_CLIENT_SECRET, ENCRYPTION_KEY]
+    blob = everything_secret(issued)
+
+    # The admin identity's lookup, then success and failure bodies that echo every secret.
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/user", json={"login": "admin"}, is_reusable=True)
+    echo = {"is_reusable": True}
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/octo/ok", json={"description": blob, blob: "key"}, **echo
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/octo/bad",
+        status_code=422,
+        json={"message": blob, "errors": [blob]},
+        **echo,
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/octo/text", text=blob, headers={"content-type": "text/plain"}, **echo
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/boom", status_code=500, text=blob, **echo)
+
+    results: list[Any] = []
+    # One app per identity: the SDK's session manager can only run once per app.
+    apps = [
+        (oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]),
+        (build_oauth_app(oauth.settings).app, BEARER_TOKEN),
+    ]
+    for app, token in apps:
+        async with mcp_client(app, token) as mcp:
+            for repo in ("ok", "bad", "boom"):
+                results.append(
+                    await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": repo})
+                )
+            results.append(
+                await mcp.call_tool(
+                    "gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/octo/text"}
+                )
+            )
+
+    texts = [result.content[0].text for result in results]
+    per_identity = [
+        (results[:4], secrets),
+        (results[4:], [*admin_secrets, *(issued if mode != "off" else [])]),
+    ]
+    for group, forbidden in per_identity:
+        for result in group:
+            assert_clean(result.content[0].text, forbidden)
+            assert_clean(json.dumps(result.structured_content), forbidden)
+    assert any("[REDACTED]" in text for text in texts)  # the redaction happened, not an empty body
+    everything = [*secrets, *admin_secrets]
+    assert_clean(get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), everything)
+    assert_clean(caplog.text, everything)
+    captured = capsys.readouterr()
+    assert_clean(captured.out + captured.err, everything)
+
+
+async def test_exceptions_during_a_call_do_not_leak_secrets(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    secrets = static_secrets()
+
+    async def explode(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("failure carrying " + " ".join(secrets))
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(oauth.extras.executor, "execute", explode)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/user", json={"login": "admin"}, is_reusable=True)
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, BEARER_TOKEN) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"})
+
+    assert result.is_error
+    assert_clean(result.content[0].text, secrets)
+    assert_clean(caplog.text, secrets)
+    assert_clean(get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), secrets)
+    assert "RuntimeError" not in result.content[0].text  # no exception details by default
+
+
+async def test_validation_errors_never_contain_argument_values(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    planted = "sekret-value-" + GITEA_TOKEN
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, BEARER_TOKEN) as mcp:
+        results = [
+            await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": planted + "?x#y", "repo": "r"}),
+            await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": 12345, "repo": planted}),
+            await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "extra": planted}),
+            await mcp.call_tool("gitea_api_request", {"method": planted, "path": "/x"}),
+            await mcp.call_tool("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": planted}),
+            await mcp.call_tool(
+                "gitea_api_request",
+                {"method": "GET", "path": "/user", "sudo": "not valid " + planted},
+            ),
+        ]
+
+    for result in results:
+        assert result.is_error
+        assert planted not in result.content[0].text
+        assert GITEA_TOKEN not in result.content[0].text
+    assert planted not in get_audit_logger().log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+# Access logs
+
+
+def uvicorn_access_record(path_with_query: str) -> logging.LogRecord:
+    return logging.LogRecord(
+        name="uvicorn.access",
+        level=logging.INFO,
+        pathname=__file__,
+        lineno=1,
+        msg='%s - "%s %s HTTP/%s" %d',
+        args=("127.0.0.1:5000", "GET", path_with_query, "1.1", 302),
+        exc_info=None,
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    [
+        "/oauth/callback?code=one-time-gitea-code&state=state-secret-value",
+        "/oauth/consent?request=pending-request-secret",
+        "/authorize?client_id=c&code_challenge=abc&state=client-state-secret",
+    ],
+)
+def test_access_log_lines_drop_the_query_string(path: str) -> None:
+    record = uvicorn_access_record(path)
+
+    assert AccessLogQueryFilter().filter(record)
+
+    line = record.getMessage()
+    assert "[redacted]" in line
+    assert path.split("?")[0] in line
+    for secret in (
+        "one-time-gitea-code",
+        "state-secret-value",
+        "pending-request-secret",
+        "client-state-secret",
+        "code_challenge",
+    ):
+        assert secret not in line
+
+
+def test_the_runner_installs_the_access_log_filter(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp import transports
+
+    access_logger = logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(access_logger, "filters", [])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", lambda *a, **k: None)
+    caplog.set_level(logging.INFO, logger="uvicorn.access")
+
+    assert run_http(oauth_settings()) == 0
+    access_logger.info(
+        '%s - "%s %s HTTP/%s" %d',
+        "127.0.0.1:5000",
+        "GET",
+        "/oauth/callback?code=one-time-gitea-code&state=state-secret-value",
+        "1.1",
+        302,
+    )
+
+    assert "one-time-gitea-code" not in caplog.text
+    assert "[redacted]" in caplog.text
+
+
+# repr
+
+
+def test_repr_of_settings_and_secret_holding_objects_contains_no_secret() -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings()
+    identity = Identity(login="alice", mode="oauth", token=USER_TOKEN, redact=(USER_REFRESH,))
+    session = SessionRecord(
+        session_id="session-id-value",
+        client_id="c1",
+        login="alice",
+        is_admin=False,
+        gitea_access_token=USER_TOKEN,
+        gitea_refresh_token=USER_REFRESH,
+        gitea_expires_at=None,
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        resource="https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+        created_at=0.0,
+        previous_refresh_hash="hash-of-previous-refresh",
+    )
+    upstream = UpstreamTokens(access_token=USER_TOKEN, refresh_token=USER_REFRESH, expires_at=None)
+    pending = PendingAuthorization(
+        client_id="c1",
+        client_name="Client",
+        redirect_uri="https://client.example/cb",
+        redirect_uri_provided_explicitly=True,
+        code_challenge="challenge",
+        client_state="client-state-secret",
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        resource="https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+        code_verifier="pkce-verifier-secret",
+        csrf_hash="csrf-hash-secret",
+        binding_hash="binding-hash-secret",
+    )
+
+    rendered = [
+        repr(settings),
+        str(settings),
+        repr(identity),
+        repr(session),
+        repr(upstream),
+        repr(pending),
+        repr(settings.gitea_token),
+        repr(settings.model_dump()),
+    ]
+
+    for text in rendered:
+        assert_clean(text, [*static_secrets(), "client-state-secret", "pkce-verifier-secret"])
+        assert "csrf-hash-secret" not in text and "binding-hash-secret" not in text
+        assert "hash-of-previous-refresh" not in text
+    assert "**********" in repr(settings.gitea_token)
+
+
+def test_secrets_in_object_keys_are_masked_like_values() -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.security import sanitize_data
+
+    token = "agm_" + "A1b2C3d4E5f6G7h8I9j0K1l2M3n4O5p6Q7r8S9t0U1v"
+    nested = {"outer": [{token: "value", "plain": token}]}
+
+    masked = sanitize_data(nested, mode="mask")
+    blocked = sanitize_data(nested, mode="block")
+
+    assert token not in json.dumps(masked) and token not in json.dumps(blocked)
+    assert masked["outer"][0]["plain"] != token
+    assert blocked != nested
+
+
+# Configuration errors and a real stdio process
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("variable", "value"),
+    [
+        ("GITEA_URL", "https://user:" + GITEA_TOKEN + "@gitea.example.com"),
+        ("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com?token=" + GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("MCP_BEARER_TOKEN", "short-" + "x" * 5),
+        ("PUBLIC_BASE_URL", "http://mcp.example.com/" + GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("OAUTH_SCOPES", GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY", "tooshort-" + ENCRYPTION_KEY[:5]),
+        ("MCP_PORT", GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("MCP_PATH", GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS", GITEA_TOKEN),
+        ("LOG_LEVEL", GITEA_TOKEN),
+    ],
+)
+def test_configuration_errors_name_the_setting_but_never_echo_its_value(
+    variable: str,
+    value: str,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
+) -> None:
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp import cli
+    from aegis_gitea_mcp.cli import main
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", GITEA_TOKEN)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(variable, value)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "configure_logging", lambda level: None)
+
+    assert main(["serve", "--transport", "http"]) == 2
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert variable in err
+    assert value not in err and GITEA_TOKEN not in err
+    assert "Traceback" not in err
+
+
+async def test_a_real_stdio_process_keeps_every_secret_out_of_stdout_stderr_and_the_audit_file(
+    tmp_path: Any,
+) -> None:
+    import sys
+
+    from mcp import Client
+    from mcp.client.stdio import StdioServerParameters, stdio_client
+
+    secrets = [GITEA_TOKEN, BEARER_TOKEN, APP_CLIENT_SECRET, ENCRYPTION_KEY]
+    env = {
+        "GITEA_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:9",  # nothing listens: every call fails
+        "GITEA_TOKEN": GITEA_TOKEN,
+        "MCP_BEARER_TOKEN": BEARER_TOKEN,
+        "GITEA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET": APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        "TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY": ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        "DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "state"),
+        "AUDIT_LOG_PATH": str(tmp_path / "state" / "audit.log"),
+        "REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS": "2",
+        "LOG_LEVEL": "DEBUG",
+    }
+    params = StdioServerParameters(
+        command=sys.executable,
+        args=["-m", "aegis_gitea_mcp.cli", "serve", "--transport", "stdio"],
+        env=env,
+        cwd=str(tmp_path),
+    )
+    stderr_path = tmp_path / "stderr.log"
+    with stderr_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8") as errlog:
+        async with Client(stdio_client(params, errlog=errlog)) as client:
+            results = [
+                await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"}),
+                await client.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": 5}),
+                await client.call_tool("gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/user"}),
+            ]
+
+    for result in results:
+        assert result.is_error
+        assert_clean(result.content[0].text, secrets)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    assert_clean(stderr_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), secrets)
+    assert_clean((tmp_path / "state" / "audit.log").read_text(encoding="utf-8"), secrets)

tests/security/test_secret_echo.py

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+"""Secret values that pass through tool calls are never echoed back to the model.
+
+Covers stored webhook authorization headers (SEC-02), Action secrets and
+submitted credential fields. Credential-issuing operations are the documented
+exception: they return the credential they just minted.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp import Client
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea.executor import CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS
+from tests.test_server_helpers import API, audit_entries, connected, mock_user, server_settings
+
+STORED_HEADER = "Bearer webhook-target-secret-0123456789"
+BASIC_HEADER = "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZC1vZi10aGUtd2ViaG9vaw=="
+MODES = ["off", "mask", "block"]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def hook(header: str | None = STORED_HEADER) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "id": 3,
+        "type": "gitea",
+        "active": True,
+        "config": {"url": "https://ci.example.org/hook", "content_type": "json"},
+        "authorization_header": header,
+    }
+
+
+async def call(client: Client, name: str, arguments: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, Any]:
+    result = await client.call_tool(name, arguments)
+    return result.content[0].text, result.structured_content  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+
+
+HOOK_CASES = [
+    ("gitea_hook_repo_list_hooks", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"}, "GET", "/repos/o/r/hooks", True),
+    (
+        "gitea_hook_repo_get_hook",
+        {"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "id": 3},
+        "GET",
+        "/repos/o/r/hooks/3",
+        False,
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_hook_repo_edit_hook",
+        {"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "id": 3, "body": {"active": True}},
+        "PATCH",
+        "/repos/o/r/hooks/3",
+        False,
+    ),
+    ("gitea_hook_org_list_hooks", {"org": "acme"}, "GET", "/orgs/acme/hooks", True),
+    ("gitea_hook_org_get_hook", {"org": "acme", "id": 3}, "GET", "/orgs/acme/hooks/3", False),
+    ("gitea_hook_user_list_hooks", {}, "GET", "/user/hooks", True),
+    ("gitea_hook_user_get_hook", {"id": 3}, "GET", "/user/hooks/3", False),
+    ("gitea_admin_list_hooks", {}, "GET", "/admin/hooks", True),
+    ("gitea_admin_get_hook", {"id": 3}, "GET", "/admin/hooks/3", False),
+    (
+        "gitea_api_request",
+        {"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/o/r/hooks"},
+        "GET",
+        "/repos/o/r/hooks",
+        True,
+    ),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "method", "path", "is_list"), HOOK_CASES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("header", [STORED_HEADER, BASIC_HEADER])
+async def test_stored_webhook_authorization_header_is_never_returned(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+    mode: str,
+    tool: str,
+    arguments: dict[str, Any],
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    is_list: bool,
+    header: str,
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    stored = hook(header)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method=method, url=f"{API}{path}", json=[stored, hook(None)] if is_list else stored
+    )
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
+        text, structured = await call(client, tool, arguments)
+
+    assert header not in text
+    assert header not in json.dumps(structured)
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in text
+    # The rest of the hook stays readable.
+    assert "ci.example.org" in text
+    assert header not in json.dumps(audit_entries())
+
+
+async def test_empty_authorization_header_stays_visible_as_empty(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/hooks/3", json=hook(""))
+    async with connected() as client:
+        _, structured = await call(
+            client, "gitea_hook_repo_get_hook", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "id": 3}
+        )
+
+    assert structured["data"]["authorization_header"] == ""
+
+
+async def test_nested_secret_fields_are_redacted_by_key_name(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/hooks",
+        json=[{"config": {"url": "https://x.example", "secret": "plain-shared-secret"}}],
+    )
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode="off")) as client:
+        text, _ = await call(client, "gitea_hook_repo_list_hooks", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"})
+
+    assert "plain-shared-secret" not in text
+
+
+async def test_credential_issuing_operations_still_return_their_credential(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    assert "userCreateToken" in CREDENTIAL_ISSUING_OPERATIONS
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    minted = "a" * 20 + "0123456789abcdef"
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=f"{API}/users/alice/tokens", json={"id": 1, "name": "ci", "sha1": minted}
+    )
+    async with connected() as client:
+        text, _ = await call(
+            client, "gitea_user_create_token", {"username": "alice", "body": {"name": "ci"}}
+        )
+
+    assert minted in text
+    # ... but the audit file never contains it.
+    assert minted not in json.dumps(audit_entries())
+
+
+# Action secrets: names and metadata only, never values
+
+VALUE = "Sup3r-Secret-Action-Value!"
+SHORT_VALUE = "pw"
+
+
+def listing_with_values() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """What Gitea sends (names and creation times), plus a hostile ``data`` field."""
+    return [
+        {"name": "DEPLOY_KEY", "created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "data": VALUE},
+        {"name": "NPM_TOKEN", "created": "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z", "description": "ci"},
+    ]
+
+
+SECRET_LISTINGS = [
+    ("gitea_actions_repo_list_secrets", {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"}, "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets"),
+    ("gitea_actions_org_list_secrets", {"org": "acme"}, "/orgs/acme/actions/secrets"),
+    (
+        "gitea_api_request",
+        {"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets"},
+        "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets",
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_api_request",
+        {"method": "GET", "path": "/user/actions/secrets"},
+        "/user/actions/secrets",
+    ),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "path"), SECRET_LISTINGS)
+async def test_listing_secrets_returns_names_and_metadata_never_values(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, mode: str, tool: str, arguments: dict[str, Any], path: str
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}{path}", json=listing_with_values())
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
+        text, structured = await call(client, tool, arguments)
+
+    assert VALUE not in text and VALUE not in json.dumps(structured)
+    names = [item["name"] for item in structured["data"]]
+    assert names == ["DEPLOY_KEY", "NPM_TOKEN"]
+    assert structured["data"][0]["created"] == "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+    assert structured["data"][1]["description"] == "ci"
+
+
+async def test_a_secret_path_in_a_repository_is_not_mistaken_for_action_secrets(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/contents/secrets", json=[{"name": "a", "data": "kept"}]
+    )
+    async with connected() as client:
+        _, structured = await call(
+            client, "gitea_api_request", {"method": "GET", "path": "/repos/o/r/contents/secrets"}
+        )
+
+    assert structured["data"][0]["data"] == "kept"
+
+
+SECRET_WRITES = [
+    (
+        "gitea_actions_update_repo_secret",
+        {"owner": "o", "repo": "r", "secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
+        "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_actions_update_org_secret",
+        {"org": "acme", "secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
+        "/orgs/acme/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_actions_update_user_secret",
+        {"secretname": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
+        "/user/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY",
+    ),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [VALUE, SHORT_VALUE])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "path"), SECRET_WRITES)
+async def test_updating_a_secret_never_echoes_the_submitted_value(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+    mode: str,
+    value: str,
+    tool: str,
+    arguments: dict[str, Any],
+    path: str,
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level("DEBUG")
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    # Success echoing the value, then a validation error repeating it (as Gitea 422s do).
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="PUT",
+        url=f"{API}{path}",
+        status_code=201,
+        json={"echo": value, "name": "DEPLOY_KEY"},
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="PUT",
+        url=f"{API}{path}",
+        status_code=422,
+        json={"message": f"invalid secret data: {value}", "errors": [f"data {value} too long"]},
+    )
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
+        ok = await call(client, tool, {**arguments, "body": {"data": value}})
+        failed = await call(client, tool, {**arguments, "body": {"data": value}})
+
+    for text, structured in (ok, failed):
+        assert value not in text
+        assert value not in json.dumps(structured)
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in ok[0] and "[REDACTED]" in failed[0]
+    assert value not in json.dumps(audit_entries()) and value not in caplog.text
+
+
+async def test_the_raw_tool_also_hides_a_submitted_secret_value(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="PUT",
+        url=f"{API}/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/K",
+        status_code=422,
+        json={"message": f"bad {VALUE}"},
+    )
+    async with connected() as client:
+        text, _ = await call(
+            client,
+            "gitea_api_request",
+            {
+                "method": "PUT",
+                "path": "/repos/o/r/actions/secrets/K",
+                "body": {"data": VALUE},
+            },
+        )
+
+    assert VALUE not in text and "[REDACTED]" in text
+
+
+# Other submitted credential fields
+
+CREDENTIAL_BODIES = [
+    (
+        "gitea_admin_create_user",
+        {},
+        "POST",
+        "/admin/users",
+        {"username": "bob", "email": "bob@example.com", "password": "Pa55word-Of-Bob"},
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_hook_repo_create_hook",
+        {"owner": "o", "repo": "r"},
+        "POST",
+        "/repos/o/r/hooks",
+        {"type": "gitea", "authorization_header": "Bearer hook-target-token-123", "config": {}},
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_repo_migrate",
+        {},
+        "POST",
+        "/repos/migrate",
+        {
+            "clone_addr": "https://example.org/x.git",
+            "repo_name": "x",
+            "auth_token": "migration-source-token-123",
+            "auth_password": "migration-source-pass-123",
+            "aws_secret_access_key": "aws-secret-access-key-value-123",
+        },
+    ),
+    (
+        "gitea_api_request",
+        {},
+        "POST",
+        "/orgs/acme/hooks",
+        {"config": {"secret": "shared-hook-secret-123", "url": "https://x.example"}},
+    ),
+]
+
+
+def secret_values(body: Any) -> list[str]:
+    found: list[str] = []
+    if isinstance(body, dict):
+        for key, item in body.items():
+            if isinstance(item, str) and key in {
+                "password",
+                "authorization_header",
+                "auth_token",
+                "auth_password",
+                "aws_secret_access_key",
+                "secret",
+            }:
+                found.append(item)
+            else:
+                found.extend(secret_values(item))
+    return found
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", MODES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("tool", "arguments", "method", "path", "body"), CREDENTIAL_BODIES)
+async def test_submitted_credentials_are_redacted_from_results(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+    mode: str,
+    tool: str,
+    arguments: dict[str, Any],
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    body: dict[str, Any],
+) -> None:
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    secrets = secret_values(body)
+    assert secrets
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method=method,
+        url=f"{API}{path}",
+        status_code=422,
+        json={"message": "rejected: " + " ".join(secrets), "errors": secrets},
+    )
+    request = (
+        {"method": method, "path": path, "body": body}
+        if tool == "gitea_api_request"
+        else {**arguments, "body": body}
+    )
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode=mode)) as client:
+        text, structured = await call(client, tool, request)
+
+    for secret in secrets:
+        assert secret not in text and secret not in json.dumps(structured)
+        assert secret not in json.dumps(audit_entries())
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in text
+
+
+# Credential-issuing operations: the credential goes to the caller, nowhere else
+
+
+async def test_issued_credentials_reach_the_caller_but_not_the_audit_file_or_the_logs(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level("DEBUG")
+    mock_user(httpx_mock)
+    token = "9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a099887766"
+    registration = "runner-registration-token-0123456789ABCDEF"
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=f"{API}/users/alice/tokens", json={"id": 1, "name": "ci", "sha1": token}
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST",
+        url=f"{API}/admin/actions/runners/registration-token",
+        headers={"token": registration},
+        status_code=200,
+    )
+    async with connected(server_settings(secret_detection_mode="block")) as client:
+        created, _ = await call(
+            client, "gitea_user_create_token", {"username": "alice", "body": {"name": "ci"}}
+        )
+        runner, _ = await call(client, "gitea_admin_create_runner_registration_token", {})
+
+    assert token in created and registration in runner  # the documented exemption (W-07)
+    audit_text = json.dumps(audit_entries())
+    for secret in (token, registration):
+        assert secret not in audit_text
+        assert secret not in caplog.text

tests/security/test_startup_fail_closed.py

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+"""The server refuses to start unless it is safe to: authentication off loopback, valid settings."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import cli, transports
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.cli import main
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import run_http, run_stdio
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import oauth_settings
+from tests.test_server_helpers import BEARER_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN, server_settings
+
+WILDCARD_V4 = "0.0.0.0"  # noqa: S104 (a bind address used as test input, never bound)
+WILDCARD_V6 = "::"
+NON_LOOPBACK = [
+    WILDCARD_V4,
+    WILDCARD_V6,
+    "[::]",
+    "192.168.1.10",
+    "10.0.0.5",
+    "203.0.113.5",
+    "2001:db8::1",
+    "mcp.example.com",
+    "localhost.evil.example",
+    "gitea.internal",
+    "127.1",  # not a canonical loopback address: refused rather than guessed
+    "0",
+    "128.0.0.1",
+]
+LOOPBACK = ["127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2", "127.255.255.254", "::1", "[::1]", "localhost", "LOCALHOST"]
+
+
+class Served:
+    """Replaces ``uvicorn.run`` and records whether anything was started."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def __call__(self, app: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        self.calls.append(kwargs)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def served(mock_env: None, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Served:
+    spy = Served()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", spy)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "configure_logging", lambda level: None)
+    return spy
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", NON_LOOPBACK)
+def test_a_non_loopback_bind_without_authentication_exits_2(
+    host: str, served: Served, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert run_http(server_settings(mcp_host=host)) == 2
+
+    captured = capsys.readouterr()
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "without HTTP authentication" in captured.err
+    assert captured.out == ""
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", NON_LOOPBACK)
+def test_the_serve_command_refuses_the_same_binds(
+    host: str, served: Served, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", GITEA_TOKEN)
+
+    assert main(["serve", "--transport", "http", "--host", host]) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "without HTTP authentication" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", NON_LOOPBACK[:4])
+def test_a_bearer_is_enough_to_bind_publicly(host: str, served: Served) -> None:
+    assert run_http(server_settings(mcp_host=host, mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN)) == 0
+
+    assert len(served.calls) == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", NON_LOOPBACK[:4])
+def test_complete_oauth_is_enough_to_bind_publicly(host: str, served: Served) -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings(mcp_host=host, mcp_bearer_token=None, gitea_token=None)
+
+    assert run_http(settings) == 0
+    assert len(served.calls) == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", LOOPBACK)
+def test_loopback_binds_may_run_without_authentication(host: str, served: Served) -> None:
+    assert run_http(server_settings(mcp_host=host)) == 0
+
+    assert len(served.calls) == 1
+
+
+# Half-configured authentication
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "missing",
+    [
+        "gitea_oauth_client_id",
+        "gitea_oauth_client_secret",
+        "token_encryption_key",
+        "public_base_url",
+    ],
+)
+def test_half_configured_oauth_exits_2_and_never_falls_back_to_no_auth(
+    missing: str, served: Served, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings(mcp_host=WILDCARD_V4, mcp_bearer_token=None, **{missing: None})
+
+    assert run_http(settings) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert missing.upper() in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_oauth_with_a_bearer_but_no_admin_token_exits_2(
+    served: Served, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert run_http(oauth_settings(gitea_token=None)) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "GITEA_TOKEN" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bearer", ["", "short", "x" * 31])
+def test_a_bearer_shorter_than_32_characters_is_rejected_at_configuration(
+    bearer: str, served: Served, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", GITEA_TOKEN)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("MCP_BEARER_TOKEN", bearer)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("MCP_HOST", WILDCARD_V4)
+
+    code = main(["serve", "--transport", "http"])
+
+    if bearer == "":
+        # A blank value counts as unset, so the unauthenticated public bind is refused instead.
+        assert code == 2 and "without HTTP authentication" in capsys.readouterr().err
+    else:
+        assert code == 2
+        assert "invalid configuration" in capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert served.calls == []
+
+
+def test_an_http_public_base_url_on_a_public_host_is_rejected(
+    served: Served, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.example.com")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_TOKEN", GITEA_TOKEN)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PUBLIC_BASE_URL", "http://mcp.example.com")
+
+    assert main(["serve", "--transport", "http"]) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "PUBLIC_BASE_URL" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_a_missing_gitea_token_exits_2_for_admin_token_mode_and_stdio(
+    served: Served, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert run_http(server_settings(gitea_token=None, mcp_bearer_token=BEARER_TOKEN)) == 2
+    assert run_http(server_settings(gitea_token=None)) == 2
+    assert run_stdio(server_settings(gitea_token=None)) == 2
+
+    captured = capsys.readouterr()
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "GITEA_TOKEN" in captured.err
+    assert captured.out == ""  # stdout is reserved for JSON-RPC
+
+
+def test_an_unwritable_audit_log_exits_2_before_serving(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    served: Served,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
+) -> None:
+    blocker = tmp_path / "blocker"
+    blocker.write_text("a file where a directory is needed")
+    path = blocker / "audit.log"
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUDIT_LOG_PATH", str(path))
+
+    assert run_http(server_settings(audit_log_path=path)) == 2
+    assert run_stdio(server_settings(audit_log_path=path)) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "audit log" in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+def test_a_symlinked_audit_path_exits_2(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    served: Served,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
+) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere.log"
+    target.write_text("")
+    link = tmp_path / "audit.log"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUDIT_LOG_PATH", str(link))
+
+    assert run_http(server_settings(audit_log_path=link)) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "symbolic link" in capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert target.read_text() == ""
+
+
+def test_unknown_disabled_tools_stop_startup(
+    served: Served, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert run_http(server_settings(disabled_tools=["gitea_no_such_tool"])) == 2
+    assert run_stdio(server_settings(disabled_tools=["gitea_no_such_tool"])) == 2
+
+    assert served.calls == []
+    assert "gitea_no_such_tool" in capsys.readouterr().err

tests/security/test_token_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""The encrypted OAuth token store: permissions, encryption, key handling and ownership (SEC-13)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import transports
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import (
+    STORE_FILENAME,
+    OAuthStore,
+    OAuthStoreError,
+    SessionRecord,
+    derive_fernet_key,
+    token_hash,
+)
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import run_http
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    USER_REFRESH,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    oauth_settings,
+    sign_in,
+)
+
+OTHER_KEY = "another-key-0123456789abcdef0123456789"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def a_session() -> SessionRecord:
+    return SessionRecord(
+        session_id="s1",
+        client_id="c1",
+        login="alice",
+        is_admin=False,
+        gitea_access_token=USER_TOKEN,
+        gitea_refresh_token=USER_REFRESH,
+        gitea_expires_at=None,
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        resource="https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+        created_at=1e12,
+    )
+
+
+async def test_file_is_0600_and_a_new_directory_is_0700(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    previous = os.umask(0)
+    try:
+        directory = tmp_path / "new" / "state"
+        store = OAuthStore.load(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+        store.sessions["s1"] = a_session()
+        await store.save()
+    finally:
+        os.umask(previous)
+
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(directory.stat().st_mode) == 0o700
+    assert stat.S_IMODE((directory / STORE_FILENAME).stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    assert [entry.name for entry in directory.iterdir()] == [STORE_FILENAME]
+
+
+def test_a_symlinked_store_is_refused_and_its_target_untouched(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere"
+    target.write_bytes(b"keep me")
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).symlink_to(target)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="symlink"):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    assert target.read_bytes() == b"keep me"
+
+
+async def test_a_symlink_swapped_in_later_is_not_written_through(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere"
+    target.write_bytes(b"keep me")
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).symlink_to(target)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="symlink"):
+        await store.save()
+    assert target.read_bytes() == b"keep me"
+
+
+async def test_the_file_holds_no_plaintext_and_our_tokens_only_as_hashes(
+    tmp_path: Path, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(data_dir=tmp_path))
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock, login="alice-the-user")
+
+    raw = (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes()
+
+    for secret in (
+        USER_TOKEN,
+        USER_REFRESH,
+        flow.client_secret,
+        flow.tokens["access_token"],
+        flow.tokens["refresh_token"],
+        "alice-the-user",
+        APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    ):
+        assert secret.encode() not in raw
+    plain = Fernet(derive_fernet_key(ENCRYPTION_KEY)).decrypt(raw).decode()
+    assert flow.tokens["access_token"] not in plain
+    assert flow.tokens["refresh_token"] not in plain
+    assert token_hash(flow.tokens["access_token"]) in plain
+    assert token_hash(flow.tokens["refresh_token"]) in plain
+
+
+async def test_a_wrong_key_stops_startup_without_wiping_the_store(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    store.sessions["s1"] = a_session()
+    await store.save()
+    before = (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes()
+    served: list[Any] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", lambda *a, **k: served.append(a))
+
+    code = run_http(oauth_settings(data_dir=tmp_path, token_encryption_key=OTHER_KEY))
+
+    assert code == 2 and served == []
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY" in err and "move the file away" in err
+    assert OTHER_KEY not in err and ENCRYPTION_KEY not in err
+    assert (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes() == before
+
+
+def test_a_garbage_store_stops_startup_and_stays_on_disk(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).write_bytes(b"not a fernet token")
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    assert (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes() == b"not a fernet token"
+
+
+# SEC-13: who owns the directory
+
+
+def fake_owner(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, directory: Path) -> None:
+    """Report ``directory`` as owned by a different uid than the running process."""
+    real_stat = os.stat
+
+    def stat_other(path: Any, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> os.stat_result:
+        info = real_stat(path, *args, **kwargs)
+        if Path(path) == directory:
+            fields = list(info)
+            fields[stat.ST_UID] = info.st_uid + 1
+            return os.stat_result(fields)
+        return info
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(os, "stat", stat_other)
+
+
+async def test_a_directory_owned_by_another_user_is_refused_on_load_and_save(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    store = OAuthStore(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    fake_owner(monkeypatch, directory)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="owned by another user"):
+        OAuthStore.load(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="owned by another user"):
+        await store.save()
+    assert list(directory.iterdir()) == []
+
+
+async def test_a_group_or_world_writable_directory_that_cannot_be_tightened_is_refused(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    directory.chmod(0o777)
+
+    def refuse(self: Path, mode: int) -> None:
+        raise PermissionError("not permitted")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "chmod", refuse)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="writable by group or others"):
+        OAuthStore.load(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY)
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="writable by group or others"):
+        await OAuthStore(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY).save()
+    assert list(directory.iterdir()) == []
+
+
+async def test_a_loose_directory_we_own_is_tightened_not_refused(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    directory.chmod(0o777)
+
+    await OAuthStore.load(directory, ENCRYPTION_KEY).save()
+
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(directory.stat().st_mode) == 0o700
+
+
+def test_startup_exits_2_for_a_directory_owned_by_someone_else(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    fake_owner(monkeypatch, directory)
+    served: list[Any] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", lambda *a, **k: served.append(a))
+
+    assert run_http(oauth_settings(data_dir=directory)) == 2
+
+    assert served == []
+    assert "owned by another user" in capsys.readouterr().err

tests/test_auth.py

@@ -17,8 +17,13 @@ from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import (
     StaticBearerVerifier,
 )
 from aegis_gitea_mcp.errors import ToolError
-from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor, ToolOutcome
-from tests.test_server_helpers import API, BEARER_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN, server_settings
+from tests.test_server_helpers import (
+    API,
+    BEARER_TOKEN,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    server_settings,
+)
 
 # Static bearer verifier
 
@@ -171,3 +176,23 @@ async def test_missing_gitea_token_is_refused() -> None:
 
     with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="GITEA_TOKEN"):
         await resolver.resolve(None)
+
+
+async def test_concurrent_first_calls_send_one_login_lookup() -> None:
+    import asyncio
+
+    lookups: list[str] = []
+
+    class SlowExecutor(GiteaExecutor):
+        async def request(self, method: str, path: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> ToolOutcome:
+            lookups.append(path)
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.01)  # a real network round trip yields to other calls
+            return ToolOutcome(False, {"data": {"login": "admin"}}, 200)
+
+    settings = server_settings()
+    resolver = AdminIdentityResolver(settings, SlowExecutor(settings))
+
+    identities = await asyncio.gather(*(resolver.resolve(None) for _ in range(10)))
+
+    assert {identity.login for identity in identities} == {"admin"}
+    assert lookups == ["/user"]

tests/test_cli.py

@@ -33,3 +33,16 @@ def test_package_version_matches_pyproject() -> None:
 
     data = tomllib.loads((Path(__file__).parent.parent / "pyproject.toml").read_text())
     assert data["project"]["version"] == __version__
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["0", "65536", "-1", "http", "80.5"])
+def test_serve_rejects_bad_ports_with_a_short_message(
+    value: str, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exit_info:
+        build_parser().parse_args(["serve", "--port", value])
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert exit_info.value.code == 2
+    assert "--port" in err and "65535" in err
+    assert len(err) < 500

tests/test_config.py

@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ def test_env_names_are_case_insensitive(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None
 
 
 def test_reads_dotenv_file(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path) -> None:
-    (tmp_path / ".env").write_text("GITEA_URL=https://dotenv.example.com\nREAD_ONLY=true\n")
+    dotenv = tmp_path / ".env"
+    dotenv.write_text("GITEA_URL=https://dotenv.example.com\nREAD_ONLY=true\n")
+    dotenv.chmod(0o600)  # an implicit ./.env is only trusted with mode 0600 (SEC-04)
     reset_settings()
     settings = get_settings()
 

tests/test_oauth_flow.py

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+"""End-to-end per-user OAuth over the real HTTP app: DCR, consent, Gitea, tokens, MCP calls."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import TOKEN_PREFIX
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    API,
+    APP_CLIENT_ID,
+    APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    BASE,
+    CLIENT_STATE,
+    GITEA,
+    GITEA_CODE,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    REDIRECT,
+    TOKEN_URL,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    exchange_code,
+    form_of,
+    gitea_requests,
+    mcp_client,
+    mock_gitea_login,
+    payload,
+    pkce,
+    query_of,
+    register,
+    start_flow,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+async def test_full_flow_runs_tool_calls_as_the_signed_in_user(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    verifier, challenge = pkce()
+
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, challenge)
+
+    # Our server sends the browser to Gitea with its own PKCE, callback and scopes.
+    assert gitea_url.startswith(f"{GITEA}/login/oauth/authorize?")
+    upstream = query_of(gitea_url)
+    assert upstream["client_id"] == APP_CLIENT_ID
+    assert upstream["redirect_uri"] == f"{BASE}/oauth/callback"
+    assert upstream["response_type"] == "code"
+    assert upstream["code_challenge_method"] == "S256"
+    assert upstream["code_challenge"] != challenge  # ours, not the client's
+    assert upstream["scope"] == " ".join(oauth.settings.oauth_scopes)
+    assert upstream["state"] != CLIENT_STATE
+
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock, login="alice")
+    callback = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": upstream["state"]}
+    )
+    assert callback.status_code == 302
+    location = callback.headers["location"]
+    assert location.startswith(f"{REDIRECT}?")
+    back = query_of(location)
+    assert back["state"] == CLIENT_STATE and back["code"]
+
+    # Gitea received the code with our verifier and the app credentials.
+    (token_request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, TOKEN_URL)
+    form = form_of(token_request)
+    assert form["grant_type"] == "authorization_code"
+    assert form["code"] == GITEA_CODE
+    assert form["client_id"] == APP_CLIENT_ID
+    assert form["client_secret"] == APP_CLIENT_SECRET
+    assert form["redirect_uri"] == f"{BASE}/oauth/callback"
+    assert form["code_verifier"]
+    (user_request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/user")
+    assert user_request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+
+    tokens = exchange_code(client, registration, back["code"], verifier)
+    assert tokens.status_code == 200
+    body = tokens.json()
+    assert body["token_type"] == "Bearer"
+    assert body["expires_in"] == 3600
+    assert body["scope"] == "gitea"
+    assert body["access_token"].startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX)
+    assert body["refresh_token"].startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX)
+
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"full_name": "octo/demo"})
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url=f"{API}/admin/users", status_code=403, json={"message": "Only admins"}
+    )
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, body["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+        admin = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_admin_search_users", {})
+
+    assert not result.is_error
+    envelope = payload(result)
+    assert envelope["identity"] == {"login": "alice", "mode": "oauth", "sudo": None}
+    (repo_request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/repos/octo/demo")
+    assert repo_request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+
+    assert admin.is_error
+    error = payload(admin)
+    assert error["error"]["kind"] == "forbidden"
+    assert error["identity"]["mode"] == "oauth"
+    (admin_request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/admin/users")
+    assert admin_request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+    assert GITEA_TOKEN not in admin_request.headers["Authorization"]

tests/test_oauth_flow_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,719 @@
+"""Threat cases of the per-user OAuth flow, exercised over the real HTTP app.
+
+Covered: token expiry, refresh rotation and reuse detection, revocation, code
+replay, PKCE and client binding, state replay and expiry, the confused-deputy
+attack (browser binding), consent CSRF and clickjacking headers, redirect URI
+and resource manipulation, upstream failures, upstream refresh, the static
+bearer next to OAuth, and secrets in logs, audit entries and results.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import TOKEN_PREFIX
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    API,
+    APP_CLIENT_ID,
+    APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    BASE,
+    BEARER_TOKEN,
+    CLIENT_STATE,
+    CSRF_FIELD,
+    ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    GITEA,
+    GITEA_CODE,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    REDIRECT,
+    RESOURCE,
+    TOKEN_URL,
+    USER_REFRESH,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    exchange_code,
+    form_of,
+    gitea_requests,
+    mcp_client,
+    mock_gitea_login,
+    payload,
+    pkce,
+    query_of,
+    refresh,
+    register,
+    sign_in,
+    start_flow,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger and the rate limiter read the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def mcp_status(client: TestClient, token: str) -> int:
+    """HTTP status of an MCP request with ``token`` (401 when the token is not accepted)."""
+    response = client.post("/mcp", json={}, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    return response.status_code
+
+
+def consent_form(client: TestClient) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Register, call /authorize and open the consent page; return (request id, csrf)."""
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    authorize = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+            "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+        },
+    )
+    consent_url = authorize.headers["location"]
+    match = CSRF_FIELD.search(client.get(consent_url).text)
+    assert match is not None
+    return query_of(consent_url)["request"], match.group(1)
+
+
+def callback_after_consent(client: TestClient, **params: str) -> Any:
+    """Run the flow up to Gitea and call our callback with ``params``."""
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    return client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"], **params})
+
+
+# Discovery and the static bearer in the same app
+
+
+def test_metadata_documents_and_the_bare_protected_resource_path() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    suffixed = client.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")
+    bare = client.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource")
+    server = client.get("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server").json()
+
+    assert suffixed.status_code == bare.status_code == 200
+    assert bare.json() == suffixed.json()
+    assert bare.json()["resource"] == RESOURCE
+    assert bare.json()["authorization_servers"] == [BASE]
+    assert bare.json()["scopes_supported"] == ["gitea"]
+    assert server["issuer"] == BASE
+    assert server["registration_endpoint"] == f"{BASE}/register"
+    assert server["revocation_endpoint"] == f"{BASE}/revoke"
+    assert server["code_challenge_methods_supported"] == ["S256"]
+
+
+def test_unauthenticated_mcp_request_gets_the_oauth_challenge() -> None:
+    response = browser(build_oauth_app().app).post("/mcp", json={})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert (
+        f'resource_metadata="{BASE}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"'
+        in response.headers["WWW-Authenticate"]
+    )
+
+
+async def test_static_bearer_still_runs_as_admin_next_to_oauth(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/user", json={"login": "root"}, is_reusable=True)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"full_name": "octo/demo"})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, BEARER_TOKEN) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+
+    assert payload(result)["identity"] == {"login": "root", "mode": "admin-token", "sudo": None}
+    (request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/repos/octo/demo")
+    assert request.headers["Authorization"] == f"token {GITEA_TOKEN}"
+
+
+async def test_sudo_from_an_oauth_user_is_sent_with_the_users_own_token(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/user", status_code=403, json={"message": "no sudo"})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_user_get_current", {"sudo": "root"})
+
+    assert result.is_error and payload(result)["error"]["kind"] == "forbidden"
+    request = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/user")[-1]
+    assert request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+    assert request.headers["Sudo"] == "root"
+
+
+# Our tokens: expiry, refresh rotation, revocation
+
+
+def test_expired_access_token_is_rejected_with_401(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    oauth.clock.advance(3601)
+
+    assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) == 401
+
+
+def test_refresh_rotates_both_tokens_and_reuse_revokes_the_grant(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    with browser(oauth.app) as client:
+        flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+        old_access, old_refresh = flow.tokens["access_token"], flow.tokens["refresh_token"]
+
+        rotated = refresh(client, flow, old_refresh)
+        assert rotated.status_code == 200
+        new = rotated.json()
+        assert new["access_token"] != old_access and new["refresh_token"] != old_refresh
+        assert mcp_status(client, old_access) == 401
+        assert mcp_status(client, new["access_token"]) != 401
+
+        replay = refresh(client, flow, old_refresh)
+
+        assert replay.status_code == 400 and replay.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+        # Reuse of a rotated-out refresh token signals theft: the whole grant ends.
+        assert mcp_status(client, new["access_token"]) == 401
+        assert refresh(client, flow, new["refresh_token"]).json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+
+
+def test_refresh_honours_scope_rules(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    widened = refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["refresh_token"], scope="gitea admin")
+    same = refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["refresh_token"], scope="gitea")
+
+    assert widened.json()["error"] == "invalid_scope"
+    assert same.status_code == 200 and same.json()["scope"] == "gitea"
+
+
+def test_refresh_token_of_another_client_is_rejected(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    with browser(oauth.app) as client:
+        flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+        other = register(client).json()
+
+        response = client.post(
+            "/token",
+            data={
+                "grant_type": "refresh_token",
+                "refresh_token": flow.tokens["refresh_token"],
+                "client_id": other["client_id"],
+                "client_secret": other["client_secret"],
+            },
+        )
+
+        assert response.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+        assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) != 401
+
+
+def test_expired_refresh_token_is_rejected(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    oauth.clock.advance(31 * 24 * 3600)
+
+    assert refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["refresh_token"]).json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+
+
+def test_access_token_is_not_a_refresh_token(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    response = refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["access_token"])
+
+    assert response.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+    assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["refresh_token"]) == 401
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("which", ["access_token", "refresh_token"])
+def test_revoking_either_token_ends_the_grant(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, which: str) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    revoked = client.post(
+        "/revoke",
+        data={
+            "token": flow.tokens[which],
+            "client_id": flow.client_id,
+            "client_secret": flow.client_secret,
+        },
+    )
+
+    assert revoked.status_code == 200
+    assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) == 401
+    assert refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["refresh_token"]).json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+    assert oauth.store.sessions == {}
+
+
+def test_another_client_cannot_revoke_a_grant(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    with browser(oauth.app) as client:
+        flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+        other = register(client).json()
+
+        client.post(
+            "/revoke",
+            data={
+                "token": flow.tokens["access_token"],
+                "client_id": other["client_id"],
+                "client_secret": other["client_secret"],
+            },
+        )
+
+        assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) != 401
+
+
+# Authorization codes and states
+
+
+def test_replayed_code_is_rejected_and_revokes_the_tokens_it_produced(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+    registration = {"client_id": flow.client_id, "client_secret": flow.client_secret}
+
+    replay = exchange_code(client, registration, flow.code, flow.verifier)
+
+    assert replay.status_code == 400 and replay.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+    assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) == 401
+    assert '"oauth_code_replay"' in oauth.settings.resolved_audit_log_path.read_text("utf-8")
+
+
+def test_code_needs_the_right_pkce_verifier_and_client(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    other = register(client).json()
+    verifier, challenge = pkce()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, challenge)
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+    callback = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+    code = query_of(callback.headers["location"])["code"]
+
+    wrong_verifier = exchange_code(client, registration, code, pkce()[0])
+    wrong_client = exchange_code(client, other, code, verifier)
+    right = exchange_code(client, registration, code, verifier)
+
+    assert wrong_verifier.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+    assert wrong_client.json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+    assert right.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_expired_code_is_rejected(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    verifier, challenge = pkce()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, challenge)
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+    callback = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+    code = query_of(callback.headers["location"])["code"]
+
+    oauth.clock.advance(301)
+
+    assert exchange_code(client, registration, code, verifier).json()["error"] == "invalid_grant"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("state", [None, "", "made-up-state", "x" * 500])
+def test_unknown_state_is_a_generic_400(state: str | None) -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    params = {"code": GITEA_CODE}
+    if state is not None:
+        params["state"] = state
+
+    response = client.get("/oauth/callback", params=params)
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "location" not in response.headers
+    assert "made-up-state" not in response.text and GITEA_CODE not in response.text
+    assert response.headers["Cache-Control"] == "no-store"
+
+
+def test_expired_and_replayed_states_are_rejected(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+
+    expired_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    oauth.clock.advance(601)
+    expired = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(expired_url)["state"]}
+    )
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+    state = query_of(gitea_url)["state"]
+    first = client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+    replayed = client.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+
+    assert expired.status_code == 400
+    assert first.status_code == 302
+    assert replayed.status_code == 400
+    assert len(gitea_requests(httpx_mock, TOKEN_URL)) == 1
+
+
+def test_callback_in_a_browser_that_did_not_start_the_flow_is_refused(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    """Confused deputy: an attacker's Gitea URL opened by a victim must not mint a code."""
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    attacker = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(attacker, redirect_uris=["https://evil.example/cb"]).json()
+    authorize = attacker.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+        },
+    )
+    consent_url = authorize.headers["location"]
+    match = CSRF_FIELD.search(attacker.get(consent_url).text)
+    assert match is not None
+    approved = attacker.post(
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        data={
+            "request": query_of(consent_url)["request"],
+            "csrf": match.group(1),
+            "decision": "approve",
+        },
+        headers={"Origin": BASE},
+    )
+    state = query_of(approved.headers["location"])["state"]
+
+    victim = browser(oauth.app)  # no cookies; Gitea silently redirects the victim here
+    response = victim.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "location" not in response.headers
+    assert gitea_requests(httpx_mock, GITEA) == []
+    # The state is spent: the attacker cannot complete it either.
+    retry = attacker.get("/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": state})
+    assert retry.status_code == 400
+    audit = oauth.settings.resolved_audit_log_path.read_text("utf-8")
+    assert '"oauth_callback_binding_mismatch"' in audit
+
+
+def test_consent_page_shows_the_client_and_destination_escaped() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    registration = register(client, client_name="<script>alert(1)</script>").json()
+    authorize = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+        },
+    )
+
+    page = client.get(authorize.headers["location"])
+
+    assert page.status_code == 200
+    assert "<script>" not in page.text and "&lt;script&gt;" in page.text
+    assert "localhost:3000" in page.text
+    assert page.headers["X-Frame-Options"] == "DENY"
+    assert "frame-ancestors 'none'" in page.headers["Content-Security-Policy"]
+    assert page.headers["Cache-Control"] == "no-store"
+    cookie = page.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
+    assert cookie.startswith("__host-aegis-oauth-csrf=")
+    assert "samesite=strict" in cookie and "secure" in cookie and "httponly" in cookie
+
+
+def test_consent_post_needs_the_csrf_cookie_token_and_origin() -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    request_id, csrf = consent_form(client)
+    form = {"request": request_id, "csrf": csrf, "decision": "approve"}
+
+    origin = {"Origin": BASE}
+    cross_site = browser(oauth.app).post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers=origin)  # no cookie
+    wrong_token = client.post("/oauth/consent", data={**form, "csrf": "nope"}, headers=origin)
+    bad_origin = client.post(
+        "/oauth/consent", data=form, headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"}
+    )
+    unknown = client.post("/oauth/consent", data={**form, "request": "unknown"}, headers=origin)
+    good = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers=origin)
+    again = client.post("/oauth/consent", data=form, headers=origin)
+
+    assert [r.status_code for r in (cross_site, wrong_token, bad_origin, unknown)] == [400] * 4
+    assert good.status_code == 303
+    assert again.status_code == 400  # single use
+    binding = good.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
+    assert "__host-aegis-oauth-flow-" in binding and "samesite=lax" in binding
+
+
+def test_unknown_consent_request_page_is_a_400() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    assert client.get("/oauth/consent", params={"request": "nope"}).status_code == 400
+    assert client.get("/oauth/consent").status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_denying_consent_returns_access_denied_to_the_client() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    request_id, csrf = consent_form(client)
+
+    denied = client.post(
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        data={"request": request_id, "csrf": csrf, "decision": "deny"},
+        headers={"Origin": BASE},
+    )
+
+    assert denied.status_code == 303
+    assert denied.headers["location"].startswith(REDIRECT)
+    assert query_of(denied.headers["location"]) == {"error": "access_denied", "state": CLIENT_STATE}
+
+
+def test_gitea_error_redirects_access_denied() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    response = callback_after_consent(client, error="access_denied")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 302
+    assert query_of(response.headers["location"]) == {
+        "error": "access_denied",
+        "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+    }
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("case", ["token_500", "user_401", "no_code"])
+def test_upstream_failures_redirect_server_error_without_detail(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, case: str
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    if case == "token_500":
+        httpx_mock.add_response(
+            method="POST", url=TOKEN_URL, status_code=500, text="secret upstream detail"
+        )
+    elif case == "user_401":
+        httpx_mock.add_response(
+            method="POST", url=TOKEN_URL, json={"access_token": USER_TOKEN, "token_type": "bearer"}
+        )
+        httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/user", status_code=401)
+
+    response = callback_after_consent(client, code="" if case == "no_code" else GITEA_CODE)
+
+    location = response.headers["location"]
+    assert query_of(location) == {"error": "server_error", "state": CLIENT_STATE}
+    assert "secret upstream detail" not in location
+    assert oauth.store.sessions == {}
+
+
+def test_authorize_with_an_unregistered_redirect_uri_never_redirects() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+
+    response = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "redirect_uri": "https://evil.example/cb",
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+        },
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "location" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_authorize_for_another_resource_is_invalid_target() -> None:
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+
+    response = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": pkce()[1],
+            "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+            "resource": "https://other.example/mcp",
+        },
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 302
+    assert query_of(response.headers["location"])["error"] == "invalid_target"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "http://evil.example/cb",
+        "javascript:alert(1)",
+        "https://user:pw@evil.example/cb",
+        "https://claude.ai/cb#frag",
+        "custom-scheme://callback",
+    ],
+)
+def test_registration_rejects_unsafe_redirect_uris(uri: str) -> None:
+    response = register(browser(build_oauth_app().app), redirect_uris=[uri])
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert response.json()["error"] in {"invalid_redirect_uri", "invalid_client_metadata"}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "uri",
+    [
+        "https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback",
+        "http://localhost:51234/callback",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:8765/callback",
+        "http://[::1]:9000/cb",
+    ],
+)
+def test_registration_accepts_https_and_loopback_redirect_uris(uri: str) -> None:
+    response = register(browser(build_oauth_app().app), redirect_uris=[uri])
+
+    assert response.status_code == 201
+    assert response.json()["client_secret"]
+
+
+# Upstream (Gitea) token refresh
+
+
+async def test_gitea_token_near_expiry_is_refreshed_before_the_call(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock, expires_in=30)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST",
+        url=TOKEN_URL,
+        json={
+            "access_token": "gitea-user-access-token-NEW-0123456789",
+            "refresh_token": "gitea-user-refresh-token-NEW-0123456789",
+            "expires_in": 3600,
+            "token_type": "bearer",
+        },
+    )
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"full_name": "octo/demo"})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+
+    assert not result.is_error
+    refresh_request = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, TOKEN_URL)[-1]
+    assert form_of(refresh_request) == {
+        "grant_type": "refresh_token",
+        "refresh_token": USER_REFRESH,
+        "client_id": APP_CLIENT_ID,
+        "client_secret": APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    }
+    (repo_request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/repos/octo/demo")
+    assert repo_request.headers["Authorization"] == "Bearer gitea-user-access-token-NEW-0123456789"
+    (session,) = oauth.store.sessions.values()
+    assert session.gitea_refresh_token == "gitea-user-refresh-token-NEW-0123456789"
+
+
+async def test_gitea_invalid_grant_ends_the_session_without_admin_fallback(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock, expires_in=30)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=TOKEN_URL, status_code=400, json={"error": "invalid_grant"}
+    )
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+
+    assert result.is_error
+    error = payload(result)["error"]
+    assert error["kind"] == "identity_error"
+    assert "sign in again" in error["message"]
+    assert gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/repos") == []
+    assert oauth.store.sessions == {} and oauth.store.tokens == {}
+    assert mcp_status(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) == 401
+
+
+# Secrets never leak
+
+
+async def test_no_secret_reaches_logs_audit_or_results(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    flow = sign_in(client, httpx_mock, expires_in=30)
+    refreshed = "gitea-refreshed-token-0123456789abcdef"
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="POST", url=TOKEN_URL, json={"access_token": refreshed, "expires_in": 3600}
+    )
+    leak = f"{USER_REFRESH} {ENCRYPTION_KEY} {APP_CLIENT_SECRET} {refreshed}"
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"description": leak})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+    rotated = refresh(client, flow, flow.tokens["refresh_token"]).json()
+    client.post(
+        "/revoke",
+        data={
+            "token": rotated["access_token"],
+            "client_id": flow.client_id,
+            "client_secret": flow.client_secret,
+        },
+    )
+
+    text = result.content[0].text  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    for secret in (USER_REFRESH, ENCRYPTION_KEY, APP_CLIENT_SECRET, refreshed):
+        assert secret not in text
+    assert text.count("[REDACTED]") >= 4
+    secrets = [
+        USER_TOKEN,
+        USER_REFRESH,
+        refreshed,
+        GITEA_CODE,
+        ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        GITEA_TOKEN,
+        BEARER_TOKEN,
+        flow.client_secret,
+        flow.code,
+        flow.verifier,
+        flow.tokens["access_token"],
+        flow.tokens["refresh_token"],
+        rotated["access_token"],
+        rotated["refresh_token"],
+        query_of(flow.gitea_url)["state"],
+        query_of(flow.gitea_url)["code_challenge"],
+    ]
+    # Lines the test's own HTTP client logs about its requests to our app are not server logs.
+    logs = "\n".join(
+        record.getMessage()
+        for record in caplog.records
+        if not (record.name in {"httpx", "httpx2"} and BASE in record.getMessage())
+    )
+    assert "oauth sign-in: Gitea user alice" in logs
+    audit = oauth.settings.resolved_audit_log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert '"oauth_login"' in audit and '"oauth_revoke"' in audit
+    for secret in secrets:
+        assert secret not in logs, secret
+        assert secret not in audit, secret
+    assert TOKEN_PREFIX not in json.dumps([vars(token) for token in oauth.store.tokens.values()])
+
+
+def test_oauth_endpoints_are_rate_limited(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv("RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "2")
+    client = browser(build_oauth_app().app)
+
+    statuses = [register(client).status_code for _ in range(3)]
+
+    assert statuses == [201, 201, 429]

tests/test_oauth_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+"""Shared builders for the per-user OAuth tests: settings, a fake clock and the browser flow."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import secrets
+import time
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit
+
+import httpx
+import httpx2
+from mcp import Client
+from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.audit import AuditLogger
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.config import Settings
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.components import build_oauth_components
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.server import build_server
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import HttpAuthExtras, build_http_app
+from tests.test_executor_helpers import API, BEARER_TOKEN, GITEA_TOKEN
+
+BASE = "https://mcp.example.com"
+RESOURCE = f"{BASE}/mcp"
+GITEA = "https://gitea.example.com"
+TOKEN_URL = f"{GITEA}/login/oauth/access_token"
+USER_URL = f"{API}/user"
+APP_CLIENT_ID = "gitea-app-client-id"
+APP_CLIENT_SECRET = "gitea-app-client-secret-0123456789abcdef"
+ENCRYPTION_KEY = "token-encryption-key-0123456789abcdefghijklmnop"
+USER_TOKEN = "gitea-user-access-token-0123456789abcdef"
+USER_REFRESH = "gitea-user-refresh-token-0123456789abcdef"
+GITEA_CODE = "gitea-authorization-code-0123456789"
+REDIRECT = "http://localhost:3000/callback"
+CLIENT_STATE = "client-state-value-123"
+
+__all__ = [
+    "API",
+    "BEARER_TOKEN",
+    "GITEA_TOKEN",
+]
+
+
+class FakeClock:
+    """A controllable wall clock starting at the real time."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.now = time.time()
+
+    def __call__(self) -> float:
+        return self.now
+
+    def advance(self, seconds: float) -> None:
+        self.now += seconds
+
+
+def oauth_settings(**overrides: Any) -> Settings:
+    """A complete per-user OAuth configuration with a static bearer and an admin token."""
+    values: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "gitea_url": GITEA,
+        "gitea_token": GITEA_TOKEN,
+        "mcp_bearer_token": BEARER_TOKEN,
+        "mcp_port": 8080,
+        "oauth_enabled": True,
+        "gitea_oauth_client_id": APP_CLIENT_ID,
+        "gitea_oauth_client_secret": APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        "token_encryption_key": ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        "public_base_url": BASE,
+    }
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return Settings(**values)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class OAuthApp:
+    """The HTTP app with its OAuth pieces."""
+
+    app: Starlette
+    extras: HttpAuthExtras
+    settings: Settings
+    clock: FakeClock
+
+    @property
+    def provider(self) -> Any:
+        return self.extras.auth_server_provider
+
+    @property
+    def store(self) -> Any:
+        return self.provider._store
+
+
+def build_oauth_app(
+    settings: Settings | None = None,
+    clock: FakeClock | None = None,
+    audit: AuditLogger | None = None,
+) -> OAuthApp:
+    """Build the full HTTP app the way ``run_http`` does, with a fake clock."""
+    settings = settings or oauth_settings()
+    clock = clock or FakeClock()
+    extras = build_oauth_components(settings, clock=clock, audit=audit)
+    server = build_server(settings, resolver=extras.resolver, executor=extras.executor)
+    app = build_http_app(
+        settings,
+        server=server,
+        token_verifier=extras.token_verifier,
+        auth_server_provider=extras.auth_server_provider,
+        extra_routes=extras.extra_routes,
+        client_registration_options=extras.client_registration_options,
+        revocation_options=extras.revocation_options,
+        rate_limited_paths=extras.rate_limited_paths,
+    )
+    return OAuthApp(app=app, extras=extras, settings=settings, clock=clock)
+
+
+def browser(app: Starlette) -> TestClient:
+    """A browser-like client (cookies, no redirect following). No lifespan is started."""
+    return TestClient(app, base_url=BASE, follow_redirects=False)
+
+
+def pkce() -> tuple[str, str]:
+    verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()
+    return verifier, base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode().rstrip("=")
+
+
+def query_of(location: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {key: values[0] for key, values in parse_qs(urlsplit(location).query).items()}
+
+
+def register(client: TestClient, redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None, **extra: Any) -> Any:
+    body = {
+        "redirect_uris": redirect_uris or [REDIRECT],
+        "client_name": "Test client",
+        **extra,
+    }
+    return client.post("/register", json=body)
+
+
+def mock_gitea_login(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+    *,
+    login: str = "alice",
+    is_admin: bool = False,
+    access: str = USER_TOKEN,
+    refresh: str | None = USER_REFRESH,
+    expires_in: int | None = 3600,
+) -> None:
+    body: dict[str, Any] = {"access_token": access, "token_type": "bearer"}
+    if refresh is not None:
+        body["refresh_token"] = refresh
+    if expires_in is not None:
+        body["expires_in"] = expires_in
+    httpx_mock.add_response(method="POST", url=TOKEN_URL, json=body)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        method="GET", url=USER_URL, json={"login": login, "is_admin": is_admin, "id": 7}
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class SignIn:
+    """Everything a completed browser flow produced."""
+
+    client_id: str
+    client_secret: str
+    verifier: str
+    code: str
+    tokens: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    gitea_url: str = ""
+
+
+CSRF_FIELD = re.compile(r'name="csrf" value="([^"]+)"')
+
+
+def start_flow(client: TestClient, registration: dict[str, Any], challenge: str) -> str:
+    """``/authorize`` -> consent page -> approve; return Gitea's authorization URL."""
+    authorize = client.get(
+        "/authorize",
+        params={
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "redirect_uri": REDIRECT,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "code_challenge": challenge,
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+            "resource": RESOURCE,
+        },
+    )
+    assert authorize.status_code == 302, authorize.text
+    consent_url = authorize.headers["location"]
+    assert consent_url.startswith(f"{BASE}/oauth/consent?request=")
+    page = client.get(consent_url)
+    assert page.status_code == 200
+    match = CSRF_FIELD.search(page.text)
+    assert match is not None
+    approved = client.post(
+        "/oauth/consent",
+        data={
+            "request": query_of(consent_url)["request"],
+            "csrf": match.group(1),
+            "decision": "approve",
+        },
+        headers={"Origin": BASE},
+    )
+    assert approved.status_code == 303, approved.text
+    return str(approved.headers["location"])
+
+
+def sign_in(
+    client: TestClient, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, *, login: str = "alice", **gitea: Any
+) -> SignIn:
+    """Run the whole flow (DCR, consent, Gitea, callback, /token) for one user."""
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    verifier, challenge = pkce()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, challenge)
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock, login=login, **gitea)
+    callback = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+    assert callback.status_code == 302, callback.text
+    code = query_of(callback.headers["location"])["code"]
+    tokens = exchange_code(client, registration, code, verifier)
+    assert tokens.status_code == 200, tokens.text
+    return SignIn(
+        client_id=registration["client_id"],
+        client_secret=registration["client_secret"],
+        verifier=verifier,
+        code=code,
+        tokens=tokens.json(),
+        gitea_url=gitea_url,
+    )
+
+
+def exchange_code(
+    client: TestClient, registration: dict[str, Any], code: str, verifier: str
+) -> Any:
+    return client.post(
+        "/token",
+        data={
+            "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+            "code": code,
+            "redirect_uri": REDIRECT,
+            "client_id": registration["client_id"],
+            "client_secret": registration["client_secret"],
+            "code_verifier": verifier,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def refresh(client: TestClient, flow: SignIn, refresh_token: str, **extra: str) -> Any:
+    return client.post(
+        "/token",
+        data={
+            "grant_type": "refresh_token",
+            "refresh_token": refresh_token,
+            "client_id": flow.client_id,
+            "client_secret": flow.client_secret,
+            **extra,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+@asynccontextmanager
+async def mcp_client(app: Starlette, token: str) -> AsyncIterator[Client]:
+    """The SDK client calling ``app`` over an in-process ASGI transport with ``token``."""
+    async with (
+        app.router.lifespan_context(app),
+        httpx2.AsyncClient(
+            transport=httpx2.ASGITransport(app=app),
+            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+            base_url=BASE,
+        ) as http_client,
+        Client(streamable_http_client(f"{RESOURCE}", http_client=http_client)) as c,
+    ):
+        yield c
+
+
+def payload(result: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(result.content[0].text)  # type: ignore[no-any-return]
+
+
+def form_of(request: httpx.Request) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """The form-encoded body of a request Gitea received."""
+    return {key: values[0] for key, values in parse_qs(request.content.decode()).items()}
+
+
+def gitea_requests(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, url_prefix: str) -> list[httpx.Request]:
+    return [r for r in httpx_mock.get_requests() if str(r.url).startswith(url_prefix)]
+
+
+def mcp_status_lifespan(app: Starlette, token: str) -> int:
+    """HTTP status of a bare MCP request with ``token``, with the app's lifespan running."""
+    with browser(app) as client:
+        response = client.post("/mcp", json={}, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    return response.status_code

tests/test_oauth_provider.py

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+"""Unit tests for the OAuth provider: registration rules, caps, races and edge cases."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp.server.auth.provider import (
+    AccessToken,
+    AuthorizationParams,
+    RefreshToken,
+    RegistrationError,
+    TokenError,
+)
+from mcp.shared.auth import OAuthClientInformationFull
+from pydantic import AnyUrl
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import provider as provider_module
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.provider import (
+    OAuthTokenVerifier,
+    StoredAuthorizationCode,
+    StoredRefreshToken,
+    _ExpiringMap,
+    redirect_uri_problem,
+    s256,
+    same_resource,
+)
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    REDIRECT,
+    RESOURCE,
+    FakeClock,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    sign_in,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def client_info(client_id: str = "c1", **overrides: Any) -> OAuthClientInformationFull:
+    values: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "client_id": client_id,
+        "client_secret": "secret-0123456789",
+        "redirect_uris": [REDIRECT],
+        "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_post",
+        "scope": "gitea",
+    }
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return OAuthClientInformationFull.model_validate(values)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("uri", "ok"),
+    [
+        ("https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback", True),
+        ("http://localhost/cb", True),
+        ("http://LOCALHOST:1234/cb", True),
+        ("http://127.0.0.1:1/cb", True),
+        ("http://[::1]/cb", True),
+        ("http://127.0.0.2/cb", False),
+        ("http://localhost.evil.example/cb", False),
+        ("https://x.example:99999/cb", False),
+        ("https:///nohost", False),
+        ("ftp://x.example/cb", False),
+        ("https://x.example/cb#", False),
+    ],
+)
+def test_redirect_uri_rules(uri: str, ok: bool) -> None:
+    assert (redirect_uri_problem(uri) is None) is ok
+
+
+def test_same_resource() -> None:
+    assert same_resource("https://mcp.example.com/mcp/", "https://MCP.example.com:443/mcp")
+    assert not same_resource("https://mcp.example.com/other", "https://mcp.example.com/mcp")
+    assert not same_resource("not a url", "https://mcp.example.com/mcp")
+
+
+def test_s256_matches_rfc7636_appendix_b() -> None:
+    assert (
+        s256("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk")
+        == "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"
+    )
+
+
+def test_expiring_map_evicts_the_oldest_and_expires_entries() -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    entries: _ExpiringMap[int] = _ExpiringMap(2, clock)
+    entries.put("a", 1, 10)
+    entries.put("b", 2, 10)
+    entries.put("c", 3, 10)
+    entries.put("short", 4, 1)
+
+    assert len(entries) == 2 and entries.get("a") is None and entries.get("b") is None
+    clock.advance(2)
+    entries.put("d", 5, 10)  # the expired entry is purged, nothing live is evicted
+    assert entries.get("c") == 3 and entries.get("d") == 5 and len(entries) == 2
+    clock.advance(11)
+    assert entries.get("c") is None and entries.pop("d") is None
+
+
+async def test_registration_metadata_limits() -> None:
+    provider = build_oauth_app().provider
+
+    with pytest.raises(RegistrationError) as many:
+        await provider.register_client(
+            client_info(redirect_uris=[f"https://x.example/{n}" for n in range(11)])
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RegistrationError) as method:
+        await provider.register_client(client_info(token_endpoint_auth_method="private_key_jwt"))
+    with pytest.raises(RegistrationError) as large:
+        await provider.register_client(client_info(client_name="x" * 9000))
+
+    assert many.value.error == "invalid_redirect_uri"
+    assert method.value.error == large.value.error == "invalid_client_metadata"
+    assert provider._store.clients == {}
+
+
+async def test_public_clients_may_register() -> None:
+    provider = build_oauth_app().provider
+
+    await provider.register_client(
+        client_info(token_endpoint_auth_method="none", client_secret=None)
+    )
+
+    assert (await provider.get_client("c1")).token_endpoint_auth_method == "none"
+    assert await provider.get_client("unknown") is None
+
+
+async def test_client_cap_evicts_the_least_recently_used_client_without_sessions(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "MAX_CLIENTS", 3)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)  # client with a session
+    provider = oauth.provider
+    await provider.register_client(client_info("old"))
+    oauth.clock.advance(5)
+    await provider.register_client(client_info("newer"))
+    oauth.clock.advance(5)
+    await provider.get_client("old")  # used recently: "newer" is now least recently used
+    oauth.clock.advance(provider_module.PENDING_TTL)  # none of them is young any more
+
+    await provider.register_client(client_info("newest"))
+
+    assert set(provider._store.clients) == {flow.client_id, "old", "newest"}
+
+
+async def test_client_cap_refuses_when_every_client_has_a_session(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "MAX_CLIENTS", 1)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RegistrationError, match="limit"):
+        await oauth.provider.register_client(client_info("another"))
+
+
+async def test_authorize_defaults_scope_and_binds_our_resource() -> None:
+    provider = build_oauth_app().provider
+    client = client_info()
+    params = AuthorizationParams(
+        state=None,
+        scopes=None,
+        code_challenge="challenge",
+        redirect_uri=AnyUrl(REDIRECT),
+        redirect_uri_provided_explicitly=False,
+    )
+
+    location = await provider.authorize(client, params)
+
+    request_id = location.split("request=")[1]
+    pending = provider.consent_request(request_id)
+    assert pending.scopes == ["gitea"] and pending.resource == RESOURCE
+    assert pending.code_verifier not in repr(pending)
+    assert provider.consent_request("") is None
+    assert provider.begin_consent("unknown") is None
+
+
+async def test_exchange_races_and_missing_sessions_are_invalid_grant(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock,
+) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    provider = oauth.provider
+    client = await provider.get_client(flow.client_id)
+    (session_id,) = oauth.store.sessions
+    code = StoredAuthorizationCode(
+        code="never-issued",
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        expires_at=oauth.clock.now + 60,
+        client_id=flow.client_id,
+        code_challenge="x",
+        redirect_uri=AnyUrl(REDIRECT),
+        redirect_uri_provided_explicitly=True,
+        session_id=session_id,
+    )
+    stale_refresh = StoredRefreshToken(
+        token="sha256:x",
+        client_id=flow.client_id,
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        session_id=session_id,
+        token_hash="not-stored",
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(TokenError) as code_error:
+        await provider.exchange_authorization_code(client, code)
+    with pytest.raises(TokenError) as refresh_error:
+        await provider.exchange_refresh_token(client, stale_refresh, ["gitea"])
+
+    assert code_error.value.error == refresh_error.value.error == "invalid_grant"
+
+
+async def test_code_whose_session_vanished_is_invalid_grant(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+        GITEA_CODE,
+        mock_gitea_login,
+        pkce,
+        query_of,
+        register,
+        start_flow,
+    )
+
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+    callback = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+    code_value = query_of(callback.headers["location"])["code"]
+    info = await oauth.provider.get_client(registration["client_id"])
+    code = await oauth.provider.load_authorization_code(info, code_value)
+    oauth.store.sessions.clear()
+
+    with pytest.raises(TokenError):
+        await oauth.provider.exchange_authorization_code(info, code)
+
+
+async def test_load_helpers_ignore_foreign_tokens(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    provider = oauth.provider
+    client = await provider.get_client(flow.client_id)
+
+    assert await provider.load_refresh_token(client, "not-ours") is None
+    assert await provider.load_refresh_token(client, flow.tokens["access_token"]) is None
+    assert await provider.load_access_token("not-ours") is None
+    assert await provider.load_access_token(flow.tokens["refresh_token"]) is None
+    assert await OAuthTokenVerifier(provider).verify_token("static-bearer") is None
+    access = await OAuthTokenVerifier(provider).verify_token(flow.tokens["access_token"])
+    assert access is not None
+    assert access.subject == "alice" and access.resource == RESOURCE
+    assert flow.tokens["access_token"] not in repr(access)
+    oauth.store.sessions.clear()
+    assert await provider.load_access_token(flow.tokens["access_token"]) is None
+    assert await provider.load_refresh_token(client, flow.tokens["refresh_token"]) is None
+
+
+async def test_revoking_tokens_without_a_session_is_a_no_op(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+
+    await oauth.provider.revoke_token(AccessToken(token="t", client_id="c", scopes=[]))
+    await oauth.provider.revoke_token(RefreshToken(token="t", client_id="c", scopes=[]))
+
+    assert len(oauth.store.sessions) == 1
+
+
+async def test_sessions_per_login_are_capped(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock
+) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "MAX_SESSIONS_PER_LOGIN", 2)
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    first = sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+    oauth.clock.advance(1)
+    sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+    oauth.clock.advance(1)
+    sign_in(client, httpx_mock)
+
+    assert len(oauth.store.sessions) == 2
+    assert await oauth.provider.load_access_token(first.tokens["access_token"]) is None
+
+
+async def test_callback_for_an_evicted_client_is_refused(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    from tests.test_oauth_helpers import GITEA_CODE, pkce, query_of, register, start_flow
+
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    oauth.store.clients.clear()
+
+    response = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+
+
+async def test_session_save_failure_redirects_server_error(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+        CLIENT_STATE,
+        GITEA_CODE,
+        mock_gitea_login,
+        pkce,
+        query_of,
+        register,
+        start_flow,
+    )
+
+    oauth = build_oauth_app()
+    client = browser(oauth.app)
+    registration = register(client).json()
+    gitea_url = start_flow(client, registration, pkce()[1])
+    mock_gitea_login(httpx_mock)
+
+    async def broken_save() -> None:
+        raise OSError("disk full")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(oauth.store, "save", broken_save)
+    response = client.get(
+        "/oauth/callback", params={"code": GITEA_CODE, "state": query_of(gitea_url)["state"]}
+    )
+
+    assert query_of(response.headers["location"]) == {
+        "error": "server_error",
+        "state": CLIENT_STATE,
+    }
+    assert oauth.store.sessions == {}
+
+
+async def test_audit_failures_are_logged(
+    httpx_mock: HTTPXMock, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    class BrokenAudit:
+        def log_security_event(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+            raise RuntimeError("audit down")
+
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(audit=BrokenAudit())  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+    sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+
+    assert "audit log write failed: RuntimeError" in caplog.text

tests/test_oauth_resolver.py

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+"""Tests for the OAuth identity resolver: no mix-up between identities, upstream refresh."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from mcp.server.auth.provider import AccessToken
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.auth import STATIC_CLIENT_ID
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.errors import ToolError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.identity import Identity
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.resolver import (
+    OAUTH_ONLY,
+    SIGN_IN_AGAIN,
+    OAuthIdentityResolver,
+)
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import OAuthStore, SessionRecord, TokenRecord
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.upstream import UpstreamError, UpstreamInvalidGrant, UpstreamTokens
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    GITEA_TOKEN,
+    USER_REFRESH,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    FakeClock,
+    oauth_settings,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+class FakeUpstream:
+    """Stands in for GiteaUpstream.refresh."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *outcomes: UpstreamTokens | Exception, delay: float = 0.0) -> None:
+        self.outcomes = list(outcomes)
+        self.calls: list[str] = []
+        self.delay = delay
+
+    async def refresh(self, refresh_token: str) -> UpstreamTokens:
+        self.calls.append(refresh_token)
+        if self.delay:
+            await asyncio.sleep(self.delay)
+        outcome = self.outcomes.pop(0)
+        if isinstance(outcome, Exception):
+            raise outcome
+        return outcome
+
+
+class FakeAdmin:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.seen: list[AccessToken | None] = []
+
+    async def resolve(self, access: AccessToken | None) -> Identity:
+        self.seen.append(access)
+        return Identity(login="root", mode="admin-token", token=GITEA_TOKEN)
+
+
+def make_store(tmp_path: Path, clock: FakeClock, **session: Any) -> OAuthStore:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY, clock)
+    values: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "session_id": "s1",
+        "client_id": "c1",
+        "login": "alice",
+        "is_admin": False,
+        "gitea_access_token": USER_TOKEN,
+        "gitea_refresh_token": USER_REFRESH,
+        "gitea_expires_at": clock.now + 3600,
+        "scopes": ["gitea"],
+        "resource": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+        "created_at": clock.now,
+    }
+    values.update(session)
+    store.sessions["s1"] = SessionRecord(**values)
+    store.tokens["h"] = TokenRecord("access", "s1", "c1", ["gitea"], clock.now + 3600)
+    return store
+
+
+def oauth_access(session_id: Any = "s1", subject: str = "alice", **claims: Any) -> AccessToken:
+    return AccessToken(
+        token="sha256:x",
+        client_id="c1",
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        subject=subject,
+        claims={"auth": "oauth", "session_id": session_id, **claims},
+    )
+
+
+STATIC = AccessToken(token="static", client_id=STATIC_CLIENT_ID, scopes=["gitea"])
+
+
+def resolver(
+    store: OAuthStore, upstream: Any = None, admin: Any = None, clock: Any = None
+) -> OAuthIdentityResolver:
+    return OAuthIdentityResolver(
+        store, upstream or FakeUpstream(), admin, clock=clock or FakeClock()
+    )
+
+
+async def test_oauth_token_resolves_to_the_session_user(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    identity = await resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert (identity.login, identity.mode, identity.token) == ("alice", "oauth", USER_TOKEN)
+    assert identity.redact == (USER_REFRESH,)
+    assert USER_TOKEN not in repr(identity) and USER_REFRESH not in repr(identity)
+    assert identity.metadata() == {"login": "alice", "mode": "oauth", "sudo": None}
+
+
+async def test_static_bearer_and_no_token_go_to_the_admin_resolver(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    admin = FakeAdmin()
+    subject = resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), admin=admin, clock=clock)
+
+    assert (await subject.resolve(STATIC)).mode == "admin-token"
+    assert (await subject.resolve(None)).mode == "admin-token"
+    assert admin.seen == [STATIC, None]
+
+
+async def test_oauth_only_deployment_fails_closed_for_admin_mode(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    subject = resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), admin=None, clock=clock)
+
+    for access in (STATIC, None):
+        with pytest.raises(ToolError) as caught:
+            await subject.resolve(access)
+        assert caught.value.detail == OAUTH_ONLY and caught.value.status_code == 401
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "access",
+    [
+        AccessToken(token="t", client_id="some-client", scopes=["gitea"]),
+        AccessToken(token="t", client_id="some-client", scopes=["gitea"], claims={"auth": "x"}),
+        oauth_access(session_id=None),
+        oauth_access(session_id=5),
+    ],
+)
+async def test_unknown_token_kinds_never_reach_the_admin(
+    tmp_path: Path, access: AccessToken
+) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    admin = FakeAdmin()
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="unknown identity"):
+        await resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), admin=admin, clock=clock).resolve(access)
+    assert admin.seen == []
+
+
+async def test_oauth_marker_on_a_static_client_id_still_needs_a_session(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """A token claiming OAuth is never treated as the static bearer."""
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    admin = FakeAdmin()
+    forged = AccessToken(
+        token="t",
+        client_id=STATIC_CLIENT_ID,
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        subject="alice",
+        claims={"auth": "oauth", "session_id": "missing"},
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="sign in again"):
+        await resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), admin=admin, clock=clock).resolve(forged)
+    assert admin.seen == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("session_id", "subject"), [("gone", "alice"), ("s1", "mallory")])
+async def test_ended_session_or_subject_mismatch_means_sign_in_again(
+    tmp_path: Path, session_id: str, subject: str
+) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    admin = FakeAdmin()
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError) as caught:
+        await resolver(make_store(tmp_path, clock), admin=admin, clock=clock).resolve(
+            oauth_access(session_id, subject)
+        )
+
+    assert caught.value.detail == SIGN_IN_AGAIN and caught.value.status_code == 401
+    assert admin.seen == []
+
+
+async def test_token_without_expiry_is_never_refreshed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream()
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=None)
+
+    await resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert upstream.calls == []
+
+
+async def test_refresh_keeps_the_old_refresh_token_when_gitea_sends_none(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(UpstreamTokens("new-access", None, clock.now + 3600))
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+
+    identity = await resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert identity.token == "new-access"
+    assert store.sessions["s1"].gitea_refresh_token == USER_REFRESH
+    reloaded = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY, clock)
+    assert reloaded.sessions["s1"].gitea_access_token == "new-access"
+
+
+async def test_concurrent_calls_refresh_once(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(
+        UpstreamTokens("new-access", "new-refresh", clock.now + 3600), delay=0.01
+    )
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+    subject = resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock)
+
+    identities = await asyncio.gather(*(subject.resolve(oauth_access()) for _ in range(5)))
+
+    assert upstream.calls == [USER_REFRESH]
+    assert {identity.token for identity in identities} == {"new-access"}
+
+
+async def test_transient_failure_keeps_a_still_valid_token(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(UpstreamError("token request failed: HTTP 502"))
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+
+    identity = await resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert identity.token == USER_TOKEN
+    assert "s1" in store.sessions
+
+
+async def test_transient_failure_with_an_expired_token_is_retryable(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(UpstreamError("token request failed: HTTP 502"))
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now - 10)
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError) as caught:
+        await resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert caught.value.status_code == 503
+    assert "s1" in store.sessions
+
+
+async def test_invalid_grant_ends_the_session_and_its_tokens(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(UpstreamInvalidGrant("Gitea rejected the grant"))
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+    admin = FakeAdmin()
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="sign in again"):
+        await resolver(store, upstream, admin=admin, clock=clock).resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert store.sessions == {} and store.tokens == {}
+    assert admin.seen == []
+    assert OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, ENCRYPTION_KEY, clock).sessions == {}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(("offset", "survives"), [(30.0, True), (-30.0, False)])
+async def test_no_refresh_token(tmp_path: Path, offset: float, survives: bool) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    store = make_store(
+        tmp_path, clock, gitea_refresh_token=None, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + offset
+    )
+    subject = resolver(store, FakeUpstream(), clock=clock)
+
+    if survives:
+        assert (await subject.resolve(oauth_access())).token == USER_TOKEN
+    else:
+        with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="sign in again"):
+            await subject.resolve(oauth_access())
+    assert ("s1" in store.sessions) is survives
+
+
+async def test_session_ended_while_waiting_for_the_refresh_lock(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+    subject = resolver(store, FakeUpstream(), clock=clock)
+    lock = subject._locks.setdefault("s1", asyncio.Lock())
+
+    async with lock:
+        task = asyncio.ensure_future(subject.resolve(oauth_access()))
+        await asyncio.sleep(0)
+        store.end_session("s1")
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError, match="sign in again"):
+        await task
+
+
+async def test_save_failures_are_logged_not_raised(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+
+    async def broken_save() -> None:
+        raise OSError("disk full")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store, "save", broken_save)
+    upstream = FakeUpstream(
+        UpstreamTokens("new-access", None, clock.now + 3600), UpstreamInvalidGrant("x")
+    )
+    subject = resolver(store, upstream, clock=clock)
+
+    assert (await subject.resolve(oauth_access())).token == "new-access"
+    store.sessions["s1"].gitea_expires_at = clock.now + 10
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError):
+        await subject.resolve(oauth_access())
+
+    assert "could not save the refreshed Gitea token" in caplog.text
+    assert "could not save the OAuth store" in caplog.text
+
+
+async def test_audit_failure_does_not_block_ending_a_session(
+    tmp_path: Path, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    store = make_store(tmp_path, clock, gitea_expires_at=clock.now + 10)
+
+    class BrokenAudit:
+        def log_security_event(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+            raise RuntimeError("audit down")
+
+    subject = OAuthIdentityResolver(
+        store,
+        FakeUpstream(UpstreamInvalidGrant("x")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        None,
+        clock=clock,
+        audit=BrokenAudit(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(ToolError):
+        await subject.resolve(oauth_access())
+    assert store.sessions == {}
+    assert "audit log write failed: RuntimeError" in caplog.text
+
+
+async def test_executor_redacts_session_secrets(httpx_mock: Any) -> None:
+    executor = GiteaExecutor(oauth_settings(), extra_secrets=[ENCRYPTION_KEY])
+    httpx_mock.add_response(
+        url="https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/version",
+        json={"a": USER_REFRESH, "b": ENCRYPTION_KEY, "c": USER_TOKEN},
+    )
+    identity = Identity(login="alice", mode="oauth", token=USER_TOKEN, redact=(USER_REFRESH,))
+
+    outcome = await executor.request("GET", "/version", identity)
+    await executor.aclose()
+
+    assert outcome.payload["data"] == {"a": "[REDACTED]", "b": "[REDACTED]", "c": "[REDACTED]"}

tests/test_oauth_startup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+"""Startup and wiring of per-user OAuth: OAuth-only deployments, store failures, log hygiene."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp import transports
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.gitea import GiteaExecutor
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import OAuthSetupError
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth import components as components_module
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.components import RATE_LIMITED_PATHS, build_oauth_components
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import STORE_FILENAME
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.transports import AccessLogQueryFilter, http_startup_errors, run_http
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    API,
+    BEARER_TOKEN,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    gitea_requests,
+    mcp_client,
+    oauth_settings,
+    payload,
+    sign_in,
+)
+from tests.test_server_helpers import ANY_HOST
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+class UvicornSpy:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.calls: list[tuple[Any, dict[str, Any]]] = []
+
+    def __call__(self, app: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        self.calls.append((app, kwargs))
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def uvicorn_spy(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> UvicornSpy:
+    spy = UvicornSpy()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(transports.uvicorn, "run", spy)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access"), "filters", [])
+    return spy
+
+
+def oauth_only(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
+    return oauth_settings(gitea_token=None, mcp_bearer_token=None, **overrides)
+
+
+def test_oauth_only_deployment_starts_on_a_public_bind(uvicorn_spy: UvicornSpy) -> None:
+    assert run_http(oauth_only(mcp_host=ANY_HOST)) == 0
+
+    assert len(uvicorn_spy.calls) == 1
+    assert (
+        http_startup_errors(oauth_only(mcp_host=ANY_HOST), build_oauth_components(oauth_only()))
+        == []
+    )
+
+
+def test_oauth_with_a_bearer_but_no_gitea_token_is_refused(
+    uvicorn_spy: UvicornSpy, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    assert run_http(oauth_settings(gitea_token=None)) == 2
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "GITEA_TOKEN is required" in err and "unset MCP_BEARER_TOKEN" in err
+    assert uvicorn_spy.calls == []
+
+
+def test_undecryptable_store_stops_startup_and_keeps_the_file(
+    tmp_path: Path, uvicorn_spy: UvicornSpy, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
+) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).write_bytes(b"garbage")
+
+    assert run_http(oauth_settings(data_dir=tmp_path)) == 2
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    assert "per-user OAuth cannot start: cannot decrypt" in err
+    assert (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes() == b"garbage"
+    assert uvicorn_spy.calls == []
+
+
+def test_unreadable_store_directory_is_a_setup_error(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    def denied(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        raise PermissionError("denied")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(components_module.OAuthStore, "load", denied)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthSetupError, match="cannot read the OAuth token store"):
+        build_oauth_components(oauth_settings())
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "settings",
+    [
+        {"oauth_enabled": False},
+        {"gitea_oauth_client_secret": None},
+    ],
+)
+def test_components_need_a_complete_oauth_configuration(settings: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthSetupError):
+        build_oauth_components(oauth_settings(**settings))
+
+
+def test_http_public_base_url_is_refused_for_oauth() -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings().model_copy(update={"public_base_url": "http://mcp.example.com"})
+
+    errors = http_startup_errors(settings, build_oauth_components(oauth_settings()))
+
+    assert errors == ["PUBLIC_BASE_URL must use https unless the host is loopback"]
+
+
+def test_loopback_http_public_base_url_is_allowed() -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings(public_base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080")
+
+    assert http_startup_errors(settings, build_oauth_components(settings)) == []
+
+
+def test_components_wiring() -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings()
+    extras = build_oauth_components(settings)
+
+    assert isinstance(extras.executor, GiteaExecutor)
+    assert extras.rate_limited_paths == RATE_LIMITED_PATHS
+    paths = {route.path for route in extras.extra_routes}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    assert paths == {"/oauth/consent", "/oauth/callback", "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"}
+    assert extras.client_registration_options is not None
+    assert extras.client_registration_options.default_scopes == ["gitea"]
+    assert extras.revocation_options is not None and extras.revocation_options.enabled
+    assert extras.resolver._admin is not None  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    assert build_oauth_components(oauth_only()).resolver._admin is None  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+
+
+async def test_oauth_only_app_serves_users_and_has_no_admin_path(httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(oauth_only())
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock)
+    httpx_mock.add_response(url=f"{API}/repos/octo/demo", json={"full_name": "octo/demo"})
+
+    async with mcp_client(oauth.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) as mcp:
+        result = await mcp.call_tool("gitea_repo_get", {"owner": "octo", "repo": "demo"})
+
+    assert payload(result)["identity"]["mode"] == "oauth"
+    (request,) = gitea_requests(httpx_mock, f"{API}/repos")
+    assert request.headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {USER_TOKEN}"
+    rejected = browser(oauth.app).post(
+        "/mcp", json={}, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {BEARER_TOKEN}"}
+    )
+    assert rejected.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_access_log_filter_drops_query_strings() -> None:
+    record = logging.LogRecord(
+        "uvicorn.access",
+        logging.INFO,
+        __file__,
+        1,
+        '%s - "%s %s HTTP/%s" %d',
+        ("1.2.3.4:5", "GET", "/oauth/callback?code=secret-code&state=secret-state", "1.1", 302),
+        None,
+    )
+    plain = logging.LogRecord(
+        "uvicorn.access", logging.INFO, __file__, 1, "%s", ("no query",), None
+    )
+
+    assert AccessLogQueryFilter().filter(record) is True
+    assert AccessLogQueryFilter().filter(plain) is True
+
+    message = record.getMessage()
+    assert "secret" not in message
+    assert '"GET /oauth/callback?[redacted] HTTP/1.1" 302' in message
+    assert plain.getMessage() == "no query"
+
+
+def test_run_http_installs_the_access_log_filter_once(uvicorn_spy: UvicornSpy) -> None:
+    run_http(oauth_settings())
+    run_http(oauth_settings())
+
+    filters = logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").filters
+    assert sum(isinstance(item, AccessLogQueryFilter) for item in filters) == 1

tests/test_oauth_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+"""Tests for the encrypted OAuth store: file safety, encryption at rest, refusal modes, restart."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
+from pytest_httpx import HTTPXMock
+
+from aegis_gitea_mcp.oauth.store import (
+    STORE_FILENAME,
+    OAuthStore,
+    OAuthStoreError,
+    SessionRecord,
+    TokenRecord,
+    derive_fernet_key,
+    token_hash,
+)
+from tests.test_oauth_helpers import (
+    APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+    ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+    USER_REFRESH,
+    USER_TOKEN,
+    FakeClock,
+    browser,
+    build_oauth_app,
+    mcp_status_lifespan,
+    oauth_settings,
+    sign_in,
+)
+
+KEY = ENCRYPTION_KEY
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _env(mock_env: None) -> None:
+    """The audit logger reads the process-wide settings."""
+
+
+def session(session_id: str = "s1", *, created_at: float = 0.0) -> SessionRecord:
+    return SessionRecord(
+        session_id=session_id,
+        client_id="c1",
+        login="alice",
+        is_admin=False,
+        gitea_access_token=USER_TOKEN,
+        gitea_refresh_token=USER_REFRESH,
+        gitea_expires_at=None,
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        resource="https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+        created_at=created_at,
+    )
+
+
+def token(session_id: str = "s1", expires_at: float = 10_000.0) -> TokenRecord:
+    return TokenRecord(
+        kind="access",
+        session_id=session_id,
+        client_id="c1",
+        scopes=["gitea"],
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+    )
+
+
+def test_key_derivation_is_hkdf_sha256_with_the_documented_info() -> None:
+    expected = HKDF(
+        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None, info=b"aegis-gitea-mcp oauth store"
+    ).derive(KEY.encode())
+
+    assert derive_fernet_key(KEY) == base64.urlsafe_b64encode(expected)
+    assert derive_fernet_key(KEY) != derive_fernet_key(KEY + "x")
+
+
+async def test_file_and_directory_permissions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state" / "nested"
+    store = OAuthStore.load(directory, KEY)
+    store.sessions["s1"] = session(created_at=1e12)
+
+    await store.save()
+
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(directory.stat().st_mode) == 0o700
+    assert stat.S_IMODE((directory / STORE_FILENAME).stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    assert [p.name for p in directory.iterdir()] == [STORE_FILENAME]  # no temp file left
+
+
+async def test_existing_loose_directory_is_tightened(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir(mode=0o755)
+    directory.chmod(0o755)
+
+    await OAuthStore.load(directory, KEY).save()
+
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(directory.stat().st_mode) == 0o700
+
+
+async def test_loose_file_permissions_are_restricted_on_load(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+    await store.save()
+    path = tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME
+    path.chmod(0o644)
+
+    OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+
+
+async def test_contents_are_encrypted_at_rest(tmp_path: Path, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    oauth = build_oauth_app(oauth_settings(data_dir=tmp_path))
+    flow = sign_in(browser(oauth.app), httpx_mock, login="alice-the-user")
+
+    raw = (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes()
+
+    for secret in (
+        USER_TOKEN,
+        USER_REFRESH,
+        flow.client_secret,
+        flow.client_id,
+        flow.tokens["access_token"],
+        flow.tokens["refresh_token"],
+        "alice-the-user",
+        APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        KEY,
+    ):
+        assert secret.encode() not in raw
+    plain = Fernet(derive_fernet_key(KEY)).decrypt(raw).decode()
+    assert USER_TOKEN in plain and flow.client_secret in plain
+    # Our own tokens are stored only as hashes.
+    assert flow.tokens["access_token"] not in plain
+    assert token_hash(flow.tokens["access_token"]) in plain
+
+
+async def test_state_survives_a_restart(tmp_path: Path, httpx_mock: HTTPXMock) -> None:
+    settings = oauth_settings(data_dir=tmp_path)
+    first = build_oauth_app(settings)
+    flow = sign_in(browser(first.app), httpx_mock)
+
+    second = build_oauth_app(settings)
+
+    assert mcp_status_lifespan(second.app, flow.tokens["access_token"]) != 401
+    assert flow.client_id in second.store.clients
+
+
+def test_symlinked_store_is_refused(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "elsewhere.json"
+    target.write_bytes(b"x")
+    os.symlink(target, tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="symlink"):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+
+async def test_symlink_swapped_in_at_runtime_is_refused_on_write(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+    os.symlink(tmp_path / "elsewhere.json", tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="symlink"):
+        await store.save()
+    assert not (tmp_path / "elsewhere.json").exists()
+
+
+def test_non_regular_store_path_is_refused(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).mkdir()
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="not a regular file"):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+
+async def test_wrong_key_refuses_to_start_and_keeps_the_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+    store.sessions["s1"] = session(created_at=1e12)
+    await store.save()
+    before = (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes()
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY") as caught:
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, "another-key-0123456789abcdef0123456789")
+
+    assert KEY not in str(caught.value)
+    assert (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).read_bytes() == before
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "document",
+    [
+        b"not json",
+        b"[]",
+        b'{"version": 2}',
+        b'{"version": 1, "clients": []}',
+        b'{"version": 1, "sessions": {"s": {"unexpected": 1}}}',
+        b'{"version": 1, "clients": {"c": {"info": [], "registered_at": 0, "last_used_at": 0}}}',
+        b'{"version": 1, "tokens": {"h": {"kind": "other", "session_id": "s", "client_id": "c",'
+        b' "scopes": [], "expires_at": 1}}}',
+    ],
+)
+def test_corrupt_document_refuses_to_start(tmp_path: Path, document: bytes) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).write_bytes(Fernet(derive_fernet_key(KEY)).encrypt(document))
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="not a valid OAuth store"):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+
+def test_garbage_file_refuses_to_start(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    (tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME).write_bytes(b"garbage")
+
+    with pytest.raises(OAuthStoreError, match="cannot decrypt"):
+        OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+
+async def test_prune_drops_expired_tokens_and_dead_sessions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    clock = FakeClock()
+    clock.now = 5_000.0
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY, clock)
+    store.sessions["live"] = session("live", created_at=0.0)
+    store.sessions["expired"] = session("expired", created_at=0.0)
+    store.sessions["fresh"] = session("fresh", created_at=4_900.0)  # sign-in in progress
+    store.sessions["abandoned"] = session("abandoned", created_at=0.0)
+    store.tokens["a"] = token("live", expires_at=6_000.0)
+    store.tokens["b"] = token("expired", expires_at=4_000.0)
+
+    await store.save()
+    reloaded = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY, clock)
+
+    assert set(reloaded.tokens) == {"a"}
+    assert set(reloaded.sessions) == {"live", "fresh"}
+
+
+def test_store_helpers(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+    store.sessions["s1"] = session("s1")
+    store.sessions["s2"] = session("s2")
+    store.sessions["s2"].previous_refresh_hash = "abc"
+    store.tokens["t1"] = token("s1")
+
+    assert store.path == tmp_path / STORE_FILENAME
+    assert [item.session_id for item in store.sessions_of("alice")] == ["s1", "s2"]
+    assert store.session_by_previous_refresh("abc") is store.sessions["s2"]
+    assert store.session_by_previous_refresh("nope") is None
+    assert store.client_has_sessions("c1") and not store.client_has_sessions("c2")
+    assert store.end_session("s1") is True
+    assert store.tokens == {} and store.end_session("s1") is False
+    assert USER_TOKEN not in repr(store.sessions["s2"])
+    assert USER_REFRESH not in repr(store.sessions["s2"])
+
+
+async def test_failed_write_leaves_no_temporary_file(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    store = OAuthStore.load(tmp_path, KEY)
+
+    def boom(src: object, dst: object) -> None:
+        raise OSError("disk full")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(os, "replace", boom)
+    with pytest.raises(OSError, match="disk full"):
+        await store.save()
+
+    assert list(tmp_path.iterdir()) == []
+
+
+async def test_directory_tightening_failure_only_warns(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    directory = tmp_path / "state"
+    directory.mkdir()
+    directory.chmod(0o755)
+
+    def refuse(self: Path, mode: int) -> None:
+        raise PermissionError("not owner")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "chmod", refuse)
+    await OAuthStore.load(directory, KEY).save()
+
+    assert "could not restrict" in caplog.text